Free Motion in Limine - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

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‘ (2d Cir.1988)). Wood claims to have included in her
*8 "Whereas other disparate treatment claims may complaint regarding the Howley incident her
scrutinize discrete harms such as hiring or discharge, contention that Howley’s behavior was motivated by
a hostile work environment claim analyses a her gender. Whether his behavior was in fact
workplace environment as a whole to discover motivated by her gender or sexual orientation is
whether it is 'abusive.' " Raniola v. Brattoa, 243 F.3d immaterial. The complaint in and of itself is
610. 617 52d Ci.r.200l) quoting Harris v. Forklift sufficient. Because the complaint was made to the
510 U.S. 17. 22. 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 l...Ed.2d 295 company's General Counsel and the individual
(1993). acknowledged by the company to have been
The Supreme Court has set forth a non-exclusive responsible for terminating Wood, Sarathi Roy, was
list of factors to consider when evaluating a interviewed in the course of the investigation into the
i workplace environment, consisting of "the complaint, Wood has succeeded in creating a genuine
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its issue of material fact with respect to the third prong.
severity; whether it is physically threatening or Wood’s termination constitutes an adverse
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and employment action.
whether it reasonably interferes with an employee's ,
work performance." *9 Wood faces difficulty in establishing a causal .
Raniola. 243 F.3cl at 620 quoting Harris 510 U.S. at connection between the complaint and her
Q. Notably, "no single factor is required." Harris, termination, nine months later. "Proof of causal
` ` 510 at 23. In this case, the alleged discriminatory connection can be established indirectly by showing
conduct was neither frequent nor severe. Roy's that the protected activity was followed closely by
alleged comments were largely "mere offensive discriminatory treatment." DeCintio v. Westchester l
utterance[s]." ld. Furthermore, Wood has come County Medical Center 821 F.2d lll, 115 (2d
forward with no evidence that she complained about Cir.l987) (citing Davis v. State University ol New
Roy's behavior to his superiors. At her deposition she York. 802 F .2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.l986t). The Second
testified that outside of the Howley incident, she did Circuit has concluded that two years is too long a
not complain about any harassment or discrimination time to support an inference of a causal connection.
on the basis of her gender or sexual orientation. Ric/iaralsozi v. New York State Dept. of Correctional
l Wood Depo. [Dkt. No. 45-2, Ex. A] at 104. While the Service. 180 li.3cl 426. 447 {2d Cir.1999). Wood
Howley incident involved a physical altercation, it attempts to support an inference of such a connection
was isolated and Wood comes forth with no evidence 2 by asserting that Roy, who is friendly with Howley,
to suggest that it interfered with her work could not terminate her until he was made her
performance. supervisor, only a month prior to her termination.
. l The one month is sufficient to support an inference of
B. Retaliatory Discharge causal connection. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit
Corp. 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir.l998) (finding that
The plaintiff claims that she was discharged in causal connection could be inferred where
retaliation for filing a complaint with respect to the termination occurred less than two months after
Howley Incident in violation of both state and federal complaint was made). With this evidence, Wood
law. As both parties agree, in order for the plaintiff to succeeds in creating a genuine issue of material fact.
make a case for retaliatory discharge, she must show While the court questions whether the plaintiff can
"(l) that she was engaged in protected activity by prevail on this theory, it cannot conclude, as it must
opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) ` for the purposes of a motion for summary judgement,
that the employer was aware of that activity; (3) that that Wood could not prevail with this evidence before
, she suffered adverse employment action; and (4) that a finder of fact.
there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse action." Galrlieri-Airibrosirzi C. Sempra's Investigation of the Howley Incident
v. Nat’Realty and Dev. Corgi . 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d
Cir.l998;. Count Six of Wood’s complaint alleges breach of
contract on the premise that Sempra failed to
Even if an employee is not the victim of prohibited properly investigate the Howley incident pursuant to
discrimination, l Title VII protects her against its own policy as provided in The Employee
retaliation for protesting against such discrimination. Handbook of Sempra Energy Trading Corp.
ld. at 285 (citing Mano/iararz v. Columbia Universitv ("Employee Handbook"). Counts Thirteen and
College o["P/msicimis & Swgeeons 842 F.2d 590. 593 Fourteen allege negligent failure to investigate ‘
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· harassment claims as required by the Employee Trading and its subsidiaries, in an amount to be
Handbook and Sempra's Professional Conduct determined by Sempra Trading’s management solely
Policy, respectively. in their discretion." Employment Contract [Dkt. No.
