Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

) ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) Estrella Foothills High School; Henry ) Schmidt, Superintendent of Schools for ) Estrella Foothills School; Eric Godfrey; ) ) Jerry Nunez; Marty Arambel; Phillip Echeverria; Jeannie Guy; Jerry Kerr; and ) ) Gary Mayfield, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Kenneth Lyon and Towanda Lyon, for Taralyn D. Lyon,

No. CV 03-2306-PHX-JAT ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 26). Plaintiffs Kenneth Lyon and Towanda Lyon, for their daughter, Taralyn D. Lyon ("Ms. Lyon"), have filed a Response (Doc. # 29), and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. # 33). For the following reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Ms. Lyon's claims, except for her equal protection claim. I. Legal Standard - Motion for Summary Judgment Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file that establish the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The non-movant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Rather, the non-movant's response must set forth specific facts by affidavits or by other admissible evidence as provided in Rule 56, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of the case, resolution of the factual dispute might affect the case's outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Factual disputes are genuine if they "properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. Thus, a genuine issue for trial exists if the non-movant presents evidence from which a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, could resolve the material issue in its favor. Id. However, "[i]f the [non-movant's] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).

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II.

Background Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. In 2002, Ms. Lyon was

a student at Estrella Foothills High School in the Buckeye Union School District. (Doc. #27 ("Defendants' Statement of Facts") at ¶1; Doc. #30 ("Plaintiff's Statement of Facts") at ¶1.) On November 6, 2002, Eric Godfrey, the assistant principal, suspended Ms. Lyon from school for 10 days following Ms. Lyon's admission that she drank alcohol following a gym class earlier that day. In accordance with District Regulation J-4840, a formal hearing was held on November 21, 2002, regarding the administration's recommendation that Ms. Lyon be suspended for the remainder of the school year. At the hearing, both Ms. Lyon and the District were permitted to present their positions through exhibits and witness testimony. The hearing officer subsequently concluded that Ms. Lyon had consumed alcohol on campus, in violation of the District's policy. Additionally, the hearing officer affirmed the 10-day suspension, but denied the recommended long-term suspension. Ms. Lyon thereafter appealed the hearing officer's decision to the District Governing Board. On December 6, 2002, the District Governing Board affirmed the hearing officer's findings that Ms. Lyon had violated the District's policy on alcohol consumption. However, the District Governing Board modified the hearing officer's Order to adopt Principal Jerry Nunez's recommendation that Ms. Lyon be given an additional five-day suspension and that she enter into a disciplinary contract for the remainder of the school year. Ms. Lyon then filed a special action in Maricopa County Superior Court, challenging the Governing Board's decision.

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Ms. Lyon raised five issues in her special action: (1) whether the District's decision was arbitrary or capricious; (2) whether the District violated her right to due process by suspending her from school; (3) whether the District subjected her to double jeopardy in violation of the United States and Arizona Constitutions; (4) whether she violated the District's policy against unacceptable conduct on school property as a student; and (5) whether the hearing officer was partial toward the District. (DSOF, ex. 1 at 2-3.) On September 29, 2003, the Superior Court issued a seven-page minute entry order, affirming the Governing Board's decisions and denying all relief that Ms. Lyon requested. (DSOF, ex. 1.) Ms. Lyon then appealed this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. #37, Lyon v. Buckeye Union High School District No. 101, (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004) ("Memorandum Decision").) In her action before the Court of Appeals, Ms. Lyon raised the following issues: (1) did the Superior Court correctly review the Governing Board's decision as a special action; (2) did the Superior Court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow her an evidentiary hearing; (3) did the Superior Court abuse its discretion by ruling that the Governing Board's decision was not arbitrary and capricious; (4) did the Superior Court correctly hold that she did not suffer a due process or double jeopardy violation; and (5) did the Superior Court properly hold that her claims raised for the first time on appeal were waived. (Mem. Dec. at 4, ¶9.) On December 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision affirming the Superior Court's decision, in full. (Id.) In the interim, on November 21, 2003, Ms. Lyon's parents initiated this lawsuit on Ms. Lyon's behalf. (Doc. #1.) In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Lyon asserts claims pursuant -4Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 4 of 21

