Free Motion to Amend/Correct/Modify - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 03-cv-2355-RPM LEONID DMITRUK, Administrator of the Estate of Alexander Bugaychuk, deceased, and YELENA BUGAYCHUK, an individual, and NATALIA MELNIK, an individual, and IRINA MOROZOV, personally and as administrator of the Estate of Yevgeniy Morozov, deceased, and as Guardian for SARA MOROZOV, a minor, and ELEANNA MOROZOV, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. GEORGE AND SONS' REPAIR SHOP, INC., a Colorado corporation, d.b.a. "George's Towing", GEORGE ROSLER, a resident of the State of Colorado, and JORGE LUIS LAGE, a resident of the State of Florida, and ANGEL EXPRESS, INC., a Florida corporation, Defendants. ____________________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT ____________________________________________________________________________

I. RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs request an order granting leave to amend their complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), to expressly incorporate their claim for exemplary damages under Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-21-102. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS In the early morning hours of November 26, 2001, a tractor-trailer combination owned by Angel Express and driven by Jorge Lage went in the ditch in snowy and icy conditions at the

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bottom of a knoll on Interstate 70 near Limon, Colorado.1 Defendants George And Sons' Repair Shop and George Rosler ("Rosler") responded to a Colorado State Patrol dispatch call for assistance in towing the tractor-trailer combination out of the ditch.2 After towing the tractor-trailer combination back onto the I-70 right-of-way, Rosler allegedly unhitched his tow truck. Rosler admits he then asked Lage to drive together to the next exit to settle the tow bill.3 After proceeding to approximately 350 feet before an off-ramp at Exit 348, Rosler stopped directly in the lane used by motorists to exit the highway at Exit 348.4 Rosler testified that he parked in the traveling lanes of I-70 because he thought Lage might get stuck again, and he didn't want to pull Lage back onto the highway.5 Rosler admits there were several exits and a truck stop further down the highway where the two vehicles could have pulled completely off of I-70 without getting stuck in the snow.6 As directed or suggested by Rosler, Lage pulled to a stop behind Rosler. Instead of deploying warning triangles for oncoming motorists, Rosler simply waited inside the cab of his tow truck for Lage to finish a cell phone call.7 Rosler stated he remained in his tow vehicle with the heater on "`cause it was cold."8 Rosler never deployed any emergency warning triangles or

1

Exhibit 1, true copy of George Rosler Deposition Transcript, at 8:19-23. Exhibit 1, at 11:10-12. Exhibit 1, at 15:4-9. Exhibit 1, at 20:21-25. Exhibit 1, at 20:5-15. Exhibit 1, at 61:16-65:3 Exhibit 1, at 24:7-20. Exhibit 1, at 25:14-18.

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flares as required by Colorado and federal highway safety laws,9 although these devices are required to be placed at specific locations around all commercial vehicles stopped on the highway or shoulder "as soon as possible."10 (Emphasis added.) While Rosler was waiting in the cab of his tow truck, a Budget rental vehicle driven by Morozov apparently did not realize the Rosler and Lage vehicles were actually stopped on the Interstate. There is no evidence that Morozov was doing anything other than property attempting to exit the highway at Exit 348. Morozov collided directly into the back of the stationary Angel Express tractor-trailer and was killed instantly. His passenger, Bugaychuk, died approximately 3 weeks later from the critical injuries he sustained in the collision. Rosler admits he knows that "when you pull off to the side of the road, as soon as possible, you put reflectors out."11 Rosler now claims he did not "have time" to deploy the warning triangles because he "wasn't there but just a very few minutes." However, on October 17, 2002, approximately 11 months after the collision but prior to the commencement of this action, Rosler admitted to insurance investigator Steve Armstrong that he had been stopped approximately 5 to 10 minutes prior to the collision.12 Rosler also admits that he regularly ignores the mandatory emergency warning device

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Exhibit 1, at 38:22-39:1-15. 49 CFR § 392.22(b)(1) Exhibit 1, at 40:8-14.