45-2, Ex. D] at 1. Wood signed that contract on
A personnel manual can create a contract. See Finley September 6, 2000. Id.
v. Aetna Lim and Casualty Comgaav. 202 Conn. 190
520 A.2d 208 ] 1987). The Connecticut Supreme While Wood claims that she understood the contract
Court has held that "under appropriate circumstances, to include by implication promises made to her by
[representations in a personnel manual] may give rise Audrey . Cullen and Sempra's President, David
to an express or implied contract between employer Messer, the explicit terms of the contract are entirely
and employee." Irl. at 198. 520 A.2d 208 (citing inconsistent with the terms she claims to be binding
l /1/lagnan v. Anaconda lmlustries Inc. 193 Conn. 558, upon Sempra. The written contract makes the amount
564, 479 A.2d 781 (1984]). Where employers of any bonus entirely discretionary. Such provision
"includ[e] appropriate disclaimers of the intention to cannot be reconciled with an implicit term that a
contract," however, "employers can protect bonus would be paid in a minimum amount of ten
themselves against employee contract claims based percent of booked profits.
on statements made in personnel manuals." ld. at 199,
g 520 A.2d 208.; sec also Gaudio v. Gritfin Health Similarly, the employment contract includes a
Services Corp .. 249 Conn. 523, 535, 733 A.2d 197 provision that "Sempra Trading may terminate
` {1999). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the [Wood's] employment at will and whether or not for
Employee Handbook included express language cause." Employment Contract [Dkt. No. 45-2, Ex. D]
disclaiming formation of a contract: "This handbook at 1. This provision contradicts Wood's allegation
is not intended to be an express or implied contract of that an implied contract existed for sustained
employment for a specified period of time, a employment so long as Wood remained profitable.
guarantee of employment, or a promise to provide The Connecticut Supreme Court has found that an
benefits." Employee Handbook (Dkt. No. 45-2, Ex. I) implicit contract requiring that termination be for
at 1. Wood cannot support a claim of breach of cause only can exist even where an explicit letter
contract relying on the Employee Handbook. contract exists. T orosvan v. Boehringer Ingelheim
" Pharmaceuticals. Inc. 234 Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89
*10 Furthermore, "Connecticut law does not permit ]1995`]. In that case, however, the letter contract made
recovery for an employer's negligent conduct of an no reference to the company's ability to terminate the
investigation into charges of sexual harassment that is former employee. la'. at 8-9. 662 A.2d 89. Here,
required by federal law." Malik v. Carrier Corp. 202 Wood also relies on Gaudio v. Griffin Health
F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir.2000]. "[C]orrective actions that Services, 249 Conn. 523, 733 A.2d 197 g1999].
a risk-averse employer might take to comply with There, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that an
federal law may not give rise to a negligence action, implicit contract existed because the parties had not
whether the rationale is couched in terms of breach, entered into an express contract. hl. at 532. 733 A.2d
legal duty, or privilege." ld. at 106. 197. The facts are entirely inapposite to those here.
"[P]arties who have entered into controlling express
D. Breach of Implied Contract and the Implied contracts are bound by such contracts to the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing exclusion of inconsistent implied contract
obligations." HB. Toms Tree Surgery v. Brant 187
Wood claims that Sempra violated an implied Conn. 343, 347, 446 A.2d 1 (1982). Therefore, Wood
contract with respect to both her termination and cannot sustain a claim under a theory of implied
, Sempra's refusal to pay Wood a bonus for her work contract.
in 2002. Wood is correct to argue that, "[w]hether the ‘
parties have entered into [an implied contract] is a *11 Wood also asserts a claim for breach of the
question of fact." Cluistensen v. Bic Corporation. 18 implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. "It is
Conn.App. 451, 454, 558 A.2d 273 (1989] (citing axiomatic that the duty of good faith and fair
Corrtveau v. Jenkins Bros. 144 Conn. 383, 387, 132 dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a
A.2d 67 `]l957_]. Wood does not dispute, however, contractual relationship" Magnan v. Anacondo
that an express contract controlled her employment Industries [nc., 193 Conn. 558, 566. 479 A.2d 781
relationship with Sempra. Furthermore, that contract (1984) (emphasis added). "In other words, every
provides that Wood "may also be eligible for a bonus, contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither
based on [her] perfomiance and that of Sempra party do anything that will injure the right of the
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· other to receive the benefits of the agreement." De La (citations omitted; internal quotation omitted). The
Cone/za og Hartford, Inc; tr. Aetna Lite Insurance doctrine applies only where " justice requires
Corrrganv 269 Corin. 424.433, 849 A.2d 382 (20041 compensation to be given for property or services
(intemal citations and quotations omitted; emphasis rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available
added). Because Wood's claim that Sempra breached by an action on the contract.' " Q/gat 282, 649 A.2d
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 5.15 (Quoting 5 S. Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) §
made "[p]ursuant to the implied contracts that were 1479). As the court has concluded above, Wood
created," Compl. [Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A] at 1] 117, there cannot deny that she rendered services under a
is no genuine question of fact with respect to that contract. She entered into an agreement that provided
claim because there is no implied contract. that she would be eligible for a bonus, at the
discretion of Sempra's management. Sempra's
1 E. Promissory Estoppel and Unjust Enrichment management having determined, in its discretion and
pursuant to the contract, not to pay Wood a bonus for
While inconsistent pleading is permitted under the the year 2002, Wood cannot claim that Sempra was
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wood cannot unjustly enriched by her work during that year.
