Free Statement of Facts - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

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EXHIBIT 19

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 For the MATSCH, beginning Courtroom
VS.

IN

THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT

DISTRICT COURT OF COLORADO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and iUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. JAMES S. STONE, Plaintiffs, 89 M i154 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, et al.,

ROCK74ELL

Defendants.

TRIAL TO JURY - DAY 19 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Proceedings U.S. District a.m. United

held Judge

before for

the

HONORABLE of

RICHARD Colorado, 1999,

P.

the

District day of

at 8:33 C-204,

on the States

22nd

March, Denver,

in

Courthouse,

Colorado.

APPEARANCES Plaintiffs: Maria T. Vullo, Esq. Jeannie S. Kang, Esq. Matthew Chevez, Esq. Jr., Esq. Robert E. Montgomery, Wharton Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, & Garrison 1285 Avenue of the Americas Suite 2607 New York, New York 10019

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

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Goldberg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A Monday The first I had I was heard

- Direct it was the by and Sunday the asked if night,

4409 the

about on

before.

notified Mr.

Friday Tuck, or find

1~ndersecretary ~be in Denver, going And so

of energy, Colorado on?"

John night

! could

Sunday

Monday. out

I said you was were, get briefed what my

"What's back." by the

Ke said on to as and

"You'll Denver, to what we went

when and

I went

Colorado the from

deputy going the was you

secretary to be,

problems there.

role Q A Q before A Q A day Q EPA A Q EBI A Q

was And That And

deputy his were

secretary Henson by

again Moore. deputy

is Henson

Moore?

name,

briefed

secretary

Moore

the

day

the

raid?

Essentially. Right. I don't before And agents Yes. From raid that day and for the deal but next few weeks time i take at it the plant. recall--it raid, you but could have been that Sunday night,

the

it was there

right would on the

in that

vicinity, of FBI and

he told

that the

be a number 6th of June?

searching

plant

occupied I00

a great percent, work of the talk

of your quite.

out

the

Almost What

not

did the

that day to

entail raid? the

during

those

several

weeks

following A

I needed

with

various

staff

members

of the

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Goldberg 1 2 3 Department on, try of Energy there a calming with I had that the and

- Direct let them know what was

4410 going

to provide I talked for to him.

influence contractor

to this also

traumatic tried FBI and to and with do

incident. the the the same EPA

and

various their work And

meetings went we had On

with

the

assure

unimpeded several

greatest the the and

of cooperation. day where they told

meetings being the they

during FBI and

me what was do the

they--they lead

EPA, how

mostly

FBI

who to

force--what were a bit came of to

wanted

they we

wanted did, of the

it.

Some

things quite that

negotiable, on my plant part with

which and me, The

and

it required staff

work the

that

immediate

to adjudicate. other part of the of plant audit time I was occupied on the with plant. I

doing !had to

what

I call

a baseline where the and

activities was with

establish

regard controls.

to safety, And for

environment, I brought from Q A outside Those Yes. You others ~art

management in another the people plant

their

team

of maybe

50

or more these

people baselines.

to help under

me establish your

worked

direction?

mentioned DOE

a calming

influence, Do they you

talking recall

about concern

among on the

the

people DOE

on-site. that

of those Absolutely. What

people

might

be arrested?

do you

recall

about

that

subject?

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Goldberg A They wanted to know with DOE from

- Direct me if they were going to be

4411

arrested Q A them coming their IQ

and

charged the DOE not

criminal that the

activity. were only needed and already thing to there. I could approach tell the

These These was

are are I did as

people and but

people, know, as

they

weeks work.

calmly

they

could

continue for

on with them. of DOE personnel?

It was

a very

traumatic this concern

experience on

Did

you about

communicate being

the part

~eople

arrested

to your

headq~/arters

Yes. Q Now were you in regular period basis. contact with the people raid? back at DOE

headquarters A Q A Tuck, Yes, And My and

in the on a daily

following

with two

whom main

in particular? contacts assistant were the undersecretary, admiral, to the Mr. John

special

to the

secretary,

Leo Duffyo Q Were there with particular the FBI raid allegations that that were made use in of

connection incinerators? A

related

to the

As I recall yes. you

there

was

a section

that

dealt

with

an

incinerator, Q And did

investigate--you that mostly

or the

people

working

under

direction We looked

investigate at it, but

allegation? we let the FBI do their job.