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12 See true copy of letter of Andrew C. Gauen, attorney for Angel Express, to Komron Allahyari dated June 9, 2004; letter of Steve Armstrong to North American Risk Services dated October 21, 2002; summary of Steve Armstrong interview with George Rosler dated October 17, 2002, attached as Exhibit 7. Rosler's statements contained within the report constitute admissions within a business record. See FRE 803 (6); 807.

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requirements "[i]f it only takes me a very short time to get [a towing job] done. . ."13 According to Rosler, "we have a few minutes sitting alongside the road before you have to put the warning devices out."14 However, the plain language of 49 C.F.R. 392.22 provides no such exception. Similarly, Rosler understands his legal duty is to completely exit the traveling lanes of I70 prior to stopping under Colorado Revised Statute 42-4-230.15 With respect to the subject collision, Rosler claims that the "traveled portion" of I-70 does not include the third, exit-only lane at Exit 348.16 Inconsistently, elsewhere in his deposition Rosler testifies that "the shoulder is in the traveled portion of the highway."17 Rosler's admissions illustrate that he is aware of the state and federal highway safety requirements, but habitually chooses not to obey them because he considers them to be inconvenient - despite the extreme disregard for the safety of and risk to other motorists. The collision was investigated by the Colorado State Patrol.18 According to investigating Colorado State Trooper Jason Bandy, Morozov drove directly into the back of the Angel Express tractor-trailer combination without any skidding or other evidence to indicate that he lost control of his vehicle. When asked if "it was as if, you know, you are driving behind a semi truck but that semi truck is not moving and you go straight into it, right?," Trooper Bandy responded,

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Exhibit 1, at 51:6-15. Exhibit 1, at 60:19-61:1-6. Exhibit 1, at 79:21-80:18. Exhibit 1, at 83:1-7. Exhibit 1, at 83:22-23. True copy of relevant portion of Colorado State Patrol Accident Report, attached as Exhibit 3.

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"Correct. It was a direct hit."19 The Accident Report provides that the Angel Express tractor-trailer combination "was parked on the eastbound off ramp of Colo. 70." Ex. 3. The diagram on the Accident Report shows Angel Express's position at impact, effectively blocking the entire lane of traffic exiting Interstate 70. The drawing also indicates there was "no pre-impact braking by [Morozov]." The Court issued the D.C. Colo. L. Civ. R. 16.2 Scheduling Order herein on May 21, 2004.20 The Scheduling Order set the deadline for amendment of pleadings on June 28, 2004, five weeks later. Ex. 4 at p. 6. The Scheduling Order set the discovery cutoff for November 30, 2004. Ex. 4 at p. 6. Plaintiffs propounded written discovery and obtained responses thereto prior to the discovery cutoff. Plaintiffs timely deposed defendant George Rosler on November 23, 2004. Ex. 1. Plaintiffs timely deposed Trooper Bandy on November 29, 2004. Ex. 2. Under applicable Colorado law, a complaint may not contain a demand for exemplary damages. CRS § 13-21-102. Instead, the plaintiff must bring a motion to amend after initial disclosures have occurred, setting forth a prima facie case for inclusion of exemplary damages in the amended complaint. Id. In the present case, Rosler filed his initial disclosure on May 19, 2004, which was received by plaintiffs after the issuance of the Scheduling Order.21 Plaintiffs did not come into possession of evidence to make their prima facie showing of exemplary damages under CRS § 13-21-102 until after the depositions of Rosler and Bandy. At that time, the deadline to amend their Complaint under the Scheduling Order had already passed.
19

True copy of Trooper Jason Bandy Deposition Transcript, at 61:14-62:4, attached as Exhibit 2. True copy of Scheduling Order, attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

20

True copy of relevant portion of Defendant's George's Towing and George Rosler, Initial Disclosure Pursuant To F.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), attached as Exhibit 5.

