Free Memorandum in Support of Motion - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

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Case 3:03-cv—00990-AWT Document 25-6 Filed 06/15/2004 Page 1 of 4
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LEXSEE 1999 CONN. SUPER. LEXIS 695
Sa'Vonta Hunter v. Mazda of Milford et al.
CV 9803506865
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
FAIRFIELD, AT BRIDGEPORT
1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 695
March 2, 1999, Decided
March 2, 1999, Filed

NOTICE: [*1] THIS DECISION IS UNREPORTED front passenger tire exploded or blew and was
AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER APPELLATE completely [*2] shredded due to the negligence of
REVIEW. COUNSEL IS CAUTIONED TO MAKE AN Mazda of Milford, causing the plaintiff to sustain lasting
INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE fear, anxiety, emotional trauma and distress, as well as a
STATUS OF THIS CASE. loss of income. The plaintiff alleges in count two that
Mazda of Milford‘s conduct in count one is in violation
· DISPOSITION: MMAI's motion for summary of the Connecticut Product Liability Act, General
judgment as to counts three and four ofthe amended Statutes 52-5 72(sa) et seq.
complaint granted.
The plaintiff alleges in count three that her losses were
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes due to the fact that MMAI carelessly and negligently
designed, rnanufactured and inspected the tire, in that
MMAI knew or should have known that the tire was not
JUDGES: SKOLNICK, J. of sufficient durability for the purpose for which it was
intended. The plaintiff alleges in count four that the
OPINIONBY: SKOLNICK conduct of MMAI is in violation ofthe Connecticut
Product Liability Act.
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET The plaintiff alleges in count tive that Bridgestone was
ENTRY NO. 123) negligent as it knew or should have known that the tire
was not of sufficient durability for the purpose for which
The plaintiff] Sa‘Vonta Hunter, filed a six—count amended it was intended due to an unidentitied defect, and that
complaint against the following defendants: Mazda of Bridgestone breached its express and implied warranties [
Milford a/lc/a Milford Mazda afk/a Volvo City Milford- as to the mileage capacity ofthe tire. The plaintiff alleges
New Haven, Inc. n/k/a Connecticufs Own Volvo (Mazda in count six that the conduct of Bridgestone violates the
of Milford [seller of automobile]), Mazda Motors of Connecticut Product Liability Act.
America, Inc. (MMAI [distributor of automobile]); and
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone [manufacturer MMAI [*3] has tiled a motion for summary judgment as
of tire]). The plaintiff alleges in cotuit one that on or to the plaintiffs claims against it in the third and fourth
about June 14, 1995, she purchased a 1995 Mazda counts on the grotmd that they are barred by the doctrine
Protege automobile from Mazda of Milford, and that the of unspecified defect. The plaintiff has tiled an objection
front passenger tire was improperly designed and to the motion for summary judgment, and the matter was
manufactured and inherently dangerous. The plahitiff heard by the court on January 19, 1999.
further alleges that on or about October 20, I996, while
operating the automobile on Interstate 95, the defective

