Free Motion for Attorney Fees - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 00-cv-02098-REB-MJW KELLY FINCHER, by her guardian, JAMES FINCHER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

D.C.Colo.LCivR 7.1 Certification: Plaintiff's counsel has conferred in good faith with Defendant's counsel about this Motion. Defendant's counsel opposes the relief requested herein. Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys of record, The Carey Law Firm, hereby moves for an award of attorney fees, pursuant to this Court's Order Concerning Motion For Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2007, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3, and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708, as follows: I. INTRODUCTION The history of this case is well known to the Court, is fully described in the Facts & Procedural Background section of the Court's October 9, 2007, Order Concerning Motion For Summary Judgment, and therefore will not be repeated in detail.

1

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 2 of 16

On August 24, 2000, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action against Prudential Property And Casualty Insurance Company ("Prudential"). In that Complaint, Plaintiff brought claims based upon Prudential's failure to offer the statutorily-required enhanced PIP coverage as required by Colorado's No-Fault Act, including declaratory relief/reformation, breach of contract, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and willful and wanton breach of contract. In its answer, Prudential denied that it owed any additional PIP benefits to any person, including Plaintiff, and listed ten affirmative defenses. Many years of hotly contested and extremely intensive litigation have followed, during which some twenty-three pretrial motions were filed, and the case went up to the Tenth Circuit and back. Eventually, following the ruling in Fincher v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 76 Fed. Appx. 917 (10th Cir. 2003) that Plaintiff was entitled to reformation of the Prudential policy because its offer of APIP benefits to it insureds did not comply with the requirements of Colorado law concerning the permissible level of the cap on APIP benefits, a trial before this Court was held to determine the effective date of reformation of the Prudential policy and the other terms of reformation. On February 28, 2006, the Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Orders [#158] reforming the Prudential policy as of the date of Fincher's accident on May 8, 1994, and further ruling that the $200,000 cap on APIP benefits permitted by the CAARA would apply to the reformed contract. Thereafter, on April 12, 2006, Prudential tendered to Fincher a payment of $92,500, bringing to $200,000 the total amount of benefits paid by Prudential to Fincher in PIP and APIP benefits. On May 31, 2006,

2

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 3 of 16

Prudential tendered to Fincher an additional payment of $202,000 as payment of the statutory interest due to Fincher under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708(1.8). Plaintiff's complaint included class action allegations based on the assertion that Prudential's APIP policy language was flawed in the same way for all Prudential insureds, with the result that none of those insureds received an offer of APIP benefits that complied with the requirements of the No-Fault Act. Although Prudential may argue that some of the hours in this matter were devoted to class certification matters until the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification on March 22, 2007, the reality is that much if not most of the class certification arguments and proceedings focused on Prudential's repeated attacks on the merits of Plaintiff's claims, rather than their suitability for class treatment. Moreover, the class claims were part of this action from the beginning, and it is not fair to deprive Plaintiff of fees related to those claims and her role as a putative class representative because these legal services were necessarily performed in this matter in conjunction with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain relief for all Prudential insureds who were insured under the same policy that was reformed to provide APIP coverage in this case. In any event, Plaintiff's counsel have analyzed the attached time entries to identify those related to class certification matters and have determined that only 15.5 hours of attorney time and 41.25 hours of paralegal time, with a total value of $8,491.25, were devoted to class certification issues, including briefing the class certification motion. Given the fact that much of the class certification-related litigation was actually focused on the merits of Plaintiff's claims, the hours spent on class certification directly contributed to the successful result in this case.

