Free Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ____________________________________ ) PETRO-HUNT, L.L.C., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 00­512 L v. ) ) Honorable Francis M. Allegra UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF RONALD J. TENPAS Acting Assistant Attorney General Environmental & Natural Resources Division JAMES D. GETTE Trial Attorney Environment and Natural Resources Division United States Department of Justice Benjamin Franklin Station, P.O. Box 663 Washington, DC 20044 Telephone: (202) 305-1461 Facsimile: (202) 305-0506 James. [email protected]

Of counsel: Timothy H. Baker Office of the Solicitor Division of Mineral Resources Department of the Interior 1849 C Street, N.W., Mail Stop 4230 Washington, D.C. 20240

Of counsel: Jay McWhirter Office of the General Counsel Department of Agriculture 1718 Peachtree St., NW, Suite 576 Atlanta, Georgia 30309-2437

Dated this 2nd day of September, 2008

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DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), and 12(b)(6), Defendant, the United States of America, hereby moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on several grounds. In the alternative, to the extent that the Court finds it necessary to go beyond the confines of the pleadings, the United States moves for summary judgment pursuant to RCFC 56. First, Defendant seeks dismissal of the contract claims contained in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Amd. Cmplt.") (Counts IV, V, VI, and VII) pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the contract claims1 because those claims are barred by the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.2 Plaintiff admits that it was known as early as 1991, well over six years before any complaint was filed in this case, that Defendant had taken actions which allegedly violated the deeds that form the basis of Plaintiff's contract claims. Second, Defendant seeks dismissal of this case pursuant to RCFC 56 on the ground that Plaintiff's contract claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. Plaintiff's failure to notify Defendant or the Court of its contract claims for more than eight years, despite ongoing litigation between the parties throughout that entire period of time, is manifestly unreasonable and has

As set forth below, the United States is also moving to dismiss the majority of Plaintiff's takings claims because they are barred by the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations.
2

1

In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. V. Untied States, ___U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 750, 753-54 (2008), the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that Section 2501 is jurisdictional in nature. Thus, this section of the instant motion is properly considered a motion to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1). i

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prejudiced Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims should be barred. Third, the contract claims in the First Amended Complaint (Counts IV, V, VI, and VII) should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue those claims. Plaintiff would only possess standing to pursue these contract claims if it was a party to the contract or in privity with one of the contracting parties. Here, however, the alleged contract for sale of property in the Kisatchie National Forest was between certain lumber companies and the United States. Plaintiff was not a party to the contract. Moreover, Plaintiff is not a successor-in-interest to the lumber companies. Rather, Plaintiff admits that it is the successor-ininterest to Good Pine Oil Company, which was never a party to the sales of land to the United States and has never entered into any contract with the United States related to the property at issue here. Thus, given that Plaintiff is not a party to any contract with Defendant and is not the successor-in-interest to any contracting party, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue contract claims against the United States. Fourth, Plaintiff's claim for reformation of the alleged contract (Count VII) must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) because this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims for non-monetary relief. Fifth, in this case, Plaintiff claims that the United States has permanently and/or temporarily taken ninety-six mineral servitudes from it (Counts I, II, and III). With respect to ninety of those servitudes, however, the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana has already ruled that those servitudes are owned by the United States. As such, any claim by Plaintiff regarding the ownership of these ninety servitudes is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ultimately, because Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the 90 servitudes,

