Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 On August 30, 2004, Defendants Jose M. Heras d/b/a Martin's Taxi; Ramon Alberto Angulo Arce d/b/a Taxi el Guero; Pilar Bedoy d/b/a Pilar Taxi Service; Pedro Santa Cruz d/b/a Pedro's Taxi Service; Mario A. Tostado d/b/a Mario's Taxi #1 and Mario's Taxi #2; Javier Camacho Nuno d/b/a Nunos Taxi Service #2; Armando Linarez d/b/a Linarez Taxi Cab; Marcelino Zamora Espuerra d/b/a Chelo's Taxi; Mario D. Buchanan d/b/a Buchanan's Taxi #1, Buchanan's Taxi #3, Buchanan's Taxi #6, Buchanan's Taxi #7, Buchanan's Taxi #8, Buchanan's Taxi #9; Sergio Buchanan d/b/a Buchanan's Taxi #2, Buchanan's Taxi #4, and Buchanan's Taxi #5; vs. City of San Luis, et al., Defendants. Ed Dorsey and San Luis Yuma Transit, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. CIV 03-1447 PHX RCB O R D E R

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Rosa Maria Bedoy d/b/a Brenda's Taxi #1 and Brenda's Taxi #2; Jose Bedoy d/b/a Bedoy Taxi Service #1, Bedoy Taxi Service #2, Bedoy Taxi Service #3, Delfino Bedoy d/b/a Bedoy's Taxi; Jesus Bedoy Carrasco d/b/a Bedoy's Taxi Service #1, Bedoy's Taxi Service #2, Bedoy's Taxi Service #3, and Bedoy's Taxi Service #4 ("Taxi Defendants") filed a motion for summary judgment in this matter. (doc. 43). On September 29, 2004, Plaintiffs Ed Dorsey and San Luis Yuma Transit, Inc., filed a response to Taxi Defendants' motion and a cross-motion for discovery, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). (doc. 47). These motions were fully briefed on October 13, 2004. (doc. 50).1 Thereafter, by order of the Court, the parties submitted supplemental briefings on Taxi Defendants' motion. Order (doc. 62); Supp. Resp. (doc. 63); Supp. Reply (doc. 64). This Court, having carefully considered the arguments set forth by the parties, now rules. I. Background Facts Plaintiff Ed Dorsey is an African-American who is a co-owner of San Luis Yuma Transit, Inc. ("Transit"), a bus transportation business. Complt. (doc. 1) at 4. Transit is engaged in a transportation service providing passenger transportation between the City of San Luis and the City of Yuma in Arizona. Id. Taxi Defendants operate or operated taxis in the City of San Luis, Arizona. Id. Transit and Taxi Defendants compete for customers. Id. On July 29, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging the

Upon stipulation to dismiss with prejudice, the Court ordered this matter dismissed as to Defendants City of San Luis, Harper, Ruiz, Garcia, Lugo and Zaragoza. (doc. 60). However, the Court ordered the action continued as to the remaining defendants, including Taxi Defendants. Id. Case 2:03-cv-01447-RCB Document 65 -2Filed 08/25/2005 Page 2 of 16

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following against Taxi Defendants: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Sixth Claim for Relief); (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Seventh Claim for Relief); (4) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Eighth Claim for Relief); (5) intentional interference with business expectancy (Tenth Cause of Action); (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Eleventh Cause of Action); and (7) intentional interference with contract (Twelfth Cause of Action). (doc. 1).2 The core of Plaintiffs' allegations against Taxi Defendants is that Taxi Defendants received preferential treatment from the City of San Luis and were involved in a conspiracy with the City of San Luis to intentionally discriminate, harass, and intimidate Dorsey based on his race. Id. at 10-17. Plaintiffs also claim that Taxi Defendants' violation of public transportation laws and ordinances interfered with Plaintiffs' business expectancy, was extreme and outrageous, and interfered with Plaintiffs' contract with their customers. Id. II. Summary Judgment Standard To grant summary judgment, this Court must determine that the record before it contains "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and, thus, "that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether to

grant summary judgment, this Court will view the facts and inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

In their motion, Taxi Defendants specifically raise arguments in support of summary judgement on all of these claims except for Plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for Relief. Motion (doc. 43). Case 2:03-cv-01447-RCB Document 65 -3Filed 08/25/2005 Page 3 of 16

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475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323. In such a case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. 242, 247-48 (1986). See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. A material fact is any factual dispute that

might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 250. Finally, if the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, a court may grant summary judgment. See, e.g., California

Architectural Build. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). -4Filed 08/25/2005

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III. Discussion 1. Plaintiffs' Request for Default Judgment Plaintiffs argue that, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d),3 judgment should be entered in their favor on all claims, because Taxi Defendants have failed to provide certain requested discovery and engaged in "dilatory tactics." Supp. Resp. (doc. 63) at 2. Plaintiffs note that several of the Taxi Defendants "never responded to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents[.]" Id. at 3.4 Citing Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem., Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and Aljassim v. S.S. South Star, 323 F.Supp. 918, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), Plaintiffs assert that default judgment may be entered against a party refusing to respond to interrogatories. Id. at 4.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) states: If a party...fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection..., the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule...

