Free Order on Motion for Reconsideration - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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WO

MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nathaniel Hearn, Plaintiff, vs. Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., Defendants.

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No. CV 03-1924-PHX-MHM (MEA) ORDER

Plaintiff Nathaniel Hearns is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman
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in Florence, Arizona. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983 concerning his previous confinement in the Maricopa County Madison Street Jail.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court screened the First Amended Complaint
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and dismissed without prejudice Counts One through Nine of Plaintiff's First Amended
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Complaint and the Defendants named in those counts. The Court called for an answer from
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Defendant Sergeant Riddle to Count Ten of the First Amended Complaint.
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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal
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Without Prejudice of Counts and Defendants (Doc. #19), which seeks reconsideration of the
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portions of the Court's Order dismissing without prejudice Counts One through Nine of
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Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
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The Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for

Reconsideration.
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Case 2:03-cv-01924-MHM-MEA

Document 25

Filed 08/17/2006

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I. Motion for Reconsideration "Motions to reconsider are appropriate only in rare circumstances." Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). "Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). "The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985). Such motions should not be used for the purpose of asking a court "`to rethink what the court had already thought through -- rightly or wrongly.'" Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F. Supp. at 1351 (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). A. Count One In Count One of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Arpaio had "failed to adequately train detention officer and Sgt. to the constitutional limits to make sure they follow them and then do not show a deliberate indifference." The Court dismissed Count One because Plaintiff had failed to allege any constitutional deprivation and because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff focuses on the Court's statement that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. He argues that Defendant Arpaio, as Maricopa County Sheriff, is ultimately responsible for the institution of policy. The Court finds no basis to depart from its original decision, which dismissed Count One because Plaintiff had failed to allege any constitutional deprivation and because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. B. Counts Two, Three, and Four In Counts Two, Three, and Four, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Roberson, Wade, and Deputy Sheriff John Doe denied his right of access to the courts when they failed to provide Plaintiff with clean clothes and transportation to the courthouse for a probation
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violation hearing. The Court dismissed these claims pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), noting that a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on these claims would imply that his continued incarceration was invalid. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that "although the incarceration for [the] probation violation was invalid," his claim is that Defendants violated their obligation to transfer him to court, which prevented him from appearing in court and, because he was representing himself, from defending himself. He argues that "the claim presented is not a rigid Heck . . . claim. Although what occurred is mirrored with Heck v. Humphrey, the claim is based on what occurred just prior to the Heck v. Humphrey[] deprivation." The Court finds no basis to depart from its original decision. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 ("[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [invalidated].") (emphasis added, footnote omitted); See Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Heck to probation and parole revocation hearings). C. Count Five In Count Five, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Rodgers was deliberately indifferent because she refused to provide Plaintiff with clean clothes, thereby forcing him to appear in court with "smelly unclean clothes." The Court dismissed this claim because Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a constitutional deprivation that would give rise to a claim of deliberate indifference. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had an obligation to provide adequate clothing and that he should be given an opportunity to determine Defendant's state of mind. The Court finds no basis to depart from its original decision. Although Plaintiff may have had to appear in court with smelly unclean clothes on one occasion, this de minimis deprivation is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference. See Young v. Berks County Prison, 940 F. Supp. 121, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (although plaintiff "was often forced to wear ill-fitting, dirty, or torn clothes" the deprivation was "not
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`sufficiently serious' to be of constitutional dimension," and defendants "could have intentionally subjected [plaintiff] to the deprivation . . . and their conduct would still not amount to a constitutional violation"). D. Counts Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine In Count Six, Plaintiff alleged that, after being placed in disciplinary segregation, he was denied his legal documents and writing materials, and Inmate Legal Services refused to mail his motions to the court. As a result, Plaintiff, who was representing himself, was unable to prepare his defense in his criminal case. In Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Glee refused to take Plaintiff to his legal visits, Defendant Hill removed legal documents - including important witness information - from Plaintiff's cell, and Defendant Browning destroyed Plaintiff's legal documents and put Plaintiff in disciplinary lock-up. Plaintiff's alleged injury in each of these claims is that he was unable to have witnesses testify in his behalf at trial and he was consequently found guilty. The Court dismissed these claims pursuant to Heck. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff relies on his "previous access to the courts arguments." The Court finds no basis to depart from its original conclusion that these counts should be dismissed pursuant to Heck. IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal Without Prejudice of Counts and Defendants (Doc. #19) is denied. (2) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to Rule 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings. DATED this 15th day of August, 2006.

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