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the servitudes could not have been taken from it. Therefore, Defendant moves to dismiss these claims pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, RCFC 56. Sixth, with respect to the remaining six servitudes, Plaintiff's claims are premised upon the argument that the United States took the property by issuing leases to third parties to conduct mining operations in violation of Plaintiff's mineral servitudes. Of the 15 leases issued by the United States on the six mineral servitudes, however, 10 of the leases were issued more than six years before Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this case. As such these claims are barred by the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. § 2501) and should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). Seventh, also with respect to the remaining six servitudes, Plaintiff cannot allege a permanent taking (Count I) because any leases of mineral rights on these six servitudes have now either been terminated or cancelled by the Bureau of Land Management, or have expired. In any event, the leases have come to an end. As such, there can be no permanent taking and this claim should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 56. Eighth, similarly with respect to the remaining six servitudes, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a taking on servitudes one, three, and four. The unrefuted evidence is that no leases were ever issued on these three servitudes. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims with respect to these three servitudes should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 56. Ninth, also with respect to the remaining six servitudes in which the district court held that Plaintiff possesses a mineral interest, Plaintiff does not possess a compensable interest in precluding the United States from issuing the leases at issue here. Under Louisiana law, as a protective measure, a party may issue leases on mineral servitudes, which are later determined to

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be owned by someone else. Conversely, the true owner has no right under state law to prohibit such leases, which, as a matter of law, do not interfere with the true owners use and enjoyment of the property. As such, these claims should be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative RCFC 56. A memorandum in support of this motion follows.

iv

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. B. C. Lack of Jurisdiction ­ RCFC 12(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Failure to State a Claim ­ RCFC 12(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Summary Judgment ­ RCFC 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Plaintiff's Contract Claims, Which Were Filed More Than Six Years After They Accrued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A. Plaintiff's Claims Are Subject to the Tucker Act's Six-Year Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Establishing the Court's Jurisdiction . . . . 10 Plaintiff Failed to Timely File Its Contract Claims in this Case . . . . . . . 11

B. C. II. III.

Plaintiff's Contract Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Latches . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claims Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff is Not a Party to the Contract, nor is Plaintiff a Successor-in-Interest to a Contracting Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Claims for Equitable Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Plaintiff Has No Legally Compensable Property Interest in the Prescribed Mineral Servitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A. Plaintiff Must Demonstrate that It Possesses a Compensable Property Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Plaintiff is Collaterally Estopped from Arguing that it Holds A Compensable Property Interest in the Prescribed Servitudes . . . . . . . . . 21

IV. V.

B.

VI.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Any of Plaintiff's Taking Claims Based Upon Leases Issued Before August 24, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 v

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VII.

Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for a Permanent Taking of the NonPrescribed Servitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for a Taking on Servitudes One, Three, and Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Plaintiff Lacks a Compensable Property Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A. Background Principles of State Law Define the Contours of Plaintiff's Property Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1. As a Threshold Matter, Plaintiff Must Demonstrate the Existence of a Protected Property Right Before a Taking Can Be Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Demonstrating That a Property Interest Exists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 State Law Routinely Defines the Scope of a Plaintiff's Property Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

VIII.

IX.

2.

3.

B.

Louisiana Law Does Not Allow a Mineral Servitude Owner to Restrict the Issuance of Protective Leases on Its Servitude . . . . . . . . . . 32

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14 Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 30 Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 837 (1993), aff'd, 37 F. 3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28-31 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Ariadne Financial Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. United States, 133 F.3d 874 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 823 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 31 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Block v. North Dakota, vii

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461 U.S. 273 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Bobula v. United States Dep't of Justice, 970 F.2d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Bond v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 641 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Borough of Alpine v. United States, 923 F.2d 170 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Bowen v. United States, 292 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 C.W. Over & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 18 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 35 Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chandler v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 106 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 viii

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Cloutier v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 326 (1990), aff'd mem., 937 F.2d 622 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28, 29, 31 Cook v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 783 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 De Graffenried v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 458 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 D'Andrea v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 612 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Entines v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 673 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Erickson Air Crane Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Eurell v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 273, 566 F.2d 1146 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Fanning, Phillips, Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Ferreiro v. United States, 350 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, ix

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194 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Hartle v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 843 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Hendler v. United States, 952 F. 2d. 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Ho v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 96 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Hunt v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 810 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 750, 753-54 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 10 Jones v. United States, 801 F.2d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225 (1887) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Kinne v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 104 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Serv., x

