Free Reply in Support of Motion - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Ernest Calderón (#007677) Faith C. Klepper (#018444) CALDERÓN LAW OFFICES 2020 N. Central Ave., Suite 1100 Phoenix, AZ 85004 (602) 265-0004

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA JOYCE A. CORRALES, Plaintiff, vs. CHASE BANKCARD SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, d/b/a Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Defendant. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Assigned to the Honorable Susan R. Bolton) (Oral Argument Requested) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), Defendant Chase BankCard Services, No. CIV 02-2157-PHX-SRB

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Inc., hereby replies to Plaintiff Joyce A. Corrales' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and requests this Court grant Defendant's Motion because Plaintiff's Response failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support her claims. Defendant also requests sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 56(g) for submitting an affidavit in bad faith. This motion is supported by the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities incorporated herein. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 2006.

23

CALDERÓN LAW OFFICES
24 25 26

___s/Faith C. Klepper__________________ Ernest Calderón Faith C. Klepper
1

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 1 of 15

1 2

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. Standard for Granting Summary Judgment In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries the burden of production, in

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

which it must produce evidence negating an element of the claim or show that the non-moving party does not have sufficient evidence to meet its burden at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2000). Once that burden has been met, it is incumbent upon the non-movant party to rebut the evidence negating elements of the claim. "The opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations or mere assertions, but must come forward with significant probative evidence." Dugger v. Oregon Restaurant Services, Inc., 2006 WL 782475, *1 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2006). [Emphasis added.]

12 13 14 15 16 17

II.

Additional Factual Background Chase Bright was an employee of JPMorgan Chase & Co. in the Employee Relations

Department who had no supervisory authority over Retention Department employee Joyce Corrales or any authority to hire or fire her. Defendant's Separate Statements of Fact

("DSSOF"), Exhibit 4 at ¶4. Mr. Bright could only report the findings of his investigation and
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

any recommendation he may have based upon the information he had obtained to his supervisor and to the Human Resources Department, who would be involved in employment decisions. Id. at ¶5. Mr. Bright asked only appropriate and relevant questions. Id. at ¶7. Male witnesses were interviewed in the same and similar manner to Plaintiff. Id. at Exhibit 4A at CBSJC0100. Plaintiff was reluctant to answer Mr. Bright's questions because she thought she was under investigation for comments she made to Brooke King. Id. at ¶9. Any personal, humiliating or immaterial information she may have provided to Mr. Bright was done because she felt she

26

had to defend herself from sexual harassment charges and put the blame on Mrs. King. Plaintiff's
2

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 2 of 15

1 2 3 4

Separate Statement of Fact ("PSSOF"), Exhibit 1A at 218:1-3. Mr. Bright never explicitly or implicitly threatened Plaintiff with any tangible employment action if she did not answer his questions. Defendant's Reply to PSSOF ("Reply") at ¶18. After Plaintiff resigned, she was "okay when [she] found out that [Mrs. King] didn't file

5 6 7 8 9 10

some charge against [her]." Reply at ¶12. After she found out she was not the target of the investigation, Plaintiff "felt better" and "wanted to go [back] to work." Id. She did not allege her ability to do her job suffered as a result of her earlier interactions with Mr. Bright or her supervisors. Id. III. Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment. A. The "law of the case" argument is inapplicable here.

11 12 13 14 15 16

Plaintiff attempts to bolster her factually unsupported sexual harassment claim by arguing that the Court of Appeals decision on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is the "law of the case" that this Court cannot overturn. Such an argument defies logic. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based strictly on the pleadings. No additional evidence is provided to the Court because the nature of the Rule

17

12 motion is to determine whether the allegations in the pleadings are sufficient to proceed.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1

A Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, however, differs from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it permits and indeed encourages the submission of supporting evidence beyond the four corners of the pleadings to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations in the Complaint.1 Thus, there is no "law of the case" that prevents this Court from reviewing the evidence discovered after the pleadings have been reviewed. The only evidence

"The very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, comment to subdivision (c).
3

