Free Order on Motion to Suppress - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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WO

IN THE UNITED S TATES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DIS TRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Henry Watkins,

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Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. CR 03-1167-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Henry Watkins' M otion to Suppress.

(D kt .

The G overnment filed a response opposing the motion (dkt. 1048), to which

Defendant filed a reply (dkt. 1131). For the reasons s et fort h herein, Defendant's motion will be denied. BACKGROUND On July 8, 2003, at approximat ely 5:20 a.m., officers with the Oro Valley Police Department's SWAT team entered Defendant's home at 1610 South Country Club Road, in Tucson. T he officers were in possession of a federal warrant for Defendant's arrest.

Defendant contends that officers violated the "knock-and-announce" provis ions of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 when they executed the warrant. (Dkt. 989.) In response, the Government argues that the Court need not addres s t he legality

of the officers' actions in entering the house because the exclusionary rule does not ap p ly to the statement Defendant made aft er being taken into custody pursuant to a valid arrest

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warrant . (D kt . 1048 at 7­8.) In his reply, Defendant interprets the Government's response as a concession that a violation of § 3109 did occur and withdraws his initial request for an evidentiary hearing on the knock-and-announce issue. (Dkt. 1131 at 5.) ANALYS IS Both § 3109 and the Fourth Amendment require that police officers entering a dwelling pursuant to a warrant announce their purpose and authority and either wait a reasonable amount of time or be refused admittance before forcibly entering the residence. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933-35 (1995); United States v. Chavez-M iranda, 306 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). If officers violate the knock-and-announce statute, evidence

seized during the search must be suppressed. See United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1985). According to the Government, officers approached Defendant 's door at 5:20 a.m., knocked and announced their presence, waited ap p roximately 10 seconds, and then forced entry into the home, deploying a diversionary device as t hey did so. (Dkt. 1048 at 7­8.) Defendant was arrested in a back bedroom without incident. Government does not argue that the manner of entry (Id. at 8.) While the exigent

was justified by

circumstances, it asserts that prior to the execution of the warrant officers had been informed that Defendant was a suspected methamphetamine addict and was known to p os s es s weapons. (Id. at 7.) Following his arrest and while he was still in the house,

D efendant w as advised of his Miranda rights and was interviewed by an ATF agent. Defendant seeks to suppress his statements made during the interview. Defendant's version of events differs from the Government's. He asserts that the

officers "did not knock and announce prior to their entry." He claims that he was as leep , and that when the officers "broke into his home" he "jumped out of bed to investigate." (Dkt. 989 at 2.) Immediately upon forcing entry into the residence, he asserts, the officers (Id.) The device exploded outside Defendant's

t os s ed a stun grenade into the hallway.

bedroom door, knocking him onto his bed and leaving him temporarily deaf and

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disoriented.

(Id.)

Defendant does not dispute the Government's assertion that he was

arrested in his bedroom without incident, nor that he was later advised of his Miranda rights and interviewed in the home by an ATF agent. Significantly , D efendant does not

cont end t hat the interview was involuntary, coerced, or that he was impaired during the interview by the officers' manner of entering the house or their use of the stun grenade. "The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie cas e w hen asserting a § 3109 claim." United States v. Schenk, 983 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing DiCesare, 765 F.2d at 896)). A defendant seeking an evidentiary hearing must make an offer of proof "`sufficiently definite, specific, det ailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question.'" DiCesare, 765 F.2d at 895 (quoting United States v. Ledesma, 499 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1974)). The parties cite no evidence to s up p ort their respective versions of the events, and Defendant no longer seeks an evidentiary hearing. The Government argues, in effect, that

the motion to suppress must be denied even if the ent ry violated § 3109. Thus, the Court will as s ume, without deciding, that the entry violated the knock-and-announce rule and was therefore illegal.1 The Seventh Circuit addressed a very similar situation in United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2000). Officers executing an arrest warrant " inappropriately" rammed