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865 F.2d 235 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Lakewood Assocs. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 320 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 30, 32 M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28-31 Maniere v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 410 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Maritrans v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 21, 29, 30 Mason v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 832 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 McDonald v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 110 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10, 11 Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n, Inc., v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed.Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Mother's Rest., Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Murray v. United States, 817 F. 2d. 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

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18 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Petro-Hunt v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. La. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 Petro-Hunt v. United States, 2007 WL 715270, *1 (5th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 20, 21 Petro-Hunt v. United States, 365 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 3 Pixton v. B & B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 221 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Raitport v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 155 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14 Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exchange Serv., 846 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10 Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Simmons v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 131 (2002), aff'd, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 23415938 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 State of Alaska v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 689 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 xii

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Stearns Co., Ltd. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18 Tabb Lakes v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff'd, 10 F. 3d. 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Thomas vs. Gen. Servs. Admin, 794 F. 2d. 66 (Fed. Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc., 312 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Truckee - Carson Irr. Dist v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 361 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 17 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 31 United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18

United States v. Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. 580 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 18

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United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . 20 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

STATE CASES American Lung Ass'n v. State of La., 645 S.2d 1219, 1222 (La. Ct. App. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Gailey v. McFarlin, 193 So. 570 (La. 1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

FEDERAL STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 28 U.S.C. § 2501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 36

STATE STATUTES La. Civ. Code Art. 789 (1870) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 La. Rev. Stat. § 31:121 (West 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 32

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La. Rev. Stat. § 31:149 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 La. Rev. Stat. § 31:27 (West 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

FEDERAL RULES 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 24 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 RCFC 12(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 25, 36 RCFC 12(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 36 RCFC 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Rule 12(h)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND In the early 1930s, Bodcaw Lumber Company of Louisiana ("Bodcaw Lumber") and Grant Timber & Manufacturing Company of Louisiana, Inc. ("Grant Timber") owned approximately 180,000 acres of land in Grant, Winn, and Natchitoches parishes in Louisiana. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 10, 13.3 From 1932-1934 Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber transferred the mineral interests underlying the 180,000 acres to a third party, Good Pine Oil, to do oil and gas exploration. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. The mineral interests transferred to Good Pine Oil constituted 96 mineral servitudes. Id. ¶ 19. Then from 1934-1937, Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber separately sold the surface rights to the 180,000 acres of land to the United States. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. At the time of the initial sale of the surface rights to the United States, the land was burdened by the 96 mineral servitudes. Id. ¶ 39. At the time of the sale of the land to the United States, Louisiana's law of prescription provided that any mineral servitude, on which there was no production activity for a period of ten years, prescribed to the owner of the surface estate. La. Civ. Code Art. 789 (1870); La. Rev. Stat. § 31:27 (West 2008). Subsequently, Act 315 of 1940 was passed by the Louisiana Legislature, which amended the prescription law and made it inapplicable to lands owned by the

3

For purposes of the instant motion only, Defendant assumes the truth of the allegations in the Amended Complaint that are material to the adjudication of the instant motion. The majority of the facts relevant to the instant motion are also set forth in the 2004 decision by the Fifth Circuit in Plaintiff's quiet title action. See Petro-Hunt v. United States, 365 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Petro-Hunt II"); see also Petro-Hunt v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. La. 2001) ("Petro-Hunt I"). 1

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United States. See Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 390; 1940 La. Act 315; La. Rev. Stat. § 31:149 (1974). In 1948 the United States brought an action for declaratory relief against Nebo Oil, the successor to Good Pine Oil, arguing that, with respect to 1 of the 96 servitudes, the mineral interests had prescribed to the United States as surface owner as the result of ten years of nonuse. (This servitude is referred to herein as the "Nebo Oil Servitude"). The Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled that Act 315 of 1940 was retroactive and therefore prevented the Nebo Oil Servitude from prescribing to the United States. Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 391, citing United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003, 1010 (5th Cir. 1951). In 1973, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that was contrary to the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit in Nebo Oil. In United States v. Little Lake Misere, the Supreme Court held that, as a choice-of-law principle, Act 315 of 1940 could not be applied to property acquired by the United States prior to its enactment because it was "`plainly hostile to the interests of the United States' and could not be `borrowed' as the rule of decision." Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 392, citing United States v. Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. 580, 596 (1973).4 As a result of this subsequent Supreme Court precedent, which called into question the vitality of the Nebo Oil decision, the United States reassessed its ownership position vis-a-vis the remaining 95 mineral servitudes and determined that it did, in fact, own the mineral servitudes as the result of the Louisiana prescription law that existed at the time of the land purchases. PetroHunt II, 365 F.3d at 393-94; see also Petro-Hunt I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 675. As a result,

