Free Motion to Dismiss Case/Lack of Jurisdiction - District Court of Arizona - Arizona

O SBORN MALEDON
A P ROF E SS IO NA L A S S OC IA T I O N A T T OR NEY S A T LA W

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The Phoenix Plaza 21st Floor 2929 North Central Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2794 P.O. Box 36379 Phoenix, Arizona 85067-6379 Telephone Facsimile 602.640.9000 602.640.9050

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Debra A. Hill, 012186 Ronda R. Fisk, 022100 OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. 2929 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 [email protected] [email protected] (602) 640-9000 Attorneys for Defendants Global Missions, El Shaddai Ministries, Second Chance Ministries, and Michael Cambra IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA ESTATE OF JOSEPH J. STUDNEK, by and through its PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, JOSEPH M. STUDNEK, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant v. No. CIV-04-595-PHX-MHM DEFENDANTS SECOND CHANCE CHRISTIAN EVANGELISTIC MINISTRIES AND MICHAEL CAMBRA'S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

AMBASSADOR OF GLOBAL (Oral Argument Requested) MISSIONS UN LIMITED HIS SUCCESSORS, A CORPORATION SOLE, a Nevada corporation sole; EL SHADDAI MINISTRIES AND HIS SUCCESSORS, A CORPORATION SOLE, a Nevada Corporation; SECOND CHANCE CHRISTIAN EVANGELISTIC MINISTRIES, a California corporation; BISHOP OF FAITH VISION NOBLE HOUSE AND HIS SUCCESSORS, A CORPORATION SOLE, a California corporation; JOSEPH L. WILLIAMS and MONICA C. CISNEROS, as husband and wife; WILLIAM JOE LITTLE, MICHAEL CAMBRA and GLORIA CAMBRA, as husband and wife; JOEL DAVID and CINDY DAVID, as husband and wife; KEITH AARON VANN and TRISHA VANN, as husband and wife, Defendants/Counterclaimants.

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Defendants Second Chance Christian Evangelistic Ministries ("Second Chance") and Michael Cambra (collectively, the "Defendants") move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(2) and, in the alternative, FRCP 12(b)(6). This motion is supported by the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the attached affidavits, and such oral argument as the Court permits. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Over eighteen months after initiating these legal proceedings, Joseph M. Studnek, the personal representative of the Estate of Joseph J. Studnek ("Plaintiff"), filed a Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), naming numerous new defendants. (Dkt. 69.) Not content with suing the other party to the contract at issue -- Ambassador of Global Missions UnLimited and His Successors, a Corporation Sole ("Global Missions") -- Plaintiff now has named as defendants those individuals or entities that appear to have interacted with Defendant Global Missions. Named

defendants include, among others, Joseph L. Williams, the sole member of Global Missions; El Shaddai Ministries, the church that Mr. Williams regularly attends; Second Chance Christian Evangelistic Ministries, the predecessor church to El Shaddai Ministries; Michael Cambra, the pastor of El Shaddai Ministries; Gloria Cambra, Pastor Cambra's wife; and Joel David, a notary public who witnessed an affidavit signed by Mr. Williams in this litigation. Plaintiff has made the absurd allegation that all named defendants, including Second Chance and Pastor Cambra, perpetuated "fraud" upon the Plaintiff, (Dkt. 69 ¶ 17), when in fact most of them had nothing whatsoever to do with the events alleged in the Complaint. All claims against Defendants should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) the Court has no personal jurisdiction over Defendants and, alternatively, (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Second Chance was started as a community church in San Lorenzo, California with approximately 100 active congregants, all of whom resided in California. (Cambra Aff.1 ¶¶ 1, 3.) Pastor Michael Cambra, the church's spiritual leader,

incorporated Second Chance in May 1993. (Id. ¶ 2.) In early 2003, the leadership of Second Chance wanted to create a religious non-profit corporation separate and distinct from the church devoted to carrying out charitable works. (Id. ¶ 4.) Among the various projects Second Chance anticipated that the charitable organization would implement were the following: a work program to help individuals with job

