Free Order on Motion in Limine - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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Case 2:03-cv-02077-EHC Document 57 Filed 07/19/2005 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Gant and Betty Gant, husband and ) ) wife, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) vs. ) ) Roger Vanderpool, Sheriff of Pinal ) County; Pinal County, a political ) ) subdivision; et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

No. CIV 03-2077-PHX-EHC ORDER

Before the Court are five motions which are fully briefed. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Defendants' Cross-Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend Complaint [Dk. 50]. Defendants responded and filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss [Dk. 51]. Plaintiffs replied to the Motion to Amend and responded to the Motion to Dismiss [Dk. 55]. Defendants replied to the Motion to Dismiss [Dk. 56]. The Court, in its Order of February 15, 2005, gave Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint to add a hostile work environment claim [Dk. 49]. Plaintiffs' proposed First Amended Complaint (PFAC) alleges a claim for hostile work environment [Dk. 50, Exh. A].

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Defendants argue that the discrete discriminatory acts alleged in the proposed First Amended Complaint are, without more, insufficient to allege a hostile work environment claim, because Plaintiffs have arguably not alleged that Plaintiff Robert Gant ("Gant") was personally subjected to discriminatory verbal or physical conduct. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff "was not required to allege in its complaint the evidentiary facts in support of its theory of recovery"). Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendants "discredit[ed] [Gant's] character, improperly disciplin[ed] [Gant], allow[ed] several employees to utter racial epithets and slurs without appropriate corrective action, and otherwise ma[de] [Gant's] working conditions difficult" are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim. [PFAC ¶43]. Several of the cases that Defendants cite are irrelevant. The appellate courts in those cases were reviewing trial courts' summary judgment rulings following the development of the factual record. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061 (2002), Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2003), Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider its Order of February 15, 2005 that equitably tolled the time limits for filing suit regarding Gant's first denial of promotion to Lieutenant in June 2001 and his termination in February 2002 [Dk. 49]. For the reasons stated in that Order, the Court declines to reconsider this issue. Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a). The Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to file the First Amended Complaint. /// /// /// Defendants' Motion to Reconsider -2Case 2:03-cv-02077-EHC Document 57 Filed 07/19/2005 Page 2 of 4

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Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider [Dk. 52] portions of the Court's February 15, 2005 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs responded [Dk. 54]. "Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Defendants argue that the Court clearly erred in deeming events occurring before August 9, 2002 as having been alleged in the Complaint. Under the heading "Facts Common to All Causes of Action," the Complaint alleges that Gant filed suit against Defendants in state court on June 14, 2002, alleging discrimination. Complaint, ¶ 11; PFAC ¶11. The parties reached a settlement "of all claims and charges" on August 9, 2002. Complaint, ¶ 12; PFAC ¶12. Defendants allegedly promised Gant that he would be re-assigned to Region Three of the Pinal County Sheriff's Office. Complaint, ¶ 13; PFAC ¶13. This promise was allegedly "the material part of the basis and motivation for Mr. Gant [to execute] the Settlement Agreement." Id. Gant was instead assigned to Region One, allegedly "reporting to the same Lieutenant who had openly participated in the discriminatory conduct . . . that had formed the basis, in part, for . . . [the state court case.]" Complaint, ¶ 15; PFAC ¶15. "Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim." Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The allegations in the Complaint were sufficient under Rule 8 to put Defendants on notice that events preceding the alleged violation of the Settlement Agreement of August 9, 2002 were at issue in this case. Defendants argue that equitable tolling should not apply to the claims in the state court case because Gant was not diligent in prosecuting that case. After filing in state court on June 14, 2002, Gant entered into the Settlement Agreement with Defendants on August 9, 2002. Part of the basis of the federal suit is that Defendants allegedly violated -3Case 2:03-cv-02077-EHC Document 57 Filed 07/19/2005 Page 3 of 4

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this Agreement. Equitable tolling was therefore properly applied to the claims that formed part of the allegedly violated Agreement. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not established any material facts. The file, including Defendants' Statement of Facts [Dk. 35], contains sufficient evidence to persuade the Court that the case should proceed to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986) (district court may deny summary judgment where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial). Defendants' Motions in Limine Defendants filed Motions in Limine regarding damages [Dk. 42] and discrimination alleged by Pinal County employees besides Gant [Dk. 43]. Plaintiffs did not respond. The Court will address evidentiary matters at the time of trial. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint [Dk. 50]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dk. 51]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Defendants' Motion to Reconsider [Dk. 52]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Defendants' Motions in Limine [Dk. 42, 43] without prejudice to reurging at the time of trial. DATED this 18th day of July, 2005.

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