Free Motion for Miscellaneous Relief - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Case No. 01-cv-02199-MSK-MEH MICHAEL E. CLAWSON and JARED L. DILLON, Plaintiffs, v. MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, L.L.C., ARCH WESTERN RESOURCES, L.L.C., and ARCH COAL, INC., Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR BACK PAY AND INTEREST

The plaintiffs, Michael E. Clawson and Jared L. Dillon, through their undersigned counsel, Killian, Guthro & Jensen, P.C., hereby submit their Motion for Back Pay and Interest, and in support thereof, state as follows: I. BACK PAY A. Advisory Jury Verdict

The Court in this case used an advisory jury verdict on the issue of back pay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Although the jury provided an advisory verdict, the Court remains ultimately responsible for determining the appropriate award of back pay. McCue v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 165 F.3d 784, 791-92 (10th Cir. 1999). The advisory verdict on back pay was $236,000 for Clawson and $108,000 for Dillon. As discussed more completely below,

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the law and fact support these determinations. Therefore, it is plaintiffs' position that the Court should adopt the jury's findings on back pay as its own. When the Court uses and advisory jury, it may accept the jury's verdict in its discretion. Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir. 1942). "Although the court is in no way bound by the answers of an advisory jury, it may adopt the jury's findings as its own." Greenwood v. Greenwood, 234 F.2d 276, 278 (3rd Cir. 1056). However, in the Tenth Circuit, the district court cannot simply adopt the jury's advisory verdict without comment. Instead, even when the Court agrees with the jury, it must make sufficient findings to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, 129 F.3d 1408, 1416 FN 6 (10th Cir. 1997). Based on the evidence presented, the credibility of the witnesses, and the applicable law, the Court should adopt the jury's advisory verdict and find that Clawson is entitled to $236,000 in back pay and that Dillon is entitled to $108,000 in back pay. B. Legal Standard for an Award of Back Pay

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), the remedies of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 are available under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) allows for awards of back pay. "Given a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination . . . and making persons whole . . . ." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975). The Court should endeavor to give a prevailing plaintiff the most complete relief possible. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 329 (8th Cir. 1986). The Court need not identify specific factors considered in awarding back pay, because there is a presumption that an award of back pay is appropriate. Id.

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"Although damages may not be based on speculation, uncertainty in determining what an employee would have earned but for discrimination should be resolved against the employer." Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1428, 1494 (10th Cir. 1994). Therefore, "unrealistic exactitude is not required in back pay determinations . . . ." Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 1975). A back pay determination should include overtime and shift differentials. Peltway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974). Back pay should also include fringe benefits. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1493; O'Neal v. Ferguson Const. Co., 237 F.3d 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2001). In O'Neal the Tenth Circuit upheld an award of lost fringe benefits based upon the value of fringe benefits as a percentage of gross pay. O'Neal, 237 F.3d at 1256-57. This is the same method by which Mr. Brennan calculated lost fringe benefits. C. The Jury's Findings are Appropriate and Should be Adopted by the Court 1. Mr. Clawson's Back Pay

At trial, Mr. Clawson requested back pay in the amount of $235,431, consistent with the admitted expert report of Ron Brennan. (Attachment 1, Economic Damages Report for Mike Clawson, Trial Ex. 722). Mr. Brennan's report calculates what Mr. Clawson would have earned had he been returned to work by Mountain Coal and compares this with what he actually earned. Mr. Brennan also calculated lost fringe benefits in a manner approved by the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Brennan stopped calculating the economic damages on the day Mr. Clawson turned down the offer of re-employment from Mountain Coal. The jury's advisory verdict was $236,000 for back pay. This is slightly more than the amount requested. The jury could reasonably find that some of Mr. Brennan's assumptions were

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too conservative. The jury also heard testimony regarding Mr. Clawson's job searches and his need to engage in several job searches because of the lack of steady employment in his area. The cost of engaging in such job searches could be awarded as part of back pay and would be within the common knowledge and experience of the jurors. The jury was instructed not to base its decisions on speculation or conjecture. It is presumed that the jury will follow the instructions it is given. United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 2005) see also O'Neal, 237 F.3d at 1256-57. The jury could reasonably find, based on the evidence, that the economic damage to Mr. Clawson was in fact slightly more than he requested, and there is adequate support for the jury's verdict. The Court should adopt the jury's finding and award Mr. Clawson $236,000 in back pay. 2. Mr. Dillon's Back Pay

