Free Order on Motion for Reconsideration - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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IN THE UNITED S TATES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DIS TRICT OF ARIZONA

Alanco Technologies, Inc., an Arizona corporation; Technology Systems International, Inc., f/k/a TSI Acquisition Corporation, an Arizona corporation; Robert R. Kauffman and Elizabeth Kauffman, husband and wife; Greg E. Oester and Linda Oester, husband and wife, Plaintiffs,

15 vs. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, a Florida corporation, Defendant.

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No. CV-04-789-PHX-DGC ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant's mot ion for reconsideration and motion to stay the discovery schedule. Docs. ##59, 72. The motion for reconsideration will be

denied and t he Court will grant a 30-day extension of fact discovery. Terms used in this Order correspond with terms used in the Court's Order of M ay 19, 2005. Doc. #58.1

The Court concludes that oral argument on these motions is not necessary. The parties submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and facts supporting their positions. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). Case 2:04-cv-00789-DGC Document 76 Filed 10/31/2005 Page 1 of 4

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I.

Motion for Reconsideration. Defendant argues vigorously that the Court based its Order of M ay 19, 2005

(Doc. #58) on an argument never made by Plaintiffs. Doc. #59 at 2-4. T he Court does not agree. Construction of the insurance contract was an issue addressed at length by the

parties. M oreover, the N int h Circuit has held that a district court "`may grant summary judgment on any legal ground the record support s .'" Jack son, Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.14[1] (1994)). Defendant asserts t hat Plaintiffs agreed the IVI exclusion must be analyzed as of the date the claim was first made, but in making this argument Defendant cites to page 4 of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment where Plaintiffs dis cus s D efendant's argument. Doc. #59 at 2-5; see Doc. #51 at 4 ("In its previously filed M otion to Dismis s , Car olina stated that with a claims-made policy, the Court must analyze the [IVI] exclusion when the claim was first made[.]") (emphasis added). T he Court has reviewed the briefing on the

motions for summary judgment and cannot conclude that P laint iffs agreed the IVI exclusion was to be analyzed solely with respect to the first complaint filed in the State Court Suit. To the contrary, Plaintiffs argued that the IVI exclusion was to be analyzed with respect to t he amended complaint and that the amended complaint was a new claim asserted by a non-insured claimant. Doc. #51 at 3, 7-9. The motion for reconsideration relies on language from the IVI exclusion to suggest that the exclusion itself required the Court to consider only the first complaint in the State Court Suit. In so arguing, Defendant seems to contend that Section VII.C need not be

consulted because the IVI exclusion itself expres s ly ap p lies to the original complaint ­ the complaint by which the claim was "instigated" ­ in the State Court Suit. Defendant did not make this argument in its motion for summary judgment or its response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but relied instead on Section VII.C. See Docs. ##50, 54. M otions for reconsideration are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Defendant argues that t he Court's decision is incorrect in light of Pintlar Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 205 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997). The Court addressed Pintlar in its previous decision. See Doc. #58 at 6-7. M ot ions for reconsideration should

not ask the Court to rethink what it has already analyzed. See United States v . Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). Defendant argues t hat the Court's decision is contrary to Arizona law which requires that an insurance policy be construed as a whole. In reaching its previous

decis ion, however, the Court relied on the Arizona authority it considered most relevant. See Doc. #58 at 5. A gain, t he proper purpose of a motion for reconsideration is not to ask the Court to rethink its prior analysis. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. Defendant claims that the Court's decision will have implications beyond this case. It was not so intended. The Court did not p urp ort to announce broad principles of

insurance policy interpretation t hat w ould have application in cases other than this one, and it would be incorrect for Plaintiffs, Defendant , or any other party to cite the Court's prior order for some broader purpose. II. Motion to S tay Discovery. The Court ent ered a Case M anagement Order on February 18, 2005. Doc. #49. That order established a deadline for fact discovery of A ugus t 12, 2005. Id. ¶ 5. Approximately five and one-half months into the discovery s chedule, and only eleven working days before t he deadline, Defendant filed a motion arguing that discovery should be stayed until the underlying litigation has been resolved. Doc. #72 at 3. Defendant alternatively argued that discovery should be stayed until 30 days after the Court ruled on D efendant's motion for reconsideration. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that a scheduling order "shall not be modified except upon a showing of good caus e[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Good cause exists when a deadline "cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Fed. R. Civ. P . 16 Advisory Comm.'s Notes (1983 Am.). "Rule 16(b)'s `good cause' standard primarily considers the diligence of the part y s eeking the amendment."
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Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). D efendant argues that a stay might enable the parties to avoid "spending thousands of dollars seeking to compel discovery, reviewing documents, and deposing witnesses." Doc. #75 at 2. But the eleven working days that remained in the discovery

period w hen Defendant's motion was filed left little time for such activities. To the extent Defendant seeks additional time to engage in s uch dis covery, the Court finds that it has not demonstrated the diligence required for good cause under Rule 16. N or is the Court This is an

willing t o s t ay this litigation pending the outcome of the underlying case. independent action in need of independent resolution.

Because Defendant 's motion for reconsideration has been pending for some time, the Court will grant an extension of the fact discovery deadline to 30 days after the date this order is filed. All other terms of the Court's Case M anagement Order shall remain in effect. See Doc. #49. IT IS ORDERED: 1. 2. Defendants' motion for reconsideration (Doc. #59) is denied. Defendant motion to stay the discovery schedule (Doc. #72) is granted in

part, as set forth above. DATED this 31st day of October, 2005.

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