1

Defendant s eeks suppression not only of his statement to the ATF agent, but also of any other evidence seized, observed, or heard while officers were in his home. (Dkt. 1131.) The Government responds by stating that "no items of evidence w ere seized," but does not address what might have been observed or heard (out s ide of t he Miranda interview ). (D kt. 1048 at 3.) Because the Government has based its argument on a legal issue, and because Defendant has not presented factual material that would justify an evidentiary hearing (and, in fact, has withdrawn his request for an evidentiary hearing), t he Court will not address items of evidence other than Defendant's statement. The Court notes, however, that if the entry was illegal, evidence seized or observed by officers while in Defendant's home (as opposed to Defendant's stat ement after he was placed under arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant) would likely be s up p res s ed as fruit of the illegal entry. DiCesare, 765 F.2d at 895. -3-

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open the door and deployed a stun grenade before arresting the defendant. his home, the defendant gave a statement after receiving a Miranda warning.

While still in Id. at 839.

Noting that "the exclusionary rule depends on causation" and that t he defendant did not es t ablish a "link between the manner of the entry and the statement," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the statement need not be suppressed because it occurred while the defendant was in "lawful custody." Id. (emphasis in original). In United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1336­37 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held that s t at ements made by a defendant to government agents while they were executing a search warrant did not require suppression as fruit of an illegal search. Although the

warrant was illegal because it was overbroad, the defendant's statement w as not the p roduct of that illegality. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that suppression was not

required because "the agents had a legitimate, court authorized reason for being present at the time of questioning." Id. at 1337. Both of these cases relied on New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990). In H arris, officers illegally entered the defendant's home where they arrested him on the basis of probable cause that arose before the entry. Later, after he had been taken to a police The

station, the defendant gave a statement that he subsequently s ought to suppress.

Supreme Court declined to hold that the statement must be suppres s ed because it followed an illegal entry into the defendant's home. The Court noted that it has not adopted "a per se or `but for' rule t hat would make inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or livewitness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest." Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other circuits have also relied on Harris and reached similar conclusions. In United States v. Jones, 41 Fed.A p p x. 178 (10th Cir. 2002), for example, the Tenth Circuit held that suppression of the defendant's post-arrest confession was not required despite a violation of § 3109 because the defendant " w as arres t ed pursuant to a federal arrest warrant and

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p robable caus e for his arrest [was] not challenged." Id. at 181. The court explained that the confession was not the product of the illegalit y because the defendant would have been arrested even if the officers had not violated § 3109. Id. In his reply , D efendant argues that Harris "turned upon the fact that the defendant was questioned at the p olice s t at ion and not in his home." (Dkt. 1131 at 3.) Defendant argues that because his statement was made while being questioned in his home, the holding in Harris requires that the statement be suppressed. The Court does not agree. The s t at ement in Harris was admissible because "Harris was in legal custody " w hen t he s tatement was given. 495 U.S. at 20. Here, too, Defendant was in legal custody when his statement was given. Alt hough t he statement was taken in his hous e, Defendant does not contend that the warrant under which he was arrested w as invalid, that he was not formally placed under arrest before the statement was made, that he w as denied a Miranda warning, or that the statement was otherwise coerced or involuntary. Defendant's statement was made while he was under arrest pursuant to a Although it might be true that the

valid arrest w arrant supported by probable cause.

statement " came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal [entry]," that fact has been rejected by t he Supreme Court as a basis for suppressing the statement. Id. at 17. Thus, even though evidence obt ained solely as a result of the illegal entry must be suppressed (such as physical evidence seized from the home or matters observed by the officers up on entry), the same cannot be said of a statement given after Defendant had been arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Because Defendant does not assert that t he arres t itself was unlawful or that his statement was involuntary or otherwise the product of the manner in which officers entered his residence, no grounds exist to suppress the statement. His statement did not arise from the way in which the officers entered ­ t he alleged § 3109 violation ­ but from his arrest pursuant to the warrant. The statement therefore is not subject to the exclusionary rule.

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Watkins' M otion to Suppress (Dkt. 989) is denied. DATED this 3rd day of February, 2006.

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