Free Response in Support of Motion - District Court of California - California

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1 ROBERT S. GERBER (BAR NO. 137961) SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 2 12275 El Camino Real, Suite 200 San Diego, California 92130 3 T: (858) 720-8900 / F: (858) 509-3691 Email: [email protected] 4 Additional counsel listed on the following page: NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 5 LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER 6 LAW OFFICE OF DAVID C. CODELL 7 Attorneys for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors and Amici Curiae EQUALITY CALIFORNIA and 8 GAY-STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK 9 10 11 12 13 CALIFORNIA EDUCATION COMMITTEE, LLC and PRISCILLA SCHREIBER, 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, in his 17 official capacity as Governor of the State of California; EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., in his 18 official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California; JACK O'CONNELL in his 19 official capacity as California Superintendent of Public Instruction; and DOES 1 through 20 20 inclusive, 21 Defendants. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
MEM. OF AMICI EQUALITY CALIFORNIA AND GSA NETWORK SUPPORTING DEFTS.' MOT. TO DISMISS CASE NO. 07-CV-02246-BTM-WMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No.: 07-CV-02246-BTM-WMC Judge: Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz [PROPOSED] MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF AMICI CURIAE EQUALITY CALIFORNIA AND GAY-STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

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1 Additional counsel for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors and Amici Curiae EQUALITY CALIFORNIA and GAY-STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK: 2 3 SHANNON MINTER (BAR NO. 168907) VANESSA H. EISEMANN (BAR NO. 210478) 4 JODY MARKSAMER (BAR NO. 229913) NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 5 870 Market Street, Suite 370 San Francisco, California 94102 6 T: (415) 392-6257 / F: (415) 392-8442 Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 7 BRIAN CHASE (BAR NO. 242542) 8 TARA BORELLI (BAR NO. 216961) LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. 9 3325 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 10 Los Angeles, California 90010 T: (213) 382-7600 / F: (213) 351-6050 11 Email: [email protected], [email protected] 12 KRISTINA WERTZ (BAR NO. 235441) TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER 13 870 Market Street, Suite 823 San Francisco, California 94102 14 T: (415) 865-0176 / F: (877) 847-1278 Email: [email protected] 15 16 DAVID C. CODELL (BAR NO. 200965) LAW OFFICE OF DAVID C. CODELL 17 9200 Sunset Boulevard, Penthouse Two Los Angeles, California 90069 18 T: (310) 273-0306 / F: (310) 273-0307 Email: [email protected] 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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1 2 3 I. 4 II. 5 III. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
IV. C. 2. B. 4. 3.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1 FACTUAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND ................................................................ 2 ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 2 A. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(1) Because Plaintiffs Lack Standing And Their Claims Are Not Ripe. ........................... 2 1. 2. Plaintiffs have not shown a credible fear of prosecution under the challenged Penal Code sections. ................................................................ 4 Plaintiffs do not have a credible fear of discipline or civil liability under the challenged Education Code sections 210.7, 212.6, and 220. ................................................................................................. 7 Plaintiffs do not have a credible fear of discipline or civil liability under Education Code section 51500. ................................................ 8 Prudential considerations strongly support dismissal. ..................................... 9

Plaintiffs' First Cause Of Action Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) Because Plaintiffs' Do Not State A Valid Facial Claim And Because The Challenged Statutes Are Clear. ..................................................... 10 1. Plaintiffs' Facial Challenge Is Improper Because The Challenged Statutes Do Not Restrict A Substantial Amount Of Protected Expression And Therefore Cannot Be Challenged In A Facial Attack............................................................................................... 11 The Challenged Statutes Are Not Impermissibly Vague. .............................. 15

This Court Should Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' State Law Claim. ........................................................................................................ 21