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Pursuant to D. Colo. L. R. 7.1, plaintiffs' counsel conferred with defense counsel on September 30, 2005. Defense counsel declined to stipulate to an amendment of plaintiffs' Complaint to add an exemplary damages claim.22 This Motion followed.

III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON Plaintiffs rely upon the deposition testimony of George Rosler and Colorado State Patrol Trooper Jason Bandy, the Exhibits attached hereto, and upon the pleadings and papers on file herein.

IV. 1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether plaintiffs could have with reasonable diligence moved the Court for

leave to amend their Complaint prior to the Scheduling Order deadline of June 28, 2005, where Colorado law prohibits amendment to include exemplary damages until after initial disclosures have been exchanged and only upon a prima facie evidentiary showing, and where Rosler did not serve his initial disclosure until May 22, 2005, and where plaintiffs were unable to both 1) obtain deposition testimony to support the claim for exemplary damages and 2) set this motion for consideration in the five-week time span between May 22, 2005 and June 28, 2005. 2. Whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their Complaint to add only a

claim for exemplary damages without the addition of any new or different substantive claims, where Fed. R. Civ. P. provides that leave to amend should be freely granted as justice requires.

22

True copy of electronic mail communication between counsel dated October 30, 2005, attached as

Exhibit 6.

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V.

ARGUMENT

The Court Should Grant Plaintiffs' Leave To Amend Their Complaint To Include A Claim For Exemplary Damages, As Rosler's Conduct Is Prima Facie Wanton And Reckless, Rosler Was Aware Of Plaintiffs' Claim For Exemplary Damages, And Plaintiffs Could Not With Reasonable Diligence Set This Motion For Hearing Prior To The Scheduling Order Deadline Of June 28, 2005. A. Good cause exists to modify the Scheduling Order herein to permit amendment of Plaintiffs' Complaint. D.C. Colo. L CivR 16.1 provides that the scheduling order shall not be modified except upon showing of "good cause." In the present case, the May 21, 2004 Scheduling Order established a deadline of June 28, 2004 for amendment of pleadings. Thus, the first issue to be decided is whether good cause exists to modify the scheduling order. Good cause to modify a scheduling order exists where the party seeking to amend its pleading establishes that, despite diligence, it could not reasonably meet the deadline to amend pleadings under the case schedule. Marcum v. Zimmer, 163 F.R.D. 205, 254 (S.D.W.Va. 1995)(quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiffs have established good cause to modify the Scheduling Order in the present case. The amendment sought in the present case relates only to exemplary damages under Colorado law, and does not seek to add any new or different substantive causes of action. Under Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-21-102, a plaintiff seeking exemplary damages may not include such claim in the initial complaint, but instead must first "establish prima facie proof of a triable issue" on exemplary damages, and then move the court for leave to file an amended complaint to include the exemplary damages claim: A claim for exemplary damages in an action governed by this section may not be included in any initial claim for relief. A claim for exemplary damages governed Page -7-

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by this section may be allowed by amendment to the pleadings only after the exchange of initial disclosures pursuant to rule 26 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure and the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue. After the plaintiff establishes the existence of a triable issue of exemplary damages, the court may, in its discretion, allow additional discovery on the issue of exemplary damages as the court deems appropriate. CRS § 13-21-102 (emphasis added). Ordinarily, a party seeking to amend its complaint need only seek leave of the court (or legal adversary) to do so, with no substantive evidentiary requirement. By contrast, CRS § 13-21-102 imposes both a timing requirement and a substantive evidentiary hurdle, requiring the plaintiff to wait until initial disclosures are exchanged under Rule 26, and obtain substantive proof establishing a prima facie case of exemplary damages sufficient to satisfy the court of the merits of the claim. In the present case, plaintiffs could not with reasonable diligence meet the Scheduling Order deadline to amend their Complaint to include exemplary damages. The May 21, 2004 Scheduling Order set the deadline to amend pleadings only five weeks later, on June 28, 2004. Plaintiffs did not receive Rosler's Initial Disclosures until May 22, 2004. In order to establish a prima facie case for exemplary damages as required by CRS § 1321-102 prior to the deadline to amend pleadings under the Scheduling Order, the plaintiffs would have been required to complete written discovery and complete the depositions of Rosler and Bandy, and file their timely motion to amend complaint for consideration by the Court, all prior to June 28, 2004, less than five weeks after Rosler served his Initial Disclosure. Good cause to modify the Scheduling Order exists, as the plaintiffs could not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, amend their pleadings prior to the deadline.

