Free Memorandum in Support of Motion - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

Case 3:OO—cv-00339-RNC Document 116-12 Filed 01/17/2006 Page 1 of 3
Westlaw
Not Repoited in A.2d Page 1
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31124658 (Conn.Super.), 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 741
(Cite as: 2002 WL 31124658 (C0nn.Super.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT judgment on those counts based upon the doctrine of
RULES BEFORE CITING. res judicata. The court entered summary judgment at
oral argument on those counts.
Sunerier Court eteCenneetieut_ The third count in the plaintiffs amended complaint,
pent C ABRERA, the CFEPA claim, remains. Both parties seek
v_ summary judgment. The plaintiff claims because she
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVlCES_ was prevented from litigating that specific CFEPA
Nr-,_ X04Cvgl2454lS_ claim in the federal court that it still survives.
Further, she argues, since the underlying issues of the
Aug` 19, 2002 CFEPA claim are identical to the issues giving rise to
the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act claims upon
Mel_ACHLAN7 j_ which she prevailed in the federal lawsuit, she is
entitled to an affirmative summary judgment. She
l: ACTS acknowledges she would not be entitled to recover _
ai rind employment eeee was filed by the plaintiff darnagee heeauee her award ef $5,030 -00 was .
after the United Stntes Distriet Cuurt irer tlie Distriet satisfied by the State after the federal trial. She seeks _
of Connecticut dismissed her claim for relief pursuant a Judgment m hel faver here so that she eah make ah .
tn Cen_Stut_ § 31-5lm (the Wliistleblewer Act) en application for attorneys fees in accordance with the (
Eleventh Amendment grounds and her claim under Fair Emmoymehl Praetieee Ant, ah issue she Was hot
Cen_Stet_ § 46u-6() (the Cenneetieut purr able to litigate in the federal action. FNl| Defendant
Eninleynient prnetiees Aet [CEEPA] )t snnerently argues that because the underlying facts and claims T
also un the basis ef the Eleventh Ainendnient of the Title VII action are identical to those set forth j
Pietntnr eemmeneed tins action under the Accidental in the CFEPA, the deetrine df ree Jndieata entitled it
Failure er stnte statute only against me State ef teiudgntent in this ease en the third eeunt
Connecticut (an individual supervisor also was sued
in the federal action). The plaintiffs amended ® The ieane ef entitlernent te atteineye e
complaint, the operative complaint, contains three feee uhdes Title Vll had hot been
counts: the tnet count is the wtnetiebiewet Act, adiudieated in the federal aetien g
Gen.Stat. § 31-5lm; the second count is a claimed .
violation of Gen.Stat. § 31-51g (violation of ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES °
eenetttnnenei ngbte) end the time count is me The plaintiff argnea that a reeent Surierier Ceurt eaee J
Cl:El>A eluinr McCall v.. City of Danbury, CV99—0334585S, 2001
WLl05302, supports her proposition. In McCall, an ?
The redetei eeee proceeded to judgment berete e jury nnaneeeeaful tieliee denarnnent amilieant Sued in
andthe pietntntr was awarded $5,030.00 in damages federal eeurt elairning that he Wan dieeriininated i
on her Title vn ofthe own Rights Act claim, which againet heeauee he was an Afriean Anieriean, a Title f
tlte nurties agree is essentially the same us ner VII violation. The District Court determined that his
Cl:El¤A Claimt civil rights were not violated. He then brought a
CFEPA claim in the State court, which found that the
The parties agree that the first count ofthe complaint Title VII claim was essentially the same claim as the
(the ee-eened winetiebiewet claim) end the second CFEPA elairn nnder §..¢L@a@ and granted ennnnary _;
Count (the eluirned Vielntien et nluintileiis judgment in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff here l
eemntnttenet rights) both mirror me met cause ef argues that heeauee the nity ef Danhnry was entitled ?
