Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Shannon Michael Clark, Plaintiff, vs. ValueOptions, Inc., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. CV 03-1344-PHX-EHC (HCE) ORDER

Plaintiff Shannon Michael Clark filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983 alleging that Karen Marshall and Dr. Thomas Crumbley were deliberately indifferent
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to his medical needs and committed state law medical malpractice (Doc. #53). Before this
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Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Disposition and Summary Judgment (Docs. ##
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266, 267, 288, 289) and Plaintiff's Motions to Stay, for Relief from District Court's Order,
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and for Summary Judgment (Docs. ## 258, 272, 284). The Court will grant Defendants
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summary judgment, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, deny the remaining
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motions, and dismiss the instant action.
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I. Background
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Plaintiff has a history of mental illness, including suicide attempts, self-mutilation,
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severe mood swings and irrational behavior (Doc. #53). Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar
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disorder (severe and mixed), polysubstance dependence (full remission in a controlled
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environment), antisocial personality disorder, and borderline personality disorder (Doc. #62,
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ex. 2). When out of custody, Plaintiff often self-medicated with illegal drugs (Doc. #62, ex.
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4; Doc. #259). In August 2002, Plaintiff was incarcerated by the Arizona Department of
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Case 2:03-cv-01344-EHC-HCE

Document 298

Filed 03/23/2007

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Corrections (ADC) (Doc. #259). Prior to Plaintiff's release from ADC, ValueOptions, Inc. conducted a mental health evaluation of Plaintiff that included an Adult Intake Assessment completed by Marshall (Doc. #53; Doc. #58, ex.1; Doc. #259). Several days later, Crumbley reviewed the assessment and determined that Plaintiff did not qualify for the state Seriously Mentally Ill (SMI) program, which provides for case management, housing support, crisis intervention, psychiatric residential treatment, behavioral health programs, and prevention services (Id.). Plaintiff contended that less than 45 days prior to his initial evaluation, he was having mental health problems and the impulse to harm himself (Doc. #259). Plaintiff was released from ADC custody on September 1, 2002, with only 10 days worth of psychiatric medications (Doc. #53; Doc. #259). On September 8, 2002, Plaintiff contacted ValueOptions seeking a refill (Id.). An appointment was scheduled to assist Plaintiff with filling out an application for food stamps and a referral to a substance abuse program (Doc. #263). But in the interim Plaintiff began to self-medicate and, in order to pay for street drugs, committed burglaries, resulting in another sentence in ADC custody for two counts of second degree burglary (Doc. #259). In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that (1) Marshall was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's mental health needs in preparing documents for Plaintiff to receive mental health services following his release from prison; and (2) Crumbley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's mental health needs in determining that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for receiving mental health services following his release from prison1 (Doc. #53). Plaintiff also alleged that Marshall and Crumbley committed state law medical malpractice (Id.). Plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that Crumbley was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious mental health needs which resulted in the denial of mental

Plaintiff's claims against ValueOptions were dismissed pursuant to ValueOptions' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #257).
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health services following Plaintiff's release and that Crumbley committed medical malpractice (Doc. #258). Plaintiff contended that because Crumbley did not respond to a request for admissions, Crumbley admitted that any injuries suffered by Plaintiff were caused by Crumbley and that Crumbley failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff (Doc. #259). Crumbley argued in response that he timely responded to the Request for Admissions (Docs. ##264, 265). Because Crumbley is not prejudiced, the Court will accept the facts as stated by Plaintiff for the purposes of this Order (Id.). Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that because any alleged denial of medical care occurred after Plaintiff was released from custody, they did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights (Docs. ##266, 267). Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's state medical malpractice claim should be dismissed because the Court no longer has original jurisdiction over the case (Id.). Plaintiff maintained that Crumbley has presented no admissible evidence and maintained that he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs (Doc. #270). II. Extraneous Motions Plaintiff sought to stay the summary judgment proceedings on the grounds that he is attempting to appeal the Court's Order dismissing ValueOptions and that the summary judgment motion is premature as to Marshall (Doc. #272). Defendants respond that additional discovery would not alter the outcome, they are entitled to summary judgment, and denial of the Motion to Stay serves judicial economy (Docs. ##279, 280). The Court will deny the Motion to Stay because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and additional information would not alter that determination. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of ValueOptions' dismissal and argues that he has demonstrated a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the Court improperly dismissed that claim in its July 2003 screening order (Docs. ##5, 284). Because the Court has already denied reconsideration of these orders, it will summarily deny Plaintiff's second request for reconsideration. Defendants moved for summary disposition of their Motion for Summary Judgment,
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arguing that Plaintiff failed to timely respond (Docs. ##288, 289). Plaintiff filed several responses to Defendants arguments, and filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will rule on the merits of the motion and will not summarily dispose of Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, Defendants' motions will be denied. III. Motion for Summary Judgment "Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. "Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical [and mental] needs violates the Eight Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment" Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). A pretrial detainee has a similar right under the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e. a pretrial detainee has the right to the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," which includes medical treatment. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). "Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the Unites States. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: . . . (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law." Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. In particular, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered specific injury as a result of the specific conduct of a defendant, and show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of the defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Prior to his release, Marshall evaluated Plaintiff in order to determine whether he
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qualified for mental health treatment; Crumbley determined that Plaintiff was not so entitled. This determination, however, did not affect the treatment Plaintiff received during his confinement. While in prison, Plaintiff had a constitutional right not to be subjected to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. See Long, 442 F.3d at 1185; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. Plaintiff has not alleged or demonstrated that he was denied adequate mental health treatment while in prison and he did not have a constitutional right to such treatment following his release because he had greater access to treatment. Plaintiff has not alleged, much less demonstrated, that the failure to designate him SMI constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was in prison. Plaintiff's only alleged injury was the result of the lack of treatment he received after his release, which is not a basis for liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his case, i.e., that he was injured as a result of Defendants denying him a federally protected right. Defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied. IV. State Medical Malpractice Claims "[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims" which arise under the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The parties do not dispute that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law medical malpractice claims. The Court, by granting summary judgment, no longer retains original jurisdiction over the action. Even if only state-law claims remain after the resolution of the federal question, the Court, in its discretion, may retain jurisdiction. Osborn v. Haley, 127 S.Ct. 881, 896 (2007). One of the factors to consider is whether the retention of the state law claims would require substantial additional judicial time and effort. Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court is granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff's federal claims because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff had no Eighth Amendment right to medical care following his release from imprisonment. The Court is making no determination concerning
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Plaintiff's state medical malpractice claims (See Doc. #268 - affidavit introduced to demonstrate the lack of adequate care received by clients of ValueOptions). Significant discovery appears necessary to resolve Plaintiff's medical malpractice claims with the possibility of a jury trial looming. Thus, Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim will result in substantial additional judicial time and effort. The Court will, therefore, exercise its discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff may seek to proceed in state court and must do so within the requisite limitations period. See Ariz. Stat. § 12-504 (providing that "[i]f an action is commenced within the time limit for the action, and the action is terminated in any manner other than by abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or a final judgment on the merits, the plaintiff...may commence a new action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within six months after such termination"). IT IS ORDERED: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Doc. #272) and Motion for Relief from District Court's Order (Doc. #284) are denied. (2) Defendants' Motions for Summary Disposition (Docs. ##288, 289) are denied. (3) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #258) is denied. (4) Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. # 266, 267) are granted. (5) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment in favor of Defendants, and dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's action. DATED this 22nd day of March, 2007.

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