The Little Lake Misere decision was later applied by the Fifth Circuit to a case posing almost identical facts to the Nebo Oil case to support the Fifth Circuit's similar holding that Act 315 of 1940 could not be applied to property acquired by the United States prior to its enactment. Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 393, citing Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001). 2

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beginning in the late 1980s, the United States began offering leases on the United States' land on which the servitudes had been located. Id.; see also Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶ 60. Petro-Hunt disputed several of these leases. Petro-Hunt I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 675; Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶ 61. In response, Petro-Hunt and its partners (Hunt Petroleum Corp. and Kingfisher Resources, Inc.) filed a quiet title action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking to be declared the owners of the 96 mineral servitudes. Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 394; Petro-Hunt I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 675; Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶ 66. Initially, the District Court reasoned that the doctrine of res judicata applied and that the decision in Nebo Oil was determinative of the case. Petro-Hunt I, 179 F. Supp. 2d 669. The Court, therefore, initially held that Petro-Hunt and its partners still owned all 96 servitudes. Id. 179 F. Supp. 2d at 682. This decision was set aside by the Fifth Circuit based upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. 580, and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cent. Pines Land, 274 F.3d 881. Petro-Hunt II, 365 F.3d at 393. On remand, the District Court held that Plaintiff was the owner of the Nebo Oil Servitude. The District Court also held, based upon a stipulation of the parties, that 90 of the remaining 95 servitudes had prescribed and were therefore owned by the United States. See Petro-Hunt v. United States, 2007 WL 715270, at *1 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Petro-Hunt III"). (These 90 servitudes are referred to herein as the "Prescribed Servitudes"). The remaining 5 servitudes ­ which were numbered one through five in the district court's judgment on remand ­ were held to have not prescribed and to be owned by Plaintiff and its partners. See Petro-Hunt v. United States, Civ. No. 00-303 (W.D. La., Dec. 7, 2005), Judgment (Dkt. 228) (attached hereto as

3

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Exhibit A). (These five servitudes and the Nebo Oil servitude are referred to herein as the "NonPrescribed Servitudes").5 During the late 1980s and during the 1990s the United States issued a single lease on the Nebo Oil Servitude; 11 leases on servitude number two; and 2 leases on servitude number five. Declaration of Delia K. Jaquette ("Jacquette Dec."), ¶ 3 (attached hereto as Exhibit B). As set forth in the following chart, 10 of the 15 leases were issued prior to August 24, 1994, which places them more than six years before the initiation of the instant lawsuit. Moreover, also as demonstrated in the chart, all 15 leases have now either been cancelled or terminated by the Bureau of Land Management, or have expired as a result of the stated term coming to an end.
Servitude

Lease No. 046324 043575 046310 046312 046313 046314

Issuance Date January 27, 1994 June 5, 1991 January 26, 1994 January 26, 1994 January 27, 1994 January 27, 1994

Lease Disposition

End Date February 1, 2000 June 30, 2001 February 1, 2000 February 1, 2000 February 1, 2000 February 1, 2000

Source of Information Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.a.i. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.i. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.viii. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.ii. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.iii Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.iv.

