Free Response in Opposition - District Court of California - California

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KAREN P. HEWITT United States Attorney CHRISTOPHER P. TENORIO Assistant U.S. Attorney California State Bar No. 166022 880 Front Street, Suite 6293 San Diego, California 92101-8893 Telephone: (619) 557-7843 [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. PEDRO CRUZ-TERCERO, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Criminal Case No. DATE: TIME: 07CR3021-WQH

February 4, 2008 2:00 p.m.

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS: 1) 2) 3) 4) COMPEL DISCOVERY; FILE FURTHER MOTIONS; DISMISS INDICTMENT FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS; SUPPRESS STATEMENTS;

TOGETHER WITH STATEMENT OF FACTS AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

COMES NOW the plaintiff, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and through its counsel, Karen P. Hewitt, United States Attorney, and Christopher P. Tenorio, Assistant United States Attorney, and hereby files its response and opposition to Defendant's above-referenced motions. Said response is based upon the files and records of the case, together with the attached Statement of Facts and Memorandum of Points and Authorities. //

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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS PRESENT OFFENSE

On October 16, 2007, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Border Patrol Agents Jason Wardlow and Daniel Alvarado encountered Defendant Pedro Cruz-Tercero driving a white 1995 Ford Econoline van on Highway 76. The agents knew that the area where Defendant was driving is a route commonly used by alien smugglers to circumvent the I-15 Border Patrol checkpoint. The van sped up as it passed the agents. The agents lost sight of the van for approximately 30 minutes, but later found it parked with its doors open. After 10 minutes, the agents responded

to sounds in nearby brush and located Defendant. Agent Wardlow identified himself as a Border Patrol Agent. Pursuant to an immigration inspection, Defendant stated that he was the driver of the van and that he was a Mexican citizen with no immigration documents to permit him to be or remain in the United States. The agents arrested Defendant and transported him to the

Murrieta Border Patrol Station. At the station, at approximately 5:45 a.m., Agent Alvarado advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, which Agent Wardlow

witnessed.

At 7:45 a.m., Defendant made a video-taped statement in

which he admitted his prior convictions and that had not applied for readmission into the United States. Defendant was subsequently indicted on November 7, 2007 for Deported Alien Found in the United States, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a) and (b). // //

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B.

PRIOR HISTORY 1. Criminal History

Defendant's prior criminal convictions include the following. On January 21, 2000, Defendant was convicted on of Assault of a Person with a Semi-automatic Firearm (felony), in violation of California Penal Code § 245(B), in the Superior Court of San Diego County. Defendant was sentenced to three years probation and 270 days in jail. Defendant's probation was revoked on October 18, 2001, and he was sentenced to six years of prison. On October 15, 2001, Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11377(A), in the Superior Court of San Diego County. Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison. 2. Immigration History

Defendant was previously ordered deported on March 12, 2001. Defendant was most recently deported on February 16, 2005 through Calexico, California. II. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES A. THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE DISCOVERY AS PROVIDED HEREIN

Except as described below, the Court should deny Defