Free Answering Brief in Opposition - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE RENESAS TECHNOLOGY CORP., Plaintiff, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., -andSAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., Defendants. C.A. No. 07-54-JJF

PLAINTIFF RENESAS TECHNOLOGY CORP.'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND STAY

DATED: June 13, 2007

BOUCHARD MARGULES & FRIEDLANDER, P.A. Andre G. Bouchard (#2504) John M. Seaman (#3868) 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801 [email protected] [email protected] (302) 573-3500 MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP Christopher E. Chalsen Michael M. Murray James R. Klaiber 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10005 (212) 530-5000 Fax: (212) 530-5219 Attorneys for Plaintiff Renesas Technology Corp.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii I. II. III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................2 ARGUMENT...........................................................................................................3 A. This Action Should Not Be Consolidated With Civil Action No. 07-53-JJF......................................................................................................3 1. 2. Applicable Law................................................................................3 The Lack of Time and Effort Saved and Complexity of the Actions Justify Denying Consolidation ...........................................3 Samsung's Double Recovery Arguments Provide No Support for Consolidation................................................................5

3.

B.

This Action Should Not Be Stayed..............................................................6 1. 2. Applicable Law................................................................................6 Renesas Would Be Unduly Prejudiced and Put In a Tactical Disadvantage if the Court Stayed the Present Action......................7 A Stay Would Not Simplify the Issues in the Present Action...............................................................................................9 The Stage of the Present Suit Provides No Support for a Stay ................................................................................................11

3.

4.

IV.

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 3M Co v. Moldex-Metric, Inc., 2006 WL 3759758 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2006)............................................................... 3 Alloc, Inc. v. Unilin Decor N.V., 2003 WL 21640372 (D. Del. July 11, 2003) .......................................................... 9, 11 Bowers v. Baystate, 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................... 5 Catalina Lighting v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................... 6 Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Revlon, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 24 (D. Del. 1986) ...................................................................................... 3 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)...................................................................................................... 6 Flexsys Americas, LP v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc., 2005 WL 1126750 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2005)......................................................... 8, 9 Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Prods. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67812 (E.D. Mo. 2006)......................................................... 10 In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................... 5 Kearns v. GMC, 94 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996)....................................................................................... 7 Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936)...................................................................................................... 6 Metallgesellschaft AG v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 143 F.R.D. 553 (D. Del. 1992) ................................................................................. 4, 5 Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosel Vitelic Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4792 (D. Idaho Feb. 19, 1997)...................................... 7, 8, 10 Organon Teknika Corp. v. Hoffmann La Roche, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3798 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 1997).............................................. 8 Sighting Sys. Instruments, LLC v. Prestige Law Enforcement, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64698 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2006)......................................... 11 Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17821 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004) ........................................... 3, 5 Texas Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..................................................................................... 11 Zoetics, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46910 (D. Del. July 6, 2006) ............................................ 7, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) .................................................................................................... 1, 5, 8

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RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) ........................................................................................................... 3

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Plaintiff Renesas Technology Corp. ("Renesas") hereby opposes and answers Defendants' Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (collectively, "Samsung") Motion To Consolidate And Stay. I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The present action should be neither consolidated nor stayed. The present action should not be consolidated with Civil Action No. 07-53-JJF, which is stayed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) and by stipulation of the parties "until the determination of ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-595 becomes final." That action was stayed because the patents involved in that case are the very same as the patents involved in the ITC investigation. By clear contrast, none of the patents asserted in the present action (i.e., U.S. Patent Nos. 7,091,620 (the "'620 patent"); 7,106,092 (the "'092 patent"); 7,163,870 (the "'870 patent"); and 7,187,039 (the "'039 patent")) are involved in the ITC case and therefore this case is not subject to the statutory stay requirement. Indeed, Samsung did not even move to stay this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a). The patents involved in this action are not involved in the ITC action and are directed to different inventions. There could be no savings of time or effort from consolidation with the stayed case. Rather, a consolidation would needlessly increase the complexity of these infringement actions by conflating the issues of the two cases and delaying the resolution of the issues involved in the present case. Furthermore, the present action plainly should not be stayed. Again, none of the patents asserted in the present action are at issue in the ITC proceeding. The `620, `870, and `039 patents have absolutely no relation to the patents (i.e., the `128 and `344 patents) in the ITC or 07-53-JJF proceedings. The claims, specifications, prosecution histories and inventors of these patents are entirely different. In addition, the numerous 1

