Free Answering Brief in Opposition - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE CHIEF HENRY V. TOBIN, III : : Plaintiff, : : v. : : THOMAS P. GORDON, individually and in his : official capacity; SHERRY FREEBERY, : individually and in her official capacity; : COLONEL JOHN L.CUNNINGHAM, : RETIRED, individually; COLONEL DAVID F. : MCALLISTER, individually and in his official : capacity: and NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a : municipal corporation, : : Defendants. :

C.A.No. 04-1211-***

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

THE NEUBERGER FIRM, P.A. THOMAS S. NEUBERGER, ESQ. (#243) STEPHEN J. NEUBERGER, ESQ. (#4440) CHERYL A. HERTZOG, ESQ. Two East Seventh Street, Suite 302 Wilmington, DE 19801 (302) 655-0582 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Dated: February 7, 2008

LAW OFFICE OF JOHN M. LaROSA JOHN M. LaROSA, ESQ. (#4275) Two East Seventh Street, Suite 302 Wilmington, DE 19801-3707 (302) 888-1290 [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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TABLE OF CONTENTS NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 A. B. C. Plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Gordon and Freebery's Total Control of the County Government and the Police Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Defendants' Policy of Retaliation Against Their Opponents in the NCCPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

D. E.

Defendants' Illegal Election Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Form of Plaintiff's Protected Speech and Petitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Meeting With the FBI, IRA and U.S. Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 a. b. 2. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Meeting . . . . . 3

Testifying Truthfully Before a Grand Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 a. b. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Testimony . . . 4

3.

Follow-Up Statement to the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 a. b. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Statement . . . . 4

F.

The Content of Plaintiff's Protected Speech and Petitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Illegal Use of On-Duty Police Officers in the 1996 Campaign . . . . . . . . . 5 a. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Speech and Petitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 i

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2.

Freebery and Cunningham's Cover-Up of Her Son's Hit-and-Run Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 a. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Speech and Petitioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

G.

Defendants Retaliate Against Plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Denial of Two Promotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Freezing of the Promotion List To Deny Plaintiff Promotion . . . . . . . . . . 6 Lowering Plaintiff's Promotion Ranking on the New List . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Transfer to Southern Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Defendants' Personal Involvement in the Retaliatory Conduct . . . . . . . . . 6 a. b. c. Gordon and Freebery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 McAllister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. B. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Rule 8(a)(2)'s "Extremely Lenient" Notice Pleading Standards . . . . . . . . 8 1. Fair Notice is All That Is Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 a. b. The Supreme Court's Illustration of Fair Notice . . . . . . . . 9 This Simplified Pleading System Is Intended to Focus Litigation on the Merits of a Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.

A Plaintiff Need Not Plead Facts to Match the Evidentiary Elements of His Legal Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 A Plaintiff Need Not Plead a Legal Theory At All . . . . . . . . . . . 11 All a Complaint Must Do is State the Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ii

3. 4.

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5.

These "Extremely Lenient" Pleading Standards Apply In the Civil Rights Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

C. D.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 If a Complaint Fails to State a Claim, the District Court Must Allow Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review When a Complaint Is Silent On Whether a Plaintiff Was Speaking as a Citizen or As An Employee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

E.

II.

PLAINTIFF HAS APPROPRIATELY PLED THE CONDUCT, TIME, PLACE AND PERSONS INVOLVED IN HIS CLAIM TO PLACE DEFENDANTS ON NOTICE OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THEM . . . . . . . . 15 A. B. The Core of Operative Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Many Legal Claims That Flow From These Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1. Free Speech Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 a. Evidentiary Standards Do Not Apply at the Motion to Dismiss Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 The Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible . . . . 16

b. 2.

Petition Clause Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 a. Evidentiary Standards Do Not Apply at the Motion to Dismiss Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible . . . . 17

b. III.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY . . . . . . 17 A. B. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Facts Show that Defendants Violated Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Plaintiff's Rights Were Clearly Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Plaintiff's Long Established Right Against Free Speech Retaliation . . . 21 1. Garcetti Does Not Impact Any of This Long Established Law . . 24 iii

C. D.

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a.

Speech to Outside Government Agencies Has Long Received Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 (1). And Speech to Outside Government Agencies Remains Protected Even After Garcetti . . . . . . . . 25

b.

Subpoeaned Testimony Also Has Long Received Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 (1). And Subpoeaned Testimony Remains Protected Even After Garcetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Defense Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 (a). This Defense Interpretation Violates Garcetti's Express Admonitions . . . . . . . 31 The Garcetti Court Warned Against the Same Overbroad Interpretation of Job Duties Urged by the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Garcetti Court Also Explained That Speech Related to the Workplace is Still Protected . . . . . . . . . . . 33

(2).

(b).

(c).