3

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 4 of 16

Litigation of Plaintiff's remaining claims continued following the denial of the class certification motion, and a jury trial was set to commence on October 15, 2007. On March 9, 2007, Defendant moved for leave to file a motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's remaining claims. The Court granted Prudential's motion for leave on July 19, 2007, and the briefing on the substantive motion was completed on September 10, 2007. On September 21, 2007, more than 20 days prior to the date set for commencement of the trial in this matter and in accordance with the requirements of C.R.S. § 10-4-708(1.7), Plaintiff filed her Notice To Insurer Of Amount Claimed. The Notice, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, included the amounts Plaintiff claimed were denied or not timely paid, as well as the amount of attorneys fees incurred as of that time. On October 9, 2007, the Court entered its Order granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor as to her claims for breach of contract, limited to the amounts of $92,500 as the balance of APIP benefits due to the Plaintiff, and in the amount of $202,000 as payment for the statutory interest due to the Plaintiff under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4708(1.8). The Court then granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to

Plaintiff's remaining claims. In accordance with the Court's direction that Plaintiff file her request for attorneys fees under the No-Fault Act, the purpose of this motion is to submit Plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708(1.7). II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-708 The statutory predicate for awarding attorneys fees to a claimant who successfully seeks PIP benefits, including those extended PIP benefits identified in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-710, is Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708:
4

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 5 of 16

§ 10-4-708. Prompt payment of direct benefits Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid within thirty days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during that period; ... . In the event that the insurer fails to pay such benefits when due, the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the same (emphasis added). Here, Fincher has recovered upon her action in contract for the benefits Prudential should have timely paid but did not. Prudential's failure to pay such benefits allows Fincher to pursue her claim for those amounts payable to her under the No-Fault Act, including the attorney fees available under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708. As stated in Spensieri v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 268, 271 (Colo. App. 1990), an award of attorney fees to an insured who recovers benefits due in such an action furthers the fundamental purpose of Colorado's No-Fault Act: We divine the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this statute to be that it wished to assure that all accident related expenses are promptly paid by the insurer and that, under appropriate circumstances, the wrongful refusal to pay will require an award of attorney fees which may exceed the economic value of the claim. C.R.S. 10-708(1.7) provides the framework to assess whether an award of fees is appropriate. It expressly states that an insured can recover under the No-Fault Act for "claims that are denied" or claims "not timely paid by the insurer." In this case, Plaintiff won both an order reforming the Prudential policy and a judgment against Prudential, and as a result recovered the No-Fault (APIP) benefits that Prudential had denied were owed. Adams v. Farmers Ins. Group, 983 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1999) controls in assessing Plaintiff's entitlement to attorney fees and establishes that the statute only requires a plaintiff to have been "successful" in the proceedings below in order to be eligible to recover attorney fees. 983 P.2d at 802; see also Bunting v. Regional Transportation Dist., 919 P.2d 924, 928-29 (Colo. App. 1996) (the only prerequisite to an award of attorney
5

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 6 of 16

fees under C.R.S. § 10-4-708 is that the insurer failed to pay the benefits owed to the insured when due). The Adams court noted that section 10-4-708(1.7) provides an

elaborate framework defining what it means to be "successful in the proceedings," and "need[s] of no additional clarification." The court concluded by stating: The foregoing language makes it clear that a trial court need only refer to a party's monetary success in the proceedings on the underlying claim in order to see whether one was "successful in the proceedings" pursuant to section 10-4-708(1.7)(c)(I). In sum,...the threshold requirement for entitlement to fees under the Act is whether the party succeeded monetarily in the proceeding below. 983 P.2d at 802-3 (emphasis added). Moreover, when an insured has recovered past due or unpaid benefits, the award of attorney's fees is not optional. Citing to Adams,, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Giampapa v. American Family American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 12 P.3d 839 (Colo. App. 2000) described an award of attorney fees for an insured who prevails in an action to recover PIP benefits as not only warranted but required: "The award of attorney fees in litigation against an insurer for failure to pay PIP benefits is authorized by statute, § 10-4-708(1.7), C.R.S. 1999, and is mandatory." Id. at 842 (emphasis added). Here, Fincher brought an action in contract to recover the benefits Prudential should have paid but did not, and recovered all of her unpaid APIP benefits as a result of this action. Moreover, Prudential essentially acknowledges that its denial and protracted delay in paying such benefits constitutes a breach of contract that entitles Plaintiff to recover her attorney fees under C.R.S. § 10-4-708. As the Court concluded in its October 9 Order, the Court's Reformation Order, the undisputed facts, and Prudential's argument in its motion for summary judgment "all demonstrate that Prudential concedes that, under the terms of the Reformation Order, Prudential breached its contract of insurance with
6

