Free Memorandum - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

1 2 3 4

Georgia A. Staton, Bar #004863 JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C. Suite 800 2901 North Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85012 602-263-1700 Attorneys for Defendants

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7 8 9 Plaintiff, 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1. Defendants present this Trial M emorandum in order to clarify the standards applicable to Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity and Plaintiff's claims of equal protection violations. LEGAL ANALYSIS Qualified Immunity. v. Estrella Foothills High School Henry Schmidt, Superintendent of Schools for Estrella Foothills School, Eric Godfrey, Jerry Nunez, Marty Arambel, Phillip Echeverria, Jeannie Guy, Jerry Kerr, and Gary Mayfield, Defendants. TRIAL MEMORANDUM Kenneth Lyon & Towanda Lyon, for Taralyn D. Lyon, NO. CIV 03-2306-PHX-JAT

The qualified immunity doctrine shields government officials from liability if a reasonable government official could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Whether officials could have believed that their

Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT

Document 67

Filed 06/05/2006

Page 1 of 4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

conduct is reasonable is a fact-specific test and is a question for the Court. Sinaloa Lake Owners Assoc. v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9 th Cir. 1995). This case is similar to Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975), the case that sets forth the standard for determining the immunity status of school board members for decisions that they make in the course of their duties. In Strickland, the plaintiffs were high school students who were expelled when they violated the high school's rule against consuming alcohol on campus. The students sued the school board under Section 1983, alleging violations of due process. The Court used this case to articulate the level of immunity afforded to school board members in Section 1983 actions. The Court held that a school board member is immune from liability for damages under Section 1983 if he did not know that the action he took within his official capacity would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he did not take the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. Strickland, at 323. In order to void the protection of qualified immunity, the Plaitniff must prove that Defendants knowingly and intentionally applied policies inconsistently or did so with malicious intent to injure. Id. Because the Defendants applied the discipline policy consistently, Plaintiff cannot prove that they knew or should have known that they were violating her constitutional rights. Nor can Plaintiff show that the Defendants acted with "malicious intention." The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from this suit. 2. Plaintiff cannot prove that the defendants intentionally denied her equal protection.

Even if Plaintiff could sustain her burden as to Defendants' qualified 24 immunity, she cannot meet the high burden on her equal protection claim. Plaintiff 25 claims that the Defendants denied her equal protection of the laws. She does not claim 26 2 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 67 Filed 06/05/2006 Page 2 of 4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

that this denial was due to her membership in a protected class. Rather, she bases her claim on a theory that she is a "class of one." In other words, she claims that she was treated differently from other similarly situated students without a rational basis. Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9 th Cir. 2004). The standard for such claims is extremely high. Plaintiff must prove (1) a difference in treatment between Plaintiff and other similarly situated students, (2) the difference in treatment was intentional, and (3) the difference in treatment was without a rational basis. Id. Mere differences in punishment are not enough because "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass.. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). Minor differences in treatment are not enough to constitute an equal protection violation. Id. Plaintiff cannot satisfy any of the elements of this claim. She received the same treatment and discipline as the other students involved in the incident. The defendants have consistently applied the same discipline for the same infractions. Nor will Plaintiff be able to show that any difference in treatment was intentional. What Plaintiff seeks is not equal treatment but special treatment. Such a remedy is not available. CONCLUSION Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Further, even if the case were to proceed, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden and prove that she was treated differently than similarly situated students and that any treatment of her was intentional. /// /// ///

3 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 67 Filed 06/05/2006 Page 3 of 4

1 2 3

DATED this 5th day of June, 2006. JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C. By s/Georgia A. Staton Georgia A. Staton 2901 North Central Ave., Ste. 800 Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Attorneys for Defendants

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 4 Case 2:03-cv-02306-JAT Document 67 s/Gwen Coon Hon. James A. Teilborg United States District Court Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse Suite 523 401 West Washington Street, SPC 51 Phoenix, AZ 85003-2154 Joseph E. Collins, Esq. 10801 North 32nd Street, Suite 3 Phoenix, Arizona 85028 Attorney for Plaintiff Clerk of the U.S. District Court District of Arizona COPY of the foregoing mailed this 5 th day of June, 2006, to: ORIGINAL of the foregoing e-filed this 5 th day of June, 2006 with:

Filed 06/05/2006

Page 4 of 4