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) denial of due process rights by "fail[ing] to notify [Ms. Lyon]'s parents as required by law and [school] policy of the police therefore denying her [the] right to counsel under the United States Constitution"; (2) denial of equal protection by "treat[ing] [Ms. Lyon] unfairly and unequally"; (3) "enforc[ing] a policy that failed to consider mens rea denying her due process of law"; (4) "strict liability enforcement and a failure to consider intent when enforcing disciplinary rules"; and (5) denial of protection against double jeopardy. (Doc. #3 ("Amended Complaint") at 4.) Additionally, Ms. Lyon has asserted state law claims for: (1) "defamation and slander[] by making false statements or by presenting true statements in a false light"; and (2) false imprisonment for "refusing to allow [Ms. Lyon] to leave school upon her request." (Id.) On September 1, 2004, Defendants filed the instant Motion, arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment "on all counts because [Ms. Lyon's] constitutional claims are barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata and [because Ms. Lyon] failed to properly file a Notice of Claim which causes her state based claims to fail." (Motion at 1.) Additionally, Defendants argue that Mr. Lyon's "state[-]based claims also fail on the merits because she cannot establish a prima facie case of false imprisonment or defamation." (Id.) III. Discussion A. Ms. Lyon's Federal Claims 1. Due Process and Double Jeopardy Claims

Defendants first argue that Ms. Lyon is collaterally estopped from litigating her due process and double jeopardy claims because she previously litigated them in state court. The Court agrees with Defendants. -5Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 5 of 21

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Generally, state law governs the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to a state court judgment in a federal civil rights action. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, the judgments sought to be enforced are from Arizona courts. Accordingly, Arizona law will govern whether res judicata and/or collateral estoppel applies. As the parties seeking to assert preclusion (res judicata or collateral estoppel), Defendants bear the burden of proving each of the elements of either doctrine. See State Compensation Fund v. Yellow Cab Co. of Phoenix, 3 P.3d 1040, 1044, ¶14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). In Arizona, res judicata will preclude a claim when a previous judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties was, or might have been, determined in the former action. Hall v. Lalli, 977 P.2d 776, 779 (Ariz. 1999). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies when: (1) the issue to be litigated was actually litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) a final judgment was entered in the prior litigation; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked had a full opportunity to litigate the issue; (4) the party actually did litigate the issue; and (5) the issue was essential to a final judgment. See Garcia v. General Motors Corp., 990 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Ariz. App. 2000). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid final judgment is conclusive as to every issue decided and every issue raised by record that could have been decided. Heinig v. Hudman, 865 P.2d 110, 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