action inthe federal eeee (e Section was claim that te annnnary Judgment en the haeia that the federal g
her First Amendment rights were violated by the Title Vll elaine Was eeeentially the same an the
defendants in tnet action). The ptemttrr agreed at mei CFEPA elaini that ehe ia entitled te aftinnative i
argument that the defendant was entitled to summary summaYY iudsnient shloe the issues had heeh Q
judgment en the nrst twe Counts ere her eernnlnint determined in her favor in the federal lawsuit. The
based on the vet-diet in the federal tewetnt, end did plaintiff alan argnee that ainee She was net nerinitted
net dispute that me defendant is entitled to enmmety te litieate her full State etatutery reniedy in the federal
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. T
EXHIBIT H S

Case 3:OO—cv-00339-RNC Document 116-12 Filed 01/17/2006 Page 2 of 3
. Not Reported in A.2d Page 2
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31 124658 (Conn.Super.), 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 741
(Cite as: 2002 WL 31124658 (C0nn.Super.))
action, but all the issues necessary to determine her application of them to the facts of this case.
entitlement to relief under CFEPA were determined "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is
‘ in her favor in the federal case, she is entitled to distinguishable from collateral estoppel, or issue `
judgment as to liability on the third count. The preclusion. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a
defendant argues that based upon the doctrine of res final judgment, when rendered on the merits is an
judicata that it, and not the plaintiff, is entitled to absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the
surmnary judgment. same parties or those in privity with them, upon the
same claim. Slattery v. Mavkut, 176 Conn. 147,
DISCUSSION 156-57, 405 A.2d 76 g1978). In contrast, collateral
*2 "Summary judgment is designed to eliminate the estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues
delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is and facts actually and necessarily determined in an
no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven 213 earlier proceeding between the same parties or
Conn. 277 [1989). "The judgment sought should be those in privity with them upon a different claim.
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and DeLaurentis v. New Haven 220 Conn. 225, 239,
other proofs submitted show that there is no genuine 597 A.2d 807 (1991)." Weiss v. Statewide
issue as to any material fact and that the moving Grievance Committee 227 Corm. 802, 818, 633
parties entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A.2d 282 (1993). Mazziotti v.. Allstate Insurance S
Practice Book § 17-49. "[S]ummary judgment is an Co., 240 Conn. 799, 812 ) 1997). Emphasis added.
appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata *3 Both claim preclusion and issue preclusion
..." Joe's Pizza v. Aetna Lite & Casualg, 236 Conn. "express no more than the fundamental principle
863 )l996). "Because res judicata or collateral that once a matter has been fully and fairly
estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, litigated and finally decided, it comes to rest."
summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 465, 497 A.2d 974
resolving a claim of res judicata" Jackson v. R.G. )1985). Although claim preclusion and issue
Whipple Inc. 225 Conn. 705, 712 g 1993). preclusion often appear to merge into one another
in practice, analytically they are regarded as
This case posits an unusual situation where both the distinct. "[C]laim preclusion prevents a litigant _
plaintiff and defendant claim they are entitled to from reasserting a claim that has already been
summary judgment on the related legal theories of decided on the merits [I]ssue preclusion prevents
collateral estoppel and res judicata. Both of those a party from relitigating an issue that has been
doctrines "protect the finality of judicial determined in a prior suit." (lntemal quotation
determinations, conserve the time of courts and marks omitted.) Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124,
prevent ways for litigation," Virgo v. Lyons 209 128, 617 A.2d 440 ) 1992 ); see also Aetna Casualty
@_rpL_§9_7y_§_Qj_ Q 1988). Although the doctrines are & Surept Co. v. Jones 220 Conn. 285, 303-04, 596
related, res judicata applies to the preclusion of a A.2d 414 )1991). Jackson v. R .G. Whipple, Inc.,
claim while collateral estoppel pertains to issue 225 Conn. 707,712-13 (1993). Emphasis added.
