Free Other Notice - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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PAUL K. CHARLTON United States Attorney District of Arizona KEITH E. VERCAUTEREN Assistant United States Attorney Two Renaissance Square 40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4408 Arizona State Bar No. 013439 Telephone (602) 514-7500 [email protected]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA United States of America, CR-03-1167-PHX-DGC Plaintiff, v. Kevin Augustiniak, et al., Defendants. UNITED STATES' NOTICE OF INTENT AND MOTION TO INTRODUCE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED EVIDENCE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 404(b)

Notice is hereby given that the United States of America intends to introduce inextricably intertwined evidence or, alternatively, evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the government seeks to admit evidence concerning three uncharged incidents of violence committed by Defendant KEVIN AUGUSTINIAK in 1999 and 2001. Respectfully submitted this 14th day of December, 2005. PAUL K. CHARLTON United States Attorney District of Arizona s/ Keith Vercauteren KEITH E. VERCAUTEREN Assistant United States Attorney

Case 2:03-cr-01167-DGC

Document 975

Filed 12/14/2005

Page 1 of 14

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. BACKGROUND On January 19, 2005, a grand jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment ("the Indictment") in the present case. The Indictment alleges a RICO violation and RICO conspiracy, including predicate acts of kidnapping, murder, witness tampering, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and narcotics distribution, and violent crimes in aid of racketeering, including kidnapping, murder, assaults with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and threatening to commit a crime of violence. The Indictment further alleges that the enterprise, the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club of Arizona ("HAMC"), preserved and protected the power and territory of the enterprise by using violence and threats of violence, that "[m]embers of the enterprise and their associates promoted a climate of fear through violence and threats of violence," and that "[m]embers of the enterprise and their associates used and threatened to use physical violence against various individuals." Defendant KEVIN AUGUSTINIAK ("Defendant") is charged in the Indictment with a RICO violation, RICO conspiracy and violent crimes in aid of racketeering, including predicate acts of kidnapping, murder, and witness tampering. As part of the United States case-in-chief against the defendants in this case, the United States will prove each member's status within the HAMC. For example, the United States intends to prove defendant AUGUSTINIAK's status with HAMC as follows: On December 6, 1999, AUGUSTINIAK was stopped by Phoenix police for a traffic violation. AUGUSTINIAK was wearing a Hells Angels shirt and told the investigating officer he was a pledge for the HAMC. On January 27, 2000, AUGUSTINIAK was stopped by Tempe police for driving on a suspended license. AUGUSTINIAK was wearing his HAMC Mesa prospect vest. On November 30, 2000, a Mesa police detective identifies AUGUSTINIAK as a full patch member of the HAMC Mesa chapter. On December 23, 2000, AUGUSTINIAK is observed by Tempe police wearing a full patch HAMC Mesa jacket. Additionally, defendant AUGUSTINIAK was observed on numerous occasions after that date wearing HAMC colors by other law enforcement members as well as the undercover operatives in this case.
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II.

PROPOSED EVIDENCE A. Mesa Apartment Assault

The government seeks to admit evidence concerning Defendant AUGUSTINIAK's December 10, 1999, assault on a male at an apartment in Mesa, Arizona. This assault is not charged in the Indictment. On December 10, 1999, Mesa police responded to a disorderly conduct call. AUGUSTINIAK was identified to police by Aldo Guerra. Guerra also showed the police AUGUSTINIAK's HAMC prospect vest. The police left the scene, an apartment complex in Mesa, Arizona, but returned a short time later after AUGUSTINIAK had beaten Guerra. AUGUSTINIAK had told Guerra that touching his vest was an insult to the HAMC. When the police returned, AUGUSTINIAK, who was in possession of a handgun, refused to obey their commands to exit the apartment. The police shot tear gas into the apartment. AUGUSTINIAK came to the landing outside the apartment but refused to obey police commands so the police hit AUGUSTINIAK with a bean bag round, but AUGUSTINIAK continued to refuse commands. Eventually, AUGUSTINIAK was subdued by a police dog , and suffered numerous dog bites. B. Bar Assault