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 223

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1 2 3 Cases

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

4 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ................................................................................................................ 9 5 Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman 6 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................... 2, 3 7 Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union 442 U.S. 289 (1979) ................................................................................................................ 3 8 Broadrick v. Oklahoma 9 413 U.S. 601 (1973) .............................................................................................................. 15 10 California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman 328 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 3 11 California Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ. 12 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................... 14 13 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing 486 U.S. 750 (1988) .............................................................................................................. 11 14 Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. # 1 15 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................. 19 16 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits 2001 WL 664947, *1 (Mass.Super. 2001) ............................................................................ 19 17 Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. 18 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................... 13 19 Foti v. City of Menlo Park 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................. 15 20 Gonzales v. Carhart 21 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007) ........................................................................................................... 16 22 Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles 419 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................................... 2, 17 23 Grayned v. City of Rockford 24 408 U.S. 104 (1972) .............................................................................................................. 15 25 Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors 366 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 3 26 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier 27 484 U.S. 260 (1988) .............................................................................................................. 14 28
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1 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................... 19 2 Hishon v. King & Spalding 467 U.S. 69 (1984) ................................................................................................................ 13 3 4 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489 (1982) .............................................................................................................. 11 5 Hyman v. City of Louisville 132 F.Supp.2d 528 (W.D. Ky. 2001) .................................................................................... 20 6 7 In re Joshua H, 13 Cal.App.4th 1734 (1993).................................................................................................. 12 8 In re M.S. 10 Cal.4th 698 (1995)..................................................................................................... passim 9 10 Koire v. Metro Car Wash 40 Cal. 3d 24 (1985).............................................................................................................. 21 11 Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352 (1983) .............................................................................................................. 15 12 13 Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) .......................................................................................................................... 19 14 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 2 15 16 M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J.Super. 77 (1976) ...................................................................................................... 19 17 Manago v. Barnhart 321 F.Supp.2d 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)..................................................................................... 19 18 19 McSherry v. Block 880 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1989) .............................................................................................. 15 20 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Davis 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................... 3 21 22 People v. Dunkle 36 Cal.4th 861 (2005).............................................................................................................. 5 23 People v. Lashley 1 Cal. App.4th 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) .......................................................................... 4, 16 24 25 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377 (1992) .............................................................................................................. 12 26 R.G. v. Koller 415 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006) .................................................................................... 19 27 28
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1 Renne v. Geary 501 U.S. 312 (1991) .............................................................................................................. 10 2 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984) ........................................................................................................ 12, 13 3 4 Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) .............................................................................................................. 19 5 Rose v. Locke 423 U.S. 48 (1975) ................................................................................................................ 15 6 7 Roulette v. City of Seattle 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................... 11 8 Runyon v. McCrary 427 U.S. 160 (1976) .............................................................................................................. 13 9 10 Rush v. Johnson 565 F.Supp 856 (N.D. Ga. 1983) .......................................................................................... 19 11 Rust v. Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 (1991) .............................................................................................................. 14 12 13 Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control 466 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................... 3, 4 14 San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno 98 F.3d 1121 ............................................................................................................................ 6 15 16 San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno 98 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................... 6 17 Schroer v. Billington 424 F.Supp.2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) ........................................................................................ 19 18 19 Schwenk v. Hartford 204 F.3d 1187 (9th 2000) ..................................................................................................... 19 20 State v. Mortimer 135 N.J. 517 (N.J. 1994) ....................................................................................................... 20 21 22 State v. Palermo 765 So. 2d 1139 (La. App. 2000) .......................................................................................... 20 23 State v. Plowman 314 Ore. 157 (1992) .............................................................................................................. 20 24 25 Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. 368 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................... 16 26 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................ passim 27 28
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1 Thomas v. Gonzales 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................... 19 2 United States v. Dischner 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................................... 11 3 4 United States v. Gilbert 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................................... 15 5 United States v. Hanna 293 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................... 15 6 7 United States v. Morales 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1997) ................................................................................................ 11 8 United States v. Stewart 65 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................. 11 9 10 Venegas v. County of Los Angeles 32 Cal.4th 820 (Cal. 2004) ...................................................................................................... 4 11 Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n 484 U.S. 383 (1988) ................................................................................................................ 3 12 13 Wisconsin v. Mitchell 508 U.S. 476 (1993) ........................................................................................................ 11, 13 14 Younger v. Harris 401 U.S. 37 (1971) .................................................................................................................. 8 15 16 Statutes 17 18
California Civil Code § 51(e)(6) ............................................................................................................................... 17

19 California Education Code § 210.7 ............................................................................................................................... 7, 17 20 § 212 ...................................................................................................................................... 17 § 212.6 ............................................................................................................................... 7, 17 21 § 220 .............................................................................................................................. 7, 9, 13 § 231 ...................................................................................................................................... 21 22 § 44807 .................................................................................................................................... 6 § 51500 ........................................................................................................................... passim 23 California Government Code 24 § 11135(e) ............................................................................................................................. 18 § 12926(p) ............................................................................................................................. 17 25 § 12926(q) ............................................................................................................................. 17 26 California Health & Safety Code § 1365.5(e) ............................................................................................................................ 17 27 28
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1 California Penal Code § 422.56(h) ............................................................................................................................ 17 § 422.6 ................................................................................................................................... 16 2 § 422.7 ................................................................................................................................... 11 422.55 (a) ................................................................................................................................ 5 3 422.55(a)(2) ............................................................................................................................. 4 422.55(a)(6) ............................................................................................................................. 4 4 422.55(b) ..................................................................................................................... 4, 15, 16 422.56(c) ........................................................................................................................... 4, 17 5 422.6(a) ......................................................................................................................... 4, 5, 15 422.6(c) ................................................................................................................................... 5 6 7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-401 (2007)................................................................................................................ 18 8 Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 378-1, 489-2, 515-2, 846-51 (2007) ................................................................................. 18 9 10 Iowa Code Ann. § 216.2(12A) (2006) .............................................................................................................. 18 11 Iowa Code Ann. §§ 216.2(9A), 216.6-216.10 (2006) ...................................................................................... 18 12 13 Mass. Ann. Laws § 3(6) (2007).......................................................................................................................... 18 14 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:2 (2007) ................................................................................................................... 18 15 16 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5(rr) (West 2007) ......................................................................................... 18 17 N.M. Stat Ann. §§ 28-1-2(Q), 28-1-7 (2007) ................................................................................................. 18 18 19 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-2(P) (2007) ................................................................................................................. 18 20 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.310(6) (2007)............................................................................................................... 18 21 22 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-6 (10), 34-37-3 (17), 34-37-4 (2007) ....................................................................... 18 23 United States Code Title 28 24 § 1367(c)(1) ........................................................................................................................... 21 § 1367(c)(4) ........................................................................................................................... 22 25 26 Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.60.030, 49.60.040(15) (2007)..................................................................................... 19 27 Wis. Ann. Stat. § 111.32(13m) (2006) ........................................................................................................... 18 28
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1 Rules 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) ......................................................................................................................... 10 3 4
Other Authorities