2. E.

Free Speech Claims Have Survived Garcetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Plaintiff's Long Established Right Against Petition Clause Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1. 2. Garcetti Does Not Apply to the Petition Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 The Petition Clause Also Protects Informal Petitions To Non-Judicial Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Petitions to All Branches of Government - Including Federal Agencies - Receive Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 None of Plaintiff's Petitions Were Made Under Compulsion . . . 38

3.

4.

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

iv

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page

A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . 36 Abbatiello v. County of Kauai, 2007 WL 473680 (D.Hawaii Feb. 7, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26,32 Al Makaaseb General Trading Co. v. U.S. Steel International, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 485 (W.D.Pa. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Azzaro v. County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Baldassare v. State of N.J., 250 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-23 Barber v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 2006 WL 3772206 (W.D.Ky. Dec. 20, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F.Supp.2d 386 (D.Conn. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Batt v. City of Oakland, 2006 WL 1980401 (N.D.Cal. July 12, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,15 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,10 Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Bennett v. Murphy, 120 Fed.Appx. 914 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,22-23 Benoit v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the New Orleans Levee Dist., 459 F.Supp.2d 513 (E.D.La. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. Ex Rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 v

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Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge, 489 F.Supp.2d 562 (M.D.La. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3d Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,36 Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Black v. Columbus Public Schools, 2006 WL 2385359 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 17, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . 31 Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,16 Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . 36-37 Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37 Casey v. West Las Vegas Ind. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas, 2006 WL 2802209 (D.Kan. Sept. 29, 2006) . . . . . 31-32 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Inacom Corp., 2001 WL 789408 (D.Del. July 12, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11,15-16 Connecticut General Life Insur. Co. v. Universal Insur. Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 DeLuzio v. Monroe County, 2006 WL 3098033 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 30, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Deprado v. City of Miami, 446 F.Supp.2d 1344 (S.D.Fla. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20 Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,11-13,16 F.O.P., Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Fairley v. Fermaint, 482 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,29 vi

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Ferrone v. Onorato, 439 F.Supp.2d 442 (W.D.Pa. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., 947 F.2d 595 (2d Cir.1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,26,30-31,33,36-37 Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Gable v. Lewis, 201 F.3d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-34 Good v. Dauphin County, 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20 Green v. Barrett, 226 Fed.Appx. 883 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882 (3d Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,16 Hancock v. Washington, 2007 WL 1367600 (W.D.Wash. May 7, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Hare v. Zitek, 414 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D.Ill. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Hare v. Zitek, 2006 WL 2088427 (N.D.Ill. July 24, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-29 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Herr v. Pequea Township, 274 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37 Hicks v. Finney, 770 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,16,30,36 Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Hoppe v. White, 2007 WL 1141589 (C.D.Ill. April 17, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 In re Freebery, 930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007) (Table) (text on Westlaw at 2007 WL 2703156) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 vii

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Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F.Supp.2d 105 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Kirkpatrick v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., 128 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.Vt. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . 11-12 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,36 Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, Pa., 736 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37 Maloney v. Gordon, 2004 WL 1043202 (D.Del. May 4, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36-37 McLaughlin v. Pezzolla, 2007 WL 676674 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Moore v. Gabriel, 2007 WL 917291 (M.D.Ga. March 22, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-29 Morales v. Jones, 2008 WL 59370 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Paff v. Kaltenback, 204 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, ­ F.3d ­, 2008 WL 305025 (3d Cir. 2008) . . . . . 8-11,13-14,16 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,33-35 Porter v. Intermediate Unit, 2007 WL 2597911 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 5, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,33 viii

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Price v. Carroll, 2008 WL 170530 (D.Del. Jan. 17, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13,16 Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27-28 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Relational Funding Corp. v. TCIM Services, Inc., 2002 WL 655479 (D.Del. April 18, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 2006 WL 3262854 (D.Colo. Nov. 9, 2006) . . . . . . . 32 San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,35-37 Sassi v. Lou-Gold, 2007 WL 635579 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Shoemaker v. Allender, 520 F.Supp. 266 (E.D.Pa. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-25 Skrutski v. Marut, 2006 WL 2660691 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 5, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16 Springer v. Henry, 2002 WL 389136 (D.Del. March 11, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Springer v. Henry, 2004 WL 2127172 (D.Del. Sept. 16, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10,15-16 Taylor v. Town of Freetown, 479 F.Supp.2d 227 (D.Mass. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Thomas v. Ind. Township, 463 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Thompson v. City of Tucson Water Dept., 2006 WL 3063500 (D.Ariz Oct. 27, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Tillman v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc., 2005 WL 2127820 (D.Del. Aug. 30, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 U.S. v. Kemp, 365 F.Supp.2d 618 (E.D.Pa. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 ix