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) states: An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party[.] Plaintiffs allege that they did not receive responses from Taxi Defendants Javier Camacho Nuno, Delfino Bedoy and Rosa Maria Bedoy. Supp. Resp. (doc. 63) at 3. Case 2:03-cv-01447-RCB Document 65 -5Filed 08/25/2005 Page 5 of 16
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In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Taxi Defendants have engaged in "dilatory tactics" in this case by refusing to respond to requests for deposition dates and participate in settlement discussions. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs contend that Taxi Defendants intentionally failed to return Plaintiffs' phone calls regarding the scheduling of depositions and now refuse to participate in any depositions due to the expiration of the discovery deadline. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Taxi Defendants announced "on the eve of the settlement conference" scheduled for November 22, 2004, that they would not attend. Supp. Resp. (doc. 63) at 3. Plaintiffs cite United States v. Continental Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir. 1962), in support of their argument. Id. at 4. Due to Taxi Defendants' alleged failure to answer interrogatories and use of "dilatory tactics," Plaintiffs assert that they should be awarded default judgment on all their claims. Id. Taxi Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' allegations. First, Taxi Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have never propounded interrogatories to them, but, instead, only requested the production of documents. Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 3. They assert that they have provided Plaintiffs with "all of the documents requested that were in their possession, custody and control[,]" and notified Plaintiffs of as much. Id. Moreover, they assert, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that the majority of documents sought by Plaintiffs are of public record. Reply (doc. 50) at 3; Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 6. Second, Taxi Defendants contest Plaintiffs' allegations that they have engaged in "dilatory tactics" regarding setting deposition dates and participating in the November settlement -6Filed 08/25/2005

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conference. Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 3-4. In regards to the requested deposition dates, Taxi Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' written request for deposition dates was received by Winsor Law Firm, PLC, on December 20, 2004, twenty-eight days before the scheduled discovery deadline. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs' letter stated that if they did not hear from Taxi Defendants' counsel by "December 24th," Plaintiffs would "set the depositions for January 24, 25 and 26." Exbt. A (doc. 64). At the time the letter was received by Winsor Law Firm, PLC, Taxi Defendants' counsel was on vacation. Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 3. Returning from vacation on January 3, 2005, Taxi Defendants' counsel asserts that he expected the depositions to be set according to the dates referenced in Plaintiffs' letter. Id. However, Plaintiffs' counsel failed to provide any deposition notices for those dates or request an extension of the discovery deadline. Id. In regards to the settlement conference, Taxi Defendants assert that they were under no obligation to participate in a voluntary mediation and informed the Court and other parties of their intent to withdraw in a timely manner. Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 5. "On November 8, 2004, Taxi Defendants' counsel communicated via fax and U.S. Mail to this Court and to all parties in this action that Taxi Defendants would not participate in the mediation which was scheduled for November 22, 2004." Id. at 4; Exbt. B (doc. 64). Thus, Taxi Defendants gave two weeks notice of their withdrawal from participation in the conference. Id. In the case at bar, none of the authority cited by Plaintiffs in support of their arguments for default judgment are from the Ninth Circuit. This Court is not required to follow the rulings of -7Filed 08/25/2005

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courts from other circuits. Moreover, the cited cases are extreme examples of discovery violations and involve interrogatories instead of requests for production of documents. In Continental, the court affirmed a lower court's order of default based on the defendant's denial of facts in its Answer that were clearly within its knowledge and later admitted in its sworn answers to interrogatories, the defendant's failure to answer a second set of interrogatories on time, and the existence of twenty-seven different pending actions on the same bond at issue before the court. 303 F.2d at 92. Such facts convinced the Continental court that the defendant was engaged in dilatory tactics and that it had no valid defense to the plaintiff's claim. Id. In Minnesota Mining and Aljassim the courts affirmed or ordered default judgment against parties that had completely refused to answer any interrogatories. Minnesota Mining, 757 F.2d at 1260; Aljassim, 323 F.Supp. at 922. The actions contested in this case do not equate to those reviewed in the cases cited by Plaintiffs. Thus, the Court finds that default judgment based upon such actions is inappropriate. 2. Motion to Strike In their Supplemental Reply, Taxi Defendants move the Court to strike Plaintiff Dorsey's Affidavit, (doc. 48), filed in support of Plaintiffs' response to Taxi Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Supp. Reply (doc. 64) at 6. Taxi Defendants argue that the affidavit is invalid because it was filed unsigned. Id. Although Plaintiffs later filed a signed version of the affidavit, Taxi Defendants argue that the correction is "suspect and untimely." Id. Therefore, Taxi Defendants urge the Court to strike -8Filed 08/25/2005

