Free Answer to Amended Complaint - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

THOMAS O'CONNOR, v. LYNNE B. PIERSON, ET AL

: : : : :

NO.: 3:00CV339 (RNC)

JANUARY 13, 2006

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO AMENDED COMPLAINT DATED APRIL 28, 2000 This Court never ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss. As such, these defendants had never answered the complaint.

FIRST COUNT: 1.

(Temporary and Permanent Injunction)

As to paragraph 1, the defendants admit that Thomas O'Connor was a

tenured teacher in Wethersfield, Connecticut, and that he was employed by the Wethersfield Board of Education from 1982 until 2003. The remainder of paragraph 1 is denied. 2. As to paragraph 2, the defendants admit that Lynne B. Pierson was the

Superintendent of Schools in Wethersfield. As to the remainder of paragraph 2, the defendants do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof.

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 2 of 10

3.

That portion of paragraph 3 which states: "Later in March, the plaintiff

was placed on administrative leave with pay by Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Robert B. Buganski, while an investigation was conducted over a number of allegations" is admitted. As to the remainder of paragraph 3, the defendants do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof. 4. That portion of paragraph 4 which states: "On March 29,1999, the

defendants were informed by Dr. Fred G. Rubin, the plaintiff's cardiologist, that the plaintiff was very depressed and anxious as a result of his employment situation and that he was suffering from chest pain." is denied. As to the remainder of paragraph 4, the defendants do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof. 5. Those portions of paragraph 5 which state: "Between March, 1999 and

September 3, 1999, Buganski and the defendants' attorney, Gary S. Starr, of Shipman and Goodwin, LLP, conducted an investigation into the plaintiff's performance" and "the defendants concluded on November 4, 1999 that the plaintiff needed remediation," are admitted. The remainder of paragraph 5 is denied. 6. Paragraph 6, is admitted.

2

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 3 of 10

7. 8.

Paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22 are denied. As to paragraph 8, the defendants admit that the plaintiff informed them

that he had an appointment scheduled with Dr. Rubin for November 22, 1999, and that the Board followed up with the plaintiff advising him of the need for medical certification. As to the remainder of paragraph 8, the defendants do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof. 9. As to paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 20, and 23, the defendants do not have

sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof. 10. That portion of paragraph 13 which states: "the plaintiff declined to sign

a release" is admitted. As to the remainder of paragraph 13, the defendants do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief or opinion about the truth of the matters contained therein and, therefore, leave the plaintiff to his burden of proof. 11. As to paragraph 15, the defendants admit that they warned the plaintiff

that his failure to scheduled another appointment with the psychiatrist would be deemed insubordination. The remainder of paragraph 15 is denied.

3

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 4 of 10

SECOND COUNT: (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) 12. The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Second Count, as if fully set forth herein. 13. Paragraph 22 is denied. (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

THIRD COUNT: 14.

The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Third Count, as if fully set forth herein. 15. Paragraphs 22 and 23 are denied.

FOURTH COUNT: (Invasion of Privacy) 16. The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Fourth Count, as if fully set forth herein. 17. Paragraphs 22 and 23 are denied. (Federal Civil Rights; 42 USC Section 1983)

FIFTH COUNT: 18.

The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Fifth Count, as if fully set forth herein. 19. Paragraph 22 is denied.

4

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 5 of 10

SIXTH COUNT: 20.

(State Constitutional Claim)

The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Sixth Count, as if fully set forth herein. 21. Paragraph 22 is denied. (Intentional Interference with Beneficial and Contractual Relations)

SEVENTH COUNT:

22.

The answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the First Count are hereby

made the answers to paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Seventh Count, as if fully set forth herein. 23. Paragraph 22 is denied. BY WAY OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FIRST COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: Count one is moot as the plaintiff agreed to see another psychiatrist and was returned to work. Second Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure. Third Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

5

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 6 of 10

SECOND COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Third Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity both at common law and pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-557n(a)(2)(B). Fourth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fifth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure. THIRD COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Third Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity both at common law and pursuant to Conn. Gen Stat. 52-557n(a)(2)(A).

6

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 7 of 10

Fourth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fifth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure. FOURTH COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Third Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity both at common law and pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(a)(2)(A). Fourth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fifth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure. FIFTH COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

7

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 8 of 10

Second Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Third Affirmative Defense: Dr. Pierson is entitled to qualified immunity. SIXTH COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Third Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. SEVENTH COUNT: First Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second Affirmative Defense: This claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Third Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fourth Affirmative Defense: The plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available grievance procedure.

8

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 9 of 10

DEFENDANTS, LYNNE B. PIERSON, ELLEN C. HEALY, CHRISTOPHER A. DUMAS, PATRICIA M. STRONG, CHRISTINE T. FORTUNATO, DONNA H. HEMMANN, STACEY HODGES, JOHN F. MORRIS, FREDERICK E. PETRELLI, JR., PENNY H. STANZIALE, and WETHERSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION

By/s/Alexandria L. Voccio Alexandria L. Voccio [ct21792] Howd & Ludorf, LLC 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 (860) 249-1361 (860) 249-7665 (Fax) E-Mail: [email protected]

9

Case 3:00-cv-00339-RNC

Document 114

Filed 01/17/2006

Page 10 of 10

CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing has been sent, handling charges prepaid, via U.S. Mail, to the following counsel of record this 13th day of January, 2006.

Leon M. Rosenblatt, Esquire Law Offices of Leon M. Rosenblatt 10 North Main Street, Suite 214 West Hartford, CT 06107-1988

/s/Alexandria L. Voccio Alexandria L. Voccio

2