The government seeks to admit evidence concerning Defendant AUGUSTINIAK's February 24, 2001, assault on a 44-year-old female at a bar in Tempe, Arizona. This assault is not charged in the Indictment. On February 24, 2001, numerous patrons witnessed Defendant AUGUSTINIAK assault a female at a bar in Tempe, Arizona. The assault was witnessed by a number of persons that were able to pick AUGUSTINIAK's photo out of a lineup. One civilian witness informed police that, during the assault, Defendant asked another HAMC member to retrieve his gun, but that the other HAMC member failed to do so. The same civilian witness reported that an HAMC member returned to the bar the next day to apologize to the bar owner. The assault victim sustained two broken teeth and a laceration to the head that required four staples to close. Although Defendant was charged with aggravated assault by the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, the charges were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.
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C.

Tempe Apartment Shooting

The government also seeks to admit evidence concerning Defendant AUGUSTINIAK's June 10, 2001, shooting of his neighbor at a Tempe, Arizona, apartment complex. This shooting is not charged in the Indictment. On June 10, 2001, Defendant shot a neighbor at his Tempe, Arizona, apartment complex, purportedly during an argument over noise. The altercation occurred on the landing between Defendant's and his victim's apartments. When Tempe police officers responded to the shooting scene, they were greeted by HAMC Mesa Chapter members Jack Perkins and Gary Dunham. Dunham was attired in a white HAMC tee shirt. Perkins and Dunham told Tempe police that they were present at the scene to offer Defendant "moral support." Near Defendant's apartment door, Tempe police discovered a sign that read, "Support Your Local Hells Angels, Mesa." Defendant was charged with the shooting and, eventually, pled guilty. On August 12, 2003, AUGUSTINIAK appeared before Maricopa County Superior Court Judge James Keppel to be sentenced for the shooting of his neighbor. At the sentencing, AUGUSTINIAK admitted being a member of the HAMC Mesa chapter for two years. In addition, Mesa HAMC member Gary Dunham told the court he was AUGUSTINIAK's sponsor in the HAMC, and testified on behalf of AUGUSTINIAK. III. LEGAL ANALYSIS The government seeks to admit evidence of Defendant AUGUSTINIAK's 1999 Mesa apartment assault, his 2001 bar assault and his 2001 apartment shooting on the grounds that such evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses, namely, that the RICO enterprise, the HAMC, preserved and protected the power and territory of the enterprise by using violence and threats of violence, that members of the enterprise and their associates promoted a climate of fear through violence and threats of violence, and that members of the enterprise and their associates used and threatened to use physical violence against various individuals. Alternatively, the government seeks to admit such evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

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A.