placement; purchasing properties in the San Lorenzo area to build affordable housing; and purchasing and tearing down crack-houses to improve the quality of life in the neighborhood. (Id.) To further the goal of creating two distinct non-profit

corporations, Pastor Cambra incorporated El Shaddai Ministries as a corporation sole under the laws of Nevada in June 2003. (Id. ¶ 5.) Beginning in 2003, El Shaddai Ministries assumed the operations for day-to-day ministry and community outreach from Second Chance. (Id. ¶ 6.) Second Chance still exists as a religious non-profit corporation for the purpose carrying out charitable works, id., and Pastor Cambra still serves as a director for Second Chance. (Id. ¶ 1.) Defendants have had virtually no contacts with Arizona. Neither of the

Defendants maintains a registered agent for service of process in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 7, 17.) Neither of them has (and never has had) an office, telephone, telex, telefax number, mailing address or bank account in Arizona, and they do not own or lease real property in the state. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 18.) None of Second Chance's directors or officers reside in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 9.) Pastor Cambra, the incorporator and a director of

Affidavit of Michael J. Cambra in Support of Defendants' Second Chance and Michael Cambra's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint dated March 10, 2006, attached hereto as Exhibit A. -3-

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and statutory agent for Second Chance, has only traveled to Arizona on one occasion in 2005, long after the events at issue in this lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 19.) In addition to not having any contacts with Arizona, neither of the Defendants has initiated any contacts with Plaintiff. The only contact Plaintiff has had with Pastor Cambra is when he visited El Shaddai Ministries looking for Mr. Williams. (Id. ¶ 11.) Neither of the Defendants made any representations to Plaintiff regarding how to reduce the Estate's tax liability or tax credits that the Estate would receive for donations. (Id. ¶ 12.) And Plaintiff made no donation or promise of a donation either of the Defendants. (Id. ¶ 13.) Indeed, there is no mention of either Second Chance or Michael Cambra in the Faithful Steward Covenant between Plaintiff and Global Missions, which indicates that Plaintiff intended to donate all of the Estate's assets to Global Missions. See Faithful Steward Covenant, Exhibit B hereto. Neither of the Defendants had any knowledge of the Faithful Steward Covenant until after Plaintiff completed the donation of a building to Global Missions. (Cambra Aff. ¶ 14.) The one attenuated connection between the Defendants and this litigation is that Joseph Williams, the sole member of Global Missions, is a congregant at El Shaddai Ministries, the successor church to Second Chance and the church at which Pastor Cambra is the Senior Minister. (Id. ¶ 15.) Nevertheless, Mr. Williams has no control over Second Chance's ultimate decision making: He is not an officer,

director, or employee of Second Chance; he is not a signatory on or beneficiary of any bank accounts held by Second Chance; he does not have joint ownership of any property with Second Chance. (Id. ¶ 15.) Additionally, Mr. Williams' corporation sole, Global Missions, has no control over either of the Defendants. Second Chance and Global Missions do not have any common staff, officers, or directors and they do not share the same physical facility. (Id. ¶ 16.) Global Missions has not made any donations to Second Chance and is not otherwise affiliated with the ministry. (Id.) Global Missions also does not and has not employed or otherwise provided any compensation to Pastor Cambra. (Id. ¶ 25.)
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Furthermore, Pastor Cambra is not a signatory on or beneficiary of any bank accounts held by Global Missions and he does not have joint ownership of any property with Global Missions. (Id.) The fact that Plaintiff did not name either of Defendants when he filed his original complaint and his first amended complaint (Dkt. 21) is indicative of the Defendants' complete lack of involvement in the events alleged in the Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff only amended his complaint to include Second Chance and Pastor Cambra after Pastor Cambra filed an affidavit in support of Mr. Williams' motion to dismiss for improper service of process. See Affidavit of Michael Cambra dated May 8, 2005, Exhibit C hereto.2 ARGUMENT I. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ARIZONA. The assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant that has been served with process outside the forum comports with the requirements of due process only if the defendant had such minimum contacts with the forum that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate "`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). Consistent with the mandates of constitutional due process, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Defendants, as they have no contacts with Arizona.