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EXHIBIT 20

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Department o~ Energy
Washington, DC 20585 June 9, 1989

~MORANDUM TO:

Edward Goldber~ Ag~'in~ Area Manager - Rocky Flats Area Office ~.J~T~I Under Secretary of Energy

FROM: SUBJECT:

Interim Organization

The attached interim organization for the Rocky Flats Area Offica is approved. cc: Bruce Twining

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Rocky Flats

Area Office

- Interim

Organization

o

The existing Operations and Compliance groups are responsible managing day-to-day business at the Rocky Flats Plant.

for

The Safety and Environment groups are new parts of the organization designed to strengthen the line management and oversight functions of the Area Office in carrying out its responsibility to assure safe, environmentally sound operations. The Environment group will be responsible for assessing the environmental acceptability of Rocky Flars Operations on a continuous basis. It will be staffed with personnel who have strong backgrounds in environmental science and nuclear facility operations. The new components of the Rocky Flats Area Office will assure that operations are being conducted properly, that any improvements are pursued in operational performance. The Acting Manager of the Rocky Flats Area Office and the Manager of the Albuquerque Operations Office will jointly coordinate all production activities at the Rocky Flats Plant that would affect the integrated weapons production complex.

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EXHIBIT 21

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UNITED

STATES CLAIMS COURT

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
--VS--

No. 91-1362-C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

September 23, 1994 I0:00 A.M.

DEPOSITION OF: ADMIRAL JON MICHAEL BARR

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7

Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1989.

Q

Since graduating

from the Naval Academy,

have

you been continuously Navy? A Q Department A Q A I have.

in the service,

in the United States

At some point, of Energy.

you were assigned

to the

Is that true?

That's correct. When was that? My first day on the job was the 5th of July that in about the previous month brief

I had before

visited,

as I recall, the office

for one reasonably

period to talk to the officer going to retire

I was relieving,

who was

before I got there and had made a tour of during one of my four-day off periods in

several facilities my previous Q A Q Department A Application. Q job.

Who was the person you were replacing? A Brigadier General, Paul Cavanareo

What position of Energy? Deputy

did you first take with the

Assistant

Secretary

for Military

Prior to being assigned describe

to the Department

of

Energy, could you briefly United States Navy.

your career in the

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8

Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3

A

Certainly.

Upon graduation, Pipeline,

went through

the

Nuclear Power Training submarine Submarine

which lasted

a year, then to the

school for six months, Snook (phonetic)

then I was assigned

in San Diego for almost

three

5 6 7 8 9 I0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

years. Then I was an Instructor Power School for several through training Navigator at the Navy Nuclear then I went

years, two years,

of several months Tecumseh,

prior to becoming which I was there for

on the U.S.S.

approximately

four years.

Then I went to the Executive Barb (phonetic) in Pearl Harbor. Officer

Officer on the Submarine

From there I went to be the Commanding of the Navy Nuclear Power School Subsequently at Cambridge,

Maryland.

during my tour, I moved to Orland, California. Training Officer at

After that I went through Prospective pipeline, which

lasts about six months,

and then was with

the Navy Skipper,

and from there the ship was transported Following that, which lasts about two at Naval Reactors Commanding officer of

home to Connecticut. years, again, in Washington Officer,.and

a brief period

of training

D.C. and assigned after commissioning Boston.

as Prospective as Commanding

the Attack Submarine

Following several

that and a period of training Officer

of

months, I was Commanding

of the U.S.S.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Ohio, a ballistic Washington. commander Squadron period 9.

missile

submarine

out of Bangor, following that, I was

About a year and-a-half Squadron

of Submarine

17, which is the Trident During that period for a Group

in Bangor, Washington.

of about

six weeks also Commander

of Submarine

Following Washington

the tour of Squadron

17, I went to of the

D.C. and first was the Deputy Drins (phonetic)

Director

Attack Submarine Naval Operations. Q A

and Officer

of Chief

About what year was that? That was 1986. Got there in March. I left

there in the very, I guess it was January having been selected DOE Deputy Director Command Center, standard Center. Q

of 1988 after

for flag rank, and was until I went to for Operations in the National you are watch Command Military

which means basically

in the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs

And I went to the OE the 5th of July. In any of those positions before you went to of