At trial, Mr. Dillon requested back pay in the amount of $146,830, consistent with the admitted expert report of Ron Brennan. (Attachment 2, Economic Damages Report for Jared Dillon, Trial Ex. 721). The report calculates what Mr. Dillon would have earned if he had been returned to work. The report also calculates what Mr. Dillon did earn prior to his first termination from Oxbow, and what he would have earned had he not failed to mitigate from his termination to the date of trial. Using this information, Mr. Brennan calculated Mr. Dillon's back pay damages, as shown on page one of Attachment 2. The jury only awarded Mr. Dillon $108,000. The court has the discretion to award Mr. Dillon the full amount contained in Mr. Brennan's report. However, because the evidence supports the amount awarded by the jury, it is this amount that is being requested by Mr. Dillon. Although neither side specifically mentioned $108,000, the amount is supported by the evidence.

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The jury heard the testimony of both Mr. Brennan and Dr. Darnell and had the opportunity to assess their relative credibility on the issue of Mr. Dillon's damages. The jury also heard evidence that the fringe benefits at Oxbow may have been equal to the benefits at Mountain Coal, reducing Mr. Dillon's damages. The jury could also consider whether Mr. Dillon would be able to advance from Miner III to Miner II, and Miner I, and the time it would take him to advance if he was promoted. This determination would affect the amount of Mr. Dillon's damages, and there was conflicting evidence on the subject. The jury could consider issues of mitigation and failure to mitigate. The jury could also consider defense counsel's cross examination, and the demonstrative exhibit showing lower figures for back pay in the first two reports of Mr. Brennan. Some or all of these considerations could have motivated the jury to award only $108,000 in back pay. The amount is supported by the evidence, and the Court should adopt the jury's finding and award Mr. Dillon $108,000 in back pay damages. 3. The Plaintiffs' Back Pay Damages Should not be Reduced by Money Received from Collateral Sources

Plaintiffs expect that defendants will argue that the amounts of back pay awarded to plaintiffs should be reduced by amounts received from collateral sources. This position is incorrect. Amount received from collateral sources should not be deducted from a plaintiff's damages. "The collateral source rule allows plaintiff to seek full recovery from a tortfeasor even though an independent source has compensated the plaintiff in full or in part for the loss . . . public policy favors giving the plaintiff a double recovery rather than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy a reduced liability simply because plaintiff has received compensation from an independent source." Green v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).

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It is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor. If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance or by making advantageous employment arrangements, the law allows him to keep it for himself. If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or established for him by law, he should not be deprived of the advantage it confers. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis added) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b (1979). No collateral source benefits should be deducted from plaintiffs back pay damages. a. Unemployment and Workers' Compensation Payments

Neither unemployment nor workers' compensation payments should be deducted from plaintiffs' back pay damages. The United States Supreme Court established that payments from publicly established benefits programs should not be deducted from back pay damages. NLRB v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1951). While this was a National Labor Relations Act case, the NLRA damage provisions served a model for the Title VII damage provisions, and consequently for the ADA as well. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc., 95 F.Supp 2d 1118, 1122 (D. Mont. 2000). The Tenth Circuit held that it was appropriate to refuse to deduct unemployment benefits from an award of back pay. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-626 (10th Cir. 1980). The Tenth Circuit explained that such a deduction could result in a "windfall to the employer," because it allows the defendant to substitute the unemployment payments for its own liability. Id. The same logic would apply to workers' compensation payments. Workers' compensation is a benefits program established and mandated by the government to promote the public good. This makes it similar to unemployment insurance. See Gullet Gin, 340 U.S. at