Case 3:03-cv—00990-AWT Document 25-6 Filed 06/15/2004 Page 2 of 4

Page 2
1999 Conn. Super. LEXES 695, *
“Practice Book 384 [now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) 17- defect as long as there is evidence of an unspecified
49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered dangerous condition where other identifiable causes are
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof absent. The plaintiff contends that the tire that blew was
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any not worn and that the vehicle did not hit any sharp object
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to or hole before it blew into pieces and was shredded. n3
judgnent as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for The plaintiff claims that since there are no other
summary judgment, the trial court must view the identifiable causes and MMA] has not submitted or l
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving produced evidence of other identifiable causes, the
party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements under the products i
burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] liability act. 1
material facts which, under applicable principles of
Substmmve l&W’ emma hm [0 ajudgmem its a matter Of n3 The plaintiff fails to attest to these claims .
law ` ` ` and {die pmlty Oppcsmgsuch a motmn must in her affidavit in opposition to the motion for l
provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the S a .ud Bm
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.“ (Citations Wl gm '
omitted.) Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 [*4]
CO}/m' 374’ 38O"81’ 713 Add 820 (1998) "The plaintiff [in a products liability action] must prove
• * g
mms nl argues ee ee eeeem ereim it ee me jgsggglggjggjggligggggjlgggujithjiggggggggsyge
unspecified defect in the tire caused her injuries. MMA] dam Cmus to an Extent bc Gnd that which would be §
contends that under the products liability act, a plaintiff ctmim lated b the Ord; Consumer who umhases i
need not establish a specific defect as long as there is . . p .y my P
. . . . rt, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
evidence of an unspecified dangerous condition where communi as to its characteristics , Résmcmcm
other identifiable causes are absent. MMA] further (scccncuté TONS 402A Comment, It is mt HBCGSS
contends that there is not Sufficient evidmfcc to that the plaintiff in a stfict tort action establish a spghific
reasonably infer, without resortmg to conjecture or ’ . . .
. . . . defect so long as there rs evidence of some unspecified _ r
speculation, that a defect existed at the time the tire left . . . §
, . . dangerous condition . . . Whether a product is »
MMA] s control. MMA] argues that the plamtrff has . . l
. . . unreasonably dangerous is a question of fact to be i
failed to rule out other possible causes as to why the tire . . . . . .
. . determined bythe jury. In deterrnmmg this question the *
blew, such as road hazards or that the plamtrff had . . . l
. . jury can draw their own conclusions as to the
already driven for at least twenty thousand miles on the . . i.
t. H2 expectations ofthe ordinary consumer and the i
lm knowledge common in the community at large . . . The
jury may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish the Q
nl In its memorandum in support of the dangerous condition ofthe product . . . ln the absence of
motion for summary judgment, MMA] refers to other identifiable causes, evidence of malfunction is
itself as Mazda Motors of America, Inc. d/b/a sufficient evidence of a defect under 4U2A." (Citations
Mazda North American Operations (MNAO). For omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck &
ease of identification, the court will use the Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 687, 690-91, 406 A.2d 1254, cert.
abbreviation MMA] when referring to the denied, I 77 Conn. 754, 399 A.2d 526 (1979).
distributor of the Mazda Protege automobile at
issue here. The mere fact that there is sufficient
. . . . . evidence to infer a defect [*7] does not
th ti?r£h°Pl“m];1fft`°§*1H€;ll?“h"‘%d€p°S‘“°; e tctts arily mean eee there ie eemeee
R ‘°` if my M °°“ .“"€“ ‘” tls ‘““" as eviaeeee to infer that me defect existed at
33,724 miles before the accident. (Motion For the time Of Sale Normally the qucsmms y
Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of Of when and Wléew a defaét originated
Sa'Vonta Hunter p. 61.) will be left to the -
’ ju1’y....Wherethe g
[*5] answers to these questions would be
based only on speculation or conjecture,
. . . . however, the answers cannot stand ....
Tlpetplamtiff argues thtat her allegations phtaftthe tueegxrpusc The wst for the Sufacimcy of Evidence
no gliémugg OE OHgd€m;u%h;$PS I tes 2; Sp hltl used to prove that a product was defective
SEGCI; Ilia mn tm B; Hf QTO FQ; ‘*‘ ;"§E’ha° SS ° a at the time ereere wiir be more difficult to
Sha F SEE; Cause th i gc O dOW[ nt lgilhcma Ni;. meet where circumstantial, and not direct,
t e p ain r argues a s e nee no es a rs a speci rc Gvidcncc ofthe defect is produced-