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differences in the claim terms of the `092 patent and the `128 patent far outweigh any similarities in these claims. Imposing a stay in the present action would prejudice plaintiff Renesas by drastically postponing its ability to enforce its `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents against Samsung. A decision in the ITC proceeding is not due until June 2, 2008, with any appeals to the Federal Circuit likely more than a year beyond that. Renesas should be permitted to obtain redress from Samsung's infringement of Renesas's `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents without having to first obtain a resolution on Renesas's `344 and `128 patents. There is no substantial justification for preventing the present action from proceeding in parallel with the ITC matter, as they concern completely different patents and different available remedies. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS The present action alleges infringement of the `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents. (See Declaration of John M. Seaman ("Seaman Decl."), Exhs. 1-4.) The `620, `870 and `039 patents have no relation to the `344 or `128 patents (Seaman Decl., Exhs. 5-6) involved in the ITC case. The inventors of the `620 patent are Chuichi Miyazaki, Yukiharu Akiyama, Masnori Shibamoto, Tomoaki Kudaishi, Ichiro Anjoh, Kunihiko Nishi, Asao Nishimura, Hideki Tanaka, Ryosuke Kimoto, Kunihiro Tsubosaki, and Akio Hasebe. The inventors of the `870 and `039 patents are Yasushi Koubuchi, Koichi Nagasawa, Masahiro Moniwa, Youhei Yamada, and Toshifumi Takeda. None of these individuals are inventors of the `344 or `128 patents. Although the `092 patent derives from the same application family as the `128 patent, it is a completely different patent containing different claims from the `128 patent. (See Seaman Decl., Exhs. 2 & 6.) 2

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III.

ARGUMENT A. This Action Should Not Be Consolidated With Civil Action No. 07-53-JJF 1. Applicable Law

Courts may consolidate actions involving a "common question of law or fact" and "make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). However, the mere existence of common issues, although a prerequisite to consolidation, does not mandate a joint trial. The court must balance the savings of time and effort gained from consolidation against the inconvenience, delay, or expense that might result from simultaneous disposition of the separate actions. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Revlon, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 24, 32 (D. Del. 1986). In Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17821, at *3-5 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004), this Court denied consolidation of two infringement actions even though one patent was a continuation of the other asserted patent, the patents had the same inventors and had specifications that were "virtually identical." The court found that "[a]dding another patent to the plaintiff's claims will only increase the case's complexity and make it that much harder for a jury to come to a resolution" and thus "consolidation of the two cases would be more burdensome than beneficial." Id. at * 5. (emphasis added). 2. The Lack of Time and Effort Saved and Complexity of the Actions Justify Denying Consolidation

Consolidation would provide no savings of time and effort as both actions are in their initial stages. The present action is unlike 3M Co v. Moldex-Metric, Inc., 2006 WL 3759758, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2006), where "much of the same discovery from 2003

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Action can be used in the 2006 Action." Here, discovery has just begun and the issues in the present action have not begun to take shape. Thus, consolidation would not provide any savings of time and effort. Consolidation would result in prolonged delay and unnecessary prejudice to Renesas. Since Civil Action No. 7-53-JJF is stayed "until the determination of ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-595 becomes final," consolidation of the two actions would effectively stay the present action and permit Samsung to continue to infringe the `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents while the ITC resolves infringement on entirely different patents. A more appropriate course would be to follow Metallgesellschaft AG v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 143 F.R.D. 553 (D. Del. 1992), where this court denied a motion to consolidate two infringement actions involving the same parties. In Foster Wheeler, the Court rejected consolidation although it found some "common issues of fact and law" and that the two suits' claims were "supported or refuted by some overlapping evidence." Id. at 558. Despite these similarities, the Court concluded that joint adjudication of the claims would "unduly complicate the intrinsically complex factual and legal issues at bar" and denied consolidation. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The Court should deny Samsung's motion to consolidate for the same reasons. Not only are the legal and factual similarities between the Delaware Actions minimal at best, consolidation of these cases would unnecessarily complicate the already complex issues involved. The present action currently includes four patents involving sixteen inventors. Indeed, consolidation of these actions would unnecessarily require this Court--and inevitably a jury--to consider two additional patents involving three