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U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-21 U.S. v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. Of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 United Mine Workers of America v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Walters v. County of Maricopa, Ariz., 2006 WL 2456173 (D.Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006) . . . 25-26,33 We, Inc., v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Weston v. Pa., 251 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,10,13,16 White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266 (1845) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,20 Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Constitution, Statutes, and Rules U.S.Const., Amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 42 U.S.C. § 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 42 U.S.C. § 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 x

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,13,16 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Fed.R.Civ.P. 84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING This case was filed on September 2, 2004. (D.I. 1). Following defense representations that any further proceedings would prejudice their Fifth Amendments rights against selfincrimination in the criminal cases against them (D.I. 8-9), this action was stayed on December 15, 2004. (D.I. 12). A First Amended Complaint was filed on July 24, 2007. (D.I. 14). The three year stay was lifted on December 13, 2007. (D.I. 21). Defendants then moved to dismiss the case, asserting issues that should have been briefed three years ago. (D.I. 22-23). This is plaintiff's Answering Brief in opposition to defendants' Motions to Dismiss. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1. Under long established notice pleading standards, plaintiff has appropriately pled the conduct, time, place and persons involved in his claim to place the defendants on notice of the claims against them. 2. It has long been clearly established that defendants could not retaliate against whistleblowing police officers who go outside the chain of command to report corruption to the FBI, IRS, U.S. Attorney and a federal grand jury. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Plaintiff. At the time this case was filed, plaintiff was a decorated and high achieving Lieutenant and 28 year veteran of the NCCPD. He had a spotless record and was a diligent employee who had always performed his job in an exemplary manner. During the many years that passed while this case was stayed, plaintiff retired from the NCCPD and became Chief of the Middletown Police Department. (First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 3, 88-93). B. Defendants. Defendant Gordon was the County Executive of NCC. He is a convicted criminal who pled guilty to committing crimes while holding public office. (¶ 4). Defendant Freebery was the Chief Administrative Officer of NCC. She also is a convicted 1

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criminal who has pled guilty to committing crimes of dishonesty and deception while holding public office. (¶¶ 5, 42). Defendant Cunningham was the Colonel of the NCCPD. Like the other defendants, he also is a convicted criminal, having pled guilty to committing crimes while serving as the highest ranking police officer in NCC. (¶ 6). Defendant McAllister is the former Colonel of the NCCPD and is the only defendant without a criminal conviction on his record. (¶ 7). Notably however, his initials are found in a federal criminal indictment as committing illegal acts on behalf of his fellow defendants. (¶ 12). C. Gordon and Freebery's Total Control of the County Government and the Police Department. Defendants Gordon and Freebery totally control each and every aspect of NCC government. They intentionally created an atmosphere of intimidation so that county employees would comply with their orders and directions, even if unlawful. These defendants also exercised total control over the NCCPD, from personnel and promotion decisions down to the most minute detail of day to day operations. Defendants Cunningham and McAllister regularly committed illegal acts on their behalf out of fear of the consequences of refusing their illegal requests. (¶¶ 9-13, 82-83). 1. Defendants' Policy Of Retaliation Against Their Opponents in the NCCPD. Defendants had a policy, practice and custom of retaliating against their opponents within the NCCPD. (¶ 9). D. Defendants' Illegal Election Schemes. In 1996, Gordon and Freebery began their illicit quest to gain complete and total control over County Government so that they could use it for their illegal ends. At the time, Gordon was the recently retired Chief of the NCCPD and was running for County Executive. Freebery was his successor and the then current Chief of the NCCPD who would soon become Gordon's second in command in County Government. (¶¶ 14-

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15). To accomplish these goals, beginning in 1996 and continuing through the 2002 elections, defendants abused their positions and, in violation of 15 Del.C. § 8012(d) and 15 Del.C. § 8002(6)(f), repeatedly and illegally forced numerous police officers, police academy recruits and other county employees to work on political campaigns on County time. These campaigns included those of defendants themselves, as well as the campaigns of other powerful state and local politicians. Defendants also forced other County employees to work on political campaigns and engage in other political activities on the clock, all in violation of state law. Defendants also ordered police officers to engage in numerous illegal activities on their behalf. In sum, defendants Gordon and Freebery: (1) illegally converted and stole NCC resources and used them to support political campaigns; (2) illegally forced numerous county police officers, police recruits and other county employees to campaign for politicians during working hours; and (3) illegally forced numerous Executive Assistants to work more than 900 hours on political campaigns, also during working hours. (¶¶ 15-16f, 10-12, 31). Defendants and their minions subsequently pled guilty to many of these crimes. (¶¶ 16a-16f, 4-6). E. The Form of Plaintiff's Protected Speech and Petitioning. 1. Meeting with the FBI, IRS and U.S. Attorney. On October 18, 2002, plaintiff attended a meeting at a secret location with representatives of the FBI, IRS and the U.S. Attorneys' Office to blow the whistle on defendants' illegal conduct. (¶ 17). a. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties. As was specifically pled in the Complaint, plaintiff attended and spoke out at this meeting "in his private capacity as a concerned citizen." (¶¶ 17, 23-25, 65-65a). b. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Meeting.

