Free Memorandum Opinion - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 32 Filed 05/29/2007 Page1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ROLAND C. ANDERSON, :
Plaintiff, :
v. : Civil Action No. 05-877-JJF
GENERAL MOTORS CORP., z
Defendant. z
Roland C. Anderson, Wilmington, Delaware.
Pro Se Plaintiff.
Michael Busenkell, Esquire of ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT,
LLC, Wilmington, Delaware.
Attorney for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
May 29, 2007
Wilmington, Delaware

Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 32 Filed 05/29/2007 Page 2 of 4
Ekl.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion For A Default
Judgment (D.I. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will deny the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on December 19, 2005
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for race
discrimination in connection with his employment by Defendant. A
Return Of Service was executed stating that “Terry Tyndall,
People’s Systems Admin.” was served with process on March 29,
2006 (D.I. 9). Defendant General Motors did not timely file an
answer. Plaintiff now moves for entry of default judgment.1
II. DISCUSSION
By his Motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court should
enter default because Defendant has not filed an answer or other
response to the Complaint. In response, Defendant contends that
entry of default is not warranted because service of process was
procedurally deficient. Specifically, Defendant contends that
Terry Tyndall was not a person authorized to receive service on
behalf of GM and that it did not learn of the proceedings until
August 24, 2006. Defendant filed an Answer contemporaneous with
its response to Plaintiff’s Motion (D.I. 17-3).
[Although Plaintiff moves for entry of default judgment, a
party must move for entry of default prior to requesting the
entry of default judgment. Sge Fed R. Civ. P. 55(a). Because
Plaintiff is proceeding prg se, the Court will construe the
Motion as a motion for entry of default.
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Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 32 Filed 05/29/2007 Page 3 of 4
Although no default has been entered in the instant case,
the Court concludes that the factors enumerated by the Third
Circuit in United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d
192 (3d. Cir. 1984), for setting aside an entry of default
counsel against granting Plaintiff’s Motion. A decision to
vacate the entry of default is left to the discretion of the
district court. Id. In making this determination, courts
consider: 1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced if the
court sets aside the default; 2) whether the defendant has a
meritorious defense; and 3) whether the default was a result of
the defendant’s culpable conduct. Id. In the Third Circuit,
defaults are generally disfavored, and therefore, in close cases,
courts must construe doubts in favor of resolving the cases on
the merits. Zawadski De Bueno v. Bueno Castro, 822 F.2d 416, 420
(3d. Cir. 1987)(citations omitted).
In this case, the Court concludes that the factors weigh
against the entry of default. Defendant filed an Answer with its
response to Plaintiff's Motion within four business days after
Plaintiff moved for default judgment. Even assuming arguendo
that service of process was proper and Defendant was not timely
in its response to the Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged that
he will be prejudiced by the delay. Thus, the first factor
weighs against the entry of default. Next, the Court concludes
that Defendant’s Answer alleges a meritorious defense because it
would provide a complete defense if proved at trial. see
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Case 1:05-cv-00877-JJF Document 32 Filed 05/29/2007 Page 4 of 4
$55,518.05 728 F.2d at 195. Further, the Court concludes that
the default was not a result of Defendant's culpable conduct.
“In this context, culpable conduct means actions taken willfully
or in bad faith.” Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d
120, 123—24 (3d. Cir. 1983). By affidavit, Mr. Tyndall asserts
that he believed the documents served upon him pertained to a
pending Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Complaint filed
by the Plaintiff separate from the instant action. (D.I. 21, Ex.
A). Mr. Tyndall stated he did not intentionally disregard the
documents or intentionally withhold them from Defendant's legal
department. IQ. Thus, the Court concludes that, under the
circumstances, there is insufficient evidence on the record to
find wilfulness or bad faith.
In sum, the Court concludes that entry of default is not
warranted because Plaintiff has not established prejudice, the
Defendant has a meritorious defense, and there is insufficient
evidence of culpable conduct by the Defendant. Accordingly, the
Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
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