Inextricably Intertwined Evidence

Evidence of incidents that are "inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense are admissible independent of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Williams, 291 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Evidence is not `other acts' evidence within the scope of Rule 404(b) if it is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged."); United States v. King, 200 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 1987). Other acts evidence is admissible to demonstrate a "connected or inseparable transaction" with respect to the crimes charged. United States v. Wexler, 621 F.2d 1218, 1226 (2nd Cir. 1980). Evidence of other acts is "inextricably intertwined" if it "constitutes a part of the transaction that serves as a basis for the criminal charge," or is "necessary to . . . permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime." United States v. Serang, 156 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1998); Williams, 291 F.3d at 1189; United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, others acts evidence may be admissible for the purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred. "It is well-settled that in prosecutions for racketeering offenses, the government may introduce evidence of uncharged offenses to establish the existence of the criminal enterprise." United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90, 93 (2nd Cir. 2003) (Admitting evidence of sixteen uncharged robberies in a racketeering prosecution where the evidence was relevant to the existence of the racketeering enterprise and the conspiracy). In addition, courts have consistently held that evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, including violence, is admissible in the context of RICO or other racketeering prosecutions because they constitute inextricably intertwined evidence of RICO enterprises' criminal goals and methods. See, e.g., Williams, 291 F.3d at 1190 (in prosecution for interstate travel in aid of racketeering, evidence of repetitive assaults is admissible because "`the policies underlying the rule [404(b)] are simply inapplicable when some offenses committed in a single criminal episode become `other acts' because the defendant is indicted for less than all of his actions.'") (citation omitted.); United States v. Rolett, 151 F.3d 787, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1998) (Evidence of defendant's
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burglaries and thefts is admissible in a prosecution for murder in aid of racketeering because the property crimes were inextricably intertwined as "an integral part of the immediate context of the crime charged . . . ."); United States v. Gray, 292 F. Supp.2d 71, 78-79 (D. D.C. 2003) (In a RICO and drug conspiracy prosecution, evidence of uncharged homicides, including the homicide of an individual for a personal grievance, was permissibly introduced and admitted "as proof of the manner in which the organization's members protected their drug enterprise and individual members from detection, apprehension, and prosecution;" "[T]he government's evidence was further introduced to demonstrate that the murder successfully established [defendant] as a man of intimidating violence, a violent persona that he productively used to negotiate a more lucrative position in the organization and tighten its control over drug trafficking in that neighborhood."); United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp.2d 503, 515 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("The alleged threats of violence, shootings, beatings, and murder were all part and parcel of the defendant's attempts to keep the drug business of the [enterprise] operating smoothly and without interference, and thus Rule 404(b) is not applicable . . . ."); Cf. United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1995) (Evidence related to defendant's affiliation with the Mexican Mafia was admissible in a murder prosecution because it "was necessary to explain the reason that [defendant] would kill a stranger ­ to be accepted into the gang ­ and to how and why other inmates assisted him in obtaining the weapon.") In this case, the government alleges in Count One of the Indictment that the purposes of the RICO enterprise, the HAMC, include "[p]reserving and protecting the power and territory of the enterprise by using intimidation, murder, violence, threats of violence, and attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder" and "[k]eeping victims and witnesses in fear of the enterprise and in fear of its members and associates through violence and threats of violence." Count One of the Indictment further alleges that the means and methods of the enterprise include the commission of "acts of violence, including murder, to protect and expand the enterprise's territory and criminal operations," the promotion of "a climate of fear through violence and threats of violence," and the use and "threatened use of physical violence against various individuals." In other words, the HAMC employs systematic violence and threats of violence
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to intimidate rival motorcycle gangs from infringing HAMC "territory," to discourage victims and witnesses from cooperating with law enforcement, to insulate the HAMC from law enforcement scrutiny, and to promote a pervasive reputation for violence in the community. To this end, the HAMC encourages and rewards violence by its members and associates against any individual who wittingly or unwittingly challenges or offends the HAMC. In order to demonstrate the violent methods and means of the HAMC, the government is entitled to introduce evidence of charged and uncharged violent acts committed against rival motorcycle gangs and others, as well as evidence that the HAMC sanctions and rewards such violent conduct by its members and associates. Defendant's 1999 apartment assault as well as Defendant's 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting constitute evidence inextricably intertwined with the violent RICO enterprise charged in the Indictment. In the 1999 apartment assault, defendant AUGUSTINIAK had beaten Guerra after telling him that touching his vest was an insult to the HAMC. In the 2001 bar assault, Defendant was present with another HAMC member when he assaulted and seriously injured the female victim. Defendant's use of excessive violence to redress an apparently minor grievance is consistent with the HAMC's modus operandi of using excessive violence to intimidate a targeted victim, as well as the community. With respect to the apartment shooting, Defendant openly displayed a sign exhibiting his HAMC membership and was quickly reinforced by other HAMC members shortly after he shot his unarmed neighbor over a minor dispute. The fact that Defendant gained membership in the HAMC after the 1999 apartment assault, and then retained his membership in the HAMC despite the HAMC's knowledge of his 2001 violent conduct shows that the HAMC sanctioned his behavior. Moreover, Defendant's 2001 uncharged violent acts occurred mere months before he and other HAMC members brutally murdered Cynthia Garcia after they viciously assaulted her at the HAMC clubhouse in Mesa, Arizona. The apparent motive for Garcia's murder was her offensive comments about the HAMC. The government will present significant evidence that HAMC members were often rewarded with increased standing in the HAMC for violent attacks on rival motorcycle members and others. Consequently, Defendant's 1999 apartment assault,
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2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting constitute evidence inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses, which substantively allege that the HAMC employs systematic violence against any individual who offends an HAMC member or associate. Accordingly, such evidence is admissible independent of Rule 404(b). B. Rule 404(b)

