Free Order - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 34 Filed 06/O1/2007 Page1 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ROLAND C. ANDERSON, :
Plaintiff, ;
v. ; Civil Action No. 05-877-JJF
GENERAL MOTORS CORP., i
Defendant. E
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s letter request for
appointment of counsel.1 (D.I. 28). For the reasons discussed,
the Court will deny Plaintiff's request.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on December 19, 2005
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for race
discrimination and retaliation in connection with his employment
by Defendant. On February 22, 2007, another lawsuit filed by
Plaintiff involving similar allegations against the same
Defendant was consolidated with this case. On March 23, 2007,
Plaintiff filed this request for appointment of counsel.
II. DISCUSSION
By his letter, Plaintiff requests an attorney and cites the
factors considered by the Third Circuit when reviewing motions
‘Plaintiff’s letter also requested information regarding the
status of his Motion For A Default Judgment (D.I. 15). Having
resolved the Motion For A Default Judgment by Memorandum Opinion
and Order entered May 29, 2007, the Court need only discuss the
request for appointment of counsel.

Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 34 Filed 06/O1/2007 Page 2 of 3
for appointment of counsel set forth in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147 (3d Cir. 1993). Defendant did not file a response.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, upon motion by the
complainant, a court may appoint counsel for a complainant if it
deems appointment just. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(£)(1). The Third
Circuit developed a list of criteria to aid district courts in
weighing whether to request an attorney to represent an indigent
civil litigant. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).
As a threshold matter, the Court must assess whether the
claimant’s case has some arguable merit in fact and law. Ig. at
155. If a claimant overcomes this initial hurdle, the Court may
then consider the following non—exhaustive list of factors:
1. the plaintiff's ability to present his or her own
Case;
2. the difficulty of the particular legal issues;
3. the degree to which factual investigation will be
necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue
investigation;
4. the plaintiff's capacity to retain counsel on his or
her own behalf;
5. the extent to which a case is likely to turn on
credibility determinations; and
6. whether the case will require testimony from expert
witnesses.
Ig. at 155-57. Additional factors to consider with respect to a
Title VII case are the efforts taken by a plaintiff to obtain
counsel and the plaintiff's financial ability to retain counsel.
See Hicks v. ABT Associates, Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 969 (3d. Cir.
1978); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th.
Cir. 1977).
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Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 34 Filed 06/O1/2007 Page 3 of 3
Keeping in mind the practical considerations cited above and
exercising the broad discretion offered the Court, the Court
concludes that the appointment of counsel is not warranted at
this time. Specifically, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
not met the threshold issue; he has not demonstrated that his
discrimination claim has some arguable merit in fact and law.
The EEOC issued a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights" letter to
Plaintiff stating that, “[b]ased upon its investigation, the EEOC
is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes
violations of the statutes.” (D.I. 2-2). Additionally,
Plaintiff has demonstrated some knowledge of the legal system and
ability to present his own case by making several filings.
Further, Plaintiff has not indicated that he has made efforts to
obtain counsel or that he sought assistance from organizations
that frequently offer assistance to pro se indigent litigants
with meritorious claims. Because Plaintiff is not confined, his
access to legal resources and attorney contacts is not
restricted. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's letter
request for appointment of counsel (D.I. 28).
@5.3
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's letter
request for appointment of counsel (D.I. 28) is DENIED.
2007 W _ i 4 ** --- ;
UNr T D S ATE DISTRICT J GE
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