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As Defendants correctly point out, both the Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals have previously issued judgments on her due process claim.1 First, in her special action before the Superior Court, Ms. Lyon claimed that the District's actions violated her right to due process of law. In its minute entry order, the court held: 4. Due Process Violation Lyon asserts that the Defendant did not afford her due process. The Plaintiff, [Ms. Lyon], claims that she received "absolutely no notice before the ten (10) day suspension was ordered on November 6, 2002," and the notice of November 13, 2002, for a hearing was insufficient to prepare, thus depriving her of her due process rights. Due Process consists of the right to be heard under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 4 of Article II of the Arizona Constitution. The Supreme Court has stated that "At the very minimum, students facing suspension must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing . . . ." The court also stated that the ". . . timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests . . . ." Furthermore, the Court stated that ". . . the hearing should precede the student's removal . . . but if prior notice and hearing is not feasible . . . the necessary notice should follow as soon as practicable." The District did not deprive [Ms.] Lyon of her due process rights. District regulations JKRC enumerates the due process rights afforded to every student in the District. These rights include: (1) the right to know the charges; (2) the right to respond to the charges, telling the student's side of the story; and (3) the right to appeal the decision to the Governing Board, as outlined in Policy JKD, if the suspension from school is for more than nine (9) days. While Defendants argue that Ms. Lyon is collaterally estopped from relitigating her due process and double jeopardy claims in this action, because Defendants' theory is that she previously asserted these same claims in state court proceedings, as opposed to subissues of these claims, res judicata is the proper theory of preclusion. -7Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 7 of 21
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The record reflects that [Ms.] Lyon was afforded each of these rights. Mr. Godfrey fully informed [Ms.] Lyon of the charges against her when she first arrived at his office on November 6, 2002. Godfrey told [Ms.] Lyon that a student had reported her behavior, that the school wanted to ensure her safety, and that he wanted to determine whether she had violated school policy. Godfrey then gave [Ms.] Lyon time to tell her story. On November 13, 2002, the Principal, Mr. Nunez's, letter to the Lyon family further informed them of the charges and the hearing scheduled for November 21, 2002. Lyon, through counsel, had the opportunity to present her position at the hearing. Exercising her due process rights [Ms.] has filed an appeal. In this case, [Ms.] Lyon was afforded notice and a hearing and therefore, this court finds that [she] was afforded due process. (DSOF, ex. 1.) Thus, Ms. Lyon previously asserted a cause of action against the District for violation of her right to due process, and the Superior Court issued a final judgment on the merits denying her claim. Further, as indicated above, Ms. Lyon appealed the trial court's decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. As one of her issues on appeal, Ms. Lyon argued that the District violated her due process rights on two grounds: (1) "the [D]istrict violated its own notice provisions when she was sent home the day she drank alcohol on school grounds; and (2) she argues that Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)[,] requires more process than she was afforded." (Doc. #37, Memorandum Decision at 9, ¶21.) Reviewing Ms. Lyon's due process claim de novo, the court held that the District not only complied with its policy regarding student suspension, but afforded Ms. Lyon adequate process. Specifically, the court held, in pertinent part:

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Moreover, the district complied with each step of it's [sic.] student suspension regulation in accordance with the district manual. The school notified [Ms. Lyon]'s parents on the day of the alleged violation that she would be given a short-term suspension of 10 days. A few days later, [Ms. Lyon] and her parents were given notice of the November 21, 2002 hearing regarding her short-term suspension and possible suspension for the school year. [Ms. Lyon], her attorney, and her parents attended the November 21 hearing and [Ms. Lyon]'s attorney presented her position through exhibits and witness testimony. [Ms. Lyon] suffered no due process deprivation because she was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Id. at 10-11, ¶¶25-26.) Thus, Ms. Lyon also raised the issue of whether the District's conduct violated her due process rights at the state appellate court level, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's decision. Likewise, Ms. Lyon also raised, and both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals denied, her claim that the District violated her right to be free from double jeopardy when it imposed and later amended the length of her suspension. As detailed in the Superior Court's minute entry order: [Ms.] Lyon argues that she is being tried and punished for the same misconduct three (3) times - once for ten (10) days, once for a year and an additional five (5) days. .... [Ms.] Lyon appealed to the School Board. The School Board's policy JKD, Step 6, states that "If the Board determines that the punishment was not reasonable, they may modify the punishment." In this case, the Board determined that the Hearing Officer's punishment was not reasonable and modified it to include an additional five (5) day suspension. Despite a recommendation to suspend [Ms.] Lyon for the year, the Board accepted the Principal's recommendation to stay the year long suspension, which was appropriate under the facts of this case. -9Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 9 of 21

