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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DONALD M. DURKIN CONTRACTING
INC.
Plaintif
vs.
CITY OF NEWARK , et ai. Defendants
and
: CASE NO. 04- 0163- GMS
CITY OF NEWARK Third-Party Plaintif
vs.
DONALD M. DURKIN CONTRACTING FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and URS CORPORATION Third-Party Defendants
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARIE INSURANCE COMPANY Intervenor
PLAINTIFF' S MOTION IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND POST- JUDGMENT INTEREST 1988 AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54 PURSUANT TO 42 U.
C.
The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant Donald M.
Durkin Contracting, Inc. (" Durkin
(collectively the " City
October 11
) against
Defendant City of Newark and Councilpersons
and the Court entered
) on October 5 ,
2006 ,
judgment for Durkin on
2006.
Durkin fies this Motion for attorneys ' fees , costs and post-judgment interest 42
c. 91988 and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54.
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Durkin is entitled to recover its attorneys ' fees , costs and post-judgment interest
(as well as an enhancement multiplier on its fees due to delay) because it has met all of the
requirements for reimbursement under 42 U.S. C.
91988.
First , Durkin. is a prevailing pary. Second , the attorneys ' fees and costs incurred
were reasonably incurred. And ,
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
finally, the attorneys
' fees charged are
C. 91988.
market rates.
See
See also
42 U.
Durkin recognizes that the jury verdict and judgment includes some portion of the
attorneys ' fees incurred in this matter (Jury Verdict LA.3). To the extent that the City attempts
to reduce or seek disallowance of any of those fees , Durkin submits that its Motion for attorneys
fees , costs and post-judgment interest 42 U. C. 91988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54
sets forth an entirely independent basis for an
award of attorneys ' fees and
costs. Durkin
respectfully requests that this Cour either hold this Motion in abeyance , depending on the final
determination of all post-trial motions , or respectfully allow Durkin to timely renew this Motion
if and when it becomes appropriate to do so.
City'
Blatant
Disreeard for Discoverv
The entire course of this litigation was plagued and unnecessarily protracted by
the City
s blatant violation and disregard
for the discovery rules
, with the most crucial and
damaging documents being disclosed as the trial proceeding took place.
Had these materials been made available when originally requested , they would
have unquestionably abbreviated the litigation and saved Durkin and the Court a great deal
time money and resources in resolving the key issues
in the case , and likely avoided a
considerable amount of the injuries suffered by the Durkins.
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The City commenced its obstructive discovery practices right from the start of this
litigation. See
Paul Logan, Esquire Unsworn Declaration , Appendix (" App. ) AI- A56.
See also
A2
The improper and unwarranted withholding of documents continued through the
close of Durkin s case- in-chief.
10.
The belated productions consist of three (3) groups of documents: the first group
was produced one week before trial; the 2
group was disclosed in a conference call with the
to begin; and the 3
Court on the day trial was originally scheduled
Durkin after
group was provided to
the close of Durkin s case in chief.
11.
This led to Durkin filing a succession
of four (4)
Memoranda with the Court
s flagrant
immediately prior to picking a Jury and during trial , seeking sanctions for the City
discovery abuses. (D. L 246 261 263 and 279).
12.
Not only were the vast majority
but certain
of these
documents not subject to any proper
claim of privilege ,
documents were in fact issue and/or claim- dispositive on the
breach of contract claims made by Durkin.
13.
Addressing some of the withheld documents ,
this Court found that the City
wrongfully withheld documents " without a tenable basis of privilege or work product is evidence
of the City
14.
s bad faith conduct." See
Court Order dated September 28 2006 , page 7. (D. L 268).
The City
s discovery
practices significantly hampered Durkin
s retrieval of
relevant source documents bearing upon the central issues in the case.
15.
As it turned out , having seasonable access to the documents in question would
have completely changed the legal and factual landscape of this case in Durkin s favor from the
onset.
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16.
Below are just some examples of these documents and the effect they could have
had on this litigation I
a.