Michael Cambra and Second Chance are not the only defendants that Plaintiff has identified solely on the basis of an affidavit used in this litigation. Plaintiff has also named Joel David, a California notary public. Mr. David notarized one of Mr. Williams' affidavits and subsequently signed his own affidavit indicating that if Plaintiff had contacted him, he would have responded to Plaintiff's request for information in his notary journal as long as it did not require him to violate the Notary Public Code of Professional Responsibility and the request complied with the requirements of California law. See Affidavit of Joseph L. Williams dated September 14, 2004, Exhibit D hereto, and Affidavit of Joel David dated February 28, 2005, Exhibit E hereto.
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A.

Legal Standard.

As the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, "the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate." Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). When a defendant moves to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(2), "the plaintiff is `obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.'" Scott v.

Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar International, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977). Where there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, a federal court applies the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum state. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. Arizona law permits jurisdiction over non-resident defendants "to the maximum extent permitted . . . by the Constitution of the United States." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a). Because Arizona's long-arm rule reaches to the limits of due process, the long-arm and due process analyses collapse, and the Court can proceed directly to consider whether a defendant has constitutionally-sufficient contacts with Arizona. Batton v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 271, 736 P.2d 2, 4 (1987); Armstrong v. Aramco Servs. Co., 155 Ariz. 345, 348, 746 P.2d 917, 920 (App. 1987). Whether an Arizona court can assume personal

jurisdiction over a foreign corporation without violating due process is determined according to the "minimum contacts" analysis familiar to federal law, as discussed below. B. Defendants Do Not Have the Requisite Minimum Contacts With Arizona.

The minimum contacts analysis requires a court to determine whether the nonresident defendant has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citation omitted). This test requires, before jurisdiction can be exercised, the plaintiff to show that the -6-

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nonresident defendant took some action or engaged in some conduct that was purposefully directed at the forum state. See id. at 472-76.3 The minimum contacts analysis has been refined into two different bases for personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. A court may

exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if that party's purposeful contacts with the forum state are "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984); see also Batton 153, Ariz. at 270, 736 P.2d at 4 (general jurisdiction over a nonresident exists only when defendant's contacts are so substantial or "continuous and systematic" that defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in the forum state). In the case of specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff is not required to show continuous, substantial activities by the nonresident defendant in the forum state. Instead, a showing of somewhat more limited contacts with the forum will suffice, but the plaintiff's cause of action must arise out of those specific contacts in order to meet the minimum contacts requirement. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. In addition, those specific contacts by the defendant must have resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activity of the plaintiff or others. See id. at 417. Plaintiff cannot aggregate factual allegations concerning multiple defendants to establish personal jurisdiction over any single defendant. In fact, the United States The purposeful availment standard requires more than foreseeability of causing injury in another state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). Rather, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The purposeful availment requirement prevents defendants from being haled into a jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
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Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to consider the defending parties together and to aggregate their forum contacts in determining whether jurisdiction exists. Instead, minimum contacts must be met as to each individual defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-2 (1980); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) ("Each defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually."); Williams v. Lakeview, Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 3, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000) (specific jurisdiction "does not arise from the plaintiff's or a third party's unilateral activity" in the forum state). Given that Defendants have had virtually no contacts with Arizona, this state has neither general nor specific jurisdiction over them in this case. 1. Defendants Are Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in Arizona.

