Free Response to Motion - District Court of Arizona - Arizona


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1 Burton M. Bentley, Esq. (Bar No. 00980) 2 BURTON M. BENTLEY, P.C. 5343 North 16th Street, Suite 480 3 Phoenix, Arizona 85016 (602) 861-3055 4 (602) 861-3230 fax Attorney for Rada Defendants 5 6 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA CAUSE NO. CIV 03 2390-PHX-JAT

8 LAWRENCE J. WARFIELD, 9 RECEIVER, 10 11 12 13 MICHAEL ALANIZ, et al. 14 15

Plaintiff, vs.

RADA DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants. The following Defendants:

(Oral Argument Requested)

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Leonard & Betty Bestgen Robert Carroll Rudy & Mary Crosswell Charles Davis Richard Derk Orville Dale Frazier

Ronald Kerher Dwight Lankford John & Candes Rada Paul Richard Patrick & Andrea Wehrly

(collectively "Rada Defendants"), by and through counsel undersigned, hereby submit

23 this Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal 24 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 25 26

The accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Rada Defendants'

27 Separate Statement of Controverting Facts ("SSCF") with attached exhibits supports this 28

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1 Motion. Also incorporated by reference are the Rada Defendants' Motion for Summary 2 Judgment, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Rada 3 4

Defendants' Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,

5 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and accompanying Separate Statement 6 7 8 9 I. 10 11 12

of Facts. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Introduction The Receiver's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("MPSJ") fails because the Statute of Limitations and the Statute of Repose are absolute bars, whereas the doctrine

13 of laches is an equitable bar that is supported by the Receiver's own Declaration 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

attached to the MPSJ. Under ample authority cited below, genuine issues of material fact exist as to the following: (1) Whether Dillie's plea agreement is sufficient to establish the existence of a

"ponzi scheme" and thus automatically establish "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act when the Defendants are

21 also creditors of Mid-America; 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

(2)

Whether Defendants were put on "inquiry notice" sufficient to require them

to inquire further into the business dealings of Mid-America; (3) Whether an audited financial statement for the years including 1996

through 1999 would have conclusively revealed Dillie's theft and shown that MidAmerica was insolvent;
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1

(4)

Whether the lack of review of an audited financial statement in the sale of a

2 CGA is definitively a lack of good faith; 3 4

(5)

Whether CGAs can be lawfully defined as "securities" as either an invest-

5 ment contract or a promissory note under any interpretation of Arizona state or federal 6 7 8

statutory or case law; and (6) Whether CGAs are defined as insurance under the laws of the states where

9 they were sold by the Rada Defendants. 10 11 12

II.

Standard for Granting Motion of Summary Judgment Summary judgment will only be granted where there is no genuine issue of

13 material fact and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex 14 15 16

Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Receiver is precluded from recovery and not entitled to summary judgment

17 without a trial on the merits on any issue raised in Warfield's Motion for Partial Sum18 19 20 21 22 23 24

mary Judgment for the reason that genuine issues of material fact must be adjudicated. III. Arizona Law Applies in This Case. The Receiver agrees that all states where Mid-America CGAs were sold have adopted the "pertinent provisions" of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"). (MPSJ, p.4, 1ns. 7-13.) "Where the law of two [or more] states is essentially the same,"

25 the court will "apply the law of the forum state." Mann v. Hanil Bank, 92 F.Supp. 944, 26 27 28

950 (E.D. Wisconsin 1996), International Administrators, Inc., v. Life Insurance Company of North America, 753 F.2d 1373, 1376, fn. 4. Hence, all analysis here will
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1 reference the Arizona Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, A.R.S. §§44-1001-1011. Addi2 tionally, citations to case law in relevant argument will likewise refer to Arizona law 3 4

when applicable. The Statute of Limitations, the Applicable Statute of Repose and the Doctrine of Laches Bar the Receiver's Claims Regarding Fraudulent Transfer Under the UFTA. A. Statute of Limitations and Statute of Repose