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The Board did, however, modify the punishment with an additional five days, instead of a year, pursuant to their authority outlined in the School Board's policy. This was not multiple punishment for the same acts, but a review of the original punishment, at Plaintiff's request. Therefore, this court concludes that [Ms. Lyon] has not been subject to multiple punishments for the same crime, violating her right to be free from double jeopardy. (PSOF, ex. 1 at 5-6.) Ms. Lyon appealed the trial court's denial of her double jeopardy claim. The Court of Appeals held, in pertinent part: [Ms. Lyon] argues that her Fifth Amendment rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated because "she is being tried and punished for the same misconduct two (2) times; once for 10 days, once for a year." .... Because Double Jeopardy is a criminal concept stemming from the Fifth Amendment, it does not apply in this situation. Being subjected to school discipline is not the same as being prosecuted for a criminal offense. See In re Gila County Juvenile Delinquency Action, 169 Ariz. 53, 54 816 P.2d 950, 951 (App. 1991) (expelling minor from school did not constitute punishment under Double Jeopardy Clause so as to preclude state from punishing juveniles through delinquency proceedings for same conduct). .... Furthermore, even if Double Jeopardy principles applied, [Ms. Lyon] was not placed in jeopardy twice. The penalty she received was one penalty, not two. Therefore, we do not agree with [Ms. Lyon]'s claim that the Board's decision violates principles of Double Jeopardy.

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(Mem. Dec. at 12-13, ¶¶27-28, 30-31.) Thus, Ms. Lyon previously asserted her double jeopardy claim against the District in both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals, and both courts issued final decisions denying relief. Nevertheless, Ms. Lyon argues that she should not be precluded from asserting her Section 1983 claims in this action. Specifically, she argues that she "was not allowed to litigate [the] claims in the Superior Court; rather [she was] permitted limited review of the School Board's decision based on very limited criteria as set forth in Rule 3 of the Arizona Rules of Procedures for Special Actions[.]" (Resp. at 6.) Thus, she contends that her "42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were never presented to the Arizona Superior Court and were never litigated, much less fully litigated, because Arizona law precludes this from happening in a

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"special action" which is the method used in Arizona to review the decisions of school boards." (Resp. at 7 (emphasis in original).) The Court, however, disagrees. The Superior Court's minute entry order and the Court of Appeals' memorandum decision both clearly demonstrate that Ms. Lyon previously litigated her due process and double jeopardy claims before both courts. Ms. Lyon's attempt to differentiate the claims she has asserted in this case from those asserted in her special action is also unavailing. Ms. Lyon argues that the special action was strictly a review of the District's decision to suspend her from school, and was limited to the three bases for subject matter jurisdiction set forth in Rule 3 of Arizona's Rules of Procedure for Special Actions.2

This rule provides: The only questions that may be raised in a special action are: (a) Whether the defendant has failed to exercise discretion which he has a duty to exercise; or to perform a duty - 11 Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 11 of 21

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Thus, she argues that she "was not permitted to litigate whether the actions of the School Board and/or its members violated [her rights] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (Resp. at 6.) Ms. Lyon's argument, however, ignores the fact that she is again alleging in this case that the Defendants' decision to suspend her, and the steps it took in reaching that decision, violated her due process rights. Although she has now cast her constitutional challenges as claims pursuant to Section 1983, they remain factually and legally identical to the claims she previously raised in Superior Court and before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, it is unclear what new arguments or facts Ms. Lyon would present in this case that would compel this Court to reach conclusions different from the state courts. In sum, Ms. Lyon previously asserted claims against the District for violation of her right to due process and violation of her right to be free from double jeopardy. The Maricopa County Superior Court issued a valid decision denying Ms. Lyon's request for relief on both claims and affirmed the District Governing Board's decision to suspend Ms. Lyon. Further, on appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's decision on both claims, as well. Thus, the Court holds that Ms. Lyon is precluded from re-asserting and relitigating her due process and double jeopardy claims in federal court. The Court will therefore grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to these claims.

required by law as to which he has no discretion; or (b) Whether the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or (c) Whether a determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. - 12 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 12 of 21

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2.

