Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry Northcross Patterson, Plaintiff, vs. Dora Schriro, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

No. CV 03-2178-PHX-PGR (MHB) ORDER

Plaintiff bought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officials (Doc. #15). The only remaining Defendant is Amanda Martinez, a member of the ADC Banking Staff (id. at 2B).1 Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #73), which the parties have fully briefed (Doc. ##7980). The Court will deny Defendant's motion without prejudice. The Court will also direct ADC to submit financial records showing Plaintiff's payments toward the filing fee in this action. I. Background Plaintiff's claim arose during his confinement at the ADC facility in Florence in December 2003-January 2004 (Doc. #15 at 1). The sole remaining claim in his seven-count Upon screening, the Court dismissed Moses, Miller, Rodriguez, Stuart, Stackwisch, Marlatte, Fischer, Greely, Schmidt, Allen, Dasch, Roberts, Buck, Lawrence, Whitley, Marshall, Lamb, Gibson, Bolt, Queen, Stewart, Gordon, Nelson, Coffey, Walker, Schmeir, McConnell, and Schriro as Defendants (Doc. #16).
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First Amended Complaint is Count VI, which relates to Plaintiff's inmate trust account (id. at 6D).2 Plaintiff alleged that when he received $100 in the mail on Dec. 11, 2003, Defendant deducted funds for legal fees and expenses and left Plaintiff with a balance of just $0.32 (id.). On Dec. 26, Plaintiff received another $100 from which the ADC Banking Staff deducted approximately $70 for legal expenses (id.). On Jan. 2, 2004, Plaintiff was denied indigent legal supplies due to the "lack of disbursement form," although the form was attached to his request (id.). Then, on Jan. 9, he received a printout indicating that he had a spendable balance of $31.26; yet, when he attempted to place orders at the store, he was told that his account was overdrawn from December 27 to January 25 (id.). Plaintiff claimed that deductions from his account, often without notification or explanation, included "illegal double dips" and improper deductions from re-deposited money that had been refunded to him (id.). He further claimed the these deductions violated his right to speech through use of the mail because he was unable to meet his mailing needs (id.). Plaintiff's claim in Count VI was dismissed on the grounds that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. #49). Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit (Doc. #51), which reversed and remanded the claim to the district court (Doc. #56). Defendant moved again to dismiss Count VI for failure to exhaust and failure to state a claim (Doc. #59). The Court denied Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #65), and Defendant filed her Answer (Doc. #66). A Scheduling Order was issued, and discovery commenced (Doc. #67). Defendant then moved for summary judgment on the ground that she was not involved in making deductions from Plaintiff's account and therefore cannot be liable for any constitutional violation (Doc. #73). She further argued that even assuming that Plaintiff was unable to send mail due to insufficient funds in his account, he failed to exhaust remedies for that inability to send mail (id. at 4). Defendant also contended that Plaintiff's claim fails

The Court dismissed Counts I-V on screening (Doc. #16). Count VII was dismissed in part on screening (id.), and then in its entirety on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Screening Order (Doc. #49). The dismissal of Count VII was upheld by the Ninth Circuit (Doc. #56)
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because there existed an adequate post-deprivation remedy under state law (id. at 5). Finally, Defendant argued that even assuming that Plaintiff was denied the ability to send non-legal mail due to insufficient funds in his account, there existed legitimate penological reasons for that denial (id. at 5-6). In support of her motion, Defendant submitted a separate Statement of Facts (Doc. #74), the affidavit of Lynda Wade, Inmate Trust Account Unit Manager (id., Ex. A, Wade Aff. ¶ 1), a copy of Plaintiff's account statement from Dec. 5, 2003 to Jan. 30, 2004 (id., Attach. 1), the affidavit of Defendant (id., Ex. B, Def. Aff.), and a copy of Department Order (DO) 905--the Inmate Banking/Money System policy (id., Attach. 1). The Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the motion (Doc. #76).3 In his response, Plaintiff disputed many of Defendant's and Wade's assertions about (1) inmate trust accounts, (2) what he was able to purchase at the store, and (3) the handling of his account (Doc. #79 at 1-3). He contended that contrary to their claims, when his account balance showed insufficient funds, he was denied legal materials at the store as well as indigent supplies (id. at 3-4, 6-7, 9). And he argued that deductions from his account violated ADC's own policy (id. at 10-11). He submitted numerous exhibits to support his opposition: a copy of his personal account balance worksheet (id., Ex. 2); a copy of his inmate bank account as provided by ADC (id., Exs. 3-5); and copies of Inmate Request for Withdrawal forms (id., Exs. 6-17, 19). In reply, Defendant reasserted that she was not involved in making deductions, that Plaintiff did not exhaust his claim or pursue his post-deprivation remedies, and that there were legitimate reasons for the ADC deductions from Plaintiff's account (Doc. #80). II. Claims at Issue Plaintiff's allegations about the ADC accounting system combined with the procedural posture of this case, have resulted in a complex record. Normally, at the summary judgment stage, the case has developed and the claims and issues have been refined. That has not happened here. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff listed the "First

