Free Order Dismissing Case (1915) - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:07-cv—O0528-SLR Document 8 Filed O2/20/2008 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOSEPH T. SIVIITH, )
Plaintiff, ;
v. g Civil Action No. 07-528-SLR
LAWRENCE Nl. SULLIVAN, KESTER g
CROSSE, and RALPH WILKERSON, )
Defendants. g
MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this lq1"`day of February, 2008, having screened the case pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A;
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A, for the reasons
that follow;
1. Background. Plaintiff Joseph T. Smith, an inmate at the Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution ("HRYCl"), tiled this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed informa pauperis.
2. Standard of Review. When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. §
1915 provides for dismissal under certain circumstances. When a prisoner seeks
redress from a government defendant in a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for
screening ofthe complaint by the court. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1) provide that the court may dismiss a complaint, at any time, if the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks

Case 1:07-cv—00528-SLR Document 8 Filed 02/20/2008 Page 2 of 4
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it
"lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
3. ln performing the court’s screening function under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court
applies the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Fullman v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:07CV-000079, 2007 WL 257617 (|VI.D. Pa.
Jan. 25, 2007) (citing Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7"‘ Cir. 2000). The court
must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, —U.S.—, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007);
Christopher v. Harbugg, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). A complaint must contain "‘a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, —U.S.—, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Qpgy
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))i Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
4. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however "a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do." kl; at 1965 (citations omitted). The "[t]actuaI allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." g (citations omitted). Plaintiff is
required to make a "showing" rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, — F.3d —, No. 06-2869, 2008 WL 305025, at *5 (3d Cir.
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Case 1:07-cv—O0528-SLR Document 8 Filed 02/20/2008 Page 3 of 4
2008). "[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the
requirement that he or she provide not only "fair notice," but also the "grounds" on which
the claim rests. Q (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3.) Therefore, "‘stating . . . a
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the
required element." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 2008 WL 305025, at *6 (quoting
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3.) "This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at
the pleading stage,‘ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." gl; Because
plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, —U.S.—, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted).
5. Discussion. Plaintiff filed this action against Delaware Public Defender
Lawrence Sullivan ("Sullivan") and assistant public defenders Kester Crosse ("Crosse")
and Ralph \/Wlkerson ("Wilkerson"). Plaintiff has numerous complaints, but basically
alleges that Crosse and Wilkerson did not provide him with effective assistance of
counsel during criminal proceedings. Plaintiff further alleges they used intimidation to
convince plaintiff to plead guilty. Plaintiff asks the court to place the Public Defender's
Office under investigation and to take appropriate disciplinary action. He seeks newly
appointed counsel, as well as compensatory damages.
6. The three defendants are attorneys in Delaware’s Office of the Public
Defender. As alleged by plaintiff, he was a defendant in a criminal action and
represented by Crosse and Wilkerson. When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
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allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who
caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1993).
7. Public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a
Iawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings. Eg
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Harmon v. Delaware Secretary of State, 154
Fed. Appx. 283, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2005). Because public defenders are not considered
state actors, plaintiffs claim fails under § 1983.
8. Conclusion. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the complaint is dismissed
for failure to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1). Amendment of the complaint would be futile. See Grayson v. Nlayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950,
951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).

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