December 9, 2003 Memo from Luft to Council : Although no one can be certain
this certainly seems to be the type of document that was provided to City Council
in advance of City Council Meetings in the destroyed " briefing
packets. "
(App.
A57- A58). If Durkin had been provided with this document prior to taking the
depositions of City personnel , recollections
may have been refreshed
and
Durkin s discovery process in certain areas may well have been streamlined.
b.
January 23, 2004 Memorandum from Luft to City Council:
This is another
document that would likely have been provided to City Council in advance of
City Council Meetings. (App. A59). The January 23 , 2004 Memorandum is
evidence that City Council was in fact discussing termination of Durkin prior to
the February 2 2004 meeting where it was voted to terminate Durkin. This is in
direct conflct with the sworn testimony from Councilpersons
-
all of whom
testified that they were unaware or not informed of the intent to terminate Durkin
prior to the February 2 , 2004 Council Meeting. Of far greater significance , this
memorandum indicates that Paul Cottrell , Esquire - the City s litigation counsel -
recommended that Durkin be declared in default of this contract and that their
services be terminated. " (App. A59). Not only is this in direct contradiction of
the sworn testimony of
Assistant City Manager Carol Houck and the
I Durkin incorporates by reference its Opening Briefs in support of its Motions for Sanctions for a more
detailed review and analysis of the prejudice Durkin suffered and the attorney time , resources and money expended due to the City' s discovery violations. (0.1. 246 261 263 and 279). -4KOP:353020vI3514-
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Councilpersons who uniformly testified that Luft recommended termination
also confirms that as of that date
2 but
, the City had not provided Durkin with the
as
contractually required 7 day notice of intent to terminate. This document ,
much or more so than any other , demonstrates that the City was aware , from the
commencement of this litigation , that there was no good faith basis for contending
that the termination for default was proper.
c.
February 2, 2004 Luft' s Handwritten Notes from the Executive Session :
There is
a specific mention in Luft' s handwritten notes from the Executive Session on
February 2 ,
2004 (where it was decided
to terminate Durkin) of " $276
000
holding from Durkin.
(App. A60) This appears to be a reference to Durkin
pay.
approved pay
applications that the City refused to
Most ,
if not all
Councilpersons stated under oath that they did not know at the time of termination
that money was being withheld from Durkin. This
colorable claim of privilege could conceivable
document -
to which no
attach - was the
only document
Executive
produced by the City that was prepared during the course of the
Session , and it provided important information and insight into the dialogue that
was missing from the offcial meeting minutes from that session.
d.
March 27, 2004 Luft' s
Handwritten Notes from the Executive Session
convincing "
Luft
mentions in his notes that URS is " not
and that URS " needs more
time. " (App. A61). None of this information was reflected in the testimony of
any of the Councilpersons. This
testimony of Mr. Luft ,
information also completely undermines the
Joseph Dombrowski , the former Newark Water Director
2 As an aside , Durkin also notes that the reports attached to the January 23 , 2004 Memorandum have
never been produced by the City - even though there does not appear to be even a colorable basis for their
continued withholding.
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and others who indicated that there was no reason to question URS' design of the
Reservoir. This is another example of a document that should have been available
to Durkin during discovery, and , if produced as required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ,
would have provided considerable impeachment value to the
litigation positions taken by the City throughout this lawsuit.
e.
May 24, 2004 Memorandum from Luft to City Council : Mr. Luft testified under
oath that he was unable to recall many of the events surrounding the termination
of Durkin and the events that followed. However , in the City
s 3
and last set of
documents produced there is a memorandum from Mr. Luft to Council tendering
his resignation at the request of City Council , apparently over Reservoir issues
and the termination of Durkin. (App.
A62). Also ,
in what appears
to be Mr.
Luft' s handwriting, there is a note indicating that " I am responsible and would
like to see it through. Ifthere was any mistake, it was that I trusted (and) believed
the experts who we hired...
and so did
everyone else for the City. "
(App. A63).
It stretches the bounds of logic to believe that events that were unsettling enough
to cause Mr. Luft to draft his resignation could be forgotten by the time of his
deposition just a year later.