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B.

The Court should grant leave to amend the plaintiffs' Complaint, as there exists a prima facie case for imposition of exemplary damages. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of

court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." The Rule 15(a) analysis "focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party." Marcum, 163 F.R.D. at 254. In other words, "if a plaintiff has unduly delayed seeking amendment and the delay is `accompanied by prejudice, bad faith, or futility, amendment should be denied." Smith v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 719, 721 (S.D.W.Va. 1995). The present Motion seeks only to add claims for exemplary damages. It seeks to add no additional substantive claims. In his own Initial Disclosure, Rosler identified as evidence his Exhibit 26, "Letter to Jackie Adamson from Komron Michael Allahyari, dated April 8, 2003." See Ex. 5. The relevant portion of that exhibit provided: In Colorado, punitive damages may also be awarded:

13-21-102. Exemplary damages. (1) (a) In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a wrong done to the person or to personal or real property, and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct, the jury, in addition to the actual damages sustained by such party, may award him reasonable exemplary damages. The amount of such reasonable exemplary damages shall not exceed an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual damages awarded to the injured party. (b) As used in this section, "willful and wanton conduct" means conduct purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff.

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George's Towing's willful and wanton conduct in this Incident includes, but is not limited to the following: · · Failure to place required Warning Triangles when initially pulling Angel Express from the "ditch" before this Incident occurred; Instructing and forcing Angel Express to stop and settle the tow bill on the traveled portion of Interstate 70, especially egregious in light of the hazardous conditions affecting visibility and traction and the undisputed fact that Exit 348 was only 351 feet ahead; After so stopping, failure to place required Warning Triangles for oncoming vehicles such as the one driven by Mr. Morozov and instead, in Mr. Rosler's words, "Waiting to take care of a bill."

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The evidence in this case demonstrates that the claimants will be entitled to an award of punitive damages against George's Towing under Colorado law. . . . Ex. 5, Letter of Komron Michael Allahyari to Ms. Jackie Adamson, at p. 8. In view of the fact that plaintiffs' notified Rosler that plaintiffs would seek exemplary damages, and specifically notified Rosler of the factual basis and legal grounds for such claim in April 2003, and since Rosler submitted plaintiffs' counsel's letter as evidence in their Initial Disclosure herein, it cannot be said that plaintiffs have acted in bad faith, nor can it be said that Rosler will be prejudiced in any way by plaintiffs' amendment of their Complaint at this time. Rosler has been aware of plaintiffs' punitive damages claims for more than two years. The Court should grant plaintiffs' leave to amend their Complaint to include claims for exemplary damages. A prima facie case for exemplary damages exists under CRS § 13-21-102, as a result of Rosler's knowing violation of state and federal highway safety laws. Colorado Revised Statute 42-4-230 provides: (1) No motor vehicle carrying a truck license and weighing six thousand pounds or more and no passenger bus shall be operated over the highways of this state at any time without carrying in an accessible place inside or on the outside of the vehicle three bidirectional emergency reflective triangles of a type approved by the department, but the use of such equipment is not required in municipalities Page -10-