DOE, did your duties contracts? A Q A No.

ever include the administration

Did it ever involve procurement? No, from the standpoint of other than

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

the context 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 there question

of those specific

230. But I could answer

the

if you would like me to in the context of in general. I mean, the deficiencies that we are talking

deficiencies

about here, first, other deficiencies somewhat question

were before I got there, and we had from other appraisals, and so they your do it. other

run together, specifically

and to be able to answer

for these 230, I just couldn't

Q

What was your source for deficiencies,

than the 230 raised by these Technical Team? A

Safety Appraisal

There were on site, I think it mentions safety, health, ES&H people from

in

environment,

Headquarters, deficiencies

who wrote up deficiencies. which came to my attention was a Colorado

There were through, I believe

at this time there person on site. Q A

Department

of Health

What time are you referring to now? Well, I'm trying to remember in the context of in the August, September, October

my very early time there, fall time frame that period, criticality

of 1989. My personal

on-site

looks during a

specifically inspection

a trip made in November, conducted

investigation

based on

some concerns

at Rocky Flats that was done in, as I recall,

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

happened report

very shortly

after I got there, and I think the in August. Not completely sure of in my in

out was, I think, And reports

the date.

that would come from people

office who had made trips to Rocky Flats and from people the on-site office there, particularly Mr. Goldberg after

he arrived there. Q Were any of these trips or reports that you have mentioned ist, 1988 through or on-site made during

visits or observations the time period October A

March 31st, 1989?

No. But if I could

add, they certainly

reflect the things that had gone on during that period. Q the concerns A deficiencies. without certain. Were these things separate raised by the Technical and different from Team?

Safety Appraisal

I mean, I would have to review all 230 I suspect that they are, but I can't, be absolutely investigation

reviewing

those 230 deficiencies, in the criticality

For example,

that was done at Rocky Flats, if the issue was raised at all in that Technical been. I just don't Safety Appraisal. And it may have

know. looked at in much greater

It was certainly detail by the subsequent Q A

focused investigation. study about?

What was the criticality

A concern was raised by some Rockwell

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

employees previously

on the on-site,

and I think this had come up

-- it was not the first time that it had come up had been uncontrolled criticalities at the

-- that there plant.

Very shortly been apparently non-DOE experts

after I got there,

and this had a group of

in the works before were brought

I arrived,

in to conduct a review of what

had gone on at Rocky Flats with a view to determining whether or not there had been any uncontrolled of the plant. Their findings were there had

criticalities

not been, and they were able to back that up with some reasonable technical documentation.

But what they did find was that there was a disturbing kilograms buildings gotten amount, initial estimates in the multi-tens in several of the had

of plutonium

in the ductwork

in Rocky Flats, and that this plutonium through improper,

into the ductwork operation

long-term of

improper equipment

of glove boxes, which are pieces

where work is done where you don't want workers" come in contact with the material, and

hands to actually that in particular gotten

a lot of this material

had apparently defeating filter

into the ducts because of workers which may, although within I couldn't

apparatus,

be certain of it, or most

may have contained

the glove box area.some

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

of that plutonium. Additionally a disturbing appropriate plutonium their finding was that there was

lack of knowledge Rockwell

on the part of the of

people for the form or amount and a lack of what the

in the ductwork

criticality concern

experts would agree, felt was inadequate of plutonium in the ductworko

over the possibility For example,

if you are not certain of the in the ductwork, if it is in in water that

composition

of the plutonium

such a position

that it could become suspended b~ flooded, in neutrons

should that ductwork due to the difference characteristics

there is a likelihood slowing down, therefore,

of water versus nonwater,

that

you could have had a criticality, substantial Q A really, problems.

which could have caused

What do you mean by "criticality"? Criticality is, for plutonium or anything chain reaction, life are

when you have a self-sustaining

that is that if you go through a cycle, a neutron cycle, if~you produced will, a neutron or several neutrons

by fission,

and that those neutrons such as leakage

are lost out of the into

through a number of features, area where the criticality nonfissionable materials,

could occur, absorption

absorption

into fissionable

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

material

that does not cause fission, into fissionable So finally material

and finally that does cause Every one of

absorption fission.