3 The City was able to capitalize upon this information
void" by allowing witness after witness to retreat behind a professed lack of
recollection , all of which caused Durkin to significant expend additional time and
resources searching for information that should have been produced in the normal
course of discovery.
3 It is also hard to believe that during Luft's approximately eight (8) hour deposition he did not reveal even one (I) time that he had tendered his resignation on May 27 , 2004 - or more importantly - that he
felt that he was responsible for what happened.
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17.
Not having these documents - and others -
produced as
required by the discovery
rules caused Durkin and its counsel to expend copious amounts of time , money and resources
searching for answers that lay within the body of these materials.
The City Needlesslv Extended and Complicated This Litieation
18.
The most egregious discovery violations committed
by the
City were the
withholding of documents - without any legal basis - that were issue and claim- dispositive.
19.
What these documents reveal is an acute knowledge and awareness on the part of
the City and its attorneys (both its litigation attorneys and its solicitor) of the legal infirmities in
the steps taken to terminate Durkin s contract.
20.
That is , the City knew , certainly by the time Durkin filed its lawsuit , that the City
had terminated Durkin without providing the requisite seven (7) days ' notice.
21.
Durkin sought a prompt resolution to its dispute with the City by filing a Motion
for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction on April 7 , 2004. (D. L 6).
22.
This is precisely when the City began its pattern
of calculated denials , despite
knowing that it had failed to take the contractually required steps to properly terminate Durkin
contract.
23.
This is confirmed by the January 20 , 2004 memorandum
4 from litigation counsel
Vicky Petrone to Assistant City Administrator Carol Houck,
copying third party Jil
Voeller of
URS. (App. A 72 and Trial Exhibit DUR- 31),
5 and the memorandum generated 3 days later by
4 The January 20 , 2004 Memorandum indicates: " Please find the following report from the Surety and the
independent engineer. I direct your attention to Paragraph 3 of the letter from the Surety, in which she states that the Surety is under no obligation to take action. This is correct. The Surety' s obligation arises after 1) the Surety is notified regarding a default and 2) after meeting with the Surety, declaring a default and terminating the contract. You satisfied step 1 in November. We have not formally taken Step 2 since we were waiting for this report. On Thursday we can discuss this option. " (App. A 72). 5 The January 20 , 2004 Memorandum was produced to Durkin on September 18 , 2006 - just days before
Durkin picked a Jury.
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Carl Luft to City Council announcing that Mr. Cottrell had recommended taking steps to declare
Durkin in default and terminate the contract.
24.
Rather than acknowledge it had erred in terminating Durkin s contract , the City
led Durkin and this Cour on a two year odyssey of obfuscation and delay, with Durkin and its
surety spending hundreds of thousands of dollars pursing the elusive alleged " notice
and " notice of termination.
25.
of default"
The Court recognized this in its September 28 , 2006 Order , in which it found that
the City did not have a basis to withhold the document and stated that:
Ms. Petrone s representations to her client and URS , are contrary to the City pleadings , arguments and requests of the court. Indeed , juxtaposing Ms. Petrone s communication prior to litigation with the City s representations during litigation brings the City dangerously close to a Rule 11 violation. (Citations omitted). In Ms. Petrone s own words , as of January 20 , 2004 , the City had not
formally taken the
step of declaring Durkin in default
and terminating the
contract. This contradicts statements and
argument made by the City suggesting
otherwise.
See
Court Order dated September 28 2006 , pages 7- 8. (D. L 268).
26.
Had these memoranda been disclosed in candor to Durkin and to the Court , this
case could-and should-have ended shortly after its inception.
The
City' Campaien to Conceal Information
27.
What became equally clear with each successive disclosure of documents near the
inception of trial was that the City had a conscious intent to prolong the litigation to the point
where Durkin lacked the financial wherewithal to continue.
28.
A review of selected documents demonstrates that the City s intent was both long-
standing and far-reaching.
29.