5
Bruce Handy, Roll Over, Ward Cleaver, Time, Apr. 14, 1997 ......................................................... 19

6 7
Chai Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237 (1996) ............................................................................................... 19

8 Fatima Mohyuddin, United States Asylum Law in the Context of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Justice for the Transgendered? 12 Hastings Women's L.J. 387 (2001) .................................................................................. 19 9 10 Jennifer Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity Might 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 90 (2006) ...................................................................................... 19 11 Newsweek Cover: The Mystery of Gender, May 13, 2007, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi12 bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/05-132007/0004587007&EDATE= ............................................................................................... 20 13 14 Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 (1985) ............................................................................................... 19 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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1 2 3

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Equality California and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network ("GSA Network") respectfully

4 submit the following proposed Memorandum of Points and Authorities as Amici Curiae in support 5 of the Motion to Dismiss filed on January 11, 2008 by the State Defendants.1 6 I. 7
INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs California Education Committee, LLC and Patricia Schreiber (collectively "CEC"

8 or "Plaintiffs") bring a facial, pre-enforcement challenge to various provisions of the California 9 Penal Code and the California Education Code. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge California Penal 10 Code sections 422.55(a)(2) and (6), 422.55(b), 422.56(c), and 422.6(a)2 and California Education 11 Code sections 210.7, 212.6, 220, and 51500. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and 12 Nominal Damages ("Complaint"), ¶ ¶ 29, 30. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action alleges that these 13 code sections are void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 14 of the federal Constitution. Complaint, ¶ ¶ 28-33. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action alleges that 15 these code sections violate the Privacy Clause of article 1, section 1 of the California Constitution. 16 Complaint, ¶ ¶ 34-37. 17
Plaintiffs seek a declaration that these statutory provisions are invalid and an injunction

18 barring their enforcement. Complaint, pp. 10-11. Plaintiffs also seek "reasonable costs and 19 expenses of this action, including attorneys' fees, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988."3 20 Complaint, p. 11. 21
Equality California and the GSA Network filed a Motion to Intervene in this action on 22 December 21, 2007. Currently, that Motion to Intervene is scheduled to be heard on February 15, 2008, the same date that the Court is scheduled to hear the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 23 Accordingly, while their Motion to Intervene is pending, Equality California and the GSA Network seek leave to file this Memorandum of Points and Authorities as Amici Curiae in order to ensure 24 that their views on the Motion to Dismiss are before the Court in a timely fashion. Except as expressly noted otherwise references to Codes in the text and footnotes shall be to California Codes. Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action incorrectly cites the challenged Penal Code 26 sections as "420.6(a), 420.55(a)(2) and (6), 420.55(b) and 420.56(c)," which do not exist.
1

25

2

The Complaint's prayer for relief does not include a request for nominal damages; however, the Complaint is styled as a "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and 28 Nominal Damages." Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 10-11.

27

3

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1

Facial invalidation of a statute is "manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by

2 the Court sparingly and only as a last resort." Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 419 3 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). This is particularly so where, as here, 4 the challenged statutes implicate important state interests and where adjudication of the claim may 5 require resolution of novel state law issues. In such cases, federal courts must take special care to 6 ensure that Article III standing and other justiciability requirements are met, and that plaintiffs have 7 stated valid legal claims. In this case, Plaintiffs improperly seek to invalidate core California state8 law protections against hate violence and discrimination in public schools based upon hypothetical 9 fears and implausible constructions of California law, many of which contradict controlling 10 California Supreme Court authority. 11
For the reasons set forth by the State Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, as well as for

12 the additional reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject 13 matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under which relief can 14 be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).4 This Court should also decline to exercise supplemental 15 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims. 16 II. 17
FACTUAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND Amici adopt the description of the facts and the relevant statutes in the State Defendants'

18 Motion to Dismiss. 19 III. 20 21 22
ARGUMENT A. The Complaint Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(1) Because Plaintiffs Lack Standing And Their Claims Are Not Ripe.

Because federal jurisdiction is limited to "actual cases and controversies," plaintiffs

23 invoking federal court jurisdiction must establish both standing and ripeness. Alaska Right to Life 24 Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2007). In order to establish Article 25 III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an "injury-in-fact" that is "concrete 26 and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders 27 28
Amici adopt the description of the applicable legal standards under Rule 12(b) in the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
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1 of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2 2004) ("plaintiffs must allege an imminent threat of concrete injury"). The related Article III 3 requirement of ripeness similarly requires that plaintiffs face "a realistic danger of sustaining a 4 direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement." Babbit v. United Farm Workers 5 Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). Thus, "in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with 6 standing's injury in fact prong." Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 8
In a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute, the Ninth Circuit uses "the same test to

9 determine if a plaintiff has established standing based on a fear of prosecution that [the Ninth 10 Circuit] use[s] to determine if a case or controversy is sufficiently ripe." Sacks v. Office of Foreign 11 Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2006). Under that test, a court must consider: (1) 12 "whether the plaintiffs have articulated a `concrete plan' to violate the law in question," (2) 13 "whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate 14 proceedings," and (3) "the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute." 15 California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thomas 16 v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 200 F.3d at 1139). These "factors . . . ensure that courts will 17 not decide cases in which a risk of prosecution is so remote that no `case or controversy' exists." 18 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 855 (9th Cir. 2002). 19
The above test applies even when plaintiffs base their claim on the First Amendment.

