Free Letter - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:04-cv-00125-JJF-MPT Document 115 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 1 of 3
OBERMAYER
M REBMANN MAXWELL Sr HIPPEL LLP Phi1adelphia.PA19I03—1895
Ammgys A, Law (215) 666-6000 Pax (216) 666-3166
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Steven T. Davis
Direct ora: (215} 666-2126 s Mm Read, Suite sosa
E—Mrril: Steven.Drrz,=is@ Qberrnayer.corr1 Wilmington, DE 19806
{302) 666-9094 Fax {302] 658—805l
PLEASE REPLY ro PHILADELPHIA
June 13, 2005
CONFIDENTIAL DOCUIVIENT
FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT TO
PROTECTIVE ORDER DATED APRIL 13, 2005
The Honorable Mary Pat Thynge, U.S.M.J.
United States District Coun
For the District of Delaware
844 N. King Street
Lock Box 8 — Room 4209
Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: Andrea L. Spoltorc f/ ki a Andrea L. Cadwallader
vs. Wilmington Professional Associates, Inc.
Docket No.: 04-125 JJF
Dear Magistrate Judge Thynge:
Please accept this letter in response to counsel’s letter to Your Honor dated June 8,
2005, in which the defendant provides the purported reasons that it seeks federally protected
medical records from three alcohol rehabilitation facilities that treated the plaintiff two years
after she was terminated from her employment by defendant (hereinafter "Defendant’s
Letter"). Defendant’s Letter fails to demonstrate that defendant has "good cause" under 42
U.S.C. §290dd-2(a) to allow disclosure of the alcohol rehabilitation facilities’ records.
First, defendant concedes that the information that is relevant to this action, that may
be used for cross examination of experts, is "Any information that sheds light on plaintiffs
mental or emotional condition at or before the time of her termination. . ." The records that
defendant seeks are not relevant to those issues but rather, are relevant only to plaintiffs
current mental or emotional condition, which is not at issue. E Gooinar v. Centennial Live
Insurance Co., 855 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Cal. 1994) affd 76 F.3d 1059 (6‘h Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the defendant has no basis to review the records that it seeks.
Secondly, defendant’s reliance on O'Boyle v. Jensen, 150 FRD 519 (MD. Pa 1993) is
misplaced since that case is completely distinguishable. In O’B0yle v. Jensen, the patient was
a chronic alcoholic, he was treated at the alcohol rehabilitation facility before his death and
the "possibility could not be ruled out that death resulted from preexisting condition related to
alcoholism or drug abuse." 150 F.R.D. 521. Likewise, in Mulholland v. Dietz Company 896
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Case 1:04-cv-00125-JJF-MPT Document 115 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 2 of 3
The Hon. Mary Pat Thynge, U.S.M.J.
Page 2
I une 13, 2005
F. Supp. 179, 180 (E.D. Pa 1994) plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries, and during
discovery, admitted to having had an alcohol and drug problem at the time of the accident and
to receiving treatment at a rehabilitation facility shortly thereafter. The Court found that the
records from the rehabilitation facility were relevant since they may demonstrate that
plaintiffs injuries may have been caused in whole or part by his own conduct, rather than the
negligence of others. 896 F.Supp. at 180. ln contrast here, there is no claim that alcohol
played any role in the defendant’s decision to fire the plaintiff on March 5, 2002. -
In addition, the patient in O’Boyle v. Jensen had died, so the court did not have to
weigh the important public policy principles underlying the legislative decision to provide
nearly absolute confidentiality of the treatment records—the ability to insure successful
substance abuse treatments. E Whyte v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 818 F.2d
1005, 1009 (lst Cir. 1987) (Congress recognized that absolute confidentiality is necessary to
insure successful treatment). In contrast here, plaintiffs attempts at successful treatment are
being frustrated by defendant’s repeated attempts to intrude into those confidential areas.
Defendant’s tactics are designed to embarrass and humiliate the plaintiff and to deter the
plaintiff from seeking any additional treatment that may be found to be necessary.
Defendant counsel’s purported medical analysis, likewise fails to provide good cause
for disclosure of the confidential medical records from the rehabilitation facilities. In fact,
defendant’s counsel concedes that despite the production of all of the plaintiffs medical
records to date, and the discovery it has engaged in concerning those records, including
depositions of the plaintiff] witnesses, and experts concerning events that occurred prior to
May, 2004, the defendant has "no way of knowing at present when the plaintiff first began to
suffer from Major Depressive Disorder? Yet, the precise date that condition arose is not
relevant since Plaintiff has not asserted claims that defendant caused her to suffer Major
Depressive Disorder. In addition, the absence of a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, by
a medical expert, prior to her termination, and for two years thereafter, confirm that any
attempts to provide a retrospective diagnosis to that time period, would be based solely on
speculation and conjecture. ge Goomar v. Centennial Live Insurance Co., supra. That is
obviously why defendant has failed to produce any competent medical analysis to support its
arguments to date.
Defendant also contends that "if plaintiffs disorder is so severe it makes her incapable
of working, then she cannot claim future economic damages from defendant." However, there
is no proof or claims that her current mental condition precludes her from working in the
future. As defendant is obviously aware from the documents it was provided with from the
plaintiffs subsequent employer, the plaintiff was out of work only a short period of time to
accommodate each hospital admission, and shortly after her discharge, she returned to work
and performed her work duties. Plaintiff was temiinated from her subsequent position, in late
December, 2004, because of the strict absentee policy that her subsequent employer enforced.
Thus, defendant’s contentions concerning symptoms that could, purportedly, be associated
with "severe" depression, are not applicable here.
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Case 1:04-cv-00125-JJF-MPT Document 115 Filed 06/13/2005 Page 3 of 3
The Hon. Mary Pat Thynge, U.S.M.J.
Page 3
June 13, 2005
For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not demonstrated "good cause" for
disclosure of the medical records from the additional facilities where the plaintiff has
recently received treatment. Therefore, defendant’s request for disclosure of those records
should, respectfully, be denied.
Thank you for Your Honor’s attention to this matter.
Respectfully yours,
/s/ §tev¤n. cpavls
STEVEN T. DAVIS (No. 2731)
STD/bh
cc: Laurence V. Cronin, Esquire (Via E-Filing)
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