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where there are street lights within not more than one hundred feet. (2) Whenever a motor vehicle referred to in subsection (1) of this section is stopped upon the traveled portions of the highway for any cause other than necessary traffic stops, the driver of the stopped vehicle shall immediately activate the vehicular hazard warning signal flashers and continue the flashing until the driver places the bidirectional emergency reflective triangles as directed in subsection (3) of this section. (3) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, whenever a motor vehicle referred to in subsection (1) of this section is stopped upon the traveled portion of a highway or the shoulder of a highway for any cause other than necessary traffic stops, the driver shall, as soon as possible, but in any event within ten minutes, place the bidirectional emergency reflective triangles in the following manner: (a) One at the traffic side of the stopped vehicle, within ten feet of the front or rear of the vehicle; (b) One at a distance of approximately one hundred feet from the stopped vehicle in the center of the traffic lane or shoulder occupied by the vehicle and in the direction of the traffic approaching in that lane; and ©) One at a distance of approximately one hundred feet from the stopped vehicle in the opposite direction from those placed in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection (3) in the center of the traffic lane or shoulder occupied by the vehicle; or (d) If the vehicle is stopped within five hundred feet of a curve, crest of a hill, or other obstruction to view, the driver shall place the emergency equipment required by this subsection (3) in the direction of the obstruction to view at a distance of one hundred feet to five hundred feet from the stopped vehicle so as to afford ample warning to other users of the highway; or (e) If the vehicle is stopped upon the traveled portion or the shoulder of a divided or one-way highway, the driver shall place the emergency equipment required by this subsection (3), one at a distance of two hundred feet and one at a distance of one hundred feet in a direction toward approaching traffic in the center of the lane or shoulder occupied by the vehicle, and one at the traffic side of the vehicle within ten feet of the rear of the vehicle. (4) No motor vehicle operating as a wrecking car at the scene of an accident shall move or attempt to move any wrecked vehicle without first complying with those sections of the law concerning emergency lighting. Id. (Emphasis added.) 49 C.F.R. 392.22 is substantially identical to the above-quoted statute in every respect. Colorado Revised Statutes 42-4-1204(1)(i) further provides that it is unlawful for Page -11-

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any person to "stop, stand, or park a vehicle" on any controlled access highway. Under 49 C.F.R. Part 390 et seq, Rosler was required to exercise extreme caution in light of the hazardous conditions present at the time he pulled to a stop in the traveled portion of I-70: § 392.14 Hazardous conditions; extreme caution. Extreme caution in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated. Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point at which the safety of passengers is assured. Rosler is unable to claim that he exercised extreme caution when he stopped his tow vehicle in the traveled portion of the highway to settle a tow bill, then decided to wait for the Angel Express driver to finish his phone call instead of warning oncoming motorists like Morozov. In fact, Rosler violated each of the foregoing statutes when he stopped without immediately deploying the warning devices required under §392.22(b)(2)(iv), despite the mandatory language of §392.8 requiring such use as needed, and the mandatory language of §392.14 requiring the exercise of extreme caution when hazardous conditions affect either visibility or traction. Instead of exercising extreme caution, Rosler made no effort whatever to comply with his legal obligation to warn oncoming drivers of the hazard created by his vehicle and that of Angel Express. Rosler admits he failed to place the bidirectional emergency reflective triangles behind his vehicle, as required by CRS 42-4-230. Rosler admits he did not even attempt to deploy the warning triangles, even though CRS 42-4-230(3) required Rosler to do so "as soon as possible." Page -12-