20 Getman, 328 F.3d at 1095. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a more relaxed standard 21 of justiciability in some First Amendment cases, it is well settled that plaintiffs bringing a pre22 enforcement challenge to a statute on First Amendment grounds must show that "plaintiff's 23 intended speech arguably falls within the statute's reach" and that there is "a credible threat that the 24 challenged provision will be invoked against the plaintiff." Id.; see also Alaska Right to Life 25 Political Action Comm., 504 F.3d at 851(plaintiffs bringing a pre-enforcement First Amendment 26 challenge must have "an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them") 27 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)). 28
As explained below with respect to each of Plaintiffs' void-for-vagueness claims, Plaintiffs
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1 cannot meet this test. 2 3 4
1. Plaintiffs have not shown a credible fear of prosecution under the challenged Penal Code sections.

Plaintiffs challenge two Penal Code sections defining the underlying acts that constitute a

5 hate crime: section 422.6(a) ("No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or 6 threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in 7 the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or 8 laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of 9 one or more of the actual or perceived characteristics of the victim listed in subdivision (a) of 10 Section 422.55"); and section 422.55(b) ("`Hate crime' includes, but is not limited to, a violation of 11 Section 422.6."). In addition, Plaintiffs challenge three Penal Code sections that refer to or define 12 sexual orientation and gender as protected classifications: section 422.55(a)(2) (listing "gender"); 13 section 422.55(a)(6) (listing "sexual orientation"); and section 422.56(c) (defining "gender"). 14 Based on the applicable test, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they face "a genuine threat of 15 imminent prosecution [under these provisions] and not merely an imaginary or speculative fear of 16 prosecution." Sacks, 466 F.3d at 773 (internal quotations omitted). 17
First, Plaintiffs have not alleged a "concrete plan to violate the law" because they have not

18 alleged any intended conduct that "arguably falls within the statute's reach." Getman, 328 F.3d at 19 1095. Plaintiffs allege that they may violate the Penal Code "should they fail to guess properly at 20 an individual's self-defined sex," Complaint ¶ 26 missing (emphasis added), or should they 21 "inadvertently discriminate against an individual based upon their self-defined sex," Complaint, ¶ 22 21. On its face, however, the hate crime law penalizes conduct only where a person "willfully" 23 intends to deprive another person of a protected right. Penal Code 422.6(a) (emphasis added). The 24 California Supreme Court has held that the term "willfully" means that the hate crime law 25 "require[s] proof of a specific intent to interfere with a person's right protected under state or 26 federal law." In re M.S., 10 Cal.4th 698 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing People v. Lashley 1 Cal. 27 App.4th 938, 947-49 (Cal. Ct.App. 1991)); see also Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 28 820, 848 (Cal. 2004) (the hate crime statute "requires a showing that the violator acted with
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1 unlawful discriminatory intent"). 2
In light of this controlling California precedent, Plaintiffs cannot establish a credible threat

3 of prosecution under the hate crime statute based on "inadvertent" discrimination or any alleged 4 inability to ascertain a person's "self-defined sex" under California law. An educator or 5 administrator who simply "failed to guess properly" or "inadvertently discriminated" would lack 6 the required "specific intent to interfere with a person's right protected under state or federal law." 7 In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th at 713; see also Lashley, 1 Cal.App.4th at 949 ("The conduct which section[] 8 422.6 [] is intended to reach is not the mere reckless use of force, even if motivated by ill will, but 9 rather the execution of a specific purpose to deprive another individual of his or her civil rights."). 10
The Complaint fails to demonstrate a credible risk of prosecution under the hate crime law

11 for another, independent reason, as well. Plaintiffs allege that an educator or administrator might 12 violate the Penal Code by interfering with a student's or a teacher's access to a bathroom or other 13 sex-restricted facility "by intimidation, oppression, or threat of suspension." Complaint, ¶ 26. 14 Under controlling California law, however, it is plain such actions do not fall within the ambit of 15 the hate crime law. 16
Contrary to Plaintiffs' allegations, a person can be prosecuted under the California hate