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the Dorsey Affidavit. Id. On October 12, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a signed copy of Dorsey's affidavit in their Supplement to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts. (doc. 49). Although the signed affidavit should have been filed with Plaintiffs' original Statement of Facts, the Court sees no indication that the postponed filing will cause significant harm to Taxi Defendants. Thus, the Court shall deny Taxi Defendants' motion to strike. 3. Motion for Summary Judgment a. Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief - 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Taxi Defendants challenge the viability of Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief by arguing that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown that Taxi Defendants conspired with the City of San Luis. Motion (doc. 43) at 6. Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for violations of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Complt. (doc. 1) at 11. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Taxi Defendants conspired to harass, intimidate, embarrass, annoy, abuse, cause economic harm, interfere with the liberty of and otherwise deny equal protection of the laws to Dorsey through their failure to abide by all applicable transportation laws. Id. at 11-12. In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. The elements of a such a cause of action are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act by one of the -9Filed 08/25/2005

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co-conspirators in the furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) a personal injury, property damage or deprivation of any right or privilege of the citizens of the United States. Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Gillespie v. Civitti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980). In First National Bank of Arizona v. Services Cities, 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff cannot defeat a summary judgment motion of a defendant charged with conspiracy without offering any significant probative evidence in support of the complaint. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to provide such evidence. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs have merely made conclusory statements alleging the existence of a conspiracy. In their response, Plaintiffs argue that "Taxi Defendants violated § 1985 by meeting and conspiring with San Luis Defendants and representatives of San Luis Defendants to promulgate and interpret City of San Luis transportation ordinances so as to prevent Dorsey from operating Transit thereby preventing Dorsey from earning a living." Resp. (doc. 47) at 11. Plaintiffs seem to assert that Taxi Defendants' meeting with San Luis officials at some undetermined date and time indicates the existence of a conspiracy, however such a conclusion requires many leaps of logic. Plaintiffs have failed to submit any evidence that such a meeting was part of a conspiracy. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence of an agreement or mutual understanding between Taxi Defendants and the City of San Luis representatives that held the intent to harass, intimidate, embarrass, annoy, abuse, cause economic harm, interfere with the liberty of or otherwise deny equal protection of the laws to Dorsey. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs have submitted only - 10 Filed 08/25/2005

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Dorsey's own statements alleging that Taxi Defendants were given preferential treatment by the San Luis Police Department. Dorsey Affidavit (doc. 49) at 2. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Due to Plaintiffs' lack of evidence of a conspiracy, the Court finds they have failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of this element that is essential to their claim. Therefore, the Court concludes that Taxi Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. b. Plaintiffs' Eighth Claim for Relief - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiffs base their Eighth Claim for Relief on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Taxi Defendants, in concert with the City of San Luis, engaged in acts of harassment and intimidation of Dorsey based on Dorsey's race, AfricanAmerican. Complt. (doc. 1) at 12. They assert that Taxi Defendants intentionally treated Dorsey differently from other persons similarly situated because of Dorsey's race. Id. A Section 1983 claim requires that a plaintiff "prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the 'Constitution and laws' of the United States...[and]...that the defendant acted under 'color of law'". Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Here, Plaintiffs have not set forth specific facts - 11 Filed 08/25/2005

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demonstrating a genuine issue for trial on this issue. Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that Taxi Defendants and the City of San Luis acted in concert to deprive Plaintiff Dorsey of his rights under § 1983 based on intentional discrimination. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Taxi Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of any right and acted under "color of law." A party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings or papers, but instead must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Thus, the Court concludes that Taxi Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. c. Statute of Limitations on Plaintiffs' Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Claims for Relief In addition to the federal claims defined above, Plaintiffs brought three tort claims against Taxi Defendants, alleging (1) intentional interference with a business expectancy; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3)intentional interference with a contract. Complt. (doc. 1) at 14-17. In their motion for summary judgment, Taxi Defendants assert that all of Plaintiffs' claims, including the tort claims, are time-barred. Motion (doc. 43) at 10-11. The appropriate statute of limitations time period for all of Plaintiffs' claims is two years. Id. The statute of limitations for - 12 Filed 08/25/2005

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§ 1983 actions shall be deemed the same as the appropriate state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). In Arizona, the statute of limitations for personal injuries is two years, and actions filed pursuant to §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-542; Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1987); Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991). Claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with business expectancy, and intentional interference with a contract are also covered by Arizona's two-year statute of limitations. See Nolde v. Frankie, 192 Ariz. 276, 279 (Ariz. 1998); Clark v.

