Free Motion in Limine - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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LITTLER MENDELSON
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Camelback Esplanade 2425 East Camelback Road Suite 900 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602.474.3600

J. Mark Ogden, AZ Bar No. 017018 J. Greg Coulter; AZ Bar No. 016890 Kristin R. Culbertson; AZ Bar No. 020801 LITTLER MENDELSON A Professional Corporation Camelback Esplanade 2425 East Camelback Road, Suite 900 Phoenix, AZ 85016 Telephone: 602.474.3600 Facsimile: 602.957.1801 E-Mail: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant Connecticut General Life Insurance Company UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Defendant. Case No. CIV'04 0627 PHX JAT CGLIC'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: ECONOMIC DAMAGES

I.

INTRODUCTION Defendant Connecticut General Life Insurance Company ("CGLIC") hereby moves

for an Order precluding the Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") from introducing any evidence of Carmen Santa Cruz's alleged economic damages because the amount of back pay, if any, is a matter for the Court, and not the jury, to determine. Consequently, the Court should prohibit the EEOC from introducing any testimony or exhibits regarding compensation and benefits available to Ms. Santa Cruz at CGLIC and at subsequent employers, her efforts to find employment after CGLIC, and the expenses that she allegedly incurred as a result of her involvement with CGLIC.

Case 2:04-cv-00627-JAT

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LITTLER MENDELSON
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Camelback Esplanade 2425 East Camelback Road Suite 900 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602.474.3600

II.

LAW AND ARGUMENT A. Back Pay is an Equitable Remedy for the Court to Determine.

On November 8, 2001, Ms. Santa Cruz submitted an application via the Internet and mailed her resume to CGLIC. On November 15, 2001, Ms. Santa Cruz submitted an

application and tested for a Customer Service Associate position. Ms. Santa Cruz was subsequently offered the position and declined the position once she learned the details about CGLIC's rigorous attendance policy. The EEOC claims that CGLIC discriminated against Ms. Santa Cruz by withdrawing its offer of employment upon learning Ms. Santa Cruz was pregnant. The EEOC seeks back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Even if the jury finds for the EEOC on its pregnancy discrimination claim, the Court must determine whether to award Ms. Santa Cruz the equitable remedy of back pay and, if so, the amount of any such award. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held "that there is no right to have a jury determine the appropriate amount of back pay under Title VII, . . . even after the Civil Rights Act of 1991." Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 403 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). In Lutz, the Court allowed the jury to determine whether to award back pay and the amount of the award. Although the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had

appropriately requested a jury trial on the issue of back pay, it agreed with the defendant's position that "back pay is a matter for resolution by the court, not an issue triable of right by a jury." Id. Thus, under Lutz, even if liability is found, "the district court must exercise its discretion to determine an appropriate amount of back pay, if any." Id. B. Any Evidence of Economic Damages Would Be Irrelevant and Prejudicial.

Evidence that is irrelevant to any issue that the jury must determine is inadmissible at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 402; United States v. Manning, 509 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975). Indeed, "the trial judge has the function and duty to exclude [irrelevant] evidence from consideration of the jury." United States v. Higgins, 362 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 945 (1966). Relevant evidence is "[e]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
Document 1162

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LITTLER MENDELSON
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Camelback Esplanade 2425 East Camelback Road Suite 900 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602.474.3600

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Conversely, evidence that has no tendency to prove or disprove a disputed issue is irrelevant and inadmissible. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 402. The EEOC seeks to introduce evidence, including testimony and exhibits, to show that Ms. Santa Cruz suffered economic damages. This evidence includes the compensation and benefits offered by CGLIC, her efforts to find subsequent employment, the expenses that she incurred as a result of the alleged withdrawal of employment, and the compensation and benefits that she received at subsequent jobs. Given that the jury cannot determine

Ms. Santa Cruz's entitlement to back pay or the amount of any such award, all of this evidence should be excluded as irrelevant. Even if any evidence regarding Ms. Santa Cruz's alleged economic damages were relevant, it would be unduly prejudicial to admit this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 limits the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence when

countervailing factors "substantially outweigh" its probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The countervailing factors include the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. All of these factors would be present if the EEOC were permitted to present evidence of Ms. Santa Cruz's economic losses to the jury, who will be responsible for determining liability but will have no say in determining whether Ms. Santa Cruz should receive any back pay. Evidence is "unfairly prejudicial" if it unduly tends to suggest an outcome on an improper basis, or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies or something other than the legal rules relevant to the case. Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3rd Cir. 1980). "Where evidence is of very slight (if any) probative value, it is an abuse of discretion to admit it if there is even a modest likelihood of unfair prejudice or small risk of misleading the jury." United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1992). Evidence of Ms. Santa Cruz's economic loss and any financial hardship would appeal to the jury's sympathies and impact their liability

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LITTLER MENDELSON
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Camelback Esplanade 2425 East Camelback Road Suite 900 Phoenix, AZ 85016 602.474.3600

determination. The evidence that CGLIC seeks to exclude has no probative value to a pregnancy claim or any other relevant issue that the jury will have to decide. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, CGLIC respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order precluding the EEOC from introducing any evidence of Carmen Santa Cruz's alleged economic damages, including any evidence regarding the compensation and benefits that Ms. Santa Cruz would have received, her efforts to find subsequent employment, the expenses that she incurred as a result of CGLIC's purported withdrawal of the offer, and the compensation and benefits that she received at subsequent jobs. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of June, 2006.

s/ Kristin R. Culbertson J. Mark Ogden J. Greg Coulter Kristin R. Culbertson LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Connecticut General Life Insurance Company I hereby certify that on June 22, 2006, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: Mary Jo O'Neill C. Emanuel Smith Katherine J. Kruse Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Phoenix District Office 3300 North Central Avenue, Suite 690 Phoenix, AZ 85012-9688 Attorneys for Plaintiff s/ Sharon Cooper
Firmwide:81210226.1 042081.1007

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