5 IV. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

The Rada Defendants have already argued the "statute of limitations" issue in their Motion for Summary Judgment and in their accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 30,

13 2005. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting the Rada Defendants' 14 15 16

Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 32-38.) Additionally, the Receiver readily admits that upon his appointment he took (See

17 "exclusive custody and possession of the business records" of Mid-America. 18 19 20

Declaration of Lawrence J. Warfield in Support of Receiver's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 3-4, Exhibit 3, ¶¶ 3-4, 7.) Presumably, the business

21 records were read and reviewed by the Receiver and not merely shelved. 22 23 24

B.

The Doctrine of Laches Bars the Receiver's Recovery

The defense of laches, is the "equitable counterpart of a statute of limitations."

25 Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 410, 973 P.2d 1166, 1167 (1998). This defense is 26 27 28

available to the Defendants under applicable state law. A.R.S. § 44-1010. When the claim "under the totality of the circumstances," "by reason of delay in prosecution,
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1 would produce an unjust result," it is barred by laches. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 410, 973 2 P.2d 1167. The Defendants always have the burden of showing that laches applies, but 3 4

in this instance, the factual sequence of events strongly suggest that the Receiver waited

5 too long to file this lawsuit; and the Defendants have been injured due to the Receiver's 6 7 8

carelessness, laxity and "unreasonable delay" in filing the claim. In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 990 (Bkr. S.D. Ohio 1993), In re Paternity of Gloria, 194 Ariz. 201, 203-4,

9 979 P.2d 529, 531-32 (App. 1998), Mobile Discount Corporation v. Schumacher, 139 10 11 12

Ariz. 15, 18, 676 P.2d 649, 652 (App. 1983) review denied 1984. This Court has discretion to grant or deny the Rada Defendants relief based upon

13 facts surrounding the Receiver's delay in bringing the claim. State v. Martin, 59 Ariz. 14 15 16

438, 448-49, 1230 P.2d 48, 52 (1942).

More than two years passed between the

Receiver's appointment and the time he filed the claims against the Defendants. Wasn't

17 that sufficient showing of laches? These claims are an affront to the contractual rela18 19 20

tionship that existed with Mid-America at the time the Rada Defendant received payment for services rendered. They should not be punished for the secret criminal The factual question is could any

21 activities of Robert Dillie and his onsite aides. 22 23 24

reasonable person look beyond the obvious? Were all of the hundreds of honest folk who sold CGAs in league with Dillie, or just plain stupid or naïve or gullible or ....?

25 Whatever the reasons, none of them found out about Dillie's campaign to bankrupt Mid26 27 28

America. Were they not reasonable men? And did they not resemble the average "reasonable man" that the courts have used as models to determine reasonable conduct?
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1 Can this Court ignore that the Rada Defendants acted as reasonable men would act in the 2 same or similar circumstances ­ as did the 100 or so Defendants named in this lawsuit ­ 3 4

all persons with enough intelligence to attend the Mid-America seminars, and having the

5 combined business and professional experience of perhaps in excess of 100 years 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

collectively? V. The Defendants in this Case are Creditors of Mid-America and Thus the Receiver has not Conclusively Shown that Mid-America Funds Were Transferred to Defendants with the Actual Intent to Hinder, Delay or Defraud Creditors. The Receiver argues in the MPSJ that a criminal conviction or plea agreement in a related case is sufficient to prove that there was actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors under the UFTA. (MPSJ, pp. 8-9, lns. 9-19, 1-2). In this case, the defendants

15 are creditors of Mid-America, as they would have had a claim against Mid-America had 16 17 18

they not been paid as agreed under their contractual agreement with the company. The cases cited by the Receiver to support the argument that proof of the existence of a ponzi

19 scheme automatically establishes actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud (In Re Randy, 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