Amendment right to speech via use of the mails" as the constitutional right that Defendant
3

Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).
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violated (Doc. #15 at 6D), and in her summary judgment motion, Defendant identified Plaintiff's claim as an alleged violation of his "First Amendment right to communicate with his friends and family" (Doc. # 73 at 2). The Court finds that neither of these brief constructions is a complete description of the claims at issue in this case. Under Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff's complaint does not have to identify the statutory or constitutional source of his claim. 518 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff's complaint, which cited to only the First and Fourteenth Amendments, also stated a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)). The Court explained that liberal notice pleading required courts to look at the facts alleged to determine the claims at issue. Id. at 1158. Particularly when the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court is "required to `afford [him] the benefit of any doubt' in ascertaining what claims he `raised in his complaint and argued to the district court.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 899 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001)). Also, courts are to consider more specific allegations set forth in later filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (pro se petitioner "bolstered his claim by making more specific allegations . . . in later filings"); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 & n. 9 (1989) ("[r]esponsive pleadings . . . may be necessary for a pro se plaintiff to clarify his legal theories"). Plaintiff's claims are therefore based on the factual allegations set forth in his First Amended Complaint and later clarified in his responsive pleadings. As noted by the parties, Plaintiff's allegations include a claim under the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that deductions from his account left him with $0.32, an insufficient amount for him to purchase a stamp; thus, he claims that ADC prevented him from meeting his "mailing needs" in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. #15 at 6D). Prisoners have a constitutional right to send and receive mail, subject to reasonable limitations. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). If a prison regulation impinges on an inmate's right to send mail, it will be valid only if that regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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Plaintiff's allegations also raise a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Prisoners have a property interest in their inmate accounts. Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (inmates have a protected property interest in funds received from outside sources); see also Reynolds. v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3rd Cir. 1997) (because prisoners have a property interest in funds held in inmate trust accounts, they "are entitled to due process with respect to any deprivation of this money"). The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause therefore protects inmates from unauthorized deductions from their inmate accounts. See Wright, 219 F.3d at 913. The Court also notes that although an inmate is subject to simultaneous deductions of court filing fees when he has multiple suits, full depletion of an inmate's account does not comport with the intent of the statute allowing filing-fee deductions. Samonte v. Frank, 517 F. Supp.2d 1238, 1244 (D. Haw. 2007). "[I]t is well-settled that indigent litigants proceeding in forma pauperis should not be deprived of their `last dollar.'" Id. (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Plaintiff, who was granted in forma pauperis status in this action (Doc. #3), alleged that Defendant deducted $57.28 for the for the initial filing fee in this case and deducted another $20 federal legal fee at the same time (Doc. #15 at 6D). In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff referred to these deductions and argued that the $20 deduction, which was 20% of the recent deposit into Plaintiff's account, was unauthorized because it was contrary to the Court's Order directing the ADC to deduct the initial filing fee ($57.28) and "[t]hereafter, Plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of 20 percent . . . " (Doc. #79 at 11). He claimed in his First Amended Complaint that his account was subject to "illegal double dips" and that deductions were made without notification or explanation (Doc. #15 at 6D). Plaintiff's complaints about his account continued in his opposition, where he explained that ADC purposely removes the "balance" column from the account statement provided to prisoners so that they cannot ever know what their account balance is (Doc. #79 at 3). And he argued that ADC did not comply with its own policy providing that deductions should not result in a prisoner's account balance falling below $12 (id. at 10-11). He
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maintained that as a result of Defendant's deductions, he was unable to purchase either legal supplies or indigent supplies, including hygiene products (Doc. #15 at 6D; Doc. #79 at 7, 9). These allegations are sufficient to raise a due process claim regarding alleged unauthorized deductions. In sum, Plaintiff's allegations entail a First Amendment claim related to the right to send mail and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim concerning his inmate trust account. With Plaintiff's specific claims clarified, the Court now turns to the summary judgment analysis. III. Summary Judgment A. Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). But conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate
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specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. In assessing whether a party has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995). If the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. B. 1. Analysis Liability