To the extent that the Court deems that evidence of Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting are not evidence "inextricably intertwined" with the crimes charged, the government submits that the evidence is admissible pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 1) Standard of Review

A district court's decision to admit evidence of other acts will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. Williams, 291 F.3d at 1189; United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1990). A district judge is "accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to admit such evidence." Hadley, 918 F.2d at 850. 2) Admissibility under Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid., allows for the admission of uncharged other acts or wrongs. Rule 404(b) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request of the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule" and "evidence of other crimes is inadmissible only when it proves nothing but the defendant's criminal propensities." United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984); Rolett, 151 F.3d at 791. In Hadley, the Ninth Circuit detailed the three part test for admission of other act evidence:
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1.

sufficient proof exists for the jury to find that the defendant committed the prior act;

2. 3.

the prior act was not too remote in time; and the prior act is introduced to prove a material issue in the case.

Hadley, 918 F.2d at 851; United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) . Finally, the probative value of the other act must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852. If other act evidence involves prior criminal conduct, it may be admitted to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and identity. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1268 (9th Cir. 1989). In order to admit evidence of prior criminal conduct, the following prerequisites must be met: 1. There is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act; 2. The prior criminal conduct must not be too remote in time from the commission of the crime charged; 3. The prior criminal conduct must be similar to the offense charged if offered to prove identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident; 4. The prior criminal conduct must be introduced to prove an element of the charged offense that is a material issue in the case. Id. at 1268. Once the court has determined that these prerequisites have been satisfied, the evidence is admissible if the court determines that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. a. Proof of Act In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the issue of "sufficient proof." The Supreme Court held: [T]he trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact ... by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Id. at 690, citing 21 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5054, p. 269 (1977). In Huddleston, the Court further stated that in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must consider all of the evidence presented to the jury: Individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. Id. at 690-91, citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987). Sufficient proof exists for a jury to find that the defendant committed the other acts merely from the testimony of other act victims or witnesses. Hadley, 198 F.2d at 851. In this case, Defendant was charged with the 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shootings. The bar assault was witnessed by numerous individuals, including witnesses who cooperated with law enforcement officials. Defendant was convicted for the apartment shooting. Accordingly, sufficient proof exists to establish that Defendant committed the uncharged violent acts. b. Remoteness As to remoteness of the other acts, Defendant's 1999 apartment assault was less than two years prior to the RICO predicate homicide of Cynthia Garcia. Defendant's 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting occurred within mere months of the charged October 27, 2001, RICO predicate homicide of Cynthia Garcia. In Hadley, the Ninth Circuit allowed other act evidence that was 10 years old. Id. at 851; See also, United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1997) (13 year old prior bad act allowed due to similarity of conduct). c. Materiality A district court's decision regarding the relevance of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). Regardless of the defense in a case, the Government must prove each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852. The defense cannot preclude the government from proving any element simply by focusing on other elements of the crime. Id.