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 7 of 16

Fincher." Order Concerning Motion For Summary Judgment p. 9. In addition, in other reported cases, courts have consistently awarded attorney fees where insureds like Fincher obtained insurance coverage from carriers who contested owing that coverage. In particular, the court in Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Colo. 1999) awarded attorneys fees in a situation similar to the facts found in this case. Courts have also relied in the past on Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Robins, 597 P.2d 1052 (Colo. App. 1979); Allstate Insurance v. Orban, 855 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1992); and 7A J. Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4691 (1962) for the proposition that the award of attorney fees in a case such as Fincher's results only in the entirely appropriate result of restoring the insured to the position the insured would have occupied had the carrier properly honored its statutory and/or contractual obligations in the first instance. In this case, the Court's summary judgment order establishes that Plaintiff succeeded monetarily on her breach of contract claim. As required by the No-Fault Act, Plaintiff filed her notice to insurer of amounts claimed (#263) on September 21, 2007, seeking the remaining PIP benefits due under the contract of insurance for compensable accident-related expenses or losses incurred beyond the amount paid by Prudential prior to the date this action was filed. As described in her notice, given the cap on coverage imposed by the Court, the "accident-related expenses and losses `denied or not timely paid' by Prudential under § 708 total $92,500." Exhibit 1 p. 2. The October 9, 2007, Order granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor and awarding damages in the amount of $92,500 means that Plaintiff successfully recovered 100% of the PIP benefits that remained unpaid when this action was filed.
7

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 8 of 16

III. PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES ARE REASONABLE It is settled that the fee applicant has the burden of proving the basic time/rate elements of a reasonable fee. When, as here, an insured has successfully recovered past due benefits under the No-Fault Act, the Colorado court of appeals in Spensieri, supra, described in detail what is required by the No-Fault Act: An award of attorney fees must be reasonable. A determination of reasonableness is a question of fact for the trial court and "will not be disturbed on review unless it is patently erroneous and unsupported by the evidence." [citations omitted] If, as here, the statute pursuant to which an award of attorney fees is made, does not provide a specific definition of "reasonable," then such compensation should be determined in light of all circumstances for the time and effort reasonably expended by the prevailing party's attorney. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). The initial estimate by the court of a reasonable attorney fee based on the evidence is the calculation of the "lodestar" amount. This amount represents the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. It carries with it a strong presumption of reasonableness. Blanchard v. Bergeron, supra. Spensieri, 804 P.2d 268, 270. After calculating this "lodestar" amount, the statute then

requires that fees be awarded based upon the degree by which the insured was successful in the proceeding: The award of attorney fees to the insured shall be in direct proportion to the degree by which the insured was successful in the proceeding. The determination of the degree of the insured's success shall be based upon a comparison of the amount of benefits set forth in the notice of amount of benefits claimed and the amount of benefits recovered in the proceeding. The percentage resulting from their comparison shall be the degree by which the insured was successful. C.R.S. § 10-4-708(1.7). In this case, this calculation is simple--Plaintiff successfully recovered 100% of the benefits claimed as due in her Notice To Insurer Of Amount Claimed, which is 100% of the benefits due under the reformed contract of insurance.
8

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 9 of 16

Given Plaintiff's success in recovering the benefits sought, it is necessary to compute the lodestar amount, the number of hours reasonably expended by her attorneys 1 multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Spensieri, supra. In determining

reasonable attorney fee awards, "federal courts have relied heavily on the factors articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)." Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1988). Under Johnson, courts look at twelve factors generally applicable to fee awards, including (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. These factors support the fees that are requested here. Attached hereto is Exhibit 2, the supporting Affidavit of Leif Garrison, including time/rate elements for each of the attorneys and paralegals who spent time on this case, as well as a detailed description of the legal services rendered. In addition to the detailed breakdown included in Exhibit 1, the Johnson standards are assessed as follows: (1) the time and labor required: As previously noted, the time and labor devoted to this action is considerable. The instant action was brought in 2000, and in the more
1