17 crime law only for acts that involve violence or the threat of violence. In order to be prosecuted for 18 a hate crime, a person must engage in a "criminal act" involving the use of physical "force or threat 19 of force." Penal Code §§ 422.55 (a), 422.6 (a) (emphasis added). Section 422.6(c) of the hate 20 crime law further provides that: "no person may be convicted of violating subdivision (a) based 21 upon speech alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a 22 specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the 23 threat." (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court has narrowed these requirements even 24 further, holding that Section 422.6 proscribes only threats that would cause "a reasonable 25 person . . . to believe he or she will be subjected to physical violence." In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th at 26 710 (1995) (rejecting First Amendment vagueness challenge to California hate crime law); see also 27 People v. Dunkle, 36 Cal.4th 861, 971 (2005) (same). Thus, Plaintiffs' allegation that an educator 28 might violate the Penal Code merely by threatening a student with suspension or by engaging in
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1 other types of non-violent "intimidation" or "oppression" is not credible. 2
Moreover, Education Code 44807 provides a safe harbor for any such good faith mistakes

3 by exempting school staff from criminal prosecution for exercising a reasonable degree of "physical 4 control" over students. Education Code 44807 provides: "A teacher, vice principal, principal, or 5 any other certificated employee of a school district, shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or 6 criminal penalties for the exercise, during the performance of his duties, of the same degree of 7 physical control over a pupil that a parent would be legally privileged to exercise but which in no 8 event shall exceed the amount of physical control reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect 9 property, or protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions 10 conducive to learning." 11
In addition to failing to allege any intended conduct that would be prohibited by the hate

12 crime statutes, Plaintiffs' allegations are too speculative and indefinite to demonstrate a "concrete 13 plan to violate the law." See Getman, 328 F.3d at 1094. Even where a plaintiff's intended conduct 14 is clearly prohibited by a challenged law, the plaintiff must do more than state a "general intent to 15 violate a statute at some unknown date in the future." Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139. In Thomas, 16 landlords challenged a state law prohibiting discrimination against unmarried couples by alleging 17 that they intended to violate the law at some point "in the future -- if and when a married couple 18 attempt[ed] to lease one of their rental properties." Id. at 1140. The plaintiffs' alleged intended 19 conduct ­ refusing to rent to an unmarried couple ­ unquestionably would have violated the 20 challenged statute; however, the Ninth Circuit held that it was too indefinite to "qualify as a 21 concrete plan." Id; see also San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th 22 Cir. 1996) (a general intention to engage in conduct proscribed by the Crime Control Act "some 23 day," without describing concrete plans, was insufficient to establish standing). In this case, 24 Plaintiffs are even less able to demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution because they do not 25 allege even a general intent to violate the challenged law "some day," at some unspecified future 26 time. Rather, they describe only a generalized fear that they might "inadvertently" violate the 27 statute, based on hypothetical situations that may never arise. Hate crime protections based on 28 sexual orientation and gender (including gender identity) have existed in California since 2000, and
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1 yet Plaintiffs do not allege that they have ever actually encountered any of the conjectural scenarios 2 they describe, such as being unable to discern a person's "self-identified sex," either in the context 3 of bathrooms or any other context, or indeed that they have been affected by the existence of 4 protections against hate violence based on sexual orientation and gender in any concrete way. 5
The second and third factors also support dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs do not

6 allege that they have received any specific warnings or threats ­ either from prosecuting authorities 7 or anyone else ­ that they may be prosecuted for a hate crime based on any of the hypothetical 8 scenarios in their Complaint. In addition, although the protections Plaintiffs challenge have existed 9 for several years, Plaintiffs do not allege any record of past discipline or lawsuits brought against 10 educators, administrators or anyone else for "inadvertently discriminat[ing] against an individual 11 based upon their self-defined sex," "fail[ing] to guess properly at an individual's self-defined sex," 12 or "interfer[ing] with, or threaten[ing] to interfere with, any student or employee seeking access to 13 facilities traditionally reserved to the opposite sex." Complaint, ¶ ¶ 20, 23, 26. 14 15 16
2. Plaintiffs do not have a credible fear of discipline or civil liability under the challenged Education Code sections 210.7, 212.6, and 220.

Plaintiffs also challenge Education Code section 210.7, which defines the term "gender;"

17 Education Code section 212.6, which defines "sexual orientation'" and Education Code section 18 220, which includes "gender" and "sexual orientation" as prohibited grounds for discrimination "in 19 any program or activity conducted by an educational institution that receives, or benefits from, state 20 financial assistance or enrolls pupils receiving state student financial aid." Complaint, ¶ 29.5 21
Plaintiffs do not have a credible fear of discipline or civil liability under these challenged

22 provisions. First, Plaintiffs allege only a hypothetical fear that they may "inadvertently" violate 23 these sections in some unspecified manner, based on unspecified circumstances, and at some 24 unspecified time. Complaint, ¶ 21. Under well-settled law, such a generalized fear is too indefinite 25 and speculative to "qualify as a concrete plan." See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1140. 26
Plaintiffs' Complaint challenges these provisions "as amended by Senate Bill 777." 27 (Complaint, ¶ 29: 6 (emphasis added)). As explained by the State Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, however, SB 777's amendments to these sections of the Education Code were non28 substantive. See Motion to Dismiss, at 4-5.
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1

The second and third factors of the pre-enforcement test also strongly support dismissal of

2 these claims. The Education Code has prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and 3 gender (including gender identity) since 2000. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do not allege that they have 4 received any specific warnings or threats of discipline for restricting access to a bathroom or locker 5 room, for failure to correctly identify a person's sex, or for any other conduct described in the 6 Complaint. Plaintiffs also do not allege that the challenged provisions have been enforced to 7 penalize or proscribe such conduct. When plaintiffs cannot show "`that they have ever been 8 threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely 9 possible,' they do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court." Thomas, 220 10 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)). 11 12 13
3. Plaintiffs do not have a credible fear of discipline or civil liability under Education Code section 51500.