Airesearch Mfg. Co. of Arizona, Inc., 138 Ariz. 240, 244 (Ariz. App. 1983). The applicable statute of limitations period begins at the time a plaintiff's claim accrues. A federal claim is generally considered to accrue when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986) citing Trotter v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996). In the case at bar, Plaintiffs filed their complaint on July 29, 2003. (doc. 1). Although the complaint does not state when the cause of action commenced, Taxi Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' - 13 Filed 08/25/2005

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claims accrued long before two years prior to the date of filing. Motion (doc. 43) at 11. Specifically, Taxi Defendants note that discovery in this case reveals that Plaintiff Dorsey sent a letter ("the Letter") complaining about taxi drivers and the nonenforcement of a City of San Luis ordinance to the City of San Luis City Attorney on November 11, 1998, over four years and eight months before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Id. Consequently, Taxi Defendants argue that all of Plaintiffs' tort claims are timebarred. Id. In response, Plaintiffs agree that a two-year statute of limitations applies to their claims. Resp. (doc. 47) at 8. However, Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not time-barred because they are based on Ordinance No. 172. Id. at 9. Although Ordinance No. 172 was enacted on January 24, 2001, outside the required two-year limitation, Plaintiffs assert that parts of Ordinance No. 172 were amended on February 13, 2002, by Ordinance No. 183, and on February 11, 2004, by Ordinance No. 205. Id. Plaintiffs claim that they "could not have had reason to know of the injuries caused by Ordinance No. 172 until that ordinance was enforced and subsequently amended." Id.5 Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that their three tort claims involve "continuing torts," and, therefore, are not time barred. Supp. Resp. (doc. 63) at 5. Taxi Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' assertion that Ordinance No. 172 is the basis of their claims. Taxi Defendants note that the

The Court notes that the first date of amendment falls within the two-year statute of limitations, however the second date of amendment occurred more than six months after Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this matter. Case 2:03-cv-01447-RCB Document 65 - 14 Filed 08/25/2005 Page 14 of 16

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only ordinances produced by Plaintiffs though discovery were Ordinances No. 149, 160, and 164. Reply (doc. 50) at 4. Moreover, Taxi Defendants argue that Ordinance No. 172 is "virtually identical to its predecessor, Ordinance No. 160[.]" Id. at 7. "The City of San Luis ordinances have been modified or replaced by newer ordinances, but the prohibitions against the Taxi Defendants that Plaintiffs complained about in 1998 remain the same." Id. The Court is not convinced by Plaintiffs' arguments. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dorsey wrote the November 11, 1998 Letter, nor do they dispute the alleged content of the Letter. In the Letter, Dorsey wrote, On November 11, 1998, I was told by a San Luis Police Officer that the Taxi Cab Driver could sit on Bus Stop [sic] in solict [sic] passenger [sic] from that area. The Officer [sic] name was LUIS MARQUEZ. I told him what the City ordinance said about the taxis. He told me that the Lt. told him ­ that the taxis could even load there [sic] car across the street from the taxi loading zone. I feel that this is against your City ordinance and if the City of San Luis Police Dept. - dont'n [sic] want to inforce [sic] the law then I have know [sic] choice but to have mu [sic] attorney look into this matter. I hope you would talk to him also. I dont'n [sic] want any thing [sic] bad to happen to any one [sic] but they start this mess. I have had [sic] with this predujice [sic] Police Dept. because the Buchanan Brothers load their taxis on Main Street & A Street when ever [sic] they feel like it and know [sic] say a thing to them. TDSOF (doc. 44) at Exbt. C. The Court need not determine which ordinance Plaintiffs intend to base their claims upon since the time of accrual for statute of limitations purposes is determined by Plaintiffs' knowledge of the injury. Norco Construction, Inc., 801 F.2d at 1145; Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1128. This communication indicates that on or about November 11, 1998, Dorsey knew that taxi - 15 Filed 08/25/2005

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drivers were stopping at determined bus stops and loading their taxis at "Main Street & A Street," acts deemed unlawful by Ordinance No. 160 and 172. Thus, at the time of the Letter, Dorsey knew of the injuries that are the basis of this action. At that time, Plaintiffs' claims accrued and the two-year statute of limitations began to run. Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiffs' Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Claims for Relief, as they are all time barred. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Taxi Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 43) is GRANTED. DATED this 25th day of August, 2005.

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