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 3 of 15

1 2 3 4

regarding the alleged "aggravating circumstances" in the Complaint shows that allegation to be completely false. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she complained about the alleged

harassment to her supervisors and they told her they could do nothing about it. However, at her deposition, Plaintiff admitted she never informed her supervisors of her allegations. Thus, there

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

are no "aggravating circumstances" as previously suggested by the Court of Appeals in its review of the bare allegations in the pleading. Plaintiff provides nothing to support these alleged aggravating circumstances except for the allegedly forged declaration that contradicts her previous sworn testimony. Generally, a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting her prior deposition testimony. Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). "[I]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit

13

contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact." Id. Plaintiff submits a sham declaration here claiming she complained about the interview to her supervisors which contradicts her previous sworn testimony that she didn't tell her supervisor she had a sexual harassment complaint to make. PSSOF, Exhibit 1 at ¶ 11. In addition to its contradictory nature, the statement was not signed by Corrales or read by her is incompetent to support any of the Plaintiff's separate statements of fact. See Defendant's Response to Motion to Withdraw and Section VI, infra. As such, Defendant has asked that the evidence be stricken

22

from the record in the Defendant's Motion to Strike. It re-urges that request below as Plaintiff
23 24 25 26

has yet to produce a single shred of evidence to rebut the claims of forgery or competency. /// ///
4

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 4 of 15

1 2 3 4

B.

Plaintiff did not suffer any interference with her job performance.

"A hostile work environment claim involves a workplace atmosphere so discriminatory and abusive that it unreasonably interferes with the job performance of those harassed." Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff failed to provide any

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

evidence to support her claim that her job performance suffered in the less-than-8-hour work period between the time of the interview and her resignation the following day. Whether Corrales felt bad about the interview afterward is not sufficient evidence from which one could conclude that her job performance actually suffered or that Mr. Bright's alleged conduct had become "a permanent fixture of the employment relationship." Id. at 924. Subjective feelings are not indicative of objective performance. Plaintiff testified that she went back to work the next day believing the incident was behind her. She has not provided a

13

single shred of evidence that her work performance actually suffered. Furthermore, she has not
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

provided any evidence that she was required to return for a second interview2 nor that she was demoted or otherwise suffered any tangible employment action as a result of the interview. Finally, Plaintiff has not provided this Court with any evidence that she was singled out for such alleged treatment because of her sex. Mr. Bright's affidavit stating that he interviewed her male co-workers in the same manner remains undisputed. Plaintiff's misinterpretation of Mr. Bright's appropriate line of questions does not equate to a legitimate claim of sexual harassment. Thus, Plaintiff has not met her burden to provide any evidence to support her claim of hostile

22

work environment sexual harassment and summary judgment for the Defendant must be granted.
23 24 25 26
2

Nor could she have proffered such evidence because she quit as soon as her supervisor notified her that Mr. Bright requested a follow-up interview. She never said one word to Ms. Mott about her allegations when this opportunity arose.
5

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 5 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

C. Like Holly D., Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of quid pro quo discrimination. Plaintiff equates her quid pro quo harassment claim to that of the plaintiff in Holly D v. Calif. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003). However, in that case as in this one, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a quid pro quo claim. In Holly D., the court upheld the trial court's finding that the plaintiff failed to provide significant probative evidence connecting her acquiescence to her supervisor's alleged harassment to any tangible employment consequence. The court found her subjective belief that the two were connected

9

was insufficient to survive summary judgment.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

The Ninth Circuit noted that in order to prove a "tangible employment action" element of the prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that when the "supervisor" threatens the employee with discharge, the employee complies with the demand "in order to avoid the threatened action." Id. at 1167. The court stated that "successful coercion depends upon the same abuse of supervisorial authority-the power, for example, to hire and fire-that ... renders the discharge a `tangible employment action.'" Id. at 1168. However, in this case, the

uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that Chase Bright did not have the power to hire or fire
18

Plaintiff. Plaintiff admits that Traci Mott, not Mr. Bright, was her supervisor. Plaintiff does not
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

provide any evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Bright had authority to change her conditions of employment or any foundation for such a belief. She merely alleges, without citation to the record or any supporting documentation, that his title suggests he was her supervisor. This supposition does not create a material issue of fact that could defeat summary judgment. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted that she believed she was the alleged harasser under investigation. In her deposition, Plaintiff admits that "that's why I told him that, because I felt if this was a complaint against me, this is stuff she [Brooke King] said too." PSSOF, Exhibit 1A at
6