Right to Counsel Claim

Additionally, as one of her "Theories of Liability" in her Amended Complaint, Ms. Lyon asserts that, "Defendant failed to notify [her] parents as required by law and policy of the involvement of the police therefore denying her right to counsel under the United States Constitution." (Am. Compl. at 4, ¶15.) Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because: (1) the right to counsel does not extend to civil matters; and (2) the claim is barred by res judicata. Defendants' arguments are well-taken. As Defendants correctly point out, the right to counsel secured by the federal Constitution offers little protection in the civil context. Here, Ms. Lyon has failed to offer any authority recognizing that the right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment is violated when a school fails to contact a student's parents or questions a student about an alleged violation of school policy. Cf. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (right to counsel exists in juvenile delinquency proceeding because juvenile is subjected to potential loss of liberty). Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment Ms. Lyon's claim for denial of right to counsel. 3. Equal Protection Claim

In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Lyon claims that, "Defendant[s] have treated [her] unfairly and unequally." (Am. Compl. at 4, ¶17.) In her Response, Ms. Lyon characterizes this claim as one for "[d]enial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to treat [Ms. Lyon] the same as other student [sic.] for similar alleged violations." (Resp. at 3.) Although Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment "on all counts," Defendants have not addressed Ms. Lyon's equal protection claim. Reviewing the Superior - 13 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 13 of 21

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Court's minute entry order and the Court of Appeals' memorandum decision, it does not appear that Ms. Lyon previously raised this claim before either court. Accordingly, Defendants' preclusion arguments are inapplicable. Because Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on Ms. Lyon's equal protection claim, it will be proceed to trial.3 B. Ms. Lyon's State Law Claims

As indicated above, in this action Ms. Lyon has also asserted claims for false imprisonment and defamation/slander. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both claims. 1. False Imprisonment

Under Arizona law, the tort of false imprisonment is defined as, "the detention of a person without his consent and without lawful authority." Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975). "The essential element to constitute . . . false imprisonment is

Although Defendant omitted any discussion as to Ms. Lyon's equal protection claim in their Motion, at oral argument before the Court on August 24, 2005, Defendants proffered several arguments as to why the Court should enter summary judgment in their favor on any purported equal protection claim. Particularly, Defendants argued that: (1) Ms. Lyon failed to adequately plead an equal protection claim in her Amended Complaint; and (2) Ms. Lyon should have raised any equal protection claim when she was litigating her other claims before the administrative entities and state courts. The Court finds neither of these untimely-raised arguments persuasive. First, Ms. Lyon's Amended Complaint alleges as one if its theories of liability that Defendants treated her "unfairly" and "unequally." Under the federal court's notice-pleading regime, this is all that is required under Rule 8 to put Defendants on notice of Ms. Lyon's claim. Second, unlike Ms. Lyon's other constitutional claims which directly challenge the Defendant's decision to suspend her and the process that they afforded, Ms. Lyon's equal protection claim makes a broader attack on the Defendants' disciplinary actions against Ms. Lyon in relation to those taken against other students in the District. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that Plaintiff was required to assert this claim in the previous proceedings. - 14 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 14 of 21

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unlawful detention." Id. Thus, "[a] detention which occurs pursuant to legal authority . . . is not an unlawful detention." Id. Ms. Lyon claims that "Defendants did not have the right to detain [her] after the incident of November 6, 2002, but did so on several occasions." (Resp. at 11.) In response to Defendants' Non-Uniform Interrogatories, Ms. Lyon identified two instances on which her claim is based. The first alleged incident occurred on November 6, 2002, from 2:35 - 4:30 p.m. (DSOF, 19, ex. 8 at 5.) As to the reason for the detention, Ms. Lyon stated, "Mr. Godfrey had stated to me that there was a report of alcohol on campus. He was saying that he needed the safety of his students." (Id..) She contends that Defendants lacked the authority to detain her because, "[t]here was nothing in which [Ms. Lyon] had done wrong for [her] to be detained. After answering questions, that were parallel to what the other students involved had stated, there was no reason for [her] to continue being detained." (Id.) The second alleged incident occurred on or about November 22, 2002, during school hours, and was committed by Mr. Nunez. (DSOF at ¶21; ex. 8 at 5-6.) As for the basis for the alleged detention, Ms. Lyon stated, "There were no specific reasons for my detention other than to read me the letter in which I [sic.] had been faxed to my house November 22, 2002." (Id., ex. 8 at 6.) She contends that the detention was unlawful because: I was not allowed to call my parents or my lawyer when I asked right before he asked me to go into his office. He restricted my movement by telling me I could not leave or contact my parents or legal counsel. My detainment was not for breaching any school rules or anything of that nature. I did not need his letter to be read to me or asked if I understood when in his letter he states that, "If I can be of any further assistance with this matter, - 15 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 15 of 21