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364-5. At least two circuits have held that workers' compensation should not be deducted from back pay damages. The Eighth Circuit, using logic remarkably similar to that of the Tenth Circuit in Sandia, held that workers' compensation benefits were not to be deducted from back pay in employment cases. Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2002). "[A]n employer can not set up in mitigation . . . in a tort action . . . indemnity from a collateral source, such as insurance or compensation or benefits under a Workmen's Compensation Act, even where the defendant has contributed to the fund . . . the rule gains in significance in the context of employment discrimination claims." Id. "[D]eduction of the benefits would constitute a windfall to the employer who committed the illegal discrimination." Id. The Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth, determined that workers' compensation benefits should not be deducted from a plaintiff's back pay damages. Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1171 (6th Cir. 1969). Additionally, Mr. Clawson and Mr. Dillon only requested back pay from the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) forward. Under the Colorado workers' compensation system, wage replacement benefits end once the employee has reached MMI. Section 8-42105(d)(3)(a), C.R.S.; Section 8-42-106(2)(a), C.R.S. Benefits received after MMI are to compensate for physical impairment, not wage loss. No evidence of wage loss prior to MMI was admitted; therefore, it is unlikely that the jury considered, let alone awarded, damages for wage loss prior to MMI. Workers' compensation is unlikely to be a consideration as a collateral source, because wage loss benefits were not paid during the back pay period. Even if workers compensation is considered, Moysis shows that the reasoning of the Sandia court applies equally to

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unemployment and workers' compensation benefits, and neither should be deducted from back pay damages. b. Long-term Disability Benefits

Mr. Clawson received some long-term disability benefits, and these amounts should not be deducted from his back pay damages. Long-term disability insurance was provided by a third party insurer and was part of the compensation received by Mountain Coal employees. The logic of Gullet Gin, Sandia, and Moysis applies to the receipt of disability benefits. Although Mountain Coal may have made payments to the disability insurance provider on behalf of Mr. Clawson, the payments to Mr. Clawson came from a third party. This is similar to workers' compensation or unemployment benefits. The Tenth Circuit has held that it is not error to refuse to deduct a plaintiff's disability benefits from a defendant's back pay liability. Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir. 1983).1 Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit explained, insurance benefits paid for by an employer are part of the employees' compensation, and the payments are made on the employees' behalf. EEOC v. Grady, 857 F.2d 383, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1988). In analogizing pension benefits to insurance benefits the Seventh Circuit stated: "[T]he pension benefits may be viewed as earned by the claimants and therefore not paid by the employer at all. Like an insurance policy provided by an employer, the pension benefits here were part of the claimants' compensation." Id. at 391. Long-term disability insurance in this case is a classic collateral source, and should not be deducted from Clawson's back pay.

The Tenth Circuit appears to be discussing disability insurance, although it is possible the court is referring to workers' compensation disability benefits. The distinction would be irrelevant under the facts, because in any event the employer must pay premiums, and the insurer makes payments to the employee under specific circumstances.

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c.

Short-term Disability

Short-term disability was earned by each plaintiff prior to his termination and should be considered a collateral source and not deducted from back pay. The short-term disability benefits belonged to Mr. Clawson and Mr. Dillon in the same way that their pay did. This concept was explained by the Seventh Circuit, applying Arizona law: `[I]nsurance was as much a part of the compensation Captain Lux received from his employer as were his salary, fringe benefits, and pension benefits' . . . Thus, for the purposes of Arizona's collateral source rule, his life insurance policy was purchased by him just as if he had accepted the higher salary and had written a check from his bank to pay the premiums. In re Aircraft Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 803 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1986). The same concept was described by Justice Rovira in regard to Colorado law: Keelan entered into an employment contract that, in addition to a salary, contained fringe benefits that included a provision for disability pension payments . . . it is self-evident that in exchange for these benefits Keelan received less salary than he would have received absent these benefits. . . . Essentially, Keelan `paid' for these benefits by rendering his services for a lower salary; and he, rather than [defendant], is entitled to the result of his own prudence. Van Waters, 840 P.2d at 1080 (Rovira special concur). The Colorado law on this issue should be given special consideration. Under the Erie doctrine, there is no federal common law of contracts. Therefore, Colorado law governs the contract of employment between Mountain Coal and the plaintiffs. Under Colorado law, disability benefits provided by an employer are earned by the employee and are part of the consideration for the contract of employment. Van Waters & Rogers, 840 P.2d at 1073 fn 4, 1078-1079. While federal law determines whether a collateral source should be deducted, under state law the short-term disability benefits were clearly earned by Mr. Clawson and Mr. Dillon.

