Free Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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ANDREW P. THOMAS MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY By: MICHAEL J. MASSEE State Bar No. 015901 JOSEPH VIGIL State Bar No. 018677 Deputy County Attorneys MCAO Firm No. 00032000

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CIVIL DIVISION Security Center Building 222 North Central Avenue, Suite 1100 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2206 Telephone (602) 506-8541 Attorneys for Defendant Deputy Jeremy Goad IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Defendant Deputy "J. T. Goals," whose true name is Jeremy Goad, hereby moves for summary judgment. Because Plaintiff has not presented a material dispute of fact requiring a trial, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This Motion is supported by the Statement of Facts filed herewith
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Ralph Slusher, Plaintiff, v. J. T. Goals, Defendant.

NO. CV 04-0293-PHX-EHC (MEA) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA

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and the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Plaintiff's Count II alleges that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when he failed to obtain for him medical care in the "sally port" or entrance parking lot directly underneath the Madison Street Jail. Because Defendant had no duty regarding providing medical care, because whatever injuries Plaintiff sustained were not serious, and because there is no showing that Defendant had the necessary culpable state of mind, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I. Legal Standards for Deliberate Indifference Claim To establish a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Eighth or Fourteenth amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment stemming from a denial of medical care, Plaintiff must show that Defendant knew of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his well-being. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). "In addition to a sufficiently serious objective harm, an Eighth Amendment violation requires a showing that the subjective state of mind of the prison officials was culpable." Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 733 (9th Cir. 2000). The culpable state of mind exists where the prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk" to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Defendant must have a subjective awareness of the need for medical care, and gross negligence does

not arise to such a showing. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA Document 28 2 Filed 08/22/2006 Page 2 of 7

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(9th Cir. 1990). II. Factual Background Plaintiff was an inmate in the Maricopa County jails on November 19, 2003, when he was being transported back from a court hearing to Madison Street Jail in a jail transport van. Defendant's Statement of Facts ("SOF") ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that the van suddenly stopped and he was thrown against the compartment wall inside the van. SOF ¶ 2. Plaintiff admits he does not know how fast the van was moving just prior to its sudden stop. SOF ¶ 3. After this accident, Plaintiff found himself lying on the floor of the van. SOF ¶ 4. He was still shackled to the inmates on either side of him, and they all exited the van. SOF ¶ 5. He was not bleeding, does not recall if he lost consciousness but claims that he was in severe pain. SOF ¶ 6. When he walked back to his cell, Plaintiff was shackled to other inmates and did not fall out of line. SOF ¶ 7. After he got back to his housing unit, Plaintiff put in a request for medical care and a grievance for not having received medical care immediately. SOF ¶ 8. He saw a nurse about 13 days later, but Plaintiff admits that this delay was not caused by Defendant. SOF ¶ 9. Plaintiff was seen by medical providers twice after this incident, and each time he was prescribed pain medication. SOF ¶ 10. X-rays were taken on the first visit, which showed no traumatic injuries. SOF ¶ 11. Plaintiff was released from the custody of the Maricopa County jail to the Arizona Department of Corrections in

March of 2004. SOF ¶ 12. From the time of this accident until the following Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA Document 28 3 Filed 08/22/2006 Page 3 of 7

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March, Plaintiff treated only two times for his injuries. SOF ¶ 13. Since then he has not requested any additional treatment, either while in the custody of Maricopa County or the Department of Corrections. SOF ¶ 14. Upon learning of this incident, Defendant's supervisor, Sgt. Keith Kochis, conducted an investigation. SOF ¶ 15. His report reflects that damage to the van caused by the van's scraping against a concrete pylon was estimated at $500, but to his knowledge no repairs were actually undertaken because the dent did not impact the van's operations. SOF ¶ 16. According to Sgt. Kochis, the primary duty of transport deputies is to ensure that the inmates remain in secure custody throughout the transport operation so that the safety of the public is maintained. SOF ¶ 17. When any

transport deputy is involved in an accident, he must use sound judgment to determine whether to request emergency services or to return the inmates that are being transported to a secure location where they can then access medical services as necessary. SOF ¶ 18. Medical care for inmates was available in the Madison Street Jail. SOF ¶ 19. In this case, based on the non-emergency nature of Plaintiff's injuries and the relatively minor nature of the accident, Sgt. Kochis concludes that Defendant acted properly in returning the inmates to their respective houses within the Madison Street Jail where they could access medical services in accordance with their needs and jail procedures. SOF ¶ 20. III. Analysis

The above facts show that Plaintiff's claim of cruel and unusual Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA Document 28 4 Filed 08/22/2006 Page 4 of 7

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punishment as a result of being denied immediate medical care fails to establish either prong of the relevant test: neither an objective showing of serious need for medical care, nor the required showing of a culpable mental state by this Defendant. The question of whether the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim has been met presents an issue of law for the court to decide. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1993)). Here, Plaintiff's injuries, as

objectively perceived by this Defendant, were not sufficiently serious to trigger a duty of obtaining immediate emergency medical assistance. Plaintiff was not bleeding and was able to get out of the van unassisted and thereafter walked to his assigned housing unit in the Madison Street jail without falling out of line. Plaintiff claims that he was in severe pain and further claims that he requested medical care on the spot. However, the X-rays did not reveal any traumatic injuries and the only medical care Plaintiff has received as a result of his claims of being injured in this accident was common pain medication. After completing the regimen of pain medication, Plaintiff did not request any further treatment. There is simply no evidence in the record that Plaintiff was seriously injured in this low-speed incident that occurred as the van was being parked. Moreover, there is no evidence that supports a conclusion that Defendant had the required culpable state of mind sufficient to impose liability for cruel and unusual punishment.

Defendant was charged with maintaining Plaintiff in Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA Document 28 5 Filed 08/22/2006 Page 5 of 7

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secure custody and returning him to the jail. As such, when he scraped the van on a concrete pylon as he was parking, he had to use his judgment to determine if a medical emergency existed as a result of this low-speed incident that warranted requesting emergency responders. As this accident occurred right beneath Madison Street jail, which itself had procedures and resources to provide for inmates' medical needs, returning Plaintiff to his housing unit was an objectively reasonable option under the circumstances. There is no basis to infer that Defendant was subjectively aware that Plaintiff required immediate medical attention and that he deliberately refused to request such services on Plaintiff's behalf. Conclusion At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff must present a prima facie case that shows there is a material dispute of fact requiring a trial. Plaintiff's claim has two elements, neither of which are supported by facts present in the record. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August 2006.

ANDREW P. THOMAS MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY

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Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA Document 28 6

s/ Michael J. Massee MICHAEL J. MASSEE JOSEPH VIGIL Deputy County Attorneys Attorneys for Defendant Deputy Goad
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ORIGINAL of the foregoing E-FILED and copies MAILED this 22nd day of August 2006,

Honorable Earl H. Carroll United States District Judge Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 521 401 West Washington Street, SPC 48 Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Honorable Mark E. Aspey United States Magistrate Judge 123 North San Francisco Street, Suite 200 Flagstaff, Arizona 86001 Ralph Slusher #184486 ASPC-Douglas-MSU Mohave South Unit PO Box 5002 Douglas, Arizona 85608-5002 Plaintiff Pro Per

s/ Terri Giacalone
CJ 05-480

S:\COUNSEL\Civil\Matters\CJ\2005\Slusher CJ05-480\Pleadings\MSJ..doc

Case 2:04-cv-00293-EHC-MEA

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