Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ralph Slusher, Plaintiff, vs.

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No. CV 04-0293-PHX-EHC-MEA ORDER

Plaintiff Ralph Slusher, a pro se inmate, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Before the Court is Defendant Goad's1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28), Plaintiff's Response (Doc. # 30), and Defendant's Reply thereto (Doc. # 31). The Court will grant Defendant's motion. I. Procedural History Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on November 17, 2004, in which he presented three claims for relief against Defendant Goad, Defendant John Doe, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. # 10). Upon screening, Sheriff Arpaio and Counts I and III were dismissed for failure to state a claim (Doc. # 11). Defendant Goad was required to answer

Plaintiff misspelled Defendant Goad's name as Goals.
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Count II, which presented a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs.2 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Goad was driving a van that was transporting inmates back to the jail and drove the van into a wall, seriously injuring Plaintiff's back, neck, and spine. Plaintiff further claims that after the accident, he was not given necessary emergency medical care. Defendant Goad moved for summary judgment arguing that (1) he had no duty to provide medical care because Plaintiff's injuries were not serious and (2) he did not have the necessary culpable state of mind to establish deliberate indifference (Doc. # 28). Plaintiff responded that he was seriously injured and Defendant was aware of his injuries, and therefore this case should proceed to trial (Doc. # 30). II. Summary Judgment Standard A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is "to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, "to those upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict." Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to "set forth Count II of the First Amended Complaint also named Deputy John Doe, who was also transporting the inmates when the accident occurred. The Court did not dismiss John Doe, but instructed Plaintiff to move to amend his First Amended Complaint should he discover the identity of the individual during discovery. -2Document 34 Filed 02/16/2007 Page 2 of 6
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" and not to "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleading." The nonmoving party must do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative." Id. at 249-50. III. Analysis A. Factual Background Plaintiff was a passenger in a Maricopa County Jail transportation van on November 19, 2003 being transported back to the Madison Street Jail from a court proceeding (Doc. # 28, Defendant's Statement of Facts, ¶ 1). As the van was "idling" into a space in the jail's parking lot, the van struck a pole (Doc. # 28, Ex. A at 1). The resulting damage to the van was an approximate two-foot by two-foot paint transfer and slight indentations to the passenger side of the van (Id.). Plaintiff claims that he was thrown to the floor after the collision and suffered severe neck, back, and spinal injuries. Plaintiff further claims that he informed Defendant that his neck and back were injured, but Defendant failed to immediately secure medical treatment for Plaintiff. Plaintiff received medical treatment twice after the accident before he was transferred to the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) in March. Both times he was treated with ibuprofen for pain. Plaintiff did not request any other medical treatment after his transfer to ADC. B. Analysis To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff, whether a convicted inmate or pretrial detainee, must show that defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to the alleged constitutional violations. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991).
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"[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). "To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious . . . health needs, the prisoner must show that 'the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health.'" Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)). "Further, the deliberate indifference must be both 'purposeful,' and 'substantial' in nature.'" Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 525 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). "Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they 'deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment. . . .Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.'" Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Plaintiff claims that he was seriously injured after the van collided with the pole in the jail's parking lot. Specifically, he claims that he suffered neck and back injuries (Doc. # 30 at 2). Initially, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff had a "serious medical need." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The reports prepared after the accident reflect that Plaintiff was shackled to four other inmates. When the van collided with the pole, Plaintiff was thrown to the floor of the van (Doc. # 28, Ex. 1, at 11). All five inmates were able to get up and walk into the jail without falling out of line (Id. at 12). Plaintiff was not bleeding, although he did report that his neck and back were in pain (Id., Doc. # 30 at 2). Plaintiff was seen twice by the jail's medical providers after the accident and both times he was prescribed ibuprofen (Doc. # 28, Ex. 1 at 15). The medical providers also took x-rays of Plaintiff's neck and back, which did not reveal any serious injury (Id.). Plaintiff remained in the custody of the Maricopa County Jail // // //
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System until March of 2004, when he was transferred to the ADC. Plaintiff did not request any medical treatment for his neck or back following this transfer to the ADC (Id. at 17-18). Neither these facts nor any evidence supports that Plaintiff had a serious medical need. Even assuming that Plaintiff had a "serious medical need" after the accident, the Court finds that there is no evidence that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. No evidence even suggests that Plaintiff required emergency medical treatment after the accident. Indeed, Plaintiff was able to get up and walk into the jail and he was neither bleeding nor displaying any injuries. While Plaintiff did report that he was in pain, that does not support that he required emergency medical care. The Court finds that Plaintiff's injuries, as objectively perceived by Defendant, were not sufficiently serious to trigger a duty to obtain emergency medical assistance. Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1543 (D. Ariz. 1993) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980) and Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). Moreover, a delay in treatment does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the delay caused substantial harm. Id. Here, because Plaintiff did not have serious injuries, as evidenced by treatment with only ibuprofen, the Court finds that any delay that Plaintiff experienced in receiving treatment did not cause any harm, much less substantial harm. The Court will, therefore, grant Defendant's motion. IV. Remaining Defendant In the Court's October 7, 2005 screening Order, this Court instructed Plaintiff that he would need to seek leave to amend if he wanted to serve Deputy John Doe named in his First Amended Complaint. Despite sufficient opportunity for discovery, Plaintiff has not sought to amend his complaint to identify the Doe Defendant. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: (1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28) is GRANTED. (2) Defendant Goad is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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(3) Deputy John Doe is DISMISSED without prejudice. DATED this 14th day of February, 2007.

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