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The Fifth Circuit held that when a plaintiff pays for disability benefits with her own funds, they are a collateral source and should not be deducted from back pay. Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 611 (5th Cir. 2002). As explained by the Seventh Circuit and the Colorado Supreme Court, there is no difference between paying for insurance with money earned at work or earning insurance directly from work performed for an employer. Each plaintiff earned the short-term disability benefits he received, and the amounts received are collateral sources that should not be deducted from the back pay award. Finally, short-term disability should be considered a collateral source because the shortterm disability administrator may seek a refund of wage loss benefits paid to Mr. Clawson and Mr. Dillon. The disability plan provides that benefits will be reduced by other income replacement benefits. (Attachment 3, short-term disability description, Trial Ex. 565). This appears to be limited to reducing benefits, not refunding them. It also appears to be limited to forms of income replacement insurance and would not include ADA damages. However, Mountain Coal claimed it was entitled to reimbursement of short-term disability payments because Mr. Clawson received money from workers' compensation for his permanent impairment, an issue unrelated to wage loss. (Attachment 4, Jan. 31, 2000, letter [last paragraph] from O'Donnell; Attachment 5, page 5 of Mountain Coal's response to the CCRD's Request for Information). Whether a refund should be provided under the short-term disability policy is a separate issue between the parties and is governed by a separate law. However, the possibility that a refund is required shows why short-term disability is a collateral source and should not be deducted from back pay. Under no circumstances should defendants be allowed to deduct short-term disability from back pay and then seek a refund of short-term disability later.

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The Court should avoid this possibility by not deducting this collateral source, and by allowing short-term disability issues to be resolved under the appropriate law rather than in this case under the ADA. II. INTEREST A. Post-Judgment Interest

"Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." 28 USC § 1961(a). Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to post-judgment interest on all of their damages. Plaintiffs request interest at the statutory rate, as provided in 28 USC § 1961, on their judgment. Based upon the Federal Reserve website, if judgment had been entered on April 21, 2006, the interest rate would be 4.91%. However, back pay and front pay have yet to be determined, and a judgment must be set forth on a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. Therefore, plaintiffs request the appropriate rate be determined based on the actual date of the entry of judgment, pursuant to 28 USC § 1961(b). B. Pre-Judgment Interest 1. Entitlement to Pre-Judgment Interest

Each plaintiff is clearly entitled to pre-judgment interest on his award of back pay. The United States Supreme Court determined that pre-judgment interest on back pay is authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) as part of complete compensation in order to make a prevailing plaintiff whole. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988). Pre-judgment interest should also be awarded on compensatory damages. In another context, the United States Supreme Court stated that pre-judgment interest "is an element of complete compensation." West Virginia v. United States, 470 U.S. 305, 310 (1987) see also

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Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1933) ("[I]n the absence of legislation the courts have dealt with the question of allowing interest according to their conception of the demands of justice and practicality"). One of the goals of the ADA, as well as other antidiscrimination statutes, is to make the victims of discrimination whole for the damages they have suffered. If pre-judgment interest is an "element of complete compensation," it logically applies to compensatory damages as well as back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 provides that the court, in addition to injunctions, reinstatement, and back pay, may "order any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." "[I]t is the historic purpose of equity to secure[e] complete justice." Albemarle at 418. This provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 gives the court sufficient authority to award pre-judgment interest on compensatory damages as a means of making the plaintiff whole. See Anixter v. Home-Stakes Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1544 (10th Cir. 1992) (in awarding prejudgment interest the court must consider whether it would serve to compensate the injured party and whether the equities preclude such an award) cited by Praesuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005) (ADA case discussing pre-judgment interest on attorney fees). Such interest would be outside of the damage cap, which only applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 2. Calculating Pre-judgment Interest

Although pre-judgment interest is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), no interest rate is provided for in the statute. Plaintiffs request that the Court use the State of Colorado general statutory interest rate of 8% per annum. Section 5-12-101, C.R.S. (providing for interest at 8% per annum, compounded annually). The Tenth Circuit has held that where a federal statute provides for interest, but does not specify an amount, the Court is free to choose an interest rate that will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the delay in receiving payment. Toweridge, Inc. v.