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Defendants eventually became aware of plaintiff's meeting with the FBI, IRS and U.S. Attorney's Office and were very angered and antagonized by it. (¶¶ 75, 20, 19, 119-20). 2. Testifying Truthfully Before a Grand Jury. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was served with a subpoena to testify before a federal grand jury investigating defendants' abuse of power and illegal conduct. On December 11, 2002, plaintiff appeared and testified truthfully before the grand jury about defendants' many illegal deeds. (¶¶ 18-20). a. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties. As was specifically pled in the Complaint, plaintiff testified before the grand jury "in his private capacity as a concerned citizen." (¶¶ 20, 23-25, 65-65a). b. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Testimony. Defendants were aware of plaintiff's grand jury testimony and were very angered and antagonized by it. (¶¶ 19, 75, 20, 119-20). 3. Follow-Up Statement to the FBI. On February 3, 2003, plaintiff spoke by telephone with the FBI and gave them additional information about defendants' illegal actions. (¶¶ 21-22). a. This Was Not Required by Plaintiff's Job Duties. As was specifically pled in the Complaint, plaintiff spoke with the FBI "in his private capacity as a concerned citizen." (¶ 23-25, 65-65a). b. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Statement. Defendants were aware of plaintiff's statement to the FBI and were very angered and antagonized by it. (¶¶ 75, 20, 19, 119-20). F. The Content of Plaintiff's Protected Speech and Petitioning. At his secret meeting with the FBI, IRS and U.S. Attorneys' Office, in his Grand Jury testimony and in his follow-up

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discussion with the FBI, plaintiff blew the whistle about defendants' misconduct as outlined below. (¶¶ 27, 33). 1. Illegal Use of On-Duty Police Officers in the 1996 Campaign. Plaintiff reported that defendants Gordon and Freebery had illegally forced numerous police officers to work on political campaigns during the 1996 election. For example, plaintiff explained how Freebery had shut down the Detective Division for an entire day and forced the Detectives to instead hand out campaign literature. Plaintiff also explained that Gordon and Freebery had forced him to recruit 25 NCC police officers to campaign, on duty, for Gordon's election to County Executive. (¶¶ 27-32). a. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Speech and Petitioning. Defendants were aware of the content of plaintiff's speech and petitioning to the FBI, IRS, U.S. Attorney and Grand Jury and were very angered and antagonized by it. (¶¶ 75, 20, 19, 119-20). 2. Freebery and Cunningham's Cover-Up of Her Son's Hit-and-Run Accident. Plaintiff also blew the whistle about a 2001 incident where Freebery and Cunningham ordered the cover-up of a hit-and-run car accident involving Freebery's son. The crimes committed by her son during the hit-and-run and its aftermath included: leaving the scene of an accident, failure to report an accident, driving under the influence, reckless driving and destruction of evidence. (¶¶ 33-64). However, due to Cunningham and Freebery's actions, the investigation was terminated and her son was never arrested or prosecuted. (¶¶ 46, 54, 57-58, 62). a. Defendants' Knowledge of and Anger About This Speech and Petitioning. Defendants were aware of the content of plaintiff's speech and petitioning to the

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FBI, IRS, U.S. Attorney and Grand Jury and were very angered and antagonized by it. (¶¶ 75, 20, 19, 119-20). G. Defendants Retaliate Against Plaintiff. In keeping with their well known policy of retaliation against all who opposed them (¶ 9), defendants then retaliated against plaintiff. (¶¶ 107, 94-116). 1. Denial of Two Promotions. In May 2003, defendants denied plaintiff two promotions to Captain, despite the fact he was ranked first as most qualified for promotion among all applicants on the oral board, and despite the NCCPD's historical practice of promoting candidates in the order in which they were ranked on the oral board. (¶¶ 76-107). 2. Freezing of the Promotion List to Deny Plaintiff Promotion. Subsequently, in December 2003, two more vacancies for Captain arose. However, to prevent plaintiff from receiving those promotions, defendants froze the promotion list and refused to post the vacancies. Defendants waited until plaintiff's promotion eligibility expired on March 19, 2004, before filling these positions. (¶¶ 108-114). 3. Lowering Plaintiff's Promotion Ranking on the New List. Then in April 2004, without justification defendants lowered plaintiff's promotion ranking on the new list to fourth. (¶ 112). 4. Transfer to Southern Patrol. Then in May 2004, "in a specific attempt to scare plaintiff into silence," defendants transferred plaintiff to Southern Patrol where he commanded 175 fewer police officers than he had in his previous position. (¶¶ 115-116). 5. Defendants' Personal Involvement in the Retaliatory Conduct. The Complaint also pleads that each defendant was personally involved in the retaliatory actions taken against plaintiff.