Nebo 2 2 2 2 2

Terminated Expired Terminated Terminated Terminated Terminated

Plaintiff incorrectly states that the United States was declared the owner of 91 of the servitudes (Amd. Cmplt. ¶ 69), presumably because it overlooked the Nebo Oil servitude, which was determined to still be owned by Plaintiff and its partners in addition to servitudes one through five. 4

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2 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5

046315 046318 046323 047595 047978 047979 037729 047279 047280

January 27, 1994 January 27, 1994 January 26, 1994 January 25, 1996 August 9, 1996 July 17, 1996 June 1, 1988 July 5, 1995 July 17, 1995

Cancelled Expired Terminated Cancelled Terminated Terminated Expired Expired Cancelled Expired

January 11, 2002 January 31, 2004 February 1, 2000 January 11, 2002 August 1, 2005 August 1, 2003 January 1, 2001 July 31, 2005 January 11, 2002 July 31, 2005

Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.v. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.vi. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.xi. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.vii. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.ix. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.c.x. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.f.i. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.f.ii. Jacquette Dec. Ex. B, ¶ 3.f.iii.

*Highlighted entries represent leases issued more than six years before the filing of this lawsuit.

SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Lack of Jurisdiction ­ RCFC 12(b)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff asserts takings claims and contract claims, including a request for reformation of an alleged contract. The determination of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear these claims is a question of law. See Toxgon Corp. v. BNFL, Inc., 312 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter

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jurisdiction, which must be done by a preponderance of the evidence. Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)); Entines v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 673, 678 (1997) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing all jurisdictional requirements . . . and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.")). "[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not withstand a motion to dismiss." Bond v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 641, 647 (2000) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)). Subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the court sua sponte. Fanning, Phillips, Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must accept as true the complaint's undisputed factual allegations and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488, 492 (2003) (citing Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); Pixton v. B & B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, if a motion to dismiss challenges the truth of jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint, the allegations in the complaint are not controlling, and the court may consider relevant evidence in order to resolve the factual dispute. Ferreiro v. United States, 350 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("A trial court may weigh relevant evidence when it considers a motion to dismiss that challenges the truth of jurisdictional facts alleged in a complaint."); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exchange Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Where, as here, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, the correct remedy is dismissal of the action. "[U]nder [Court of Federal Claims] Rule 12(h)(3), this court is mandated to. . .

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dismiss the action `[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . .'" Truckee-Carson Irr. Dist. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 361, 368 (1988) (alteration in original). B. Failure to State a Claim ­ RCFC 12(b)(6)

The Court has authority to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). Kinne v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 104, 107 (1990). The rules allow the dismissal when the causes of action asserted in the complaint are "fatally flawed in their legal premises and destined to fail. . . spar[ing] litigants the burdens of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity." Maniere v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 410, 419 (1994) (quoting Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 988 F.2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper when it is established that a plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with the plaintiff's allegations that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. See Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 559 (5th Cir. 1996). In approving a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), "the court primarily considers the allegations in the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account." 5A Chalres A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, p. 299 (1990). C. Summary Judgment ­ RCFC 56

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Admittedly, the facts, "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party

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opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1961) (per curiam). However, "a mere `metaphysical doubt' will not prevent the granting of a summary judgment motion." Cloutier v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 326, 328 (1990), aff'd mem., 937 F.2d 622 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The evidence presented "must be more than merely colorable." C.W. Over & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 18, 22 (1999) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("If the evidence [of the non-movant] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."). Moreover, summary judgment "must be granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-movant's case entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law." Cloutier, 19 Cl. Ct. at 328 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24). In this regard, summary judgment "is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut but, rather, as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. . . .'" Tabb Lakes v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1344 (1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327), aff'd, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993). ARGUMENT I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Plaintiff's Contract Claims, Which Were Filed More Than Six Years After They Accrued A. Plaintiff's Claims Are Subject to the Tucker Act's Six-Year Statute of Limitations