And paralegals; see Stalcup v. Schlage Lock Company, 505 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (D. Colo. 2007). 9

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 10 of 16

than seven years of litigation since then, five lawyers and two paralegals have devoted more than 1,770 hours of work to Plaintiff's cause, and a total of two law firms and at least three lawyers have entered their appearances on behalf of Prudential. The seven years of complicated litigation in this case included a fully briefed and argued appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and a two-day trial to the Court regarding the issues related to reformation. The complexity of just the reformation issues alone is evidenced by the lengthy rulings issued by both the Tenth Circuit and this Court; the Court's Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, & Orders following the reformation trial required some thirty pages of analysis. In addition, thousands of pages of discovery documents were produced, counsel for Plaintiff conducted four out of state depositions of Prudential witnesses (out of a total of 14 depositions taken or defended by the parties), and no less than five expert witnesses were engaged by the parties to analyze and submit expert reports about the complex issues of insurance and insurance law and regulation, statutory construction, damages, and bad faith involved in this case. The information gathering process related to these complex and unique issues was made more difficult by the fact that the underlying automobile accident occurred six years before this action was filed, and the relevant time period for Prudential's conduct related to the reformation issue extended as far back as 1989, some 18 years ago. As would be expected in a case of this complexity, the litigation process itself required substantial time, effort and expertise: collectively, the parties filed some twenty-three pretrial motions, and in the run up to trial alone, Prudential filed five motions in limine on various issues. Under these circumstances, the total fee amounts listed below, supported by the attached detailed description of the legal services
10

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 11 of 16

provided, represents a reasonable lodestar amount for Plaintiff's attorney fee request under the No-Fault Act. Notably, this lodestar amount does not reflect the significant risk to Plaintiff's counsel that no fee might be recovered at all. (2) the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions: The relevant concepts and novel issues of insurance law and statutory construction involved in this matter are highly specialized, and the interplay of the various equitable and legal remedies available to Plaintiff is complex. The instant litigation involved the issue of whether reformation is required; whether the policy defects themselves violated the requirements of C.R.S. § 104-710; Prudential's attempts to cure those defects, the effective date of reformation, the impact of the effective date of reformation on Plaintiff's claims related to Prudential's prereformation conduct, the efficacy of the $200,000 cap, and whether Prudential's postreformation conduct was compliant with the No-Fault Act and/or in bad faith. Each of these issues was ably contested by experienced counsel, and success doubtful. (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly: Plaintiff's counsel are the leading counsel in the state in this area of law. For example, Plaintiff's counsel also represented the plaintiff in Clark v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a case which resulted in Tenth Circuit opinions that figured heavily in the result here. The experience, skill and knowledge Plaintiff's counsel gained from these and other APIP cases therefore served to reduce the amount of attorney time required to litigate the instant case, and it is likely that Plaintiff would not have obtained any relief on the claims presented here without counsel's specialized skill and expertise in this area of the law.

11

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 12 of 16

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case: As described above, this action has been both lengthy and hard-fought, and has required many hours of attorney and paralegal time as documented in the attachments to this motion. As a result, Plaintiff's counsel have been restricted in their ability to accept other cases because of the heavy time requirements imposed by this one. (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community: The attached schedule of time and rates reflects fees that are customary and reasonable given the complex claims, legal theories and remedies at issue in this case, the experience of the counsel, and the highly contested nature of virtually every aspect of this case. In similarly complex cases litigated in the Denver metropolitan area, counsel for Plaintiff have routinely seen hourly fees for senior counsel in the range of $290 to $375 per hour, with paralegal rates ranging from $85 to $125 per hour, which compares very favorably to the rates listed in the attached supporting documents. (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fees sought here are "contingent" in the sense that Plaintiff is only entitled to her fees under the No-Fault Act because she prevailed on her contract claims. Plaintiff's counsel has been required to devote

substantial amounts of time, money and resources to this case over a seven year period with no guarantee of success and therefore no guarantee of payment. The very

significant financial risk involved in this case means that many attorneys probably would have been unwilling or unable to accept it. (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances: Kelly Fincher was very severely injured in the underlying motor vehicle accident, and PIP and APIP
12

