Free Order on Motion for Summary Judgment - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RONALD WEBER, Plaintiff, vs. FLEETWOOD MOTOR HOMES OF INDIANA, INC., Defendant.

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CIV 03-2606 PHX JWS ORDER AND OPINION [Re: Motion at Docket 99]

I. MOTION PRESENTED At docket 99, Fleetwood Motor Homes of Indiana, Inc. ("Fleetwood") moves for summary judgment on the complaint by Ronald Weber. At docket 106, Weber opposes Fleetwood's motion. Fleetwood has requested oral argument, but it would not assist the court. Therefore, Fleetwood's request is denied. II. BACKGROUND In February 2002, Weber purchased a 2002 American Dream motor home1 manufactured by Fleetwood.2 Weber alleges that his motor home started to fall apart

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Doc. 77, p. 2, ¶ 4. Doc. 81, p. 2, ¶ 3.

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shortly after he purchased it.3 To recover for the alleged defects in his motor home, Weber sued Fleetwood under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA").4 In his third amended complaint, Weber claims Fleetwood breached its written warranty and the implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and habitability.5 He also asserts that Fleetwood violated 15 U.S.C. § 2302 and 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.5, 701.3 and 702.3. The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the MMWA because the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.6 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine dispute about material facts and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party has the burden to show that material facts are not genuinely disputed.7 To meet this burden, the moving party must point out the lack of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claim, but need not produce evidence negating that claim.8 Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that a genuine issue exists by presenting evidence indicating that certain facts are so disputed that a fact-finder must

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Doc. 77, p. 4, ¶ 9. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d). Doc. 77, pp. 8-9, ¶ 27(1)-(4). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Id. at 325.

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resolve the dispute at trial.9 The court must not assess the credibility of this evidence, and must draw all justifiable inferences from it in favor of the nonmoving party.10 IV. DISCUSSION A. Fleetwood Failed to Brief the Choice-of-Law Issue and Therefore Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Weber's Warranty Claims It appears that there is a choice to make between applying the laws of Arizona and New Mexico. This is because both states have contacts with this case. One of Arizona's contacts is that it is where Weber bought his motor home.11 Arizona also is where Weber "was at all times relevant hereto."12 As for New Mexico, there are indications that it is where Weber accepted delivery of his motor home,13 where the motor home presently is located,14 and where Weber works.15 The choice-of-law issue is important because it could determine the outcome of at least Weber's implied warranty claims. Weber and Fleetwood were not in contractual privity, and it appears that privity is required to maintain implied warranty claims under Arizona law but not under New Mexico law. Those laws may have different privity requirements for written warranty claims, too, and may differ on other issues relevant to

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Id. at 255.

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Doc. 100, ex. P, purchase money security agreement between Ronald Weber and Beaudry RV in Mesa, AZ.
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Doc. 77, p. 2, ¶ 2. Doc. 108, ex. A, affidavit of Ronald Weber, p. 2, ¶ 8. Doc. 101, pp. 7-8. Doc. 100, ex. A, deposition of Ronald Weber, Oct. 18, 2004, p. 18.

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Weber's written and implied warranty claims, such as equitable estoppel and remedies. In an earlier order, the court cautioned that "a party seeking to prevail on summary judgment cannot assume that Arizona law applies. Instead, it must argue for applying a particular state's laws. Only after the party shows what law applies can it establish it is entitled to judgment under that law."16 Despite that warning, Fleetwood filed a summary judgment motion in which it assumed that Arizona law applies to this case. And even though Weber raised the choice-of-law issue in his opposition, Fleetwood still did not seriously address that issue in its reply. Because Fleetwood did not brief the choice-of-law issue, it has not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, its summary judgment motion will be denied with leave to renew. In a renewed motion, Fleetwood should discuss what choice-of-law rules apply; what kinds of facts are made relevant by those rules; what are the facts of this case; and, after applying the proper choice-of-law rules to the facts of this case, what state's laws govern this case. B. Fleetwood Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Weber's Claims Under 15 U.S.C. § 2302 and 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.5, 701.3, and 702.3 Although Fleetwood moves for summary judgment on Weber's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 2302 and 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.5, 701.3, and 702.3, the only one of these claims concerning which Weber opposes summary judgment is his claim under 16 C.F.R. § 700.5. That regulation provides that: Under section 103(b) [of the MMWA], statements or representations of general policy concerning customer satisfaction which are not subject to any specific limitation need not be

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Doc. 76, p. 5.

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designated as full or limited warranties, and are exempt from the requirements of sections 102, 103, and 104 of the [MMWA] and rules thereunder. However, such statements remain subject to the enforcement provisions of section 110 of the [MMWA], and to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. [§] 45.17 Fleetwood argues that 16 C.F.R. § 700.5 does not provide Weber with a cause of action. Weber argues that a cause of action is given by the language indicating that some statements or representations are "subject to the enforcement provisions of section 110 of the [MMWA]." Fleetwood is right. 16 C.F.R. § 700.5 does not provide Weber with a cause of action. Instead, it refers to the law ­ section 110 of the MMWA, or 15 U.S.C. § 2310 ­ that does provide him with a cause of action. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the motion at docket 99 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED with respect to Weber's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 2302 and 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.5, 701.3, and 702.3. It is DENIED with leave to renew regarding Weber's claims for breach of written and implied warranties. DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 17th day of October 2005.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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16 C.F.R. § 700.5(a).

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