An Arizona Court may exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the defendant's contacts with Arizona are so substantial or "continuous and systematic" that the defendant could reasonably foresee being haled into court "[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the [defendant's] activities in the forum State." Batton, 153 Ariz. at 270, 736 P.2d at 4 (citation omitted). Courts apply an "exacting standard" in determining whether a party's contacts "constitute sufficient `presence' to warrant general jurisdiction." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. Essentially, for general jurisdiction to exist over a defendant, its contacts with Arizona must be so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). As described above, Second Chance is a California corporation, operating solely in California. Second Chance does not maintain a registered agent for service of process in Arizona. (Cambra Aff. ¶ 7.) Second Chance does not own or lease real property in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 8.) Second Chance does not maintain an office, telephone, telex or telefax number, mailing address or bank account in Arizona. (Id.) Second -8-

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Chance has no employees in Arizona. (Id. ¶ 10.) In other words, Second Chance has had none of the contacts that "approximate[] physical presence within the state's borders." Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1086. Accordingly, Second Chance is not subject to the general jurisdiction of the Arizona courts. Similarly, Pastor Cambra is not subject to the general jurisdiction of the Arizona courts, either: He does not do business in Arizona; he does not own or lease real property in Arizona; he does not maintain an office, telephone, telex or telefax number, mailing address or bank account in Arizona; and he has no employees in Arizona. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20.) 2. Defendants Are Also Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in Arizona.

The Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists: (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). This test requires "an evaluation of the nature and quality of the defendant's contacts in relation to the cause of action." Id. Plaintiff's claim fails each prong of this test. a. Defendants Did Not Purposefully Avail Themselves of the Privilege of Conducting Activities in Arizona.

With respect to the first prong, Defendants have not "purposefully availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting any activities in Arizona. In the Ninth Circuit, the "purposeful availment" element of the test for specific jurisdiction is satisfied only if the defendant "(1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state." -9-

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Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087. The Complaint fails to allege that Defendants committed any intentional acts expressly aimed at Arizona. Indeed, Defendants have had no contacts whatsoever with Arizona and have taken no purposeful action directed at Arizona. (Cambra Aff. ¶¶ 17-20.) b. Plaintiff Does Not Allege That Defendants Engaged in Arizona-Related Contacts.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that his claims arise out of any forumrelated activities on the part Defendants. Plaintiff alleges only that "the Defendant corporations and individual Defendants are an alter ego of each other and that they are therefore individually and collectively liable for the acts of the other." (Dkt. 69 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff's conclusory assertion of an alter ego theory is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Second Chance or Pastor Cambra. See, e.g., Hockey v. Medhekar, 30 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1211 n.1 (N.D.Cal.1998) (at the pleading stage, conclusory allegations that a corporate entity is the alter ego of the defendant are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F.Supp. 636, 647 (C.D.Cal.1983) (same). To establish general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant through an alter ego theory, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case consisting of two elements: "(1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard the corporation would result in fraud or injustice." Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 170 Ariz. 34, 37, 821 P.2d 725, 728 (1991) (alter ego requires proof of unity of control and that observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote injustice). Plaintiff failed to make this prima facie showing in his Complaint. First, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing unity of interest between any of the individuals and the named corporate defendants, let alone a unity of interest and ownership that would indicate that Michael Cambra, Second Chance and the other
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defendants do not have "separate personalities." Examples of factors that bear on the "unity of interest" analysis include whether the officers and directors of the companies are the same; whether separate books, bank accounts, tax returns, financial statements and the like are kept; and whether one company holds the other company out as the agent, either expressly or impliedly, as by representing it is doing business or has a office in the forum state. None of these factors are alleged in the Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff has also failed to explain how recognizing the separate identities of the named defendants--both corporations and individuals--would result in either fraud or injustice. Indeed, disregarding the Defendants' absolute lack of contacts with Arizona and the events that allegedly occurred in this case would result in injustice. c. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Would Be Unreasonable.

Even if the Plaintiff could establish a sufficient nexus between Defendants and Arizona to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis, the Court should still decline to exercise personal jurisdiction because it would be unreasonable under the circumstances in this case. See Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1993). In determining "reasonableness," the Court should examine the following: (a) the extent of Defendants' interjection into Arizona; (b) the burden on Defendants of defending the suit in Arizona; (c) the extent of any conflict with the sovereignty of Defendants' residence; (d) Arizona's interest in the dispute; (e) the most efficient forum for the resolution of the dispute; (f) the importance of the chosen forum to the Plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (g) the existence of an alternative forum. Id. at 851. None of these factors weighs in favor of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this matter. Here, the burdens on a small ministry and a pastor based out of California in defending an action arising from unrelated conduct in an Arizona court is apparent. Arizona's interest in adjudicating the dispute vis-à-vis Defendants is minimal, given
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that Defendants have had no contacts with Arizona.