Plaintiffs also fail to allege that they intend to engage in conduct that would be prohibited

14 by Education Code section 51500.6 Plaintiffs' sole allegation with respect to Education Code 15 section 51500 is a hypothetical concern that "any curriculum or instruction that pre-assumes the 16 existence of a mother and father in a family relationship might be construed to promote a 17 discriminatory bias against persons choosing alternative relationships." Complaint, ¶ 22. Amici 18 concur with the State that such a mere reference to the existence of families consisting of mothers 19 and fathers, without any disparagement of other families based on any of the characteristics in 20 section 200, does not even "arguably fall[] within the statute's reach." See Motion to Dismiss, at 14 21 (citing Getman, 328 F.3d at 1095). In Getman, the Ninth Circuit held that a non-profit organization 22 lacked standing to challenge the alleged vagueness of certain restrictions on "advocacy" in a 23 campaign finance law based on the group's intent to publish candidate responses to a candidate 24 questionnaire. Id. at 1096. The Court held that because the group's intended communication was 25 "purely informational," the organization "[did] not face a credible threat of prosecution." Id. A 26
Education Code section 51500 provides that: "No teacher shall give instruction nor shall a school district sponsor any activity that promotes a discriminatory bias because of a characteristic 28 listed in Section 200."
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1 similar conclusion is appropriate here. 2
The second and third factors of the test governing pre-enforcement challenges also favor

3 dismissal of this claim. SB 777 added "sexual orientation" and "gender" to the list of enumerated 4 characteristics in Education Code Section 51500. Thus, Plaintiffs may argue that the absence of 5 specific warnings or any record of past enforcement means little, since these protections were added 6 only this year. As the State correctly notes, however, since 2000, the more general anti7 discrimination provision in Education Code section 220 has prohibited discrimination based on 8 sexual orientation and gender "in any program or activity conducted by an educational institution 9 that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance or enrolls pupils who receive state student 10 financial aid." Motion to Dismiss, at 6 n.3. Amici agree with the State that "it is difficult to 11 conceive of a set of facts where, for example, there is a school sponsored activity that `promotes a 12 discriminatory bias' against a student because of [his or her] sexual orientation and thereby violates 13 section 51500, but does not at the same time violate section 220 because the student is not 14 `subjected to discrimination on the basis of . . . sexual orientation.'" Id. 15 16
4. Prudential considerations strongly support dismissal.

In addition to the constitutional limits on justiciability, courts must weigh "prudential

17 considerations" in their evaluation of ripeness, which include: "the fitness of the issues for judicial 18 decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Thomas, 200 F.3d at 19 1141 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Both of these 20 considerations strongly support dismissal. Even were this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs present 21 a ripe case or controversy in the constitutional sense, the Court should decline to exercise 22 jurisdiction under the prudential component of the ripeness doctrine. See id. 23
First, there is no actual dispute requiring prompt resolution and the alleged conflict between

24 the challenged statutes and the First Amendment is devoid of any specific factual context that 25 would permit the Court even to meaningfully assess Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs ask the Court to 26 declare California laws unconstitutional, in the absence of any identifiable individuals who have 27 suffered any actual injury as a result of their application and "with no concrete factual scenario that 28 demonstrates how the laws, as applied, infringe their constitutional rights." Thomas, 200 F.3d at
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1 1141. Even more starkly than in Thomas, the Plaintiffs' claims rest upon hypothetical situations 2 with hypothetical students and teachers. Moreover, to the extent any genuine uncertainly regarding 3 the proper construction of any of the challenged code sections may arise in the context of more 4 concrete controversies in the future, California courts should be given an opportunity to construe 5 the challenged laws. See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323 (1991) (explaining that "[p]ostponing 6 consideration of the [constitutional] questions presented, until a more concrete controversy arises, 7 also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportunity to construe [the challenged 8 law], and perhaps in the process to materially alter the question to be decided" (internal quotation 9 marks omitted)). 10
Second, Plaintiffs will not suffer any identifiable hardship if the Court declines jurisdiction.

11 The only harms Plaintiffs have alleged are purely conjectural and based on events that may never 12 arise. Although Plaintiffs allege that the challenged statutes implicate First Amendment freedoms, 13 they have not alleged that they wish or intend to engage in any constitutionally protected speech or 14 expression that would be restricted by the statutes.7 None of the plaintiffs have been prosecuted or 15 charged with violating any of the challenged measures, nor is there any reasonable or imminent 16 threat of enforcement. In contrast, "by being forced to defend [the challenged laws] in a vacuum 17 and in the absence of particular victims of discrimination, the State . . . would suffer hardship were 18 [the Court] to adjudicate this case now." Thomas, 200 F.3d at 1142. Likewise, the persons who 19 directly benefit from these challenged laws-- including the members of Equality California and the 20 GSA Network--would potentially suffer great hardship were the Court to consider the 21 constitutionality of these protections prematurely, in the absence of an adequate record upon which 22 to base effective review. 23 24 25
B. Plaintiffs' First Cause Of Action Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) Because Plaintiffs' Do Not State A Valid Facial Claim And Because The Challenged Statutes Are Clear.