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 6 of 15

1 2 3 4

218:1-3. See also Reply at ¶18. This admission, combined with the other facts that she did not notify anyone at Chase of her allegations until after she called and confronted Ms. King about the investigation, demonstrates that any private sexual conversations she told Mr. Bright about were told to him in her own defense of charges she believed she was facing.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

"In cases alleging that an employee engaged in sexual relations because her supervisor implicitly demanded that she do so as a condition of her employment, we require more than conclusory allegations that the supervisor proposed a sexual liaison and the employee responded to the overtures in order to protect her employment interests." Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1174. In Holly D., as here, the plaintiff does not contend that she was "explicitly threatened" with jobrelated consequences "nor does she assert that he ever stated, directly or indirectly that there was a connection" between his actions and "her prospects for future employment." Id. at 1163. The

13

connection between the actions of the other employee and the plaintiff were drawn only "in her
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

mind." Id. "Belief, no matter how sincere, is not equivalent to knowledge." Lark v. West, 182 F.Supp. 794, 797 (D.D.C. 1960). Plaintiff has only presented conclusory allegations that she answered Mr. Bright's questions because she thought she would be fired if she did not. However, she testified that Mr. Bright never told her, either implicitly or explicitly, that he would fire her if she didn't answer his questions. He only told her that she should cooperate with the investigation. Mr. Bright did not "ever mention any potential change in her employment

22

status." Id. at 1175. Thus, the idea that Plaintiff would be fired was only "in her mind." She,
23 24 25 26

like Holly D., has presented "unsubstantiated assertions" that are insufficient to defeat Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the quid pro quo claim.

7

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 7 of 15

1 2 3 4 5

C.

Plaintiff concedes she was not constructively discharged.

Plaintiff's Response does not address the facts Defendant presented negating Plaintiff's allegation that she was constructively discharged. "A hostile-environment constructive

discharge claim entails something more [than conduct severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the employee's employment]: A plaintiff who advances such a compound claim

6

must show working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004), citing e.g. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[U]nless conditions are beyond `ordinary' discrimination, a complaining employee is expected to remain on the job while seeking redress."). Plaintiff's Response does not provide any evidence to support a claim that her working conditions were so intolerable ­ beyond ordinary discrimination ­ that she was compelled to resign. As stated above, Plaintiff did not actually notify anyone of her allegations against Chase

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Bright nor did she provide any evidence that her job performance actually suffered beyond a vague contention that she felt upset. Regardless, she claims she was "okay" once she talked to Ms. King and learned she was not Ms. King's alleged harasser. After speaking with Ms. King, Plaintiff testified she wanted to go back to work at Chase even though she still had not notified anyone at Chase of her allegations against Mr. Bright. If her working conditions were "so intolerable" that she was compelled to quit, there should have been no reason for her to want to go back as nothing had changed between her and Chase. The only thing that had changed was

23

her belief that she might be fired for sexually harassing Ms. King.
24 25 26

It is axiomatic that a complaining employee must remain on the job while seeking redress absent such extremely intolerable working conditions. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124
8

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 8 of 15

1 2 3 4

S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004). Plaintiff did not do so, but instead voluntarily resigned her job rather than make a complaint to her supervisor or anyone at the Human Resources Department or Employee Relations Department where Mr. Bright worked. As such, Plaintiff concedes that this Court should grant Defendant's request for summary judgment on the hostile environment and

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

quid pro quo claims because she was not constructively discharged. IV. Plaintiff has produced no evidence showing she suffered any damages. Plaintiff erroneously contends that her evasive answers to questions regarding her alleged damages and her unconfirmed allegations in her initial disclosure motion are sufficient evidence of her damages. Plaintiff failed to produce any probative evidence beyond her self-serving

allegations that she has suffered any damages. She further claims that her failures to respond to
12

requests for evidence she claimed she had are insufficient to permit summary judgment.
13 14 15 16 17 18

