UNITED STATES DIST?} C
DISTRICT OF CONN C I _.,
Agnes Kole : mm! JUL Q'] F3
: RléONER
v. : ll ·.3 1
_ CV 027 (JBA)
I _ on: rJ|__ Uh?.
Kuma Deboo, et. al. :
Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #13]
Pro se plaintiff Agnes Kole, incarcerated at FCI Danbury,
claims defendants deprived her of property without due process in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States -
Constitution by coercing her to pay $700.00 received from sources
outside of prison towards her court imposed fine under threat
that failure to do so would result in refusal status for her
inmate financial responsibility program ("IFRP") and attendant
limitation on job assignment, compensation potential, commissary
spending, and housing assignment.1 When Kole agreed to
participate in the IFRP in 1996, she was informed only that she
would be required to pay half of her monthly prison wages towards
1 Kole's complaint does not specify her cause or causes of action other l
than being titled as a complaint made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is plainly g
inapplicable as Kole has sued only federal officers. Understanding Kole j
represents herself, the Government's moving papers construed Kole's complaint `
with great breadth, discussing multiple possibilities, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens `
Due Process Claim, Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, and the Little Tucker I
Act. Presented with this menu, Kole filed an opposition identifying her claim
as a due process violation and citing violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") as support for her claim that defendants’ coercion ran
afoul of her constitutional right to due process. See Opp’n [Doc. %24] at 3.
Under these circumstances, the Court understands Kole's claim to be one of
procedural due process. The Court notes that Kole has no claim in any event
under the FDCPA as it covers consumer debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), which
Kole's criminal fine is not, and does not apply to officers or employees of the ;
Unites States collecting debts in the performance of official duties, see 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C), which is the conduct of which Kole complains.
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Case 3:03-cv-01027-JBA Document 22 Filed 07/27/2004 Page20f4 [
her fine,2 information consistent with but perhaps misleading in 1
light of the broader regulatory scheme promulgating IFRPs, which
prescribes monthly payments of half an inmate’s prison wages as a
mimgmmm and explicitly provides for larger payment amounts i
commensurate with the inmate’s obligations and resources, the
latter of which explicitly includes both prison account resources
eee eemmunity resources. §ee 28 C.F.R. § 545.ll(b). In 2002, it
was discovered that Kole had not made a monthly payment towards
reducing her fine for four years. Defendants accordingly told
Kole that to maintain participating status in her IFRP she would
be required to make a one time lump sum payment of $700.00, a
portion of the funds already in her prison account, and resume
monthly payments of half her prison wages towards reducing her
fine. This kind of action by prison officials is specifically i
contemplated and authorized by regulation. gee ee; Kole was i
told that refusal to make the lump sum payment and agree to
resume monthly payments would result in refusal status and i
attendant loss of her job assignment, compensation level,
commissary spending limit, and housing assignment. Such
revocation of privileges was not the creation of defendants’ E
imagination but mandated by regulation. §ee md; at
§ 545.ll(d)(3, 4, 6, 7). In her own words, "with such coercion ‘ g
2 The Government's motion is made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(b) (l) a g
(6) and is decided without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, E
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I _ Case 3:03-cv-01027-JBA Document 22 Filed 07/27/2004 Page 3 of 4
Plaintiff Kole considered the whole situation and signed the
contract." Opp’n [Doc. #21} at 2.
It is apparent under these facts that there was as a matter
of law no due process violation. The deprivation, if any,
suffered by Kole was loss of $700.00. By her own admission,
before_the deprivation, she was fully notified of the requirement é
of the payment, her regulatory right not to make it, and the
consequences of failing to do so, and, having contemplated her
options, agreed to make the payment. The notion that the
procedure was somehow deficient due to coercion cannot stand
against these defendants as the coercion complained of, loss of
privileges for failing to participate in an IFRP, is mandated by
regulation as the majority rule and not ordinarily subject to the
discretion of prison officials. lt is also unavailing to re-
characterize Kole’s claim as follows: she would not have had
outside donors supply funds to her prison account if she had
known that such funds could be withdrawn from the account to pay
her fine in addition to funds derived from her prison wages. As I
noted above, the regulations permit prison officials to set E
payment amounts in light of an inmate's community resources
without regard to whether or not those resources ever flow
through the inmate’s account. §ee 28 C.F.R. § 545.ll(b).
Finally, Kole also does not claim that she would never had agreed
to the IFRP had she known that funds other than prison wages
3
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Case 3:03-cv-01027-JBA Document 22 Filed 07/27/2004 Page 4 of 4 !
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could be required as payment towards her fine. Even if she did,
however, that is the very choice she was faced with in 2002,
after reaping the benefits of six years in the IFRP, and she
elected to retain the benefits. Accordingly, the Government’s
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motion [Doc. #l3] is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to close l {
this case. I
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IT IS so ORDERED.
I I /\ 4 .
J het Bond Arterton
ited States District Judge
Dated t1h:i.s of July, 2004 at New Haven, Connecticut. [
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