you have

a criticality.

those neutrons fissions

will produce

subsequent

fissions,

so the

remain constant. Normally if you have criticality, you would

not end up at that exact criticality. what is called supercriticality,

You would end up at

and that means that you

would have more than one neutron after the life cycle for each. The problem extremely is, because that life cycle is that you can get an

short, in the microseconds, rapid increase

exceptionally course,

in the fission rate, and, of gives you neutrons, which but

each of these fissions

are not only problems particularly people,

from the standpoint

of fission, to

those ones that leak out are hazardous radiation to people such as gamma radiation, at relative distances.

and other

which So

is also a problem criticality

is something Just talking

which one avoids at all costs. about this, I remember a few

other

things

that came out of that report.

There are in material

the glove criticality

box lines

which worked the plutonium

limits, which say you cannot into a given vessel

put more than so

much material

to insure the criticality

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

does not occur because concentration

of an inordinately material.

large

of fissionable

There have been accidents, at any of our plants, people but accidents understand

not that I know of because or follow low.

have occurred or implement

did not adequately

procedures

to keep the amount mass.

of fissionable

material

You got a critical

The limits

that we would put in the glove box were designed to prevent

lines at Rocky Flats in particular that from happening. had been exceeded Q

There were findings

that those limits

periodically. that a criticality of that

Would you consider threat

poses an imminent environment? A could

of harm to people or to the

Certainly

to people

in the location,

and it -- for

be to the environment,

should the criticality

example, scenario,

one could come up with another rationale, that a criticality occurs in a water environment, comes a great deal of

and, of course,

with criticality

fission fragments,

comes a great deal of heat. in fact, result in steam whatever the

That heat could, formation, container the local and should

that result in breaking

was, then you could send fission area and could conceivably

fragments

into

get out into the

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

atmosphere. accident Q

It would have to be a pretty

bad criticality

for that to happen,

but it is conceivable. Safety Appraisal of your

Do you know if the Technical

Team or any other

DOE team prior to the beginning

tenure at DOE raised at Rocky Flats? A surprised reasonably

the concern about glove box procedures

I don't know specifically, if they hadn't. complex,

but I would be very are

I mean, glove box procedures is looking, lengthy

and if anybody

I would be they

very surprised wouldn't

if over a reasonable

period

find at least some deficiencies. Would you please read the paragraph under

Q
Deficiencies A

on page Bates labeled E002355 The Technical Safety Appraisal

on Exhibit 93. Team at the the

plant to follow up on previous operation

concerns

reviewed

at the entire plant site against were identified, These concerns

those concerns.

Thirty new concerns Category

of which six were involve training, safety

II concerns.

radiological and operator

protection, response

fire protection,

electrical

alarms. listed under deficiencies?

Q

Are those concerns They are. Would you please

read aloud the next paragraph

also listed under deficiencies.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3

A specifically not.

I guess I would have to say I can't recall ever seeing that report, so I guess

5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 A BY MR. KELLEY: Q previously

(Discussion

off the record.)

Mr. Barr, I am showing you a document been marked as Plaintiff's with attachments

that has

Exhibit Number 5, from Albert E. 9, 1989. Have you

which is a memorandum Whiteman to Thetis

V. Hill dated April before?

ever seen this document

No, I haven't

seen this. I guess

I would

point out that it does not appear that any of these came, as I recall from looking at any of the others, in Headquarters, that any of

these ever came to anybody problem. Q A

which is a

Why do you say that's a problem? Well, I say that's a problem because one of issues that existed, and as my tenure

the significant continued

there it was very clear it had existed for a long in Rocky Flats, ut not solely oversight of contract or in Rocky

time, particularly

Flats, was an inadequate

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

operations

by DOE personnel. And when I say that, what I mean, and

particularly

in the Rocky Flats context,

is that the people until

who were in the Rocky Flats office, area office, Mr. Goldberg -- shouldn't people took over as a separate say adequate

office with adequate support, acumen.

-- with more technical

at the area office had very little technical an administrative office.

They were effectively ability

Their in a

to get into the Rocky Flats Plant to oversee

meaningful

way what was going on in the Rocky Flats Plant

was very suspect. For example, Nuclear Power operations Program, in my operating, which is a Navy whether or not

a key to determining

are being done satisfactorily basically

is, you get out before they find Flats area have,

and you look, you find problems you. That philosophy, and, as I said, others

that ability

at the Rocky

was not present.