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a. Gordon and Freebery. Defendants Gordon and Freebery made all the personnel and promotion decisions in the NCCPD and, when they so choose, also exercised total control over day to day operations. (¶ 9). Together with the Chief of the NCCPD, they made all of the personnel and promotion decisions affecting plaintiff. (¶¶ 82-84, 107, 109, 111-13, 115). b. Cunningham. Defendant Cunningham was the Colonel of the NCCPD until June 2003 and is sued for actions he took against plaintiff prior to his retirement. (¶ 6). Cunningham, and the other defendants (other than McAllister),1 were involved in the decision not to promote plaintiff to the first two vacancies. (¶¶ 82-84, 107). c. McAllister. Defendant McAllister succeeded Cunningham as Colonel in July 2003, and is sued for actions he took against plaintiff after that time. (¶ 7). He, Gordon and Freebery froze the promotion list in December 2003, denied plaintiff the next promotions in March 2004, lowered plaintiff's promotional ranking and transferred plaintiff to Southern Patrol. (¶¶ 82-84, 107, 109, 111-13, 115).2 ARGUMENT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. A. Introduction. The defense motion betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the procedural posture of this case as well as the standard of review under which the Complaint must be examined. We are not in any post-trial briefing stage of the case, analyzing the most minute detail of evidence in a trial record. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. We are not at the summary judgment stage, scouring the discovery record for evidence to match the prongs of our legal theories. Cf.

As noted in the First Amended Complaint, McAllister is only being sued for his actions after he assumed command in July 2003. (¶ 7) Accordingly, the record makes clear that plaintiff adequately pled personal involvement of the individual defendants. 7
2

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Instead, we are at the motion to dismiss stage under Rule 12(b)(6) where Rule 8(a)(2)'s notice pleading standards apply. As our District has repeatedly explained, "[w]hen deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, one must read Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), which establishes the requirements for adequately pleading a claim in federal court." Tillman v. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc., 2005 WL 2127820, *6 (D.Del. Aug. 30, 2005); Relational Funding Corp. v. TCIM Services, Inc., 2002 WL 655479, *3 (D.Del. April 18, 2002). In a comprehensive recent opinion, the Third Circuit recognized the same. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, ­ F.3d ­, 2008 WL 305025, *3-7 (3d Cir. 2008). Reading Rule 12 in conjunction with Rule 8 is fatal to the defense claim that plaintiff has not adequately pled the elements of his legal theories. B. Rule 8(a)(2)'s "Extremely Lenient" Notice Pleading Standards. 1. Fair Notice is All That is Required. For more than fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected the heightened pleadings standards defendants seek to foist upon the Court and instead unanimously has reaffirmed its long time holding that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) indeed means what it very clearly says and that the Complaint must simply "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); accord Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-68 (1993); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351-353 (3d Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit has explained that this is an "extremely lenient" standard. Weston v. Pa., 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). As the Court recently noted, motion to dismiss pleading standards "can be reduced to this proposition: Rule 8(a)(2) has it right." Phillips, 2008 WL 305025, *7. The same Court recently warned against taking "an unduly

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crabbed reading of [a plaintiff's] complaint." Id. at *9. a. The Supreme Court's Illustration of Fair Notice. The nature and extent of these "extremely lenient," id., standards of notice pleading are best illustrated by review of the example cited by the Supreme Court itself in the context of addressing a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. In Swierkiewicz, the Court explained that Rule 8(a)'s simplified notice pleading standards are "exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms" which are "sufficient under the rules" in all respects. 534 U.S. at 513 n.4; accord Fed.R.Civ.P. 84. The Supreme Court looked to Form 9, which sets forth a form complaint for negligence which states in relevant part: On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4. Under Rule 8(a)'s notice pleading standard, this one sentence allegation on liability is sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Id. In the same way, the first paragraph of plaintiff's Complaint herein is itself sufficient to withstand the defense motion. It states: Plaintiff reported to federal prosecutors, law enforcement officials and the grand jury alleged wrongdoing in November 2001 by defendant Freebery who abused her authority to protect her son from an ongoing criminal investigation into a hit-and-run motor vehicle offense. He also reported that while she was County Police Chief defendant Freebery shut down the Police Department's entire Detective Division for a full work day and forced a majority of detectives while on duty to campaign in 1996 for State Senator Thomas Sharp and for defendant Gordon who was campaigning for election to County Executive. As a result plaintiff three times has been denied promotion to the rank of police Captain. (¶ 1). These allegations alone are sufficient to withstand the defense motion. b. This Simplified Pleading System is Intended to Focus Litigation on the Merits of a Claim. As the Swierkiewicz Court explained, "[i]f a pleading fails to specify the

