Free Letter - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1 :O7—cv—OO687-GIVIS Document 19 Filed O1/O9/2008 Page 1 of 3
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Dennis Shipman
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Springfield Gardens, New York 11413-211 1
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- _ January 6, 2008 $5;
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Bradford A. Baldus, Senior Legal Advisor to the Clerk W 2;.1
United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Judicial Circuit ‘·°
U.S. Courthouse ‘ Qgm
601 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106 ___
RE: Shipman v. State of Delaware et al 07-4692 S WBT
Dear Mr. Baldus:
Delaware Attorney General’s office has not offered any opposition to our motions.
Despite that, the District Court denied an emergency motion for iinunctive relief
employing an arcane legal standard, which simply does not apply.
We immediately appealed that adverse order, and Helen A George, Motion Attorney
for the Third Circuit, returned our papers as we were not entitled to submit emergency
appeals via facsimile. Since we had already submitted hardcopies by mail foreseeing a
possible problem, the hardcopies were subsequently docketed. We are writing in response
to a letter dated December 21st by US Court of Appeals, Third Circuit staff attomey
Laura L. Greene threatening Sun Sponte summary judgment before a 3 judge panel
pursuant to 28 USC §1291 on the aforementioned emergency appeal. Our response is due
within 21 days. We submitted it yesterday, however.
In re Platsky et al; the court errs if court dismisses the pro se litigant’s pleading(s)
without instruction of how pleading(s) are deficient and how to repair pleadings. There
are no procedural instructions evident in Ms. Greene’s letter providing any guidance
with respect to a process by which a pro se litigant in an emergency motion requests the
lower court’s permission to appeal aninterlocutory order. (see Platsky v. C.I.A. 953
F.2d. 25)

Case 1 :07—cv—OO687-GIVIS Document 19 Filed 01/09/2008 Page 2 of 3
Pg. 2
More importantly, the USCA, Third Circuit has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory
appeals from USDC pursuant to Title 28 §1292 (b) (enclosed) ofthe United States Code.
"(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) lriterlocutorjy orders of the district courts of the United States (emphasis
ours), the United States District Court for the District ofthe Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the
judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court,
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof; such as
directing sales or other disposals of property;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which
appeals from Hnal decrees are allowed."
Consequently, Chapter 10.6 of the Internal Operating Procedures of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 27.4, and
Title 28 §1291 erroneously cited by Ms. Greene in support of her fatally flawed analysis
represent a gross misinterpretation of the law with respect to interlocutory appeals from
District Court orders.
Additionally, plaintiff-appellant has by virtue of the underlying civil rights complaint
made an affirmative factual showing “. . . of irreparable harm, and immediate danger"
by required affidavits as well as other documentary evidence. And, as such, has i
requested an immediate stay, enjoinment, and other urgent relief aiforded by the United
States Code as well as Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure pursuant to 3rd Circuit
L.A.R. 111.4.
Judge Sue Robinson’s decision has the effect of a final judgment considering the
grave danger in which it places plaintiff-appellant. The District Court has been given
ample opportunity to reconsider its ruling by virtue of a Notice of Appeal and
supporting documentation filed with the District Court pursuant to FRAP. Nevertheless,
the warrants complained about remain outstanding, plaintiff-appellant’s life as well as
liberty remain threatened, Delaware State Police continue to harass plaintiff-appellant
by telephone on a daibz basis, and Title 28 §1292 (b) ofthe United States Code clearly
allow an appellate review of the District Court decision under exigent circumstances as
represented.
More importantly, case laws — eg., Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978), Haines v
Kenner, 404 US 519, (1972) Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949)
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422 (1977) -
cited by plaintiff-appellant in support of his motion(s) are all Supreme Court precedents,
which have been thoroughly Shepardized and, as a result, we respectfully suggest are
binding on all lower courts, not subject to reinterpretation.

Case 1 :O7—cv—OO687-GIVIS Document 19 Filed O1/O9/2008 Page 3 of 3
Pg 3 .
The District Court here erred in refusing to examine the adequacy of petitioner’s
proffer of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit. Pp. 155- l 56; 164- 1 72. [438 U.S.
154, 156] Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978). The Court's reliance on Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), for the proposition that a determination by a neutral
magistrate is a prerequisite to the sufficiency of an application for a warrant is
obviously correct. In that case the Court said:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
» otticers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id., at 13-14.
Therefore, plaintiff respectfully requests that the motions represent a substantial
question of law and, therefore, ought to be submitted to the Circuit Court en banc or to
the panel for immediate consideration of requested relief, or for an expedited review;
and, complained about arrest warrant immediatelv stayed from execution pursuant to 3“'
Circuit L.A.R. 111.4, pending an evidentiary hearing if the state fails to immediately
administratively dismiss the underlying retaliatory and fraudulent charges in the interest
of justice. _
Ir1 Re: Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978), “where the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
1 with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,
and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a
hearing be held at the defendant's request. And for whatever other relief the Court ·
_@ems proper, fair and just.
I Jar. \ · 1
ctfull yours, ·
\Deniu hipman, Plaintiff-Appe11antPr0
cc; Hon. Beau Biden, Attorney General H
820 North French Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Clerk of Court
U.S. District Court
844 N. King Street
Lockbox 18
Wilmington, DE 19801

Case 1:07-cv-00687-GMS

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