Defendant's first claim for summary judgment is that she was not involved in making deductions from Plaintiff's account and, therefore, cannot be liable for a constitutional violation (Doc. #73 at 3). Defendant raised this same argument in her Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #59 at 9-10). In denying the motion, Court rejected this argument because the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim is the same as the standard applied on screening (Doc. #65 at 13). And because the Court found at screening that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking dismissal was more akin to a motion for reconsideration. There was nothing in Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that warranted reconsideration of the Court' determination that Plaintiff stated a constitutional claim against Defendant (id.). The liability argument presented in the pending summary judgment motion is virtually identical to that presented in the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (compare Doc. #59 at 9-10, Doc. #73 at 3-4). Nonetheless, Defendant has proffered evidence to support her contention that she was not involved in deducting money from Plaintiff's account, and the Court will review that evidence. Defendant attests that deductions like court filing fees and restitution are done through an automated system at each prison complex (Doc. #74, Ex. B, Def. Aff. ¶¶ 5-6). She states that she was assigned to the Inmate Banking Department at ADC's Central Office in Phoenix; she does not work at a prison complex (id. ¶ 9). Therefore, she asserts that she was not involved in making any of the deductions that Plaintiff attributes to her (id.).
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Defendant's assertions that deductions are done at each individual prison complex unit appear to conflict with the affidavit from Lynda Wade, the Inmate Trust Account Unit Manager in the ADC Financial Services Bureau in Phoenix (id., Ex. A, Wade Aff. ¶ 1). Wade explains that the ADC Financial Services Bureau--in Phoenix, not at each prison complex--"facilitates inmates' court-ordered payments for restitution, filing fees, child support, etc., by withdrawing funds from inmate trust accounts and forwarding the funds to the courts" (id. ¶ 4). But Wade, like Defendant, also states that the deductions are done automatically through the ADC Inmate Trust Account system, and that Central Office staff is not involved in the processing of incoming funds or the deductions from accounts (id. ¶¶ 10-11). The ADC Inmate Trust Account system is programmed to automatically take mandatory deductions from every deposit, i.e. 20% from a deposit amount for each court filing fee (id. ¶ 10). With respect to Plaintiff's account, Wade states that on Dec. 11, 2003, Plaintiff received $100 in the mail (id. ¶ 12). That money was posted to his trust account (id.). Then, the ADC Inmate Trust Account program automatically deducted 20% of that $100 for each of his outstanding court filing fees--one federal and one state--for a total of $40 ($20 for each filing fee) (id.). Plaintiff's balance was $60.05. The next day, pursuant to the Court Order issued in this case, an additional partial filing fee $57.28 was deducted, as well as $2.40 in legal copy fees (id. ¶ 13).4 Plaintiff's remaining balance was then $0.37 (id.). Wade did not indicate who made these last two deductions, but because these were individual onetime deductions, it does not appear that they would have been through the automated Inmate Trust Account system. Defendant attests that the banking program requires only a partial deduction from an inmate's account if necessary to avoid deduction of most or all of a deposit; this prevents any
4