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In this case, Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting are material to the charged offenses because they illustrate the methods and means employed by the RICO enterprise, the HAMC, to intimidate through violence any person who challenges or offends a member or associate of the HAMC. 1. Motive, Intent, Knowledge or Plan The other act evidence may also be admitted to prove motive, intent or plan. United States v. Sneezer, 983 F. 2d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 113 (1993). If the other act is admitted to prove intent, it must be similar to the offense charged. United States v. Ayers, 924 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991). Rule 404(b) evidence of intent is not restricted to the United States' rebuttal case. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 915 (5th Cir. 1978) (if intent is an element of the offense, Rule 404(b) evidence is relevant even if defendant does not raise issue of intent). In United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977), the court held that other crimes evidence was admissible in the United States' case-in-chief to show intent when the defendant made it clear pretrial that he would raise a duress defense. See also, United States v. Carpenter, 933 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding admission of other act evidence to show knowledge when the defendant raised the issue in opening statement). The United States' burden of proof for similar act evidence is simply "whether the jury could find that the defendant committed the offense." United States v. Edwards, 696 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 1983). In this case, Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting demonstrate that, as with numerous charged offenses in the Indictment, the HAMC routinely employs excessive violence to intimidate any individual who challenges the HAMC for any reason. HAMC members, such as Defendant, are rewarded with enhanced status within the HAMC for their violent conduct, and the cumulative effect of such violence also benefits the HAMC because it reinforces the enterprise's reputation in the community for violent intimidation. The HAMC is able to maintain their ability to intimidate rival motorcycle gang members, as well as other victims and witnesses of their criminal activities. Consequently,

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Defendant's uncharged criminal conduct is admissible to prove the enterprise's motive, intent, knowledge, and plan to use systematic violence to intimidate the community. 2. Modus operandi, similar scheme The other act evidence is also admissible to show a similar scheme and modus operandi. United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1984), citing United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980). Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting also demonstrate the HAMC's modus operandi with respect to the use of systematic violence to maintain control over their "territory" and in their attempts to intimidate victims, witnesses, and law enforcement. C. Probative Value

A district court's determination under Fed. R. Evid. 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dota, 33 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 432 (1995). In making a Rule 403 determination, the issue is whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In Hadley, the trial court found and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the probative value of testimony regarding other uncharged acts of sodomy was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Further, any prejudicial effect of the evidence can be limited by the court's final limiting instruction to the jury. Hadley, 98 F.2d at 852. In this case, evidence of Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting is admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is offered to prove the RICO enterprise's, the HAMC's, motive, intent, knowledge, plan, and modus operandi. The

government will present evidence that demonstrates that the HAMC encourages and rewards the use of violence as a method to intimidate other organizations and individuals who challenge the HAMC's control within its perceived "territory." Defendant's uncharged violent criminal conduct is highly probative of the HAMC's pattern of violent intimidation. Evidence of Defendant's prior criminal conduct is not offered to prove Defendant's bad character or to show conformity therewith, but rather, for the permissible purposes enumerated in Rule 404(b).
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Moreover, the probative value of Defendant's uncharged criminal conduct is not substantially outweighed by potential prejudice because the uncharged conduct is less inflammatory than the murder charged in the Indictment. See, e.g., Baez, 349 F.3d at 94. Accordingly, evidence of Defendant's 2001 bar assault and apartment shooting is admissible under Rule 404(b). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully requests that the Court admit, pursuant to the inextricably intertwined evidence doctrine, evidence of Defendant's 1999 apartment assault, 2001 bar assault and 2001 apartment shooting. Alternatively, the government requests that the Court admit such evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). Respectfully submitted this 14th day of December, 2005. PAUL K. CHARLTON United States Attorney District of Arizona s/ Keith Vercauteren KEITH E. VERCAUTEREN Assistant United States Attorney

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I hereby certify that on December 14, 2005, I electronically transmitted the attached 2 document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF system for filing and 3 transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:
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Joseph E. Abodeely, [email protected], [email protected] David Zeltner Chesnoff, [email protected] Carmen Lynne Fischer, [email protected], [email protected] Patricia Ann Gitre, [email protected], [email protected] Alan Richard Hock, [email protected] Thomas M Hoidal, [email protected], [email protected] Barbara Lynn Hull, [email protected] David M Ochoa, [email protected] Jose S Padilla, [email protected], [email protected] Mark A Paige, [email protected] James Sun Park, [email protected], [email protected],[email protected] C Kenneth Ray, II, [email protected] Brian Fredrick Russo, [email protected], [email protected] Michael Shay Ryan, [email protected], [email protected] Philip A Seplow, [email protected], [email protected] Robert Storrs, [email protected], [email protected] s/ Keith Vercauteren KEITH E. VERCAUTEREN Assistant United States Attorney