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of proving there is no evidence of a genuine dispute of fact. Despite Plaintiff's allegations of damages in her

pleadings, she provided no evidence supporting the allegations in the initial disclosure statement or deposition even though she claimed at her deposition that such evidence existed and agreed to provide it to Defendant. Plaintiff's failure to provide Defendant or this court with any evidence

19

supporting the allegations of damages in her initial disclosure statement and to provide any
20 21 22 23 24 25 26

specific testimony supporting that allegation at her deposition demonstrates that she cannot establish the requisite foundation to support the conclusory statements made in her allegations. See Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1980). (For the purpose of a motion for summary judgment, the defendant's failure to deny the plaintiff's allegation of nonpayment constituted an admission.); see also The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co., 174 Ariz. 72, 847 P.2d 117 (App. 1992). For that reason, Defendant
9

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 9 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

has met its burden on this issue and summary judgment for failure to provide significant probative evidence of damages is appropriate. V. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a jury could award punitive damages. Plaintiff's response failed to provide any evidence sufficient to permit a jury to find that punitive damages should be awarded. In order to award punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference. This showing must be more

8

than that which would meet the threshold of a prima facie case of discrimination. "To be entitled
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

to an award of punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant `almost certainly knew that what he was doing was wrongful and subject to punishment.'" EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir.1998). The showing requires "far more than mere passivity." Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding punitive damages could be awarded in case in which employee complained of racial discrimination "more than once" to union but union repeatedly refused to file a grievance so it would not damage relations

17

with the employer's management.)
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Although Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that she is entitled to punitive damages from Chase BankCard because she alleges that Chase BankCard has "poor policies on protection from sexual harassment which discouraged reporting" and because the company did not properly train or control Mr. Bright, she does not address these issues in her Response. Nor does she rebut Defendant's claim that she has not produced a single shred of evidence to support these claims. Instead, she now claims that she should be permitted to receive punitive damages based on a different set of allegations.

26

10

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 10 of 15

1 2 3 4

First, Plaintiff now claims that punitive damages are warranted based on her unsupported allegation that Chase Bright was one of her supervisors. Defendant has provided evidence that demonstrates that Mr. Bright was not Plaintiff's supervisor. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to rebut this fact.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Additionally, she claims that her supervisor's request to her not to talk about the ongoing King investigation is evidence of egregious conduct. This argument defies logic. The

undisputed facts are that Plaintiff never told anyone before she quit her job that she wanted to make a claim of sexual harassment. Consequently, Defendant does not have the duty to

investigate a claim that Plaintiff's rights were violated to such a degree that she was forced to quit her job when Defendant was never informed or aware of such allegations before she resigned. If one were to accept Plaintiff's logic that her supervisors engaged in egregious

13

conduct by telling her they could not talk about the King investigation or by having been "too
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

busy to see her" at Plaintiff's convenience, then any employer would potentially be liable for punitive damages every time the supervisor failed to drop everything they were doing to talk to an employee in the off chance that that employee might want to discuss a civil rights violation, whether or not they were aware that the employee wanted to make that kind of allegation. This sort of claim is ridiculous on its face, especially in light of Plaintiff's failure to avail herself of the opportunity to complain to her immediate supervisor Ms. Mott when she was standing before Plaintiff, informing her of the follow up interview request. At that time, Ms.

22

Mott was available to Plaintiff if she wanted to tell her that she didn't want to go back because
23 24 25 26

she had been sexually harassed. But Plaintiff never did that and has never explained why she couldn't do something as simple as to say to Ms. Mott, "I was sexually harassed and I don't want to go back for another interview." Plaintiff never really tried to make a claim of sexual
11

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 11 of 15

1 2 3 4

harassment until after she quit and found out from Ms. King that she was not the target of the investigation. Therefore, Defendant cannot be held liable for punitive damages for failing to read Joyce Corrales' mind. She was required to notify Defendant that her rights were allegedly being