According to the Court's own financial records, it does not appear that the initial filing fee of $57.28 and the 20% deduction for the federal court filing fee of $20 (the Dec. 11-12, 2003 deductions) were received (see Attach., U.S. Courts Case Inquiry Report). The first payment received for the filing fee in this action appears to have been in Oct. 2007 (id.). The Court will direct ADC to provide information about Plaintiff's deductions and payments forwarded to the Court for the filing fee in this action.
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hardship that might result from depleting all of the inmate's funds (id., Ex. B, Def. Aff. ¶ 7). She cites to the Inmate Banking/Money System policy attachment--Schedule of Deductions from Inmate Monies (id., Attach. 1 at 15-16). With respect to deductions for inmate initiated transactions (medical, store purchases, copies, postage, etc.), it indicates that deductions can be collected in full from all deposits after mandatory deductions "except the account may not be reduced below a dollar amount sufficient to allow the inmate funds to purchase stamps and health and welfare items" (id.). Similarly, department-controlled deductions can be collected in full "except that accounts may not be reduced below $12" (id.). Neither Defendant nor Wade explains who controls the banking program or who makes partial deductions when necessary to comply with these policy directives. As noted, Plaintiff specifically cites to these provisions in the Inmate Banking/Money System policy and argues that leaving him with $0.32 or $0.37 was improper and, as a result, he was unable to obtain indigent supplies, including legal materials (Doc. #79 at 7, 9-10). He also argues that deducting a 20% filing fee at the same time the initial filing fee of $57.28 was withdrawn was improper; he maintains that the Court Order directed ADC to take the initial fee and then, each subsequent month, deduct 20% in fees (id. at 11). Although a violation of ADC procedures is not itself a constitutional violation, see Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981), because the deductions from his account left him unable to obtain writing materials or indigent supplies, a constitutional question is raised (see Doc. #79 at 9). In her affidavit, Defendant states that she had nothing to do with making deductions from Plaintiff's account (Doc. #74, Ex. B, Def. Aff. ¶ 10). But she does not state her job title or describe what her job in the Central Office entails. According to Defendant's motion, it seems the only entity that could be liable for any alleged unauthorized deductions would be the automated Inmate Trust Account System program. Because Defendant's evidence leaves a question as to who controls the automated system and who performs partial deductions when necessary, there exists a question of material fact whether Defendant was liable. Defendant's request for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.
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2.

Exhaustion

Next, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to file any grievances about his inability to send non-legal mail so his claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. #73 at 4). The Court already addressed the issue of exhaustion when it ruled on Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #65). The Court determined that Plaintiff was reliably informed by prison officials that he could not grieve his claim in Count VI; thus, nonexhaustion was not a basis for dismissal. Defendant now asserts that Plaintiff failed to grieve his injury in Count VI and, therefore, his claim should be dismissed for nonexhaustion. Yet in support of this assertion, Defendant presents no specific argument. She merely refers the Court to "the legal authorities set forth in her Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, dkt. #59" (Doc. #73 at 4). Defendant does not identify which legal authorities or even which pages in that 11-page motion support the novel proposition that an inmate must separately grieve an injury even though he was denied the opportunity to grieve the violation underlying his claim (see Doc. #59). Nor does she explain why these legal authorities support her argument now when the Court expressly rejected them in its Order denying the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is still not a ground for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims in Count VI, and summary judgment for this reason will be denied. 3. Adequate Post-Deprivation Remedy

Like exhaustion, the claim that there was an adequate post-deprivation remedy was also raised in Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #59 at 10-11). The Court found that Defendant's argument--that Plaintiff could have used the inmate grievance system and then filed a risk-management claim pursuant to ADC policy--was unavailing because the filing of a risk-management claim was simply an extra step in the ADC grievance procedures, which were not available to Plaintiff (Doc. #65 at 13). Thus, this was not an "alternative" remedy (id.).