They didn't

they didn't do it, and they didn't to do it. That's to be correct. admittedly

really have the ability but I believe it

judgmental,

Q

Is that judgment Yes.

based on your observations?

Or what you learned during your tenure? Based on my observation, personal and direct,

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

and also what I learned

from people. approach

I mean, such things to the criticality which I previously

as the less than professional issue, the plutonium

in the ductwork,

have discussed, oversight

could not go on if there was an adequate Other things gauges that I observed, basis,

by the government.

such as a failure to calibrate

on a periodic

gauges which could be used for safety related items, indicates that nobody is looking. And I could go on with others, acid spill and the way that it was reported. as a serious incident, the chromic Although not it

was reported analyzed operating

it was clearly

from the standpoint practices, safely

of the number of fundamental practices, which had to break

down in order for that to occur. Whatever Albuquerque Operations technical expertise existed at the

office five or six hundred miles between the Rocky Flats Operations Office was not that I am talking from the

away, the day-to-day Area Office adequate about,

interaction

and the Albuquerque

to conduct the kind of oversight

and while there were periodic Operations office

visits

Albuquerque adequate

to Rocky Flats, it was not you would need in a and the potential for

to get the kind of oversight sophistication

plant of the technical problems

that Rocky Flats had.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 things Office

Second,

even when the Albuquerque

Operations at

applied their technical

acumen to the problems -- and it is

Rocky Flats, judgmental contractor performance

they were, in my opinion forceful

-- inadequately

in noting to the understand that his

and making the contractor was not good. For example,

I am sure we will get around to good evaluation in adjectival

it eventually. assigned

A moderately

to environment,

safety and health for the period

we are discussing Q

was not appropriate.

Based on the things that had gone on and the in the criticality area,

that we knew, particularly

which may not have been available the documents, that that occurred,

to the early authors of but indicated that there by

was an ongoing and I recall unsatisfactory the contractor and health. from the standpoint

performance

of environment,

safety

I look at that from a different

culture,

and

the problem that DOE had and may well still have is that the culture to identify, deficiencies of the organization explain, follow was such that the ability of

up on and insure correction

was in many cases just not that good. So it's

a very great concern. Q And you are looking at it from the culture of,

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you are looking at it from the Naval nuclear standpoint? A that's The direct answer to that is yes, because is such

how I know, and the success of that program infer, if others

that one could reasonably would also be successful.

follow it, they

Would you like me to go into what the differences Q first-hand office are? Well, let me ask you. Did you have any of the oversight of the Albuquerque the period

knowledge

over the Rocky Flats Area Office during

October ist, 1988, through March 31, 1989? A were periodic Only as I was just talking about, inspections, that there

and there was not continuous experts from Albuquerque, clearly indicated was

on-site presence

by the technical

and that the performance, that there I there? Q by either Operations

the problems oversight.

was not adequate

So specifically

No, I was not. When you say there was insufficient the Rocky Flats Area Office Office, you are speaking oversight

or the Albuquerque is

about your opinion;

that correct? A I mean, Oh, and my judgment, but there clearly. Yes, of course. people

are I think what most reasonable evidence for that.

would call substantial

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3

For example,

in the chromic

acid spill, if you that went into

look at what were the fundamental that, there to remain is an inoperative

problems

alarm which had been allowed precautions

inoperative.

There were no special

5 6 7 8 9 I0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

taken because monitoring carried approach

of that inoperative

alarm for more frequent of the alarm was

to insure that the function

out in some other manner. to alarms, to safety

So that shows an which I would call

features,

inadequate. Subsequent was present example, which to that and in other times when I similar items were noted. For

at Rocky Flats,

I noted in one, personally,

one case where alarms because the stop the

dealt with levels

of tanks were defeated

alarm system, alarm without

when one tank alarmed, defeating

you couldn't

all of the alarms. no meaningful

So it was a additional of

very poor design. procedures

But, again,

were put in place to insure

that the function

the alarm was carried out. And there are other instances people have found, and it became forcefully that other to my attention changed

in my tour about alarms, without authorization. Another

cut out alarms, set points

thing that contributed

to the chromic system set

acid spill was an improper

valve manipulations

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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up in such a way that that particular Q surrounding

problem could occur.