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allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice," 534 U.S. at 514, rather than move to dismiss as occurred Swierkiewicz, id. at 508 n.1, the proper approach is to instead "move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding." Id. at 514. Once the defendant is on notice of the claims against them, "claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56." Id. As the Supreme Court explained, this is the proper approach because the "liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim." Id. Notice pleading "relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. at 512. 2. A Plaintiff Need Not Plead Facts to Match The Evidentiary Elements of His Legal Theory. As the Third Circuit held just two weeks ago, "[s]tandards of pleading are not the same as standards of proof." Phillips, 2008 WL 305025, * 18. As the same Court has previously explained, "[c]omplaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory." Weston, 251 F.3d at 429. In our District's words, "the federal rules do not require the plaintiffs to plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory." Compaq Computer Corp. v. Inacom Corp., 2001 WL 789408, *3 (D.Del. July 12, 2001) (internal punctuation omitted). The Supreme Court has held the same. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (rejecting the defense claim that a plaintiff need even plead the elements of a prima facie employment discrimination claim, because that is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard).3 In the same way, plaintiff is not required to plead each prong of any relevant

Notably, in Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973, the Supreme Court declined to overrule Swierkiewicz and its application in the civil rights context. In so holding, the Court explained that Swierkiewicz reaffirmed the longstanding rules of pleadings by rejecting the use of 10

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evidentiary paradigms required to prove his case. Rather than plead evidentiary elements, the Third Circuit has "held that a civil rights complaint is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible." Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353. In other words, all that is required is fair notice of the claim asserted, which as the defense statement of facts reveals, the Complaint clearly and abundantly provides. 3. A Plaintiff Need Not Plead a Legal Theory At All. In the same way, "Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a claimant to set forth any specific legal theory justifying the relief sought on the facts alleged." Compaq, 2001 WL 789408, *3; accord Kirkpatrick v. Merit Behavioral Care Corp., 128 F.Supp.2d 186, 191 (D.Vt. 2000). As the Third Circuit has explained, "[u]nder the federal rules, as long as the issue is pled, a party does not have to state the exact theory of relief in order to obtain a remedy." Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1989).4 This is because a "pleading is a vehicle to facilitate a proper decision on the merits and not a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive." Id. As one court has explained, a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim, as long as relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations. Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir.1992) (internal punctuation omitted). In light of this, it is not surprising that "claims need not specify in exact detail every possible

"heightened pleading standard[s]" in civil rights cases. Id. As the Third Circuit recently explained, even after Twombly, "the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) remains intact." Phillips, 2008 WL 305025, *5. Accord Al Makaaseb General Trading Co. v. U.S. Steel International, Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 485, 500 (W.D.Pa. 2006); see Connecticut General Life Insur. Co. v. Universal Insur. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 622 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Under Rule 8 ... [it] is not necessary to set out the legal theory on which the claim is based."); Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., 947 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir.1991) (federal pleading is by statement of claim, not by legal theory). 11
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theory of recovery, so long as they give fair notice of the claims to the defendants." Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge, 489 F.Supp.2d 562, 577 (M.D.La. 2007). Key here is fair notice of the claim. The legal theories themselves may change or develop during the discovery process as the facts play out. "The legal theories upon which a plaintiff will rely at trial may be developed during the discovery process, refined at pretrial conferences, and tested by motion for summary judgment." Kirkpatrick, 128 F.Supp.2d at 191. 4. All a Complaint Must Do is State the Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible. As stated above, rather than plead specific facts and legal theories, the Third Circuit has repeatedly "held that a civil rights complaint is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible." Evancho, 423 F.3d 347; see, e.g. Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1980); Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978); Price v. Carroll, 2008 WL 170530, *9 (D.Del. Jan. 17, 2008). In Hall, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a civil rights complaint. 570 F.2d at 88. The Court held that the complaint was sufficient to withstand the 12(b)(6) attack because the plaintiff has alleged the conduct violating his rights (racially discriminatory activity), time (March 17, 1976), place (King of Prussia) and those responsible (various state and bank officials). Id. at 89. As a result, the Court held that the complaint "is sufficiently precise to give notice of the claims asserted and withstand the defendants' challenge to its filing." Id. Similarly, in Boykins, the Third Circuit affirmed this precedent, holding that a civil rights complaint which alleged the conduct (racially motivated expulsion from the drill team), the time (1975), the place (Ambridge Area School District high school) and the persons responsible (the coach and school administrators), was legally sufficient and that "no more is required." 621 F.2d at 80. This is