In Re Ramirez, Scholes v. Lehmann) are cases where the receiver was suing investors to recover funds for the corporation. In this case, the Defendants are not investors in Mid-America -- they are creditors, i.e., they are independent salesmen, who possess a right to payment when a CGA is sold, pursuant to an undisputed, valid and signed agreement with Mid-America. Where the

27 defendant appellants were commissioned salesmen, the court held that they "had a valid 28

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1 contractual claim against the debtors" because they entered into a contract with the 2 debtors and performed as requested by them." 3 4 5 6 7 8

In re Universal Clearing House

Company, 60 B.R. 985, 1000 (D.C. Utah 1986). In Universal, the defendants held an antecedent debt. Id., 60 B.R. at 999-1000. If the defendants in this case had not been paid the commissions due by Mid-America, they would have had a valid breach of contract claim against the company, whether the

9 company was rendered insolvent or not. Isn't that why Plaintiff has conceded that there 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

was "reasonable value"? VI. Proof of the Existence of a "Ponzi Scheme" is not Enough to Establish Fraudulent Transfer Under the UFTA, the Affirmative Defense of "Good Faith for Reasonable Value" Relieves the Defendants From Liability. Even if the ponzi scheme existed without the knowledge of the Defendants and the people in charge of management of Mid-America (of which only one was Robert

17 Dillie), that secret scheme alone is not enough to hold the Rada Defendants liable under 18 19 20

the UFTA. "The law on the issue of fraudulent transfers requires that "avoidance of a transfer as fraudulent does not necessarily lead to a remedy against transferees ... Subse-

21 quent good faith transferees often have no liability." In Re Cohen, 199 B.R. 709, 716 22 23 24

(9th Cir. BAP 1996). The Receiver's argument that the affirmative defense of "good faith for reasonable value" is not available to the Defendants is in error. Id., A.R.S. §44-

25 1008. Plaintiff has already admitted there was a fair exchange for "reasonable value." 26 27 28

/// ///
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

A. The Receiver Rightly Conceded Reasonably Equivalent Value Existed Under A.R.S. § 44-1008 The Receiver has rightly conceded that the Defendants provided "reasonably equivalent value" to Mid-America, (MPSJ, p. 10.) even though the Third Amended Complaint incorrectly alleges: "170. Additionally, each of the transfers alleged in the First Amended Complaint were made without receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and the transferor (i.e. Mid-America Foundation, Inc., or Mid-America Financial Group, Inc.) was engaged in a business or transaction for which the remaining assets of the transferor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction." (Emphasis added.) Third Amended Complaint, p. 37, ¶ 170. The Receiver's concession makes sense. As discussed above, the Defendants in

15 this case were not investors, but were independent sales agents of Mid-America, they 16 17 18

provided a service to Mid-America by selling the CGAs, in return for payment of commissions. If the Defendants did not sell a Mid-America CGA, they were not paid any

19 commission or other remuneration. Aside from the commissions, the Rada Defendants 20 21 22

expected no other remuneration from Mid-America, i.e., Defendants had no investment in the failure or success of Mid-America. The Receiver cannot deny that the sale of the Despite

23 CGAs by the Defendants conferred an economic benefit on Mid-America. 24 25 26

Dillie's knowledge that Mid-America was insolvent at the time of the CGA sales, the money that came in did pay the annuitants' monthly payments until October 2001. In

27 almost every one of the cases cited by the Receiver in the MPSJ, the cases involved 28

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1 fraud claims against investors of a company and for which those investors gave no 2 value, such is not the case here. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B.

The Defendants are Protected Transferees Under the UFTA Because They Were Not Put on Inquiry That Dillie Was Stealing Money From Mid-America and Had No Prior Notice. 1. The Defendants Had No Knowledge of the Debtor's Fraudulent Purpose, i.e., of Dillie's Theft and Purported Knowledge of Insolvency of Mid-America, Nor Were They Required to Have Such Knowledge.