The United States may not be sued unless Congress has waived sovereign immunity,

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United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983), and a waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to any conditions imposed by Congress, Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). Specifically, when a waiver of sovereign immunity contains a statute of limitations, the "limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). The statute therefore, "define[s] th[e] court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). Thus, in order for a claim to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, a plaintiff is required to file its claim within the applicable statute of limitations. Cook v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 783, 785 (1995); D'Andrea v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 612, 614, aff'd, 6 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's takings claims is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and provides that "[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." The six-year limitation is "an 'express limitation on the Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity.'" Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 240 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 817 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the Federal Circuit observed that the six-year limitations period for actions against the United States "is a jurisdictional requirement attached by Congress" that must be strictly construed. "[F]ailure to comply with the statute of limitations places the claim beyond the court's power to hear and decide." Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399, 404 (1994) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273 (1957)); see also Ariadne Financial Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. United States, 133 F.3d 874, 878 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 823 (1998)

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(citing Borough of Alpine v. United States, 923 F.2d 170, 171 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). "Because the limitations period is an express condition of the Government's consent to be sued, the court lacks the power to toll the running of the statute of limitations on equitable grounds." Simmons v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 131, 133 (2002), aff'd, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 23415938 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2003) (unpublished per curiam). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is an absolute jurisdictional statute of limitations that bars claims not brought within the prescribed six year period. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 750, 753-54 (2008). B. Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Establishing the Court's Jurisdiction

It is well-established that the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court possesses jurisdiction to hear its claims. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has addressed the burden of establishing jurisdiction in federal courts by stating that the statutory authority vested in the court to enforce its jurisdictional limitations, precludes the idea that jurisdiction may be maintained by mere averment or that the party asserting jurisdiction may be relieved of his burden by any formal procedure. If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), quoted in Catellus Dev. Corp., 31 Fed. Cl. at 404-05. "[B]ecause the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that its action was timely filed." McDonald v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 110, 113 (1997) (citing Mason v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 832, 836 (1993)). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, "[w]e presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction `unless 10

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the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.'" Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986), and King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225, 226 (1887); see also McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189. "[A] claim against the United States first accrues on the date when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action." Bowen v. United States, 292 F.3d 1383, 1385­86 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 106, 113 (2000)); see also Kemp, 65 Fed.Cl. at 825 (quoting Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481-82 (Fed Cir. 1994)). In determining when a claim has accrued, the court applies an objective standard. Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996). C. Plaintiff Failed to Timely File Its Contract Claims in this Case

Plaintiff first filed contract claims in this case on June 25, 2008. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) (counts IV, V, VI, and VII). As such, to be timely, Plaintiff's claims must have accrued no earlier than six years prior to that date, or June 25, 2002. In its first amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that certain deeds ­ through which the United States bought property from several lumber companies ­ constituted contracts, which Defendant has now allegedly breached. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 37-41 and Counts IV, V, VI and VII. Plaintiff premises the alleged breaches of these contracts on leases which the United States issued to third parties, which allowed the third parties to conduct mining operations on the property at issue in this case. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 60-65. By its own admission, however, Plaintiff was well aware that the United States was issuing leases to third parties to mine this property beginning in 1991. Plaintiff's Initial Complaint ("Cmplt.") (Dkt. 1) ¶ 9; Amd. Cmplt.

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(Dkt. 51) ¶ 60. Plaintiff, in fact, disputed the leases beginning in 1991 by writing letters to the United States Department of Agriculture. Cmplt. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 10; Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶ 61. Given that all of the facts necessary to institute a breach of contract claim had accrued by 1991, Plaintiff was required to initiate those claims by the close of 1997 at the latest. Because Plaintiff's contract claims were not filed until June 25, 2008 ­ more than ten years after the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations had run ­ this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims, which must be dismissed.6 Even if Plaintiff somehow asserts that the leasing of the mineral rights does not represent the claim accrual for purposes of Plaintiff's contract claims, Plaintiff's contract claims could not have been timely filed in this case. Certainly by the time that Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against the United States regarding the ownership of all 96 of the servitudes at issue in this case, any acts which could possibly represent the claim accrual date for Plaintiff's contract claims would have occurred. As such, Plaintiff was aware of any breach of contract claim, at the latest, by February 18, 2000 ­ the date Plaintiff brought an action against the United States in the Western District of Louisiana claiming that leases issued by the Bureau of Land Management had interfered with Plaintiff's property interests in certain mineral servitudes allegedly owned by Plaintiff. Amd. Compl. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 60, 66. Since Plaintiff did not assert its contract claims until June 25, 2008 ­ more than six years since the filing of the quiet title action in the district court ­ these claims were not timely filed. A claim which is time barred under the statute of limitations must be dismissed since this