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still the law today. See Evancho, 423 F.3d 347 (citing Hall and Boykins); Price, 2008 WL 170530, *9 (same). Accordingly, as the Evancho opinion makes clear, to provide fair notice under Rule 8(a), a civil rights complaint merely must state the "conduct, time, place and persons involved. 423 F.3d at 553. 5. These "Extremely Lenient" Pleading Standards Apply in the Civil Rights Context. As the Third Circuit has explained, "[d]iscrimination and other civil rights claims are clearly subject to notice pleading." Weston, 251 F.3d at 429. Just two weeks ago, our Circuit applied these notice pleading standards in the civil rights context. See Phillips, 2008 WL 305025. "[I]n federal civil rights cases, a claimant does not have to set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based, but must merely provide a statement sufficient to put the opposing party on notice of the claim." Weston, 251 F.3d at 428; see Evancho, 423 F.3d at 351-353 (surveying the law and rejecting the defense claim that Rule 8 requires heightened pleadings standards for civil rights cases). The marching orders of the Supreme Court in both Leatherman and Swierkiewicz are clear: the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a) applies in all civil actions, unless otherwise specified in the Federal Rules or statutory law. There is no federal rule or statute that prescribes a heightened pleading standard in § 1983 civil rights actions in which the defendant pleads a qualified immunity defense. Hence, we now make clear that which was implied in Evancho: a civil rights complaint filed under § 1983 against a government official need only satisfy the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a), regardless of the availability of a qualified immunity defense. Thomas v. Ind. Township, 463 F.3d 285, 295 (3d Cir. 2006). Once again, notice is the key. C. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standards. In light of this, defendants clearly have a substantial burden to carry in seeking dismissal of the Complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Courts must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips, 2008 WL 305025, *5. "While Rule 13

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12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at *6 (internal punctuation omitted). "This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. As the Third Circuit explained, motion to dismiss pleading standards "can be reduced to this proposition: Rule 8(a)(2) has it right." Id. at *7. D. If a Complaint Fails to State a Claim, the District Court Must Allow Amendment. "[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Id. at *17; accord id. at *1. "Moreover, we have instructed that a district court must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend." Id. at *17. The "court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time." Id. As our Circuit recently explained, not doing so is reversible error. Id. at *18. E. The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review When a Complaint is Silent On Whether a Plaintiff Was Speaking as a Citizen or as an Employee. As the Third Circuit has specifically explained in the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss free speech Garcetti context, when a plaintiff's complaint is silent on whether the employee was speaking pursuant to his official duties, "we read the complaint to allege that [the plaintiff] was speaking 'as a citizen.'" Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 242 (3d Cir. 2006).

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II.

PLAINTIFF HAS APPROPRIATELY PLED THE CONDUCT, TIME, PLACE AND PERSONS INVOLVED IN HIS CLAIM TO PLACE THE DEFENDANTS ON NOTICE OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THEM. A. The Core of Operative Facts. In defendants' own words, the "Counts of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint are grounded in the same alleged protected activity and alleged adverse actions." (OB at 4). Plaintiff wholeheartedly agrees. His claims can be briefly summarized as follows: Plaintiff exposed to the FBI, the IRS, the U.S. Attorneys' Office and the grand jury six years worth of defendants' corrupt practices while holding high public office. His whistleblowing angered and antagonized defendants who in retaliation repeatedly denied him promotion and took other adverse actions against him. As review of defendants' lengthy brief makes apparent, it is clear that although they do not like or agree with plaintiff's claims, they clearly have"fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. B. The Many Legal Claims That Flow From These Facts. Although it is not necessary under the standard of review, see Compaq, 2001 WL 789408, *3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a claimant to set forth any specific legal theory justifying the relief sought on the facts alleged."); Bechtel, 886 F.2d at 649 ("[u]nder the federal rules, as long as the issue is pled, a party does not have to state the exact theory of relief in order to obtain a remedy."), given the sheer number of billable hours and taxpayer dollars that went into crafting the defense opening brief in this time of tight County purse strings, plaintiff will briefly touch upon the wide range of legal theories that may be implicated by the undisputed set of factual allegations at issue in this case. 1. Free Speech Retaliation. A public employee's right to be free of retaliation for the exercise of their free speech rights is well recognized. See, e.g. Springer v. Henry, 435