In the context of the UFTA, the courts examine what the defendant knew or

11 should have known in questions of good faith. In Re Agricultural Research and Tech12 13 14

nology Group, Inc., 916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir. 1990), In Re Cohen, 199 B.R. 709, 719 (BAP 9th Cir. 1996). The Receiver cites to In Re Agricultural Research and Technology

15 Group, Inc., for the proposition that "if the circumstances would place a reasonable 16 17 18

person on inquiry of a debtor's fraudulent purpose, and a diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose, the transfer is fraudulent." (At 536.) There was no

19 way for the Rada Defendants to have discovered what Dillie knew, or that Mid-America 20 21 22

was insolvent. Mid-America was not required to publish audited financial statements. No regulatory agency had discovered that the company was insolvent. The Rada

23 Defendants had no knowledge of the day-to-day activities of Mid-America, any more 24 25 26 27 28

than did the SEC, the Arizona Corporation Commission or the Arizona Department of Insurance, and they were not required to do so. The Receiver took many statements made by the Rada Defendants out of context

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1 as there is testimony in the depositions of the Rada Defendants regarding what they did 2 to research Mid-America before selling the CGAs. See Plaintiff's Separate Statement of 3 4

Facts, ¶ F.1, Defendant Carroll, Exhibits A and B; ¶ 7, Defendant Derk, Exhibit C; ¶ 12,

5 Defendant Frazier, Exhibit D; ¶ 12 Defendant Kerher, Exhibit E; ¶ 15, Defendant 6 7 8

Lankford, Exhibit F; ¶ 17, Defendant Crosswell, Exhibit G; ¶ 17 Defendant Rada, Exhibit H; ¶ 17 Defendant Wehrly, Exhibit I; ¶ 18 Defendant Davis, Exhibit J; and Rada

9 Defendants' Separate Statement of Controverting Facts. There is sufficient contradic10 11 12

tion to the Receiver's assertion that the Rada Defendants performed inadequate due diligence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of "good faith" under the

13 UFTA. This is a question for a jury. 14 15 16

2.

Mid-America's Purported Insolvency

Insolvency is defined under the Arizona Fraudulent Transfer Act in § 44-1002. In

17 short, "[i]nsolvency can be either `balance sheet' (assets less liabilities) or `equitable' 18 19 20

(generally not paying debts as they become due)." In Re Viscount Air Services, Inc., 232 B.R. 416, 437 (Bkr. Ariz. 1998), A.R.S. § 44-1002. Here, the Receiver established that

21 Dillie sent a letter to the purchasers of Mid-America CGAs dated October 12, 2001 22 23 24

"informing them for the first time that Mid-America was insolvent." (MPSJ, p. 6, lns. 10-11). The Rada Defendants had no way a knowing that Dillie was stealing money

25 from Mid-America thus rendering it insolvent. They knew no more than the annuitants 26 27 28

receiving their monthly checks before October 2001. All appearances pointed toward solvency and a growing company. The due diligence investigations that the Rada
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1 Defendants conducted, singly and collectively, showed that Mid-America had no 2 financial problems -- until October of 2001. 3 4

The only support that the Receiver provides regarding the determination that Mid-

5 America was insolvent is a statement in the Receiver's Declaration. The requirement for 6 7 8

proof of insolvency is much greater than a mere statement. Under the UFTA, insolvency is determined at the date of each transfer, "not at some later time" and not at some earlier

9 time. Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 297, 63 P.3d 1029, 1034 (2003). Dillie may 10 11 12

have known of the insolvency of Mid-America, but both annuitants and the Rada Defendants understood Mid-America was more than merely Robert Dillie, as in fact it

13 was. The Board of Trustees was comprised of highly regarded, educated and esteemed 14 15 16

individuals. (See Exhibit 1, Receiver's Separate Statement of Facts, and Exhibit E, Rada Defendants' Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

17 referencing the Mid-America Board of Directors, Legal Trustees and Financial 18 19 20 21 22

Trustees.) C. The Receiver has Not Proved That the Review of Mid-America Audited Financial Statements Was Required in the Sale of CGAs.