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action -- which alleges that the challenged statutes violate the

26 First and Fourteenth Amendments because they are facially void for vagueness, Complaint, ¶ ¶ 6, 27
As explained in Section B. 1 below, as a matter of law, and based on settled federal and 28 state precedent, none of the challenged statutes in this case restricts or reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.
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1 28-33 -- fails to state a valid claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for at least two independent reasons. First, 2 the challenged statutes do not restrict constitutionally protected speech and thus may not be 3 challenged through a facial attack. Second, even if the statutes were subject to a vagueness 4 challenge, they easily pass constitutional muster. 5 6 7
1. Plaintiffs' Facial Challenge Is Improper Because The Challenged Statutes Do Not Restrict A Substantial Amount Of Protected Expression And Therefore Cannot Be Challenged In A Facial Attack.

"A facial challenge is only permitted when the law reaches `a substantial amount of

8 constitutionally protected conduct' or `is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" United 9 States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1510 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Hoffman 10 Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982), overruled on other 11 grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.1997); see also Roulette v. City of 12 Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs may not bring a facial First Amendment 13 challenge "unless, at a minimum, the challenged statute `is directed narrowly and specifically at 14 expression or conduct commonly associated with expression'") (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain 15 Dealer Publishing, 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988)). Here, the statutes Plaintiffs seek to invalidate do not 16 restrict or implicate protected speech, and Plaintiffs have not alleged (and could not credibly allege) 17 that the challenged statutes are impermissibly vague in all of their applications. Accordingly, 18 Plaintiffs' attempt to challenge these provisions through a facial attack is improper. 19 20 21
a. Penal Code Sections 422.6(a), 422.55(a)(2) and (6), 420.55(b), and 422.56(c) do not reach a substantial amount of protected speech.

Controlling authority directly rebuts Plaintiffs' conclusory allegation that the challenged

22 Penal Code statutes "abut sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms." Complaint, ¶ 3. In 23 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that hate crimes statutes like California's do not 24 implicate First Amendment freedoms because they target conduct, not expression. Wisconsin v. 25 Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993); see also United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 26 1995) ("Because we punish the act and not the opinion or belief which motivated it, the cross 27 burning in this case was not protected by the First Amendment. . . ."). The Court in Mitchell 28 expressly noted that the Wisconsin statute it upheld was "similar" to California's law. Mitchell, 508
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1 U.S at 483 n.4 (citing Penal Code § 422.7). 2
The California Supreme Court has likewise held that California's hate crime statutes do not

3 infringe upon constitutionally protected speech. In In re M.S., a defendant challenged Penal Code 4 section 422.6 on the ground that the statute was an impermissible "regulation of speech." In re 5 M.S., 10 Cal.4th at 721. The court rejected this argument, explaining that: "What section 422.6 6 generally prohibits is conduct . . . . Section 422.6 punishes the discriminatory threat of violence, not 7 the thought behind it." Id. at 722-23 (emphasis in original);8 see also In re Joshua H., 13 8 Cal.App.4th 1734, 1749 (1993) ("it is the act of discrimination and differential treatment based on 9 race or other status--not the thought behind the act--which is proscribed"). 10
The California Supreme Court also has rejected the argument that California's hate crime

11 laws (or anti-discrimination statutes generally) implicate free speech simply because some people 12 may wish to engage in bias-motivated violence for an expressive purpose: "threats, intimidation 13 and interference with the exercise of legal rights because of the victim's protected characteristic are 14 not shielded from punishment merely because the actor espouses a bigoted philosophy." In re M.S., 15 10 Cal.4th at 723. The court explained that the hate crime law prohibits acts of discriminatory 16 violence because they are harmful, not because they may express an offensive idea. In re M.S., 10 17 Cal.4th at 725 (holding that the hate crime law "does not impinge on freedom of expression" 18 because "the conduct [it proscribes] is punishable . . . for reasons unrelated to its expressive 19 content, and the enhancement is proper . . . to sanction bias-motivated conduct, not expression"); 20 see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("acts of invidious discrimination . . . 21 like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct 22 from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection."). Thus, "acts are 23 not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." In 24 re M.S., 10 Cal.4th at 723 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)). 25 26
The M.S. court noted that Penal Code section 422.6 had been amended to include gender and disability as protected categories after the defendants were convicted, though neither of those 28 classifications was at issue in the case. In re M.S., 10 Cal.4th at 707 n.1. Based on this settled law, Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts supporting their claim that the

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1 challenged Penal Code sections inhibit their protected expression or otherwise reach a substantial 2 amount of constitutionally protected activity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' facial challenge to those 3 sections should be dismissed. 4 5 6
b. Education Code Sections 220, 210.7, 212.6 do not implicate a substantial amount of protected speech.

