Free Order - District Court of Arizona - Arizona


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Date: July 7, 2005
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State: Arizona
Category: District Court of Arizona
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Amended). Doc. #115. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion. 1. A motion for judgment as a matter of law "should be granted only if 'there is ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Spectrum Sciences and Software, Inc., a ) ) Florida corporation, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Natalie A. Espinoza, No. CV 02-2619-PHX-DGC (lead) CV 02-2620-PHX-DGC CV 02-2621-PHX-DGC ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.'" Winarto v. Toshiba Electronics Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000)). The Court "is not to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence and should view all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. The Court must "'disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.'" Id. (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151). The Court "'may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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2.

Defendant argues that a statutory cap of $50,000 applies in this case. The

Court has already rejected this argument. See Docs. ##106, 111. 3. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Aguirre and Hancock failed to present

sufficient evidence that the hostile actions against them were based on their gender. The Court concludes that these Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for this issue to be considered by the jury. Plaintiff Aguirre testified that on several occasions Mr. Cheshire asked her questions about her sexual relationship with her husband. She also testified that he made obscene comments while the two were riding alone in a company vehicle and that he ordered that Aguirre participate in a pat down search with a male employee. These actions were sufficiently gender-based to raise a question of fact for the jury. Plaintiff Hancock testified that she wrote a letter of complaint to Defendant based on sexual harassment in the work place, that Cheshire regularly used vulgar language and told obscene stories about activities he had experienced with women in Vietnam, that Mr. Johnson used vulgar language in her presence, that Johnson favored men, that Cheshire clearly understood that his vulgar comments upset her, that Cheshire and Johnson deliberately harassed her and placed Wagoner in a position to harass her, that Cheshire did not like women, and that the treatment made her life "a living hell" and "torture." Defendant argued at trial and argues in its motion that these actions were not gender-specific and therefore not discrimination based on gender. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury considering this evidence and other evidence concerning the actions of Cheshire and Johnson (such as the testimony of Aguirre concerning Cheshire's actions) could conclude that the actions were motivated by Plaintiff Hancock's gender. 4. Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment on the basis of its affirmative

defense that it took reasonable steps to correct sexual harassment in the work place and that Plaintiffs unreasonably failed to avail themselves of the company's sexual harassment policy.
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Plaintiffs presented evidence at trial, however, that the sexual harassment policy was not posted at the work place as Defendant claimed and was not clearly set forth in materials delivered to employees. Moreover, although Defendant presented evidence that the company president, Mr. Ham, had an open door policy, Plaintiffs testified that they were told by their supervisors not to complain to Ham. They testified that employees were threatened with termination if they complained to Ham. Given this evidence, the validity of Defendant's affirmative defense was properly submitted to the jury. 5. Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs Espinoza and Hancock failed to provide

sufficient evidence of retaliation. Plaintiff Espinoza testified that her shift assignment was changed after Cheshire concluded that she had written an anonymous letter of complaint. Hancock testified that working conditions changed after she wrote the anonymous letter, that she received less favorable employment reviews, that Cheshire and Johnson deliberately harassed her, and that their conduct amounted to "torture." This evidence raised questions of fact for the jury. 6. Relying on cases from outside the Ninth Circuit, Defendant argues that

Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of emotional distress. Specifically, Defendant argues that claims of emotional distress in a Title VII case must be supported by corroborating evidence, such as a specific discernable injury or corroborating medical or psychological evidence. The Court gave the Model Ninth Circuit Jury Instruction on damages. Plaintiffs testified about their emotional damages, describing the emotional stress caused by Defendant's actions as well as the consequences of that stress. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence for the question of emotional distress damages to be presented to the jury under appropriate Ninth Circuit instructions. IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Amended) (Doc. #115) is denied.

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DATED this 7th day of July, 2005.

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