Now, the chromic acid spill, the events it leading up to it were identified is that right? in Exhibit

99 as a notable deficiency; A quite Exactly.

But my point is that, while they are deficiency, I

correct in saying it was a notable

believe

they miss the point by just concentrating because you had an improper

on that approach to

spill in isolation, alarms

and what you do to keep them operating It showed

and what you

do if they are not operating. approach to how you operate

an improper

valves, how you conduct

procedures. Even after all of that happens, spill which has to fill up a bermed you have a

area which was intended

to capture some spills, some of the spills, and then overflow water into such an area that could get into the waste As I previously mentioned, there was no visual or

area.

security

adequate

to go around

and make periodic

other inspections

to insure that the plant was safe. is the

Now, these items, while the example chromic acid spill and while it is serious itself,

in and of

show that the whole plant was run that way. The issue was another one which indicated the kinds

criticality of things.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 parts 30 years. shut in order mechanic pump, around valves

In another repairing

personal

observation,

I observed

a

a pump in a waste water area that this was to transfer water

as I recall, its function to various tanks.

And he had several

red tags on condition. to

and the pump was in a semidisassembled

I asked him, how do you know which valves to completely isolate

this pump so that you

won't have a flow of water out when you take the pump out? Do you have any verified to this pump. His answer schematics was no. of the systems attached

Well, how do you know? He said, I know because I have been here for

Well, when do you use red tags? Oh, I just tag them. Do you have a red tag sheet on which you fill out where you are going to hang these red tags which are used, to say Danger, Do Not Operate These Valves? Do you

have this authorized, by anybody?

this red tag authorized,

verifiable

The answer was no. How do you know you are putting into the pump? This is a fairly the right pump.

significant

How do you know you are using the right parts?

And, again,

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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the answer to my judgment

was not satisfactory. case, I think

And while that is an isolated that, along with other things, just not operated appropriate severity. If you want to run a potable distribution system at a standard indicates

that the plant was is

which in my judgment

for something

with that degree

of potential

water okay. But

like that, I guess that's with environmental

when you are dealing result in violations

issues which could that would be

of law, it would appear

a little more careful.

Q
Plant? A go up there Q A it would

How frequently

did you visit the Rocky Flats

Probably

until about March time frame I would I think that's fair.

once a month.

That's from July of 1989 to March of 19907 Let's start with, -- okay. have been an average July, August. So

of about once a month. less frequent,

After

that, early

in 1989, it was a little

because

of Mr. Stello took over more concentrated oversight of Rocky Flats.

Headquarters

But still I was out there at least once every two or three months probably actually the whole time I was there, and

more than that.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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before. A Q A Q Performance period This whole thing or just the part you have? The whole document. Okay. No, I haven't seen it. Award Fee for the

This document Evaluation

is entitled

Review Board Recommendation

October

ist, 1988, through

March 31, 1989. Have you Review Board at

ever heard

of the Performance Operations

Evaluation

the Albuquerque A

Office?

I am sure I have. I mean, I just read it to

refresh my memory, yes. Q Did you ever discuss Rockwell's Performance Evaluation Review award fee with Board

the Albuquerque regarding A effectively, gotten there

Rocky Flats? No, I did not. But I would as soon as I got there, the Albuquerque point out that

by the time I had Office no longer

Operations

had responsibility Q A

for oversight

of the Rocky Flats Plant.

They had been cut out of the loop? They had been cut out of the loop, and that is

true, with exceptions.

Q
process ? A

Is that true with respect

to the award fee

Subsequent

to next, I believe

the one that

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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ends up in March of 1990, you will see Mr. Simonson's signature on that. The Rocky Flats Office changed from the

Rocky Flats Area Office to the Rocky Flats Office. Mr. Goldberg Rocky Flats Office, Mr. Nelson. was the first manager of the Mr. Simonson, subsequently

subsequently

And from the time I was there,

I think it is of the

fair to say that all of the substantive Rocky Flats Plant was accomplished There was a substantial

oversight

by the Rocky Flats of people trying

Office. to bring

infusion

up that level of technical and a substantial

expertise

that we people

mentioned

investment

in training

to oversee. There still was use of some Rocky Flats -expertise in specific areas.

excuse me -- some Albuquerque The decision operation~

was made not to make Rocky Flats a full

office, which would have taken all areas, and and security -- I think I

some areas, such as safety remember correctly office.