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additional inventors. See, e.g., Syngenta Seeds, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17821, at *5 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004) ("Adding another patent to the plaintiff's claims will only increase the case's complexity and make it that much harder for a jury to come to a resolution." (emphasis added)). Moreover, the substantial amount of discovery already awaiting both parties in this case will grow exponentially in the wake of consolidation. To prevent this unnecessary complication of the matters at bar, this Court should deny Defendant's motion to consolidate in accordance with its holding in Foster Wheeler. 3. Samsung's Double Recovery Arguments Provide No Support for Consolidation

Samsung's alleged fear concerning the risk of "double recovery" is disingenuous. (See Defs.' Opening Br. at 8.) First, the same judge is handling both cases and will be aware of the events in the other suit. Second, double recovery is not currently even possible because no damages are available in the ITC proceeding and the 07-53-JJF action is stayed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) and will not proceed until the ITC's determination "becomes final," including appellate review by the Federal Circuit. (0753-JJF, D.I. 17); see In re Princo Corp., 478 F.3d 1345, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting § 1659(a)'s language "until the determination . . . becomes final" to require district court to maintain stay until proceedings before Commission, including appeals, becomes final). "The law is clear that the jury may award separate damages for each claim, `leaving it to the judge to make appropriate adjustments to avoid double recovery.'" Bowers v. Baystate, 320 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) "So long as a plaintiff is not twice compensated for a single injury, a judgment may be comprised of elements drawn from separate ... remedies." Id. at 1328.

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The authority cited by Samsung simply does not support consolidation, as none of these decisions suggest that consolidation could have prevented double recovery. For example, in Catalina Lighting v. Lamps Plus, Inc., the court merely held that after finding that the defendant's product infringed both a utility patent and a design patent, the plaintiff may receive the infringer's profits for infringement of the design patent under § 289 but cannot also recover a reasonable royalty on the utility patent. 295 F.3d 1277, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This Court can certainly consider any alleged double recovery issue that might arise in the 07-53-JJF action after infringement is redressed in the present action. Thus, Samsung's double recovery concern provides no support for consolidation. In view of the inconvenience, delay, and expense that would be caused by consolidation, coupled with the increase in complexity and the lack of any savings in time, this case should not be consolidated with the 07-53-JJF action. B. This Action Should Not Be Stayed 1. Applicable Law

"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). "The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). Thus, the moving party "must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else." Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).

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"In ruling on a motion to stay, courts are guided by three factors: (1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set." Zoetics, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46910, at *4 (D. Del. July 6, 2006) (Farnan, J.) (citations omitted). 2. Renesas Would Be Unduly Prejudiced and Put In a Tactical Disadvantage if the Court Stayed the Present Action

Renesas would certainly be heavily prejudiced if the Court stayed the present action. If the Court were to stay all proceedings pending final resolution of the ITC proceeding, Samsung would be allowed to continue to infringe Renesas's `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents without affording Renesas any recourse in the courts on each of these patents. See Kearns v. GMC, 94 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Each patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action." (emphasis added)). At least one court faced with circumstances nearly identical to those the present action has refused to institute a stay. See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosel Vitelic Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4792 (D. Idaho Feb. 19, 1997). In Micron, the court was faced with a motion to stay a lawsuit involving eleven asserted patents and rejected staying discovery on the seven patents that were not a part of an ITC investigation because the Defendants did not establish that a stay was necessary to prevent undue hardship or injustice. Id. at *14. The Micron court noted that all eleven patents at issue were alleged to be infringed by two of Defendants' products and were related to the same basic technology field. Id. at *7. The court also mentioned that Defendants had initiated their own third lawsuit,