It appears that as early as September 2003 , the City believed that Durkin was in
financial trouble. One (1) day after Durkin provided notice of probable errors in the Contract
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documents (Trial Exhibit DUR- 52), as it was required to do under the Contract , (Trial Exhibit
DUR- 3) Ms. Houck , Mr. Dombrowski , Mark Prouty and Jil Voeller from URS had a telephone
conversation during which Ms. Houck took notes. (App. A64- A66 and Trial Exhibit DUR- 61).
These notes reflect a disturbing reaction to Durkin s contractually mandated notification , to wit:
Mark P. " Got a feeling they (Durkin) are running out of$. "*Consider/ask solicitor create letter that copies bonding company. Doesn t know if it's Durkin who wil be finishing this job. Id.
30.
Ms. Houck' s notes , which appear to be simply her contemporaneous notes of this
telephone call with URS , were not disclosed during discovery.
31.
The strategies of the City during litigation included a concerted effort to avoid
public debate and disclosure of potentially adverse information.
32.
Roger Akin , Esquire , the City Solicitor , expressly stated to
initial litigation
counsel for URS that City Council would be strongly encouraged
not to ask any
questions of
URS regarding the reservoir design in the public session or take questions from the floor , but
rather all such questions should be reserved for an Executive Session out of the hearing of the
public - and Durkin. (App. A67- A68).
33.
This structured " one-sided" presentation was designed to promote the interests of
the City at the expense of Durkin , and was tantamount to a " gag order
34.
Perhaps the clearest example of the City s calculated approach to impoverish
Durkin is found in Mr. Akin s May 27 , 2004 memorandum to City Council. (App. A69- A71 and
Trial Exhibit DUR- 37).
35.
In that memorandum , Akin advises City Council that " (w)e perceived that Durkin
would like early resolution of the wrongful termination question. Hence , some delay in getting
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that resolution may (or may not) cause Durkin to be more amendable
mediation of certain issues.
36.
to a settlement or a
(App. A69- A71).
The City s unjustifiable means of conducting this litigation were at least parially
in that Durkin had to borrow milions of
successful ,
dollars in order to sustain itself to the
conclusion oftrial , which includes well in excess of $1 milion in legal fees.
Discoverv was Voluminous and Construction and Desien Details Were Complex
37. 38.
Discovery in this matter was extensive. (App. A6- A7 ~32- 46.
Approximately twenty-one (21) baner s boxes of documents
were produced -
amounting to over 50 000 pages of documents , as well as thousands of photographs and several
sets of construction drawings. (App. A6 ~33.
39.
Over twenty (20) individuals were deposed. (App. A6 ~38. ) Some of these
Id.
individuals were deposed over multiple days.
40.
In addition ,
numerous site visits to the Reservoir needed to be conducted during
the various stages of construction and filling.
41.
Not only was the volume of documents , drawings and photographs extensive , the
construction and design issues were extremely complex. (App. A6- A 7 ~32- 46.
42.
The complexity of the case is also demonstrated by the fact that there were seven
the completion of construction by two (2) contractors , and multiple
(7) engineering experts ,
types of testing, including soil testing and analysis and stability calculations. (App. A6 ~37.
Motion Practice and Pre- Trial Submissions were Extensive
43.
During the course of the litigation , Durkin fied a Motion for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction (D. L 5) and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D. L 26).
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44.
Durkin filed eight (8) Motions in Limine (D. L
175 ,
178 ,
181 ,
184 , 190 ,
193 ,
196
and 205), responded to ten (10) Motions in Limine filed by parties in this matter (D. L
214 215 216 217 218 , 219 ,
220 and 223), fied a Motion to Strike the City
208 211
s Motions in
234 , 235
Limine (D. L 203), filed five (5) Reply Briefs regarding Motions in Limine (D. L
233 ,
236 and 237), and fied four (4) Motions or supplemental briefs for sanctions against the City for
discovery abuses (D. L
246 261
263 and 279). Durkin
also filed a Motion to Preclude the City
from offering additional affrmative defenses (D. L 271) and an Answering Brief in Opposition to
the City s Motion for Directed Verdict. (D.!. 280).
45.
Pre- trial submissions
prepared by Durkin in
this matter were extensive.