-- remained

with the Albuquerque

Operations Q A again, others.

Any other areas? Some of the administration, safety and security. the thrust I think. As I say any

I believe

I can't recall

But the effort, to adequately

was to provide

on-site

capability

oversee the contractor.

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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moving,

and, you know, I don't know that those kind are necessary, asking him to report

of questions

what the document record.

says, since it's a part of the about the time. it is important.

I am just concerned I believe

MR. KELLEY:

BY MR. KELLEY: Q previously I am showing you a document been marked as Exhibit that has

64, which is Bates Moore to Mr. Iacobellis seen that document

labeled E001524, dated

a letter from Mr. Have you ever

June 20, 1989.

before? A saw until Q A I think I have, but I don't think this one I I got this package. So you did not see this document in 19897

I mean, I was aware that the Rocky Flats Award for that period had not been finalized. having seen this particular, I don't

17 18 19 2O 21 22 23 24

Fee Determination But as to actually think I did. Q

Were you aware of any contractual

obligations

for a time in which DOE was required Rockwell's A award fee?

to determine

Yes. But, again, I a/n not sure I was aware of time frame. It became an issue

them in the July or August

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 I mean, don't

Q A recall

Yes. Oh, yes. I mean, now, to the degree -- and I when. It was very clear, as you can see from to me, that award in. And,

the material Headquarters fee process

that you have been providing had inserted

itself into the Rockwell we are interested

for the two periods mentioned,

as I previously more, frame.

that procedure

got formalized concerning time

as I think I answered So yes.

in the question

Now, can I point to a specific

piece of paper? the

I'm sure there was one. I don't recall

specific

piece of paper that would have come around and how we are going to be involved. well understood But

said here is exactly it was certainly at Headquarters Q

in practice

by the people

and the people in the field. was Rockwell ever informed

To your knowledge, insertion

of Headquarters' A

into the award fee process?

Well, I mean, I can only, I can point to this which certainly, unless he's a that

letter to Mr. Iacobellis,

lot denser than I think he is, clearly Headquarters Q was getting involved. Do you know if Rockwell

indicated

was ever notified

in

any way prior to that letter? A I don't know. I have no knowledge of that. I

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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opinion had existed in the plant for a long, long time. It was not something nor was it something tomorrow. eventually Q A It took unfortunately that happened yesterday

to be corrected we

a long time.

And, as you know,

did have the plant shut down. When did that happen? December. Well, actually as a result of the just before

trip that I took out there with Mr. Starostecki Thanksgiving. Q A the transfer to EG&G. 19897 Correct. This was basically

concurrent

with

of responsibility Watkins

from Rockwell

International

Secretary

determined

that Rockwell perform the duties

International

could no longer

adequately

of the contract. Q Let me ask you whether in August of 1989 you

believe the conditions posed a threat month? A

at Rocky Flats were such that they or the environment within a

to public health

I can't answer

that question.

I mean, you

know, I can't answer that question. Look, the issue here, the fundamental as far as I'm concerned, operations, is there is a philosophy issue, of

there is a philosophy

of how you run a complex

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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hazardous problems.

plant which minimizes I know that philosophy years.

the likelihood because

of serious

I have lived it at

for thirty-some

That philosophy

was not present

Rocky Flats, nor do I expect had it ever been. So, therefore, likelihood my opinion was that the than it would be had Power Program approach

of a problem was greater it's the Navy Nuclear

the, basically

to things been adopted,

had the culture been changed. based on

Does that mean that I would predict,

what I saw in the first month that I was at Rocky Flats, that there would health and safety say there be a serious, in a month? would life-threatening No, I wouldn't to public say that. say I

wouldn't

be in a year.