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T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758, 763-765 (10th Cir. 1997). In this regard, the Court may use a state's statutory rate "as a matter of convenience and practicality." Id. at 764. The Colorado statutory rate of 8% provides fair compensation and should be used as a matter of convenience and practicality. The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado has used a Colorado statutory rate at least twice in discrimination cases without significant comment from the Tenth Circuit. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1980); Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063,1065-66 (10th Cir. 2006). Perhaps more importantly, other Federal courts have found 8% to be an appropriate pre-judgment interest rate, even in the absence of a statute. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp. 507 F.Supp 599, 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (gender discrimination, awarded 8% prejudgment interest compounded quarterly); Washington v. Kroger Co., 506 F.Supp 1158, 1172 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (race discrimination, awarded 8% pre-judgment interest) and see Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 1982) (approving of 8% interest rate, but vacating and remanding on other grounds). In a race discrimination case, one court awarded prejudgment interest of 12% compounded quarterly. Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc., 629 F.Supp 1034, 1041 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The use of the Colorado statutory interest rate of 8% is fair, reasonable, practical, and convenient. Therefore, plaintiffs request that the court use the Colorado statutory interest rate contained in C.R.S. section 5-12-101. Calculating the interest on the compensatory damages is a relatively simple affair. Attachment 6 shows the interest on compensatory damages for Mr. Clawson at 8%, beginning at the date of injury and compounding annually. The total of such interest to the date of the verdict is $176,543.12 ($426,543.12 - $250,000), accruing at $86.95 per day until May 13, 2006, and

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then at $93.91 per day until judgment is entered. Attachment 7 shows the interest on compensatory damages for Mr. Dillon at 8%, beginning at the date of injury and compounding annually. The total of such interest to the date of the verdict is $160,109.19 ($410,109.19 $250,000.00), accruing at $86.95 per day until judgment is entered. Calculating interest on back pay is more complicated. The Tenth Circuit has specified that back pay losses are not incurred all at once, and therefore, interest cannot begin on the entire amount all at once. Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2006). In footnote 4 of Reed, the Tenth Circuit provided a formula for calculating interest on back pay. Plaintiffs have used this formula, with one exception. In Reed, the jury awarded back pay in the exact amount testified to by the plaintiff's expert, and this amount was adopted by the court. Id. at 1064. Thus it was easy to determine the losses for each year because the testimony of the expert could be used. In this case, the jury deviated from the testimony of the damages experts. Therefore, plaintiffs have divided the back pay damages evenly over the relevant periods of time. A spreadsheet showing the formula and totals for Mr. Clawson and Mr. Dillon are included as Attachment 8 and Attachment 9 respectively. The spreadsheets show the pay per pay period, the total pay at the end of the year, the accrued interest for each pay period, and how much the interest equals after annual compounding. The interest due Mr. Clawson as of April 21, 2006, the date of the verdict, is $425,486.30, and continues to accrue at $144.98 per day until entry of judgment. The interest due Dillon as of the verdict date is $120,163.49, and continues to accrue at $50.01 per day until entry of judgment. Plaintiffs request these amounts of interest, plus accruing interest through the date of judgment. Once judgment is entered, plaintiffs request post-judgment interest at the statutory rate as discussed above.

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CONFERRAL Plaintiffs' counsel has conferred with defense counsel concerning this motion. Defendants object to this motion. CONCLUSION Both plaintiffs have demonstrated entitlement to back pay damages. The jury's advisory verdict was amply supported by the evidence. Therefore, plaintiffs request that the Court adopt the findings of the jury. The Court should follow United States Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent and refuse to deduct collateral sources from the back pay damages of either plaintiff. The Court should award pre-judgment interest on both back pay and compensatory damages. Such interest is amply supported and is in the interests of justice. The Court should adopt the Colorado statutory rate for pre-judgment interest, as a matter of fairness, convenience, and practicality. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of May, 2006.

s/J. Keith Killian J. Keith Killian Damon Davis Killian, Guthro & Jensen, P.C. 225 N. 5th Street Grand Junction, CO 81501 Telephone: (970) 241-0707 FAX: (970) 242-8375 E-mail: [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiffs Michael E. Clawson and Jared L. Dillon

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRIT OF COLORADO CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF) I hereby certify that on May 11, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses: [email protected] [email protected] and, I hereby certify that I have mailed or served the document or paper to the following non CM/ECF participants in the manner (mail, hand-delivery, etc.) indicated by the non-participant's name: Mr. Michael Clawson 38506 Back River Road Paonia, CO 81428 Mr. Jared Dillon 35404 Back River Road Hotchkiss, CO 81419 Mail

Mail

s/J. Keith Killian J. Keith Killian Attorney for Plaintiffs Killian, Guthro & Jensen, P.C. 225 N. 5th Street Grand Junction, CO 81501 Telephone: (970) 241-0707 Fax: (970) 242-8375 [email protected]

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