Free Proposed Jury Instructions - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

Case 1:04-cv-01067-MSK-CBS

Document 117-11

Filed 05/26/2006

Page 1 of 4

Pani' Competing INSTRUCTION No. 37 litf fs §1983 Malicious Prosecution--Fourth, Eight, Fourteenth Amendments O e o Pa t' c i u d r § 9 3 i ta D fn a t mac u l n f lnis lms n e 1 8 s h t ee d n if f a li s io y prosecuted him for theft. Plaintiff claims that Defendant prosecuted him not

because it had good reason to believe he had committed the crime, but in order to gain an advantage in defending against the civil appeal of his planned termination. Plaintiff claims that Defendant continued to prosecute him for theft even though it knew he had not committed theft, and that it ratified or condoned perjury and obstruction of justice by the key prosecution witness against him, a Safeway store ma a e, e a s t wte s p r r a do s u tno j tew r h lu t n g rb c ue h i s' ej y n b t co fu i ee e flo e n s u r i sc p D fn a t po euion of Plaintiff. ee d n' rs ct s He claims that these actions violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search or seizure, and his Eighth Amendment right to a fair trial by jury in the criminal prosecution. In essence, Plaintiff contends that the City did not make an honest, good faith mistake in prosecuting him for theft, but instead abused its power and authority to seek his prosecution and conviction despite its knowledge of his innocence. If this allegation is true, the City violated his Constitutional rights. Obviously, police, public officials and prosecutors could not do their jobs if, every time they prosecuted someone they honestly and in good faith believed to be guilty, they would be liable for violation of §1983 if they failed to achieve a conviction. On the other hand, given the awesome power police, public officials and prosecutors wield over the lives of citizens, our constitutional freedoms would be endangered if citizens could not use §1983 to secure relief for deprivation of their

Case 1:04-cv-01067-MSK-CBS

Document 117-11

Filed 05/26/2006

Page 2 of 4

lives, liberty or property by police, public officials or prosecutors who abuse their power to achieve criminal convictions for reasons unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the accused. The federal courts have therefore struggled over the years to strike a fair balance between the important public necessity of according police, public officials and prosecutors the freedom to make honest, good faith mistakes, and the paramount public necessity, indeed, constitutional obligation, of protecting citizens against the abuse by police, public officials or prosecutors of their power to charge and convict people of crimes. S me fd rl o r h v l kd t te cmmo l tr o " li s o e ea cut ae o e o h o s o n a ot f mac u w io poeui " stet c s n fr eemin w eh r li spo e rsc tn a h o h t e o d tr n g h te mac u rs cution in o u o i io violation of §1983 has occurred. This Court is not bound by that model, and you are not required to follow it. You may, however, find it helpful, and I will therefore explain it. Under this " mmo l tr approach, Plaintiff would be required to prove c o n a ot w " that policy-making officials of Defendant: (1) commenced or continued criminal prosecution of Plaintiff; (2) knew or had reason to know that commencement or continuation of the criminal prosecution was not supported by the evidence; (3) were motivated by malice toward Plaintiff to prosecute him; (4) deprived Plaintiff of his liberty or property in some way by prosecuting him; and (5) that the charges against Plaintiff did not result in his conviction. Though Plaintiff was not incarcerated after being charged with shoplifting, he was deprived of his liberty and property by being required to appear in court to

Case 1:04-cv-01067-MSK-CBS

Document 117-11

Filed 05/26/2006

Page 3 of 4

answer and defend against the charge of shoplifting, by losing his employment because he was charged with shoplifting, and by being forced to hire counsel to defend him in the criminal trial in May, 2003. Therefore, you are hereby instructed that Plaintiff has already established three of the foregoing elements, and that you should treat them as proven: Element (1), Defendant commenced or continued criminal prosecution of Plaintiff; Element (4), Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his liberty or property by prosecuting him; and Element (5), the charge against Plaintiff did not result in his conviction. If you also find that Plaintiff has also proved that policy-making officials of Defendant [Element 2] knew or had reason to know that commencement or continuation of the criminal prosecution was not supported by the evidence, and [Element 3] were motivated by malice toward Plaintiff to prosecute him all the foregoing elements, you must find that Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for malicious prosecution in violation of §1983. Again, however, in this Court, you may still find that Defendant maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff in violation of §1983 even if Plaintiff fails to prove each of the foregoing elements of common law malicious prosecution. In this Court, the common law tort of malicious prosecution is just a useful "tr gp i" r n l y h t may or may not find useful in your deliberations. s t o to a a g ta you ai n n o Plaintiff is not required to prove each of these elements in order to establish that Defendant maliciously prosecuted him in violation of §1983. The essential question you must decide is whether Plaintiff has proved that D fn a t p l ee d n' o s icy-making officials abused their governmental power to

Case 1:04-cv-01067-MSK-CBS

Document 117-11

Filed 05/26/2006

Page 4 of 4

commence, or continue, Pa t'prosecution for a crime they knew, or had reason lnis if f to know, he did not commit. Whether there was probable cause to commence or continue criminal proceedings depends upon whether a reasonably prudent person, based upon all of the facts and circumstances known to him when the prosecution was commenced or while it continued would have believed plaintiff guilty of the crime with which he was charged. Whether malice existed could be demonstrated by any evidence revealing mac o tep ro D fn a t p ly le n h at f ee d n' oc-making officials toward Plaintiff. It could i s i i l eei neta D fn a t p ly nu c d v e c h t ee d n' oc-making officials commenced or continued d s i their prosecution of Plaintiff for a purpose or goal other than punishing the commission of a crime, or that they commenced or continued prosecution of Plaintiff out of ill will or with reckless disregard for his Constitutional rights. Defendant commenced or continued its prosecution of Plaintiff for shoplifting with reckless disregard for his rights if it commenced or continued his prosecution without good reason to believe that he actually committed shoplifting.

Authority:

Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004)