For
example , Durkin drafted a Statement of Uncontested Facts with over 300 facts proposed as
uncontested (including citations in the record) and an Exhibit List with over 900 proposed trial
exhibits (which ultimately Durkin was able to streamline after Motions in Limine were decided
to just over sixty (60) exhibits for trial).
Durkin is Entitled to Collect Attornevs ' Fees Under Section 42 U.
46.
c. ~1988
Durkin is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys ' fees , post judgment interest
C. 91988 because it is a prevailing party.
and costs under 42 U.
47.
Durkin s attorneys ' fees may be charged to the City if the hours were " reasonably
Hensley,
expended on the litigation.
48.
461 U. S. at 433.
s attorney
The calculation of Durkin
s fees begins with the computation of a
lodestar " representing the product of the reasonable number of hours spent on the case times a
reasonable hourly rate.
Id. See also Lindy Bros.
487 F.2d 161
Builders, Inc. of Phila.
v.
Amer. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.
167- 68
(3d Cir. 1973).
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49.
The Supreme
Court and
the Third Circuit repeatedly recogmze
civil rights action.
a strong
presumption that the lodestar constitutes a reasonable fee in a
505 U. S.
v.
City of
Burlington
v.
Dague,
at 560- 64;
Pa.
v.
Del. Valley Citizens '
Council for Clean Air, 478
S. 546
565 (1986);
Blum
Stenson
465 U. S. 886
896 (1984);
Student Pub. Interest Research
General Instrument
Group ofNJ
Corp. of Del.
, Inc.
v.
AT&T Bell Lab 842 F. 2d
Mfg., Inc.,
1436 ,
1453 (3d Cir. 1988);
v.
Nu- Tek Electronics
197 F. 3d 83 , 91 (3d Cir. 1999).
50.
Timesheets setting forth the services rendered in this matter , for which
compensation is sought , are found in the Appendix.
51.
All of the attorneys
who worked on this litigation were well- qualified ,
diligent
attorneys. (App. AII- AI4
52.
~72- 81.)
The attorneys spent a reasonable and appropriate amount of time on the various
especially considering that the case involved the loss
tasks as referenced in the timesheets ,
millions of dollars and the total destruction of Durkin s professional business.
53.
The Declaration of Paul A. Logan , Esquire details that total lodestar time for
total lodestar
litigation case assessment , development and evaluation (App. A14- A15 ~82- 89);
time for pre-
trial pleadings and motions (App. A15- A16 ~90- 96);
total lodestar time for
discovery (App. A16 ~97- 103); total lodestar time for trial and trial preparation (App. A17
~ 107 - 111); and total lodestar time for business transactions (App. A 16- A 17 ~ 104- 106).
54.
In the exercise of biling judgment , counsel has eliminated 38. 5
hours of attorney
time. App. A14 ~80.
55.
All of the time spent by Durkin s attorneys surrounded a common nucleus of
inter alia,
operative facts for all counts in the Complaint
the termination of Durkin for default
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and the City
s subsequent actions which led to the
deprivation of Durkin s civil rights and
resulting damages.
56.
All of the claims raised ,
investigated and litigated by Durkin were closely, and
indeed inextricably related , and accordingly all of the attorney time is reimbursable under 42
C. 91988. See Hensley,
461 U. S.
at 435 (" where a plaintiff obtained excellent results , his
attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee " and that " the fee award should not be reduced
simply because plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit."
Wiliams v. Thomas,
See also
692 F.2d 1032 ,
1036 (5
Cir. 1982) (" A
party prevailing on a substantial
claim that is pendent to a civil rights claim is entitled to a recovery of attorney s fees when the
civil rights claim and the pendent claim arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.
57.
The hours spent by counsel were incurred reasonably
in a hard fought ,
highly
complicated matter where the City s blatant disregard for its discovery obligations created a
difficult course oflitigation. (App. AI- A56.
58.
In determining the " reasonableness " of an attorney fee the most critical factor is
Hensley,
the degree of success obtained.
59.
461 U. S. at 436.
of success evidenced by
Certainly, with the level
Jury Award of
$36 667 573.
60. 61.