attempt to circumvent the terms of a contract that she
indisputably entered by proposing a legal theory for F. Unpaid Bonus
which she cannot put forward any evidence. As the
plaintiff concedes in her Memorandum, both of these *12 Finally, Wood argues that she is entitled to
’ theories are inconsistent with the existence of a payment of a bonus for the year 2002 under the
contract. Neither party denies the existence and Connecticut state law. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-71a, et
application of a contract. Def.'s Local Rule 56ga)g1] seq. Connecticut law provides that employees denied
Statement [Dkt. No. 42] at 1] 3; accord Pl.'s Local wages are entitled to bring a civil action for recovery
Rule 56(a)]22] Response and Statement [Dkt. No. 50] of such wages. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-72. The term
at 11 3. She cannot use the theories of promissory "wages" is defined in section 31-72121) of the
estoppel and unjust enrichment to add terms to that Connecticut General Statutes as "compensation for
contract that are entirely inconsistent with those labor or services rendered by an employee, whether
expressly stated in it. the amount is determined on a time, task, piece,
1 commission or other basis of calculation."
Where a contract claim fails, a claim of promissory `
estoppel may lie. The cases cited by Wood for this "[A] bonus may constitute wages under section 31-
proposition do not involve scenarios where the 7l.a(3)." Garry v. Bcrzuccfs Restaurant Corp., 2001
contract claim fails because there is an express Wl., 1795539, *4 1D.Conn.2001). Whether a bonus
contract providing the opposite temts to those argued constitutes wages for the purposes of the statute
by the plaintiff In Sujield Dev. A.s·.s·0c. v. Societv of depends on the nature of the bonus. Where a bonus is
.S'avings, 243 Conn. 832, 708 A.2r1 1361 g1998], there "promised in exchange for additional services or
was no written contract between the parties, and the based on an employee's individual performance" it
court found that the plaintiff could not prove that a constitutes wages for the purposes of the statute and
contract existed. Having so concluded, the court the employee may bring suit pursuant to section 31-
allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a theory of jg. In -the instant case, the Employment Contract
promissory estoppel. Id. at 846. 708 A.2d 1361. This provides that bonuses are "based on [the emp1oyee's]
finding does not allow the plaintiff here, facing an performance and that of Sempra Trading and its
inability to win her case on the express contract that subsidiaries. " Employment Contract [Dkt. No. 45-2,
both Wood and Sempra agree exists and binds them, Ex. D] at l. Like the bonus contested in Garry,
( to argue that promissory estoppel can allow her a Wood's "bonus did not depend on her efforts alone,"
victory expressly prohibited by the terms of the but was determined according to the performance of
contract. the company and its subsidiaries. Garrv 2001 WL
1795539. *5.
"Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment
must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited IV. CONCLUSION
[sic], (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the
plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of For the foregoing reasons, Sempra's motion for
payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment." Hartjord summary judgment [Dkt. No. 41] is DENIED as to
Wha/ers Hoc/rev Club v. Uniroval Goodrich Tire Co. Counts One, Two, and Three with respect to Wood's
231 Conn. 276. 282-83. 649 A.2d 518 { 1994] allegations of adverse employment action and
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~ GRANTED with respect to Wood's allegations of
hostile work environment. Sempra's motion for
summary judgment [Dkt. No. 41] is DENIED as to
Counts Four and Five and GRANTED as to Counts `
Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, and
Fourteen.
SO ORDERED.
2005 WL 465423 (D.Conn.)
T Motions, Pleadings and Filings {Back to top)
· 3 :03 CV 0098 6 (Docket)
(Jun. 04, 2003)
END OF DOCUMENT
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