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 13 of 16

benefits are vital benefits designed to minimize the effect of accident-related injuries and keep injured insureds' lives on track. Plaintiff's counsel endeavored to push this case forward to ensure that her benefits were paid as timely as possible, and toward that end set this matter for trial on multiple occasions, as well as the reformation trial to the Court and at least another 5 hearings, status conferences and the like. (8) the amount involved and the results obtained: This case therefore involved both complex issues and very significant injuries and damages, and Plaintiff's counsel recovered substantial damages and interest for Plaintiff. Consistent with the

determination required by the No-Fault Act, the recovery in this action is 100% of the amount of benefits listed in the Notice to Insurer of Amounts Claimed. (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney: Plaintiff's counsel are highly experienced in cases like this one, and have obtained substantial verdicts or settlements in other similar cases involving APIP issues. On numerous occasions other lawyers have asked Plaintiff's counsel to serve as co-counsel in similar cases. (10) the undesirability of the case: The complexity of the issues involved and the significant financial risk inherent in a case where attorney fees can only be recovered upon success has often meant that clients such as Plaintiff have been unable to find any attorney willing to take their case; at the time Plaintiff's counsel accepted it, almost no other lawyer in the state would take this kind of case. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed in a case where many lawyers would have concluded that Plaintiff had already received all of the benefits due to her, and was entitled to nothing more. Given the purpose of C.R.S. § 10-4-708 as described in Spensieri, supra, the laudatory goal of ensuring prompt

13

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 14 of 16

payment of No-Fault benefits to the insureds who need them can only be accomplished if counsel are compensated for the risk involved in taking a case like this one. (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: Plaintiff has been represented by Plaintiff's counsel for more than seven years regarding this matter, and has understood the nature of the risks of non-recovery and the potential for an award of fees under the No-Fault Act. (12) awards in similar cases: Counsel for Plaintiff have won significant

recoveries in other APIP cases involving similar issues. The amount of legal fees sought here is not out of line for cases of this duration and complexity, and as described with respect to item (5) above, is based on hourly rates that are very comparable to those routinely charged by experienced lawyers for similar services in this community. Attached hereto is the Affidavit of Leif Garrison (Exhibit 2) along with detailed time/rate elements for each of the attorneys and paralegals who have spent time on this case (Exhibits A-G). The summaries of the relevant qualifications and experience of the attorneys and paralegals who performed work on this case contained in the Affidavit verify the experience, reputation, skill and ability of the professionals involved. The time entries show that each attorney performed work that was commensurate with his or her experience and ability, and that appropriate tasks were performed by paralegals where possible. Based upon the attached affidavit and detailed time entries, the total amount of hours devoted to the services rendered by attorneys is 1007.65 and paralegals 770.5. At the listed rates ranging from $175 to $395 per hour for attorney time and $95 per hour for paralegal time, the total fee amount is $305,523.00 for attorney time and $73,197.50 for
14

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 15 of 16

paralegal time. The total amount of attorney fees sought by Plaintiff pursuant to C.R.S. § 10-4-708 is therefore $378,720.50. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff has established the bases for her entitlement to recover 100% of her attorney fees pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-708, and had complied with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. Plaintiff has also met her burden in showing that the attorney fees requested are reasonable given the difficulty of the case, the risk involved, and the attorneys' expertise in complex insurance law litigation. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that her Motion for Attorney Fees be granted, and that she be awarded her attorney fees in this matter in the amount of $378,720.50. Respectfully submitted this 15th day of November, 2007. s/Leif Garrison Leif Garrison Robert B. Carey Leif Garrison The Carey Law Firm 2301 East Pikes Peak Avenue Colorado Springs, CO 80909 L. Dan Rector Franklin D. Azar and Associates 5536 Library Lane Colorado Springs, CO 80918

15

Case 1:00-cv-02098-REB-MJW

Document 278

Filed 11/15/2007

Page 16 of 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF) I hereby certify that on 15th day of November, 2007, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses: [email protected] s/Leif Garrison Leif Garrison

16