Even if the contract claims alleged by Plaintiff date back to the initial filing of the Complaint, an assertion with which Defendant strongly disagrees, Plaintiff's contract claims were still not filed within the jurisdictional time limit. 12

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Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a claim. See Jones v. United States, 801 F.2d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In the instant case, under any possible scenario, Plaintiff's contract claims were not timely filed. Those claims, therefore, must be dismissed as beyond this Court's jurisdiction. II. Plaintiff's Contract Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Latches Even assuming, arguendo, that the Tucker Act's statute of limitations does not bar plaintiffs' claims, this Court should grant Defendant summary judgment based on the doctrine of laches. Laches is "the neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and operates as an equitable bar [to suit]." Raitport v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 155, 159 (1995), quoting A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Plaintiff's inexplicable decision to sit on its claims for, at a minimum, more than eight years has prejudiced Defendant; therefore, Plaintiff should be barred from recovery. The application of laches is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Raitport v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 159; A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides, 960 F.2d at 1032. Though not based on rigid rules, a rebuttable presumption of laches arises upon proof that a plaintiff, without good excuse, delayed filing suit. Raitport, 33 Fed. Cl. at 160; De Graffenried v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 458, 487 (1990); see also Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 221, 222 (1987). To overcome the presumption of laches, Plaintiff must produce evidence that the eightyear delay here was reasonable, or that Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Raitport, 33 Fed. Cl. at 161; A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chaides, 960 F.2d at 1032, 1038. Further, "the greater

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the lapse of time, the less need there is to show specific prejudice." Eurell v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 273, 566 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1977). While the burden of proving the affirmative defense of laches ultimately rests with defendant, Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that there is a genuine issue of fact to overcome the presumption of laches. Raitport, 33 Fed. Cl. at 161. This, Plaintiff cannot do. Here, Plaintiff recognizes that it, or its predecessor in interest, first became aware of ownership disputes related to the mineral servitudes at issue in this case in 1948 when the United States first filed an action for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 53, 108 ("The United States later claimed ownership of certain of Plaintiff's Mineral Estate[s] in 1948. . . ."). Plaintiff was again put on notice regarding the dispute over the mineral servitudes at issue here in 1991, when, over Plaintiff's objections, the Bureau of Land Management issued leases on the servitudes. See supra. p. 12. Moreover, Plaintiff was well aware of the dispute over the ownership of these mineral servitudes in February 2000 when it instituted its first of two lawsuits against the United States. See supra. pp. 12-13. Despite being well aware of the disputed ownership of these mineral servitudes and the relationship that the dispute had to any property transfers related to the property, Plaintiff made no effort to apprise the United States or any court of the United States that it intended to pursue allegations of breach of contract. Instead, when it filed the instant lawsuit, Plaintiff filed it purely as a saving action that would allow for the adjudication of money damages related to the takings claims that might arise out of the quiet title action being adjudicated in the district court. That is why Plaintiff immediately moved to stay the litigation in this Court pending the outcome