Similarly, Plaintiff has no

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief as to Defendants in Arizona given Defendants' lack of contacts with Arizona. If Plaintiff wishes to bring an action against Defendants in California, it can do so. The interests of the "interstate judicial system" will also not be served by requiring out-of-state defendants to defend this lawsuit in a jurisdiction where they have no contacts with the forum state. Finally, on substantive liability issues, many, if not all, key witnesses and evidence can be expected to be found outside Arizona, and most likely in California. Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable and unfair, as well as inefficient, to maintain this action against Defendants in Arizona. Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED. Not only has Plaintiff brought a claim against Defendants in a forum that lacks personal jurisdiction over them, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against Defendants for which relief can be granted. None of the claims alleged in the

Complaint are properly asserted against Defendants. Defendants were not involved in any way with any of the claims listed With respect to Count I, Defendants played no part in the negotiation or execution of the Faithful Steward Covenant, the contract at issue in this case. (Cambra Aff. ¶ 14.) As for Count II (Fraud), Defendants did not a make any

representations to Plaintiff (other than a brief encounter when Plaintiff was looking for Mr. Williams), let alone representations that were knowingly false. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 21, 22.) Similarly, regarding Count III (Unjust Enrichment), Plaintiff never bestowed any benefit upon Defendants and therefore they have not been unjustly enriched. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 23.) Nor did Plaintiff convey any gifts upon Defendants (Counts V, VI, and
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VII). (Id.) Finally, in Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully took property and or proceeds from the sale from the property and requests that the court issue a writ of replevin to recover the property. (Dkt. 69 ¶¶ 48-49.) But replevin applies only to personal property, not real property or proceeds from a sale of real property. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1325 (2004) (defining "replevin" as "a writ obtained from a court authorizing the retaking of personal property wrongfully taken or detained" and noting that "[t]o support the action it is necessary: (a) That the property shall be personal") (emphasis added); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin § 9 (2001) ("Money is not subject to replevin unless it is marked or designated in some manner so as to become specific, as it regards the power of identification, such as being in a bag or package to be replevined."). In sum, all counts should be dismissed against Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to state a single claim upon which relief can be granted. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant its motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In the

alternative, Defendants respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants further requests that the court award its costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01. See Apollo Group, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1995) (in diversity action, court has discretion to award fees under A.R.S. § 13-341.01(A)); Berthot v. Security Pac. Bank of Ariz., 170 Ariz. 318, 823 P.2d 1326 (App. 1991) (affirming trial court's award of fees under statute where defendant established the absence of a contractual relationship). Defendants also seek an award of attorneys fees and costs from Plaintiff pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349. See Harris v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 158 Ariz. 380, 762 P.2d 1334 (App. 1988) (sanctions upheld against an attorney where the facts available to the attorney were such that he knew or should have known that the claim was unjustified).
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DATED this 14th day of March, 2006. OSBORN MALEDON, P.A.

By s/Ronda R. Fisk Debra A. Hill Ronda R. Fisk 2929 North Central, Suite 2100 Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793 Attorneys for Global Missions and El Shaddai Ministries CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on March 14, 2006, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: · Jeremy Scott Geigle, [email protected] · Bradley D. Weech, [email protected] I hereby certify that on March 14, 2006, I served the attached document by first-class mail on the Honorable Mary H. Murguia, United States District Court, Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 525, 401 West Washington Street, SPC 53, Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2154.

I hereby certify that on March 14, 2006, I served the attached document by first-class mail on the following, who are not registered participants of the CM/ECF System: Joseph L. Williams 15934 Hesperian Blvd. P.M.B. 311 San Lorenzo, CA 94580

s/ Lindsay B. Jensen
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