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

violated before she quit her job in order for punitive damages to even be considered. She did not do so. Therefore, this Court should grant summary judgment for the defense on this issue. VI. Plaintiff's affidavit in incompetent evidence violative of Rule 56(g). Unauthenticated documents may not be relied upon to defeat motion for summary judgment. Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474 (D.N.J.1995). Similarly, unsworn statements cannot be considered in determining the propriety of summary judgment. Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980). Rule 56(g) requires the court to order a party employing an affidavit made in bad faith to pay reasonable expenses, including

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

attorneys' fees, to the other party "should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith." In support of her Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presented this Court with an affidavit purportedly drafted or read and signed by Joyce Corrales as Exhibit 1 to her Separate Statements of Fact. However, prior to filing this affidavit, Plaintiff's counsel Mark Brinton filed a motion to withdraw in which he stated that he believed the signature on that affidavit to be that of his paralegal Roger McKee and not Joyce Corrales.

22

Attached to Mr. Brinton's motion was a typewritten letter (purportedly from Ms. Corrales) in
23 24 25 26

which she states that she "glanced" at "that paper" but doesn't recall what it was. Ms. Corrales goes on to ask Mr. Brinton if there was anything wrong with "that paper."

12

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 12 of 15

1 2 3 4

This correspondence and motion from Mr. Brinton (whose suspicions are confirmed in Chase's response to the motion to withdraw) indicate that the alleged affidavit was neither read nor signed by Joyce Corrales. An affidavit provided in support of a motion for summary judgment or response must be made on personal knowledge and show that the affiant is

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

competent to testify to the matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e). A statement signed by someone else or signed without being read sufficiently to know what "that paper" is does not meet the standards set forth in the rule. Moreover, a cursory review of the affidavit shows that it was mostly copied from the Complaint itself, retaining even portions of the Complaint that are clearly not within Joyce Corrales' personal knowledge. For example, Plaintiff retains her hearsay allegation from the Complaint about a conversation between Ms. King and Mr. Bright about which she had no personal knowledge. (See Declaration of Joyce Corrales at ¶5.) These

13

incompetent and contradictory statements, combined with the question of the signature's
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

authenticity, shows that this affidavit is not evidence upon which this Court may rely to rebut Defendant's statements of fact. For that reason, Plaintiff should not have filed the incompetent affidavit when such defects were known and correctable prior to its filing. Plaintiff took an additional week beyond the deadline to respond, without a request for an extension of time, to file the Response and Separate Statements of Fact. Yet, Plaintiff did not make use of that time to correct the known defects in its "evidence." This failure shows that the affidavit is not only incompetent evidence,

22

but evidence submitted in bad faith. Therefore, this Court should strike the affidavit of Joyce
23 24 25 26

Corrales from the record and order Plaintiff to pay Defendant's reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, for defending against this forgery.

13

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 13 of 15

1 2 3 4 5

VII.

Conclusion Chase Bright did not commit any improper conduct in this case and Plaintiff has no

evidence to corroborate her allegations. All competent evidence in this matter demonstrates that Plaintiff was not sexually harassed and was never compelled to resign her position with Chase Bankcard Services. Defendant requests that this Court grant summary judgment on Plaintiff's

6

claims of sexual harassment and dismiss this case with prejudice. In the alternative, if this court
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendant's vicarious liability for Mr. Bright's alleged conduct, then Defendant requests that this Court grant partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's punitive damages claim. Finally, Defendant requests all reasonable sanctions be imposed against Plaintiff in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 2006. CALDERÓN LAW OFFICES

______s/Faith C. Klepper__________ Ernest Calderón Faith C. Klepper Attorneys for Defendant Chase BankCard Services, Inc.

14

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 14 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ORIGINAL of the foregoing electronically filed this 4th day of August 2006, with: Clerk of the Court United States District Court District of Arizona COPY of the foregoing mailed this 4th day of August, 2006, to: The Honorable Susan R. Bolton Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 522 401 West Washington Street, SPC 50 Phoenix, AZ 85003-2153

Mark Brinton 1745 South Alma School Road, Suite 100 Mesa, Arizona 85210-3010 Attorney for Plaintiff

s/Faith C. Klepper
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

15

Case 2:02-cv-02157-SRB

Document 83

Filed 08/04/2006

Page 15 of 15