, Durkin s attorneys ' fees should be viewed as " reasonable
To recover attorneys ' fees under 42 U.S. C. 91988 , the fees must be market rates.
The calculation of reasonable fees under 42 U. C. 91988 is determined by the
Blum v. Stenson,
prevailing market rates in the relevant community.
62.
465 U. S. 886
895 (1984).
Lead Counsel Paul A. Logan , Esquire s biling rate for this file is $250 per hour
App. (A12 ~72.
6 Although as of January
1 2005 , Messrs. Logan and Bolger s hourly rates for similar construction litigation cases , due to the financial exigencies facing the Durkins , the rates on this fie were not increased. has been $275 per hour
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63.
Mr. Logan is familiar with rates charged in many areas ,
Id.
especially in the
Philadelphia and Wilmington areas.
64.
In his opinion , an hourly rate of $250 per hour for an attorney of his reputation
Id.
skil and experience is not in excess of the usual and customary rates for similar attorneys.
65.
Sherry Ruggiero Fallon , Esquire has also testified that Mr. Logan s hourly rate of
$250 per hour is well within the range of rates prevailing in the community for representation
before the District Court of Delaware. (App. A75 ~ 13.
66.
David T. Bolger ,
Esquire and Marsha E. Flora , Esquire also participated in this
litigation.
67.
The rates for Mr. Bolger and Ms. Flora are $250 per hour and $200 per hour
respectively. (App. AI2- A13~74 and 76.
68.
Mr. Logan is familiar with charged in many areas , especially in the Philadelphia
and Wilmington areas for attorneys having the experience exhibited by Mr. Bolger and Ms.
Flora.
Id.
69.
In his opinion , hourly rates of $250 per hour and $200 per hour for Mr. Bolger
respectively, for attorneys of their reputation , skil and experience are not in
and Ms. Flora ,
excess of the usual and customar rates for similar attorneys.
70.
Id.
and
Sherry Ruggiero Fallon , Esquire has also testified the rates for Mr. Bolger
Ms. Flora are well within the range of rates prevailing in the community for representation
before the District Court of Delaware for attorneys of their experience. (App. A75- A76 ~ 13 and
~ 17.
71.
From time to time ,
associate level attorneys provided services on the fie.
(App.
A13 ~77- 78.
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72.
The rates for the associates were either $150
Id.
per hour or $175 per hour
depending on the associate s level of skil and experience.
73.
Mr. Logan is familiar with rates charged for associates in many areas , especially
Id.
in the Philadelphia and Wilmington areas.
74.
In his opinion , hourly rates of $150 per hour or $175 per hour for associate level
attorneys with comparable levels of reputation , skil and experience are not in excess of the usual
and customary rates for similar attorneys.
Id.
75.
Additionally, as the tasks permitted , paralegals conducted work on the file. (App.
A13~79.
76. 77.
The rate charged for the paralegals was $60 per hour.
Id.
Mr. Logan is familiar with rates charged for paralegals in many areas , especially
Id.
in the Philadelphia and Wilmington areas.
78.
In his opinion ,
an hourly rate of $60 per hour for paralegal
Id.
services is not in
excess of the usual and customary rates.
79.
Successful representation of Durkin in
this complex construction case, where
wrongful termination was alleged , and where there were allegations of violation of Durkin s civil
rights , required a high degree of competence and dedication ,
as well as a
greater time
commitment than would be required ofless complex areas oflaw.
80.
(App.
A75 ~ 9.
The rates charged to Durkin for this successful
91988.
representation are reasonable
market rates and should be reimbursed under 42 U.S. C.
81.
Time spent by Durkins ' attorneys in preparing and presenting a petition for
c. 91988.
counsel fees is also recoverable under 42 U.S.
Planned Parenthood of Central New
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Jersey
v.
Attorney General of State of New Jersey,
(3d Cir. 1979).
297 F. 3d 253 , 268 (3d Cir. 2002);
Bagby
Beal,
606 F. 2d 411 , 415- 16
82.
Time spent defending the verdict also will be compensable as simply part of the
overall prosecution of the case.
83.