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F.3d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 2006); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2006). This theory is neither new nor novel. a. Evidentiary Standards Do Not Apply at the Motion to Dismiss Stage. As explained in Argument I.B.2. above, a plaintiff is not required to plead the evidentiary elements of his cause of action. See Phillips, 2008 WL 305025, *18 ("Standards of pleading are not the same as standards of proof"); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (a plaintiff need not plead the elements of a prima facie case); Weston, 251 F.3d at 429 ("[c]omplaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory."); Compaq, 2001 WL 789408, *4 ("the federal rules do not require the plaintiffs to plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory."). In the same way, a civil rights complaint will withstand 12(b)(6) attack when it states the conduct, time, place and persons responsible. See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353; Boykins, 621 F.2d at 80; Hall, 570 F.2d at 89; Price, 2008 WL 170530, *9. b. The Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible. The time frame and conduct at issue involves denying plaintiff at least three promotions (from May 2003 March 2004) because of his whistleblowing to the FBI, IRS, U.S. Attorney and the grand jury, addressing defendants' corruption of the political process and the police department. (¶¶ 17-64). The place is NCC, Delaware. The persons responsible for all of these actions are Gordon, Freebery, Cunningham and McAllister. (¶¶ 82-84, 107, 109, 111-13, 115). Accordingly, the claim for free speech retaliation is adequately pled, and defendants are on notice of the claims against them.5

Defendants concede that plaintiff's complaint should survive 12(b)(6) dismissal if this information is alleged. (OB at 9). As noted in the text directly above, this information has been clearly alleged. Additionally, defendants' personal involvement in the adverse actions is specifically alleged and discussed in detail in section G.5. of the Statements of Facts above. 16

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2. Petition Clause Retaliation. A public employee's right to be free of retaliation for exercising their petition clause rights is similarly well recognized. See, e.g. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 435-43 (3d Cir. 1994); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 234-38 (3d Cir. 2007). a. Evidentiary Standards Do Not Apply at the Motion to Dismiss Stage. As explained above, a plaintiff is not required to plead the evidentiary elements of their cause of action. Instead, a civil rights complaint will withstand 12(b)(6) attack when it states the conduct, time, place and persons responsible. b. The Conduct, Time, Place and Persons Responsible. The time frame and conduct at issue involves denying plaintiff at least three promotions (from May 2003 March 2004) because of his petitions to the FBI, IRS and U.S. Attorney addressing defendants' corruption of the political process and the police department. (¶¶ 17-64). The place is NCC, Delaware. The persons responsible for all of these actions are Gordon, Freebery, Cunningham and McAllister. (¶¶ 82-84, 107, 109, 111-13, 115). Accordingly, the claim for petition clause retaliation is adequately pled, and defendants are on notice of the claims against them. III. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they claim it was not clearly established that they were barred from a continuing campaign of retaliation against plaintiff for his blowing the whistle to the FBI, IRS, U.S. Attorney and the grand jury. As discussed below, they are mistaken. A. Introduction. Qualified immunity is a two part inquiry. Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003). First, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [defendants'] conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id.

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Next, the court must next decide whether the right allegedly violated was a clearly established one. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). B. The Facts Show that Defendants Violated Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights. As explained in Argument II above, the facts as alleged in the Complaint are sufficient to survive the defense motion to dismiss. Accordingly, plaintiff has properly alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights. C. Plaintiff's Rights Were Clearly Established. "Once it is determined that evidence of a constitutional violation has been adduced, courts evaluating a qualified immunity claim move to the second step of the analysis to determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established." Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Bennett I"). That is, in the factual scenario established by the plaintiff, would a reasonable officer have understood that his actions were prohibited. The focus in this step is solely upon the law. If it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer what the law required under the facts alleged, he is entitled to qualified immunity. If the requirements of the law would have been clear, the officer must stand trial. Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added)); accord Bennett v. Murphy, 120 Fed.Appx. 914, 916-17(3d Cir. 2005) (Bennett II); Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 2005); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Defendants simply ignore this aspect of the law which analyzes the factual scenario alleged by plaintiff, not one wished for by defendants. The prong two question becomes would a reasonable public official be put on notice that the constitutional violation already established under prong one runs afoul of clearly established law.6

The reasonableness of an official's conduct is not a separate question from whether the law was clearly established. Instead, these are two sides of the same coin. The "relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. This is because "[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity 18

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If there was any doubt on what is needed to put a reasonable public official on notice of clearly established law, the short answer is found in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Hope held that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." Id. at 741 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court unanimously agreed on this issue. Id. at 753-54 (Thomas, J. dissenting with whom Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J. join) (agreeing that "officials can still be put on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances"). This holding is in accord with a plethora of preexisting Third Circuit and Supreme Court law, discussed in much greater length below, and puts to rest in our present case any conceivable uncertainty regarding the level of factual correspondence needed between the right asserted and prior cases. Even prior to the Hope decision, the law was the same as is demonstrated by many other Third Circuit and Supreme Court opinions. "[Q]ualified immunity applies if `reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful.'" Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 318 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Good v. Dauphin County, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989)). Continuing Thus, having determined that Doe has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, we must determine whether Doe's right [ ] was "clearly established" in a "particularized" sense. An