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of the quiet title action in the district court. See Cmplt. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 11 & 13 ("The present proceeding is brought, in part, in the alternative, and the interests of justice and judicial economy require that it be stayed pending resolution of plaintiff's Louisiana Quiet Title Act Suit."); Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 5). If Plaintiff had filed its contract claims when it originally brought the instant lawsuit in 2000, Defendant would not have consented to a stay of the contract claims, which were not at issue in and not dependent upon an adjudication of the quiet title action brought by Plaintiff in the district court. In sum, even putting aside the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs' claims should be barred by the doctrine of laches. The Defendant has clearly been prejudiced as a result of the extraordinary delay in being apprised of Plaintiff's alleged contract claims; witness memories will have faded, knowledgeable employees may have retired or moved, and if an adverse judgment is ultimately rendered, damages may have increase or accumulated as a result of Plaintiff's dilatory behavior. Considering the prejudice caused by Plaintiff's failure to apprise the United States of its contract claims for almost eight years after the filing of the complaint in this case, the doctrine of laches should be applied and Plaintiff's contract claims should be dismissed. III. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claims Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff is Not a Party to the Contract, nor is Plaintiff a Successor-in-Interest to a Contracting Party The Tucker Act authorizes suit against the United States only where privity of contract exists between the party bringing suit and the United States. Erickson Air Crane Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract . . . ."). Thus, only where a contract claim is founded upon an express or implied contract between the plaintiff and the United States does the plaintiff have standing to sue. Plaintiff simply is not in privity with the United States. 15

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Plaintiff alleges that two lumber companies, Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber, executed several deeds by which the surface interests in the properties at issue in this case were transferred from the lumber companies to the United States. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶ 37. Plaintiff further alleges that these deeds represent contracts and that Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber were induced into entering into the "contracts" by certain representations by the United States regarding whether the mineral interests on the property could or would prescribe to the United States if not actively mined. Amd. Cmplt. (Dkt. 51) ¶¶ 34-36. Strikingly absent from these allegations is any assertion that Plaintiff or its predecessor in interest, Good Pine Oil,7 were parties to these contracts. Plaintiff, as a corporate successor, can only assert those rights held by the predecessor corporation, Good Pine Oil. Since Good Pine Oil was not a party to the deeds ­ identified by Plaintiff as the contracts that form the bases for its claims ­ Plaintiff cannot attempt to reach back and challenge those contracts.8 While the successors of Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber might arguably have a right to assert claims based upon the deeds between the United States and the lumber companies ­ Plaintiff, which is not in the line of corporate succession of Bodcaw Lumber or Grant Timber, does not. Since neither Plaintiff, nor its successor, were parties to the alleged contracts, the United States is not

7

Plaintiff admits that it is a successor-in-interest to Good Pine Oil, not the lumber companies that allegedly contracted with the United States. Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 52 & 60. Plaintiff, in passing, makes a vague and unsupported assertion that Good Pine Oil is the "alter ego" of Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber. Amd. Compl. (Dkt. #51) ¶ 94. Plaintiff, however, confuses the relevance and application of the alter ego concept. Generally, alter ego status is requested by an adverse party attempting to pierce the corporate veil. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 51. It is not a device employed by corporate successors to reform legal agreements or rewrite history. As such, Plaintiff cannot assert rights or claims that may have been available to Bodcaw Lumber and Grant Timber when Plaintiff is not in the corporate lines of succession of those companies. 16
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in privity with Plaintiff and has not consented to waive sovereign immunity for a breach of contract claim. IV. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Claims for Equitable Relief The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim for reformation because it falls outside the purview of this Court's limited jurisdiction. Where, as here, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim, the correct remedy is dismissal of the claim. See Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 361, 368 (1988) ("[U]nder [Court of Federal Claims] Rule 12(h)(3), this court is mandated to. . . dismiss the action `[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . .'") (alteration in original). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claim for reformation pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). As sovereign, the United States may not be sued unless it consents to such suit. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941), Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 187 (2003). As such, the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction is wholly dependent on a waiver of sovereign immunity and that waiver "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). Plaintiffs have failed to prove ­ indeed, they have failed to even suggest ­ the existence of a statutory provision that provides the "unequivocally expressed" waiver of sovereign immunity necessary for this Court to entertain claims for reformation. Undoubtedly, Plaintiff's failure is driven by the fact that no such statutory authority exists. In fact, courts have emphatically held that the statute cited by Plaintiff in its First Amended Complaint ­ the Tucker Act ­ does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain claims for equitable relief, such as reformation.

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"Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is limited to cases in which the Constitution or a federal statute requires payment of money damages as compensation