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showing that they had the ability to litigate the ITC proceeding and district court case at the same time. Id. at *12. All of these facts are present here. Samsung alleges no hardship or injustice caused by litigating the `620, `092, `870, and `039 patents in parallel with the ITC investigation. And unlike Micron, where the same two accused products were alleged to infringe all eleven asserted patents, Samsung can only allege that some of the infringing products are common to all asserted patents. Like the defendant in Micron, Samsung has initiated its own additional lawsuits against Renesas (in both this Court and the ITC) demonstrating its ability to litigate multiple cases at once. Accordingly, this Court should follow the reasoning of Micron and deny Samsung's request for a stay of this action. Furthermore, as noted above, none of the patents in the present action are at issue in the ITC investigation. Therefore, unlike the 07-53-JJF action, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) do not apply to the present action. See Organon Teknika Corp. v. Hoffmann La Roche, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3798, at *6-7 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 1997) ("Section 1659 does not apply to this request because these patents are not at issue in both proceedings."). Furthermore, the present case is unlike Flexsys Americas, LP v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc., 2005 WL 1126750 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2005), where three of the four patents asserted in the district court case were also asserted in an ITC case, and the fourth patent was related to patents asserted in the ITC case. Thus, the procedural situation here is unlike that of Flexsys, where a "majority [was] subject to a statutory stay." 1

1

Even if the present action were improperly consolidated with Civil Action No. 07-53-JJF, Flexsys would still be irrelevant because only two of the six patents in a consolidated case would be subject to a statutory stay and not a majority of the patents as in Flexsys.

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Samsung's reliance on Alloc, Inc. v. Unilin Decor N.V., 2003 WL 21640372 (D. Del. July 11, 2003) is misplaced because that suit involved only one asserted patent, which was a continuation of other patents that were undergoing reexamination before the PTO and on appeal before the Federal Circuit. Here, three of the four asserted patents have no relation to the patents in any other proceeding. Furthermore, the Alloc court relied on the imminent decisions of the PTO and the Federal Circuit to find a lack of prejudice. By contrast, the target date for a decision by the ITC is set at June 2, 2008, with a final decision based on any appeal to the Federal Circuit likely to be as late as the spring of 2009. Thus, unlike the situation in Alloc, Renesas would suffer extreme prejudice because a stay would prolong the period for Samsung to infringe Renesas's `620, `870, and `039 patents, which have no relation to patents in any other proceedings. 3. A Stay Would Not Simplify the Issues in the Present Action

A stay will not simplify the issues because the vast majority of the issues in this action are not present in the ITC proceeding. Even though Samsung asserts that claim terms, prior art, and other issues in this action and the ITC proceeding overlap, such overlap is minimal and insignificant in comparison with the cases relied on by Samsung. Three of the four asserted patents have no relation to the patents in the ITC proceeding and none of the sixteen inventors of the `620, `870, and `039 patents are inventors of the `344 and `128 patents. This sharply contrasts with the situation in Flexsys, where all four of the patents were either asserted in an ITC case or related to the patents in the ITC case. This Court will thus receive no benefit or simplification of issues regarding claim construction and Samsung's infringement on at least the `620, `870, and

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`039 patents based on an ITC decision involving the entirely unrelated `344 and `128 patents. Even though the ubiquitous terms "semiconductor device" and "substrate" appear in many of the patents, numerous claim terms essential to an infringement decision on the `620, `870, and `039 patents are not present in the `344 and `128 patents. See Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Prods. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67812, at *6 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (denying motion to stay where different claim language was at issue in two pending infringement cases). Thus, contrary to Samsung's contentions, the ITC determinations on the `344 and `128 patents will not simplify, focus or resolve the issues facing this Court on the `620, `870, and `039 patents. And although the `092 patent is related to the `128 patent, the same analysis applies, as the present action and the ITC proceeding do not concern the same issues. In Micron, the court refused to stay the assertion of a patent having the same U.S. classification as a patent subject to the statutory stay because the patent did not involve the same issues. See 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4792 at *8. The Micron court held that patents that merely involve the same general area of technology do not have the same issues. Id. at *7. Similarly, the fact that the `092 patent is related to or involves a technology similar to the `128 patent is irrelevant. Because the issues surrounding the `092 patent are not the same issues as the `128 patent in the ITC proceeding, the court should not stay the infringement claim involving the `092 patent. For purposes of determining infringement, the overlap between the `092 patent and the `128 patent is essentially insignificant in comparison with the lack of overlap among the asserted patents asserted in the 07-53-JJF action and the present case. The fact