The Plaintiff's citation to the In Re World Vision Entertainment, Inc. decision is in

23 error. This case addresses the issue of whether the sale of promissory notes (clearly 24 25 26

defined as securities under federal securities laws, `33 Act § 2(a)(3)) sold by licensed brokers involved fraudulent transfers. In Re World Vision Entertainment, Inc., 275 B.R. In our case, the instruments being sold by the Rada Defendants were

27 641 (2002). 28

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1 donative instruments, not securities under federal or Arizona law.

(See, Rada

2 Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting the Rada Defendants' 3 4 5 6 7 8

Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-38.) The Receiver omits to mention that a broker-dealer is held to a higher standard than a seller of CGAs. The broker-dealer is required to be licensed and registered with the SEC. Section 15, '33 Act; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o. The broker is required to review

9 audited financial statements and a Prospectus of the Issuer of securities. His recommen10 11 12

dation to purchase is based upon his evaluation of his customer's financial status, tax status and investment objectives among other criteria. NASD Manual R. 2310. In fact,

13 the broker selling securities has been held to be a fiduciary. 15 U.S.C.A. § 8a-2(a)(11). 14 15 16

The law does not require such procedures in the case of CGA sales persons as CGAs are not regulated as securities, and if in fact a CGA is a security, then it is exempt

17 from regulation as provided in the Securities Act. Section 3, '34 Act; 15 U.S.C.A. §78c. 18 19 20

The Receiver has not conclusively proved that the good faith for reasonable value defense is unavailable to the Defendants based upon the facts presented, but has rather

21 conceded "reasonable value." Material facts at issue are whether an audited financial 22 23 24

statement is a reasonable pre-requisite to an independent agent selling a CGA and whether a CGA is a security. The first question is a jury question. The second question

25 is for the Court to determine, as a question of law. 26 27 28

/// ///
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1 2 3 4

D.

The Mid-America CGAs Sold by Defendants Are Not "Securities" Under the "Howey Test" or by Any Definition of Federal or Arizona Law and Thus No Violation of Securities Law Occurred.

Defendants outlined the law regarding the regulation of securities and the fact that

5 CGAs are not considered securities (or are exempted) under Federal and Arizona law. 6 See Rada Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 7

Summary Judgment, pp. 6-26. In his MPSJ, the Receiver has attempted to show that a
8 9 CGA is an "investment contract" under the Howey test.

(MPSJ, p. 18). In a 1946

10 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a test regarding the determination of 11 12

whether a financial instrument could be considered an "investment contract" under the

13 definition of "security" by the ['33 Act.] 14 15 16

The Supreme Court identified characteristics common to investment contracts holding that "an investment contract for purposes of the ['33 Act] means a contract,

17 transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and 18 is led to expect "profits ... solely from the efforts" of the promotion or third party. 19 20

S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 1104, 90 L.Ed. 1244

21 (1946). Contrary to the Receiver's belief, a CGA is not an agreement through which an 22 23 24

individual can ever expect "profits" through the efforts of any person. To the contrary, there is no opportunity for gain, financial or otherwise with the purchase of a CGA. The

25 purpose of the CGA is to give the purchaser/annuitant a tax deduction, to collect a 26 27 28

periodic payment irrespective of the foundation's profitability and to make a charitable contribution to the annuitant's charity of choice.
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1

Also, the purchase of a CGA involves no risk to the annuitant. The Howey test

2 was born in the interpretation of "investment contract" by state "blue sky" law. Howey, 3 4