Durkin respectfully requests that it be awarded its attorneys ' fees and costs
any
incurred in preparing this Motion and
other fees and costs
incurred in the post- trial
proceedings. After any briefing on the present issues and other post trial matters are concluded,
Durkin wil supplemental
its Motion in this regard to complete the record with time and costs
incur and provide backup documentation as necessary.
84.
its discovery
As discussed at length in Dukrin s Opening Brief, the City s blatant disregard for
obligations caused Durkin to expend needless monies on attorneys '
fees
unnecessarily drew out this litigation and wasted judicial resources.
An Enhancement Multiplier for Delav is Appropriate
85.
From the City s continued bad faith discovery practices - which continued even
after the close of Durkin s case in chief - it appears that the City was motivated to drive Durkin
to financial destitution , and in the process cause it to accumulate unnecessary attorneys ' fees.
86.
augment the lodestar.
Under these circumstances , an enhancement multiplier for delay is appropriate to
See e. g.
Pa. v.
Del. Valley Citizens '
Council for Clean Air
478 U.S. 546
(1986) (when there is specific evidence demonstrating that any factor relied on is not subsumed
in the lodestar , a Court may adjust the fee).
87.
Durkin suggests that the Court look to 6 Del. C. 92301 and apply a multiplier of
5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate , including any surcharge as of the time from which
interest is due " to the lodestar. 6 Del. C. 92301.
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88.
Durkin further suggests that the time period " when the interest was due "
as set
forth in 6 Del. C. 92301 should be April 7 , 2004 , the date Durkin filed its Motion for Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction , seeking an early resolution of this matter. (D. L 6).
v.
Compare Amico
(D. Del. 1987)
New Castle County, et al.
654 F. Supp. 982 , 1987 U. S.
Dist. LEXIS 1020
(Court allowed a percentage
multiplier to account for the delay in payment based on
an
appropriate rate - the rate assessed in Delaware for pre-judgment interest).
Durkin is Entitled to Reimbursement for Out of Pocket Litieation Costs
89.
course... "
Under Rule 54(d)(I) Durkin , as the prevailing party, is entitled to " costs...
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
as of
90.
Section 1988 also has been construed to authorize the recovery of a broad range
Costs.
of litigation expenses beyond statutory costs proper to a Bil of
Lightolier Inc. 50 F. 3d
91.
1204
See e. g.
Abrams
1225 (3d Cir. 1995).
are for trial exhibits , deposition transcripts , photocopying,
These expenses
electronic research and other items for the case
92.
Durkin is seeking reimbursement for out of pocket expenses in the amount of
$52 943.41.
93.
A report summarizing these costs is attached to the Appendix. (App. A666-
A714.
Durkin is Entitled to Post- Judement Interest
94.
Eaves v.
Durkin is also entitled to post-judgment interest on the award of attorneys '
239 F3d 527
fees.
County of Cape May,
542 2001 U. S. App. LEXIS 938 (3d Cir. 2001).
WHEREFORE ,
for the reasons set
forth above and in Plaintiff Donald M. Durkin
Contracting, Inc.'s Motion for Attorneys ' Fees , Costs and Post- Judgment Interest pursuant to 42
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C. 91988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 ,
Plaintiff
Donald M. Durkin Contracting,
Inc. respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion for Attorneys ' Fees , Costs and PostJudgment Interest pursuant to 42 U.S. C. 91988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54 along
with granting an enhancement multiplier to the lodestar for delay.
leave to re- fie
Durkin respectfully requests
a supplemental Motion with appropriate backup documentation as necessary to
reflect all fees and costs incurred in the post- trial activities ofthis case.
POWELL , TRACHTMAN , LOGAN, CARRE & LOMBARDO, P.
/s/ Paul A. Logan Paul A. Logan Delaware Supreme Court ID #3339 475 Allendale Road , Suite 200 King of Prussia, P A 19406 Telephone: 610- 354- 9700 Telefacsimile: 610- 354- 9760
By:
Attorneys for Plaintif and Third Party
Defendant Donald M Durkin Contracting
Dated: October 25
2006
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