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Instead, Rosler testified that he remained in his tow truck cab "[be]cause it was cold." Rosler claims that he is aware of the highway safety regulations in question, but that they permit him to avoid deployment of emergency warning devices because "we have a few minutes sitting alongside the road before you have to put the warning devices out."23 Rosler further claims that he complied with the statute because the exit-only deceleration lane of I-70 at Exit 348 simply isn't part of the "traveled portion" of the roadway. Under Colorado law, a violation of any of the highway safety provisions set forth above constitutes negligence per se. Hageman v. TSI, Inc., 786 P.2d 452 (Colo. App. 1989)(reh'g denied, 1989)(cert. denied, 1990). In Hageman, the plaintiff's husband was killed when the semi-tractor he was driving collided with a stopped tractor-trailer owned by the defendant TSI. Id. at 453. The driver of the TSI vehicle testified that his engine died. Id. He placed two or three warning triangles in the vicinity of his truck, the farthest about 90 feet from the truck. Id. The trial court refused the plaintiff's request to instruct the jury that TSI's failure to place emergency triangles in precise manner required by law constituted negligence per se. Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that a jury must be instructed that violations of 49 CFR §392.21 and §392.22 constitute negligence per se. Id. at 455. Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-21-102 provides that exemplary damages are allowed where "the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct." The general purpose of exemplary damages are punishment of the defendant and deterrence against the commission of similar offenses by the defendant or others in the

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Exhibit 1, at 60:19-61:1-6.

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future. Mince v. Butters, 616 P.2d 127 (Colo. 1980). In order to recover exemplary damages, the plaintiff must show that the act causing the injury was performed with an evil intent and with the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or with such a wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights as to demonstrate a wrongful motive. Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. App. 1993). "Wanton and reckless conduct" is conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm to another and is purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk in disregard of the consequences. Id. In Miller, the court upheld the jury's finding of wanton misconduct based upon evidence that the defendant failed to comply with manufacturer's recommendations and industry safety standards, thereby exacerbating the plaintiff's injuries. Id. At 569. In the present case, Rosler has admitted that he failed to place emergency warning signals as required by law. Rosler attempts to excuse his conduct by claiming that, although he is aware of the highway safety statutes in question, they don't apply to his tow truck operation. In effect, Rosler's claims boil down to his assertion that it would be inconvenient to require him to comply with clear statutory mandates enacted for the protection of the motoring public, including the decedents, Morozov and Bugaychuk. Rosler goes so far as to argue that an exit-only lane is not part of the "traveled portion" of the highway. The statutes in question not only do not provide a safe harbor as suggested by Rosler - they affirmatively and expressly provide the opposite. Admittedly, Rosler habitually avoids his statutory obligations for the sake of convenience. Rosler's excuses are nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt to avoid liability for his inexcusable and wanton conduct. In the present case, Rosler's reckless disregard cost Morozov and Bugaychuk their lives. If Rosler had only pulled off of the traveled portion of I-70 at one of several available exits as required by law, Morozov and Bugaychuk would be alive today. Page -14-

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The facts presented set forth a clear prima facie case for exemplary damages against Rosler. This is a case in which the question of exemplary damages should be submitted to the jury. Rosler should be punished for his wrongdoing and others in his industry should be deterred from similar hazardous conduct. The clear public policies underlying highway safety laws dictate that lax adherence to safety must be avoided to prevent similar tragedies in the future. The Court should grant leave to amend plaintiffs' Complaint to include a claim for exemplary damages. WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray for an order consistent with the matters set forth herein. A proposed Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand is attached as Exhibit 8. Dated this October 11, 2005. Respectfully submitted,

/s_Komron Michael Allahyari____ Komron Michael Allahyari WASHINGTON LAW GROUP 1001 Fourth Avenue Plaza, 32nd Floor Seattle, WA 98154 (206) 423-1045 [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF) I hereby certify that on October 11, 2005, I electronically filed a true and correct copy of this document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following email addresses: Andrew Carafelli Hall & Evans, LLC 1125 17th St., Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202-2052 E-mail: [email protected]

/s__Komron Michael Allahyari_____ Komron Michael Allahyari WASHINGTON LAW GROUP 1001 Fourth Avenue Plaza, 32nd Floor Seattle, WA 98154 (206) 423-1045 [email protected] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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