328 U.S. at 298, 66 S.Ct. at 1102. This test requires that there be an element of risk

5 involved in an investment. It requires "`the placing of capital or laying out of money in 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.'" Howey, citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920). In the case of Mid-America, had Dillie not been a miscreant and a thief, there would have been no risk at all in the purchase of the CGAs. CGAs inherently do not involve risk, they support a "charitable mission." 141 Cong. Rec. 2240, Statement of The Receiver

13 Rep. Gephardt. and 141 Cong. Rec. 2024 Statement of Rep. Hyde. 14 15 16

completely misses the point of a CGA by suggesting a classification of the Mid-America CGAs as: "risky." The dishonesty of Dillie created the sole risk. Warfield illogically

17 concludes by innuendo that had Dillie not been a thief and rendered Mid-America 18 19 20

insolvent, the Mid-America CGAs would never have been "investment contracts." The conclusion that a CGA is an "investment contract" is misdirected. Under any interpret-

21 tation of the Howey test, there must be an investment motive and a scheme for profit. 22 23 24

CGAs fulfill neither element. CGAs cannot be classified as "investments" at all. They are donative instruments,

25 used by every charity in America for fundraising, if they employ the use of CGAs. The 26 27 28

return the annuitant receives, furthermore, is tax shielded. The return received by the annuitant must be less valuable than the assets given in exchange for the annuity under
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1 Federal tax law to qualify for the tax deduction ­ meaning the annuitant must lose 2 money. 3 4

That alone destroys the investment/contract/profit/motive.

See 26 U.S.C.

501(m)(5), and 26 U.S.C. 514(c)(5), which describes an annuity as tax exempt. Without

5 debt-financing" activities, an annuity must have value "less than 90 percent of the value 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

of the property received by the charity." VII. The Receiver Has No Standing to Make Claims Regarding Rada Defendants' Violation of State Law for the Sale of CGAs in California, Florida, Illinois, South Dakota, Texas and Washington. As argued in The Rada Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Rada Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (p. 44-51), the

13 Receiver "cannot bring claims on behalf of third parties." Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Benjamin, 821 F.Supp. 533, 535 (N.D.Ill. 1993). Any potential damages as a result of any possible violation of state law belong to each individual state, not to the Receiver. VIII. Recovery Under the UFTA is Limited to the Statutory Provisions, PreJudgment and Post-Judgment Interest is Not Available to the Receiver. A.R.S. § 44-1007 provides remedies for a creditor in the instance of a financing of fraudulent transfer. The only remedies that statute provides are garnishment, avoidance, attachment, injunction, appointment of a receiver and "any other relief the

23 circumstances may require." A.R.S. § 44-1007(A)(1)-(4); A.R.S. § 44-1007(A)(4)(c). 24 25 26

The statute does not provide for recovery of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and therefore it is unavailable to the Receiver in any instance of a finding of fraudulent

27 transfer in this case. 28

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1 2 3 4 5

Dated at Phoenix, Arizona this 30th day of January, 2006.
BURTON M. BENTLEY, P.C.

_s/ Burton M. Bentley _________ Burton M. Bentley Attorney for Defendants Rada

6 COPY of the foregoing mailed this th 7 30 day of January, 2006, to: 8 Robert Tretiak 4615 North Ft. Apache Road 9 Las Vegas, NV 89129 Defendant Pro Se 10 11 David Knutson First Financial Center, Ltd. 12 119 Third Street, N.E. #333 Cedar Rapids, IA 52401 13 Defendant Pro Se 14 David Tigges 15 First Financial Center, Ltd. 119 Third Street, N.E. #333 16 Cedar Rapids, IA 52401 Defendant Pro Se 17 Ren Bidwell 18 3430 Pacific Avenue SE 19 Olympia, WA 98501 Defendant Pro Se 20 Steve A. Bryant. 21 3618 Mt. Vernon, # A Houston, TX 77006-4238 22 Co-Counsel for Rada Defendants 23 Bruce F. Walters 24 2606-C West Roosevelt Boulevard Monroe, NC 28110 25 Pro Per 26 27 28

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