Free Order on Motion to Vacate (2255) - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

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SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Juan Felix, Defendant/Movant.

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No. CR 04-0403-PHX-ROS No. CV 06-1964-PHX-ROS (ECV) ORDER

Movant Juan Felix, confined in the Central Arizona Detention Center in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Motion For Time Reduction By an Inmate in Federal Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2255) (CR Doc. #127). The Court will summarily dismiss the Motion. I. Procedural History and Motion Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 500 or more Grams of Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). The plea agreement notes that the statutory maximum sentence for this offense is life. On August 8, 2006, the Court sentenced Movant to a 120-month term of imprisonment followed by 5 years on supervised release. In his Motion, Movant seeks a reduction of his sentence. He argues that his First, Sixth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights are violated because as a deportable alien prisoner, he is ineligible for a one-year sentence reduction for attending a drug treatment program during incarceration and for early release to a halfway house.
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II. Summary Dismissal A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief." Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, if there has been a valid waiver of the right to file a federal habeas corpus petition, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the Motion because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.1 III. Waiver Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that there are "strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights." United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant's waiver was clear, express, and unequivocal. Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992).

In addition, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Movant's equal protection argument in McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1999). Case 2:04-cr-00403-ROS Document 129 -2Filed 09/18/2006 Page 2 of 4

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The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d at 871(holding that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver: The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the indictment or information, or to the Court's entry of judgment against the defendant and imposition of sentence upon the defendant (including any constitutional claims pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and the procedures that must be applied to determine a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines that are waived pursuant to paragraph 3 above), providing the sentence is consistent with this agreement. The defendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court's entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack defendant's conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. The defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack the defendant might file challenging his conviction or sentence in this case. (CR Doc. #126 at 4)(Emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he had discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea voluntarily. (CR Doc. #126 at 7-8). Movant's assertions in his § 2255 Motion all pertain to sentencing and do not pertain to the voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his
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plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing issues raised in his § 2255 Motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the Motion for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion For Time Reduction By an Inmate in Federal Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2255) (Doc. #127 in CR 04-0403-PHX-ROS) is denied and that the civil action opened in connection with this Motion (CV 06-1964-PHX-ROS (ECV)) is dismissed. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. DATED this 18th day of September, 2006.

Case 2:04-cr-00403-ROS

Document 129

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