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please do not hesitate to, contact me . . ." By this, I believe I was held against my will.

Defendants contend that Ms. Lyon has failed to state a valid claim for false imprisonment because she cannot prove that either of the alleged detentions was unlawful. Citing Rasmus v. Arizona, 939 F. Supp. 709, 719 (D. Ariz. 1996), Defendants argue, "Arizona law gives teachers and administrators the authority to discipline students for disruptive conduct," which Defendants contend includes the authority to detain a student for violation of a school's conduct policy. They argue that in this case, "Defendants had the lawful authority to detain [Ms. Lyon] for questioning following the report that she drank alcohol on school grounds," and assert that Mr. Godfrey detained Ms. Lyon for less than two hours to speak with her about whether she violated the school's policy on alcohol consumption. In her Response, Ms. Lyon argues that Mr. Godfrey lacked authority to detain her because she was neither violent or disruptive, thereby distinguishing her case from Rasmus. She further argues that the detention was unlawful because it was longer than was required to stop the disruption. She asserts that, "Mr. Godfrey testified that [she] was not a danger, and, therefore there was no need to detain her." The Court, however, agrees with

As Defendants correctly point out, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 15341(A)(13) gives teachers and school administrators the authority to discipline students for disruptive conduct. See Rasmus, 939 F. Supp. at 719. As to the first alleged incident, Mr. Godfrey temporarily detained Ms. Lyon after it was reported that she drank alcohol on - 16 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 16 of 21

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campus earlier in the school day. Thus, the detention was prompted by Ms. Lyon's disruptive behavior, namely, her consumption of alcohol in violation of the District's policy against alcohol consumption on campus. Moreover, Ms. Lyon stated that the detention lasted just short of two hours. There is no evidence suggesting that the length of the detention was excessive in light of the severity of Ms. Lyon's violation of school policy. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Godfrey lawfully detained Ms. Lyon on November 6, 2002. In the same vein, Ms. Lyon has failed to come forward with any evidence or legal authority establishing that Mr. Nunez's act of calling her into his office amounted to false imprisonment. Mr. Nunez called Ms. Lyon into his office during school hours to review the letter he was sending to Ms. Lyon's parents regarding the disciplinary appeals process.4 Ms. Lyon has offered absolutely no authority establishing that Mr. Nunez, the school principal, lacked the authority to take such action. Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants' request for summary judgment on Ms. Lyon's false imprisonment claim. 2. Defamation and Slander

Ms. Lyon has asserted a claim against Defendants for defamation and/or slander. To succeed on a defamation claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) "actionability" of the statement either due to special harm caused by the publication or Indeed, under Ms. Lyon's theory, the mere requirement that she must attend class, as opposed to wandering around the school grounds freely, would amount to false imprisonment. - 17 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 17 of 21
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irrespective of special harm given the nature of the allegation. See Fillmore v. Maricopa Water Processing Sys., Inc., 1 CA-CV 04-0523, slip op. at ¶21 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 5, 2005). In this case, Ms. Lyon has alleged three incidents giving rise to her defamation claim. Ms. Lyon claims the first instance occurred on November 6, 2002, when she and Mr. Godfrey had the following exchange, which he repeated to the hearing officer and the school board: Ms. Lyon: I drank from the bottle. Mr. Godfrey: How many drinks did you take? Ms. Lyon: One. Mr. Godfrey: Well that's not what you told me earlier. Ms. Lyon: Yes it was. That is what I told you earlier. Mr. Godfrey: No it wasn't. Ms. Lyon: Okay. (DSOF, ex. 8 at 2.) Ms. Lyon alleges that in this exchange Mr. Godfrey made false statements which "wrongfully impeached [her] integrity." (Id.) Second, Ms. Lyon claims that Mr. Godfrey again defamed her on November 6, 2002, when she and Mr. Godfrey had the following exchange: Mr. Godfrey: Did you take a drink from the bottle? Ms. Lyon: Yes. Mr. Godfrey: Was there alcohol in the bottle? Ms. Lyon: No. Mr. Godfrey: But there was alcohol in the bottle. - 18 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 18 of 21