I wouldn't

there would be in ten years. As a matter of fact, the plant had operated for a lot of years with only one, that I can recall, problem, a major the fire, concern. whatever, in the late 1960's, which was

But we are dealing

here with the one in

likelihood. a hundred

We are dealing years

with, is the probability years?

or one in a million

And the effort not one in a

is to make the probability hundred. So in trying cannot answer just because

one in a million,

to answer

your question,

as you

the penny has flipped up tails

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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20 times

what it is going to come up the next t~me. The is still 50/50. What the effort is is to of the

probability

reduce the probabilities, problem acceptably small.

to make the likelihood

In my opinion, to reduce the likelihood

all that could have been done could have been of the problem to to

or that reasonably

done over the years to reduce the likelihood had not been done. alarms, the approach training Evidence procedures I mean, evidence

the approach

to valve operations,

the approach

that I mentioned

in the pump replacement program.

issue. Evidence

the lack of a gauge calibration

which were there but not used, and if tried to have worked. while no one, no one can will result in

use they wouldn't

All those things,

point to it and say the lack of a procedure a problem, properly procedure

what they can say is the lack of an adequate properly trained on, and properly used of a problem. That you

doctLmented, decreases

the likelihood

can say, and that's all you can say. Imminent imminent being in that context, what the lack of an

problem means is that, instead of the likelihood one in a million, you are now the

one in a hundred versus down to the likelihood

getting problem,

of one in two of having

and the danger level gets to the point where, hey,

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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based on my subsequent in the world would down, because

observations,

all of the review

time

not have changed

that in any way except

as I learned

more and more about what had

gone on at Rocky Flats, and I think I make the statement with good reliability, that I did find out more about what Based on what was currently could be made backwards award period, and

had gone on at RockY Flats. there, a reasonable

projection

say this was going on during period two.

this period,

So the fact that the time was limited resources were limited only worked in Rockwell's have probably suggested further

and the

favor, reductions,

because I would although

I didn't

get a chance

to do it. So what I really

would have done is hard to say. Q A What did you mean by limited staff? The way that my staff was organized programs at that

time in the defense area, the staff

area and in the production small. The guy who had been

was reasonably

the DP-23, Mr. Erickson, earlier,

incorrectly

called Mr. Spence assistant.

was at Rocky Flats as Mr. Goldberg's

So I didn't have the benefit of my senior And the organization across functional

guy in that area.

was such that it worked

lines as opposed to sites, so I couldn't and say you are the Rocky Flats

put my finger on somebody

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Admiral Barr (Kelley)

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there from previous Q Flats Office, sufficient

documents

is not clear. in the Rocky

Did you ever hear that someone one or more individuals, to correspond

had to come up with with the award fee

deficiencies

that had been determined A deficiencies

at Headquarters? say that. The number of

No, I wouldn't available

to select

from was so large that

that just wasn't an issue. One of the things I think you ought to recognize here is that a very important event occurred from that I

during this process, Headquarters mentioned

and that was the dispatch Thanksgiving

of a team just before

previously

of Mr. Starosteoki

leading one branch We were there and we probably I think that's

of this team and myself leading the other. at Rocky Flats for approximately had in our total grouping four days,

about 50 people.

fair, 50 people between the two of us. It was a comprehensive The decision Rockwell. look at Rocky Flats.

had been made at that point to replace was

EG&G was going to come in, and the feeling

that we needed another

to have another look, and I agree with this, And that look all areas,

look at how Rocky Flats was doing. deficiencies in virtually

turned up numerous

some of which are enumerated

or are similar to the ones

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that have been indicated

in this letter. scope, the implications for

But the numbers the method of operation indicated

of the plant were serious and. by Rockwell across the board,

poor performance

and additionally, ability contract

as I have also said, I think the lack of basis, oversee the

of DOE to, on a continuing radically. Now, we were changing

that. It was a Rocky

Flats Office in the last three months of that July, August, September. beefed The last three months of that period being beefed was being

up. It had not completed

up yet. So

there were still some very serious concerns. The upshot of that review was to stop weapons production weapons months. at Rocky Flats. We thought at the time that in a few

production

could probably

be reestablished

To my knowledge,

production

has never been. not the least

reestablished

for a combination

of reasons,

of which was that as we got further to correct the deficiencies, Rocky

and further into trying the which was so

the underlying,

underpinning, had been under

Flats' operational direction

capability,

Rockwell

for some years,

flawed that it was not, we were not able to make corrections, despite a whole lot of efforts in a short

period of time time.

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