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In the pending summary judgment motion, Defendant again argues that Plaintiff had two adequate post-deprivation remedies: pursuing a claim through the ADC grievance system and filing a claim with Arizona State Risk Management (Doc. #73 at 5). This argument has been addressed and rejected (Doc. #65 at 13). Summary judgment on this basis will be denied. 4. Turner Standard

Defendant's final argument is that there were legitimate penological reasons for the policy that resulted in Plaintiff's inability to send non-legal mail (Doc. #73 at 5-6). The Turner test is applied to determine whether a regulation or policy that impinges on a inmate's constitutional rights is nonetheless valid. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. But Defendant's reliance on Turner is misplaced because Plaintiff is not alleging that the policy providing for deductions from his account is unconstitutional; rather, he claims that Defendant made deductions that were not authorized by the policy and that she failed to comply with the policy's provisions that an inmate not be left with less than $12 in his account. And although Defendant argues that Plaintiff's account fell below $12 not because of mandatory court-filing fee-deductions but because of his own spending (Doc. #73 at 4), her evidence proves otherwise. Wade explained that after Plaintiff received $100 on Dec. 11, mandatory deductions were made in the amount of $97.28, leaving him a balance of just $2.77 (Doc. #74, Ex. A, Wade Aff. ¶¶ 12-13). Consequently, Turner is not applicable to Plaintiff's claims, and summary judgment on this ground will be denied. IV. Conclusion Defendant has failed to meet her summary judgment burden to demonstrate the absence of a material fact related to liability, exhaustion, alternative post-deprivation remedies, or legitimate penological interests for the deductions from Plaintiff's inmate trust account. Because Defendant has not met her initial burden, it is not incumbent on Plaintiff to set forth evidence suggesting that there are disputed facts. The Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied. But given that Plaintiff's claims were not fully fleshed out until this Order, the
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Court will deny the motion without prejudice and provide Defendant 30 days in which to file an amended summary judgment motion addressing all claims. IT IS ORDERED: (1) Within 30 days from the date of this Order, the ADC Director or her designee must submit to the Court a copy of ADC's financial records showing all deductions taken from Plaintiff's inmate trust account and forwarded to the Court for payment towards the filing fee in this action. (2) The Clerk of Court must serve by mail a copy of this Order on the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, 1601 West Jefferson, Phoenix, Arizona, 85007. (3) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #73) is denied without prejudice. (4) Within 30 days from the date of this Order, Defendant may file an amended summary judgment motion. DATED this 25th day of August, 2008.

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U.S. Courts Case Inquiry Report

Case Number DAZX203CV002178 Summary Party Information: Party# 001 001 001 001 Party Name BARRY N PATTERSON BARRY N PATTERSON BARRY N PATTERSON BARRY N PATTERSON

Case Title

BARRY N PATTERSON V DORA SCHRIRO Debt Type PLRA FILING FEE PLRA FILING FEE APPEAL PLRA FILING FEE APPEAL PLRA FILING FEE Total Owed 90.00 60.00 105.00 150.00 405.00 Total Collected 90.00 7.40 0.00 0.00 97.40 Total Outstanding 0.00 52.60 105.00 150.00 307.60

Registry Information: Depository Code Depository Name Transaction Information: Document Document Type/Number* Date Account Debt Type Number Line# CT PHX062974 10/03/2007 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX064329 11/09/2007 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX064996 11/27/2007 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX066125 12/28/2007 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX066936 01/23/2008 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX068136 02/22/2008 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX069310 03/25/2008 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 CT PHX070598 04/29/2008 DAZX203CV002178-001 2 CT PHX070598 04/29/2008 DAZX203CV002178-001 1 Accomplished Date Debt Type 10/04/2007 PLRA FILING FEE 11/13/2007 PLRA FILING FEE 11/28/2007 PLRA FILING FEE 12/28/2007 PLRA FILING FEE 01/24/2008 PLRA FILING FEE 02/25/2008 PLRA FILING FEE 03/25/2008 PLRA FILING FEE 04/30/2008 PLRA FILING FEE 04/30/2008 PLRA FILING FEE Line Type

Account Type Party/Payee Name Depository Line#
BARRY N PATTERSON

Account Code

Depository Total Doc Actn Trans Type

Amount Payee Line#

Fund

PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR

6.33 9.18 9.09 7.56 14.04 21.60 13.60 7.40 8.60

O O O O O O O O O

04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04

5100PL 5100PL 5100PL 5100PL 5100PL 5100PL 5100PL 0869PL 5100PL

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

BARRY N PATTERSON

* Document Type Legend

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