preclusion. In this case, of course, the defendant The defendant argues that all of the plaintiffs
claims that the whole of the plaintiffs claim is underlying claims have been litigated in the federal I
precluded by the doctrine res judicata. On the other action and therefore she is precluded from bringing I
hand, the plaintiff claims that since the underlying another action. Plaintiff however argues, perhaps ¤
factual issue, that is, the fact that she was hypertechnically, that since the issues or facts were ,
discriminated against, had been determined in her detemrined in her favor in the federal court action,
favor, those issues may not be denied (or re-litigated) the defendant cannot dispute them and she is entitled
by the State and therefore she is entitled to summary to summary judgment on a collateral estoppel theory.
judgment as to liability. Because, plaintiff argues, she She claims she is entitled to litigate the issue here of
was unable to seek the full remedy (in this case, attorneys fees she was prevented from seeking in
attorneys fees under CFEPA) in the federal court, that federal court, limited to her entitlement to fees and it
claim is not precluded and her lawsuit on that count the amount of fees because of the favorable A
must go forward with liability having previously been determination of the discrimination claim in the z
determined in her favor. The defendant claims that federal lawsuit. It is this argument which the state t
this "offensive" use of the doctrine of collateral characterizes as "offensive." The question to be
estoppel or res judicata is impermissible. determined, therefore, is whether or not plaintiff
. should be permitted to use the doctrine of collateral §
It is helpful to discuss in more detail res judicata and estoppel as a sword rather than as a shield. It is 3
collateral estoppel in order to determine the proper noteworthy that plaintiff cites no case for such ~
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. .

Case 3:OO—cv-00339-RNC Document 116-12 Filed 01/17/2006 Page 3 of 3
Not Reported in A.2d Page 3 ,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WI. 31124658 (Conn.Super.), 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 741 i
(Cite as: 2002 WL 31124658 (C0nn.Super.))
affirmative use of collateral estoppel nor has the END OF DOCUMENT
court found such a case. The only reference to the
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel in the `
Practice Book appear to be at § 10-50 which requires R
that res judicata be asserted as a special defense. The
case of McCall v. the Cig of Danbury, 2001 WL
105302 gConn . Super l, cited and relied upon by the
plaintiff does support the proposition that summary
judgment is an appropriate remedy where the federal
courts have made a determination under Title VII of a
state court case seeking relief under the Fair
Employment Practices Act. Unfortunately for
plaintiff] it is a case in which a defendant
successfully used federal adjudication as a bar. The
case of Virgo v. Lyons 209 Conn. 497 (19881, also
relied upon by plaintiff is also unhelpful to the
plaintiff. In Virgo, the plaintiff successfully
prosecuted a federal Section 1983 action for police C
brutality. The subsequent state court action sought
damages for assault and battery. The Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal of the second case reasoning
that the protected interests of the 1983 action "are
similar to those protected in common law tort
actions." LQLQQQJ quoting the common law axiom
that "[a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for
his just damages for the same injury." ld. at 509. See j
also Gionfrzrldo v. Grzrtenhaus Café 15 Conn.App.
392, 406, affd., 211 Conn. 67 l1989l. FN2 j
E_N_2, The court notes that the remedies
afforded by Sections 46a—l00 and 46a-104 I
for attorneys fees and costs are to be R
awarded to "successful litigants." Doe v. l
Heintz 204 Conn. 17, 22-23 t1987l. *
Plaintiff is unable to prevail here because, as g
she admits, her damages were awarded in ;.
the federal action. l
*4 It would be impermissible to pennit the plaintiff 1
to use the doctrine of collateral estoppel affirmatively
and intemally inconsistent to say that "the issues
were resolved in my favor in the first case and may
not be relitigated by the defendant, but I am entitled {
to seek further c1amages." The defendant correctly I
notes that there was nothing that prevented plaintiff .
from seeking federal and state law relief in the State <
courts. See e.g., Creme v. 7`rinliy College 259 Conn. E
QQQQQQQ. The plaintiffs motion for summary Q
judgment is denied. The defendants motion for I
summary judgment as to the third count is granted.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 31124658
(Corin.Super.), 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 741 2
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.