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that some claim terms in the `092 patent and `128 patent are similar has no bearing on all of the numerous claim terms of the `092, `620, `870, and `039 patents that are simply not present in the `128 patent. (Compare Seaman Decl. Exh. 6 at col. 17, l. 45 to col. 20, l. 30 with Seaman Decl. Exh. 1 at col. 76, l. 63 to col. 80, l. 38, and Seaman Decl. Exh. 2 at col. 17, l. 34 to col. 20, l. 9, and Seaman Decl. Exh. 3 at col. 24, lns. 31-60, and Seaman Decl. Exh. 4 at col. 24, l. 30 to col. 32, l. 8.) These different terms may have to be independently construed by this Court and would involve different infringement determinations even if similar products are accused of infringement. Furthermore, if the cases did share some issues, a stay will not simplify such issues in the present action because a final determination in the ITC proceeding has no effect on the issues in the present action. Texas Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[D]ecisions of the ITC involving patent issues have no preclusive effect in other forums."). Contrary to Samsung's position that the ITC proceeding may narrow the issues in dispute, the Court will have to independently decide any overlapping issues, if any, decided by the ITC. Id. ("The district court can attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decision that it considers justified."). 4. The Stage of the Present Suit Provides No Support for a Stay

"Although the advanced nature of a case approaching trial may weigh heavily against granting a stay, the opposite inference -- that a suit in the early stages should weigh heavily in favor of a stay -- is not true." Sighting Sys. Instruments, LLC v. Prestige Law Enforcement, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64698, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2006).

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The same is true here. The early nature of the present action has no bearing on the propriety of a stay. Contrary to Samsung's suggestion, the present case is unlike Alloc since a stay would not prevent the parties from incurring "substantial litigation-related expenses." Regardless of the present action, the parties will likely incur significant costs from the pending ITC case and the ITC matter (Inv. No. 337-TA-2544) initiated by Samsung. At best, this factor is neutral and should be disregarded. Finally, this Court has ordered a trial no later than September 2008, and the parties have agreed to a schedule designed to provide for completion of discovery (which has already begun), in accordance with this order. (D.I. 15 at 1; D.I. 21 at 1-5.) Thus, in view of this Court's holding of Zoetics, in view of the setting of a trial date, a stay in this case would not be appropriate. IV. CONCLUSION A consolidation of this action with the stayed 07-54-JJF action would needlessly complicate the resulting suit, and unduly prejudice Renesas pursuit of redress for Samsung's infringement of the patents asserted in this action. Similarly, a stay of this action would not result in any simplification and would simply delay the resolution of issues already set for trial in September of next year. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Samsung's Motion to Consolidate and Stay. 2

2

Should the court find a relationship between the `092 patent asserted in this case and the `128 patent asserted in the 07-53-JJF case substantial enough to merit consideration of a stay, Renesas would respectfully request that the Court consider merely staying Renesas's claims relating to the `092 patent (i.e. Count I) and otherwise deny Samsung's Motion to Consolidate and Stay. The existence of Count I should in no way result in a stay of Renesas's other infringement claims present in this case.

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/s/ John M. Seaman Andre G. Bouchard (#2504) John M. Seaman (#3868) BOUCHARD MARGULES & FRIEDLANDER, P.A. 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 573-3500 [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff Renesas Technology Corp.

OF COUNSEL: Christopher E. Chalsen Michael M. Murray James R. Klaiber MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10005 (212) 530-5000 Fax: (212) 530-5219

DATED: June 13, 2007

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, John M. Seaman, hereby certify that on June 13, 2007, I caused to be electronically filed a true and correct copy of the notice of the foregoing Plaintiff Renesas Technology Corp.'s Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Consolidate and Stay with the Clerk of Court by CM/ECF which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record: Timothy Devlin, Esquire FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C. 919 N. Market Street, Suite 1100 P.O. Box 1114 Wilmington, DE 19801

/s/ John M. Seaman John M. Seaman (#3868)

{BMF-W0043894.}