It is equally well-established that, as a general matter, anti-discrimination statutes such as

7 Education Code section 220 likewise do not implicate constitutionally protected speech because ­ 8 like the hate crime statute ­ they target harmful acts of discrimination, not expression. In Mitchell, 9 the Supreme Court noted that it has repeatedly rejected claims that anti-discrimination statutes 10 infringe upon protected speech. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 11 468 U.S. at 628; Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 12 160, 176 (1976)). Likewise, in In re M.S., the California Supreme Court held that the government 13 may prohibit discriminatory conduct "in a multiplicity of settings" and that such laws do not 14 implicate First Amendment protected speech for the same reasons that California's hate crime 15 statutes do not implicate protected speech. In re M.S., 10 Cal.4th at 723. 16
Based on this settled law, Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts supporting their claim that

17 Education Code section 220 or the related definitions of sexual orientation and gender inhibit their 18 protected expression or otherwise reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity. 19 Accordingly, their facial challenge to these code sections should be dismissed with prejudice. 20 21 22
c. Education Code Section 51500 does not reach a substantial amount of protected speech.

By its express terms, Education Code section 51500 applies only to teacher "instruction"

23 and to school district sponsored activities. With regard to such instruction and activities, it is well 24 settled that when the government itself speaks, "its control of its own speech is not subject to the 25 constraints of constitutional safeguards." Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 26 1013 (9th Cir. 2000). In Downs, the Ninth Circuit held that a public high school may, as part of its 27 lesbian and gay awareness month, create a bulletin board for articles promoting acceptance of 28 lesbian and gay people and may prohibit a teacher from posting articles with a contrary view. A
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1 school "may decide not only to talk about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but 2 also to advocate such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech of one of its 3 representatives." Id. at 1014. Accordingly, section 51500 does not implicate protected speech 4 insofar as it applies to school-sponsored activities, where the government's power to express its 5 own views and to control the speech of its agents and representative is greatest. See also, e.g., Rust 6 v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-200 (1991) (upholding federal regulations prohibiting recipients of 7 federal funds from promoting abortion). 8
With regard to "instruction," a somewhat different analysis must be applied because

9 "[n]either [the Ninth Circuit] nor the Supreme Court has definitively resolved whether and to what 10 extent a teacher's instructional speech is protected by the First Amendment." California Teachers 11 Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). In California Teachers 12 Association, the Ninth Circuit held that the term "instruction" in a California English-only statute 13 referred only to "the language teachers use to present the curriculum to students in California public 14 schools" and not to other, non-curricular teacher speech, including informal interactions with 15 students. 271 F.3d at 1148. Without resolving the issue, the Ninth Circuit "assume[d] arguendo 16 that the instructional speech covered by [the statute] receives some First Amendment protection" 17 and applied the standard articulated in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 18 California Teachers Ass'n, 271 F.3d at 1148-49. The Ninth Circuit explained, however, that a less 19 rigorous standard should apply to the plaintiffs' vagueness claim even under the Hazelwood 20 standard: "Because any speech potentially chilled by [the statute] enjoys only minimal First 21 Amendment protection, assuming it enjoys any protection at all, and because it is the state's 22 pedagogical interests that are paramount in this context, any vagueness contained in [the statute] is 23 even less likely to jeopardize First Amendment values." Id. at 1154. The Court rejected the 24 plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge because the statute's limitation on "instruction" did not reach 25 a substantial amount of protected speech. Id. at 1155. 26
That analysis applies equally in this case. Even assuming for the sake of argument that

27 teacher instructional speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, the limitation on 28 "instruction" in section 51500 is not impermissibly vague because it is unlikely that any ambiguity
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1 in the statute will chill any more than a negligible amount of protected speech. This conclusion is 2 strongly reinforced by the fact that Plaintiffs cannot identify any protected speech that even 3 arguably would be prohibited under section 51500. See discussion infra, at section A.3. 4 5
2. The Challenged Statutes Are Not Impermissibly Vague.

Due process does not "require `impossible standards' of clarity," Kolender v. Lawson, 461

6 U.S. 352, 361 (1983), and the constitutional prohibition against excessive vagueness does not 7 invalidate every statute that could have been crafted with greater precision, "`for in most English 8 words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.'" McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 9 1989) (quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (internal citation omitted)); see also Grayned 10 v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("Condemned to the use of words, we can never 11 expect mathematical certainty from our language."); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1530 12 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 13 1088 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) ("`Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty.'" (quoting Broadrick v. 14 Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973))). Rather, to satisfy due process, a statute simply "must be 15 sufficiently clear so as to allow persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 16 what is prohibited." Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal 17 quotation marks omitted). The statutes Plaintiffs challenge plainly meet that standard. 18 19 20
a. Penal Code sections 422.6(a) and 422.55(b) incorporate a specific intent requirement and therefore are not impermissibly vague.

Plaintiffs allege that Penal Code sections 422.6(a) and 422.55(b) are impermissibly vague.

21 Complaint, ¶ 30. While the former provides a substantive definition for hate crimes,9 the latter 22 appears to have been challenged by Plaintiffs simply because it cross-references the former, since 23 Plaintiffs do not object to section 422.55(b) on any independent ground. 24
While Plaintiffs claim that it will be "impossible" to know whet