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Case 3:03-cv—00990-AWT Document 25-6 Filed 06/15/2004 Page 3 of 4
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1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 695, *
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presumption of a defect, to avoid a directed verdict a
Where the jury are presented with defendant manufacturer would have to come forward
sufficient direct evidence of a specific with evidence that a product is not defective or did not
defect, either in design or manufacture, proximately cause the injury. This would be unfair where
the length of time between sale and injury the product has been destroyed or damaged so that proof
may be of little consequence . . . Where of absence of a defect is virtually impossible. In effect i
the evidence of a defect is wholly defendants would be made insurers." O’Cormor v.
circumstantial and consists ofthe Genera! Motors Corp., I 997 Come. Super. LEXIS 3343,
malfunction itself however, the ‘ Superior Court, judicial district of AnsoniafMilford at g
likelihood that the defect existed at the Milford, Docket No. 028104 (April 25, I997)
time of sale is more speculative. This is so (Cormdino, 1) (21 CONN. L. RPTR. 151).
because where a specific defect in design §
or manufacture is proved, the are H4 For Example in response to an
presented with evidence ofthe condition . ’ . . i
. mterrogatory dated April 30, 1998, which asked r
of the product before 1t left the . . ,, . . E
, , the plaintiff to state in detail the alleged defect
manufacturer s or sellers hands. No such . . .
anim is at and when in agree is 6r6€66¤6r6¤6ls66»S66mgf6r6¤6—=e¤6 .
cimumsmmiauy [,,8] prwcd Hom the instance the specihc part or parts of said vehicle
. . involved; the manner in which said part or parts
66ryt6¤ ‘tE”f;f‘1‘;t[°‘;· Th? *66 gg, Wat defective; andthe effectand/orresultof
BVI ence O B G S e CG O 3 Sp? . said defect, including effects and/or results on the
defect, though not fatal to the plaintiffs . _ . i
Casa dogs TB um: that thc evidential other parts of the vehicle, and the manner m [
brid’ B 1. 1 . q the defect with the Gmc of which said defect caused or contributed to the
mgm mmciubsmntial than mi ht cause of the occurrence referred to in the i
Zthmwise be 3 m Time g complaint and any injuries and damages resulting
pp P ` therefrom," the plaintiff stated: "I feel something
. is wrong with the tires." (Motion For Summary
Although the fmolml of tim? between Judgment, Exhibit C, Notice of Compliance With
purchase and injury is a significant factor .
in the mfercmial Equation it is not the Defendants Request for Interrogatones and
. ’ Production 48.)
only one. To it must be added other ’ ;_
factor? that mlght account for an At her deposition conducted on July 24, 1998, the
alteration of the product after sale, . . . ,
. . . . . plamtuf was asked why she brought a claim [
including unproper use, modification, . . d f . d d_ [
tampering Or improper maintenance allegmg that the tire was e ective, an answere . Q
Takin these factors mm c0nSid€1_a,dé)£1“ "Because there's no way that the tire could have g
We Unit look to the facts Of each case tl) slnedded like that. There was something wrong
determine Whether wgasombl and Wen with it. lf you could have seen this tire--when
. . everybody seen [sic] it, they were, like, 'You‘re .
balanced minds [could] be satisfied from lucky to be alive] ,, (Motion For S my E
the evidence adduced that the defective . . . . , ;
. . . Judgment, Exhibit A, Deposition of Sa Vonta 2
condition existed when the [product] was Hunter p 49 )
delivered." ’ ' `
. i
. . . . . . [*10] I
(Citations omitted.) Lzvmg & Learnmg Centre, Inc. v.
_§;yjj,§,6;ggr;,§gggj»6"¤—» 666rr-6e 666 665"64 The plaintifftcstified it her deposition that from at time
` ` the Mazda Protege was delivered to the plaintiff on or
. . bout June 14 1995 until the accident on October 20 l
Although the plaintiff argues that she has presented a ’ ’ . .’
evidence of a specific defect in the tire, her evidence rgléigliéligéggo HEES Wg; iggggiihi agignggggif
consists of the malfunction itself] which is circumstantial S ,3 $1 t Hunter gl ) TE? lagltiffs dah; is based On
Evidence Of H d€fS.ct’ {*9] rather than direct Or Specific hgr agsuinption thgt because tiie tire shredded "there had
evidence. 114 As discussed above, evidence ofa to bc Somethin Wmn with it ., (Exhibit A ° 49 ) The
malfunction itself is not enough to sustain a claim under laimiff also tcitiied ghowgvér that HO EX ’§_k ha;
the products liability act without showing that the defect p . . ’ . . ’ _ . .
. . ,, . . examined the tire. €Exh1b1tA, p. 49, Exhibit C, Notice of l
existed at the time of sale. If evidence of a malfunction . . , g
were to be given such probative force that it raised the Complmncgwlth Defendant S Request For .
interrogatories and Production, 48.) In her own affidavit,

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1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 695, *

the plaintiff avers only that her injuries were caused such an evidential bridge, the plaintiffs claims that the
because the subject "there was not though {sic] enough . . product must have been defective are held to be too
." (Objection To Motion For Summary Judgment, speculative, and the general course of presenting such a
Affidavit of Sa'Vonta I-[unter, 4.) claim to the jury is properly denied. In addition, the
_ plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issue of
The plaintiff has failed to present any evidence material fact by showing that the blow—out was not due
indicating that the alleged defect existed at the time the to something other than an unspecified defect in the tire
tire was sold. In cases of the type brought by the itself
plaintiff] where evidence ofthe defect is based solely on
the fact that the product malfunctioned, and where the Accordingly, l\/[MAI's motion for summary judgment as
allegedly defective product is lost or destroyed, the to counts three and four ofthe amended complaint is
burden {*I 1] is on the plaintiff to form an evidential granted.
bridge between the condition ofthe product at the time
of sale until the defect manifests itself In the absence of SKOLNICK, J'
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