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Ms. Lyon: Okay, yes. Mr. Godfrey: So you drank alcohol. (Id. at 4.) Ms. Lyon claims that Mr. Godfrey made the statements to her, and repeated them to the hearing officer and, later, to the School Board. She further states that, with respect to both the first and second incidents, the statements are false because she told Mr. Godfrey that she did not know the bottle contained alcohol. As indicated above, to recover on a defamation claim, Ms. Lyon must prove "an unprivileged publication to a third party." Fillmore, slip op. at ¶13. Mr. Godfrey's statements to Ms. Lyon do not constitute publication to a third person. Further, his act of repeating these statements to the hearing officer and school board are privileged publications, and therefore cannot support a defamation claim. See Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) (recognizing absolute privilege to defame in connection with participation in judicial proceedings). Consequently, these two incidents are insufficient to support a defamation claim. Third, Ms. Lyon claims that the third incident of defamation occurred on or about November 21, 2002, when she was walking on campus and Mr. Nunez addressed her as "Hey girl," and asked her if she had a pass. Ms. Lyon claims that as a result of this statement: I was no longer acknowledged as the person. My standing academically and athletically was taken away from [me], and then for my name to no longer be used, it seemed to me as if I was no longer existent to my school. To be referred by my gender was degrading to me as a human being. I felt as if I was like a lower class person and did not deserve to be recognized as a student or by my name.

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(DSOF, ex. 8 at 3.) The Court agrees with Defendants that this incident is insufficient to support a defamation claim. Although Ms. Lyon may have been personally offended by Mr. Nunez's statement, she has failed to point to evidence that the statement was false, or that it was published to someone other than herself. Accordingly, the claim fails as a matter of law. Because Ms. Lyon has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to support a legally viable defamation claim, the Court will grant Defendants' request for summary judgment. C. Punitive Damages Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Ms. Lyon's request for punitive damages. In support, they argue that punitive damages are not recoverable from the District, and that Ms. Lyon has failed to adduce sufficient facts to support an award against the individual Defendants. The Court agrees. As Defendants correctly point out, as a municipal entity, the District is immune from punitive damages under § 1983. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, "[i]t is well-settled that a `jury may award punitive damages under § 1983 either when a defendant's conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.'" Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991)); see Dang v. Cross, Nos. 03-55403, 03-56360, 2005 WL 2000974, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005). Defendants argue that Ms. Lyon has failed to proffer any facts establishing that any of their conduct rose to this level. In her Response, Ms. Lyon has failed to offer any citation to her statement of facts supporting her request for punitive damages. (Resp. at 12.) Moreover, at oral argument Ms. Lyon's attorney conceded that there were - 20 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 43 Filed 08/31/2005 Page 20 of 21

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presently no facts in the record sufficient to justify a punitive damages award. Consequently, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Ms. Lyon's claim for punitive damages. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #29) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: IT IS ORDERED GRANTING summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Ms. Lyon's due process, double jeopardy, right to counsel, false imprisonment, defamation, and punitive damages claims. IT IS ORDERED DENYING summary judgment as to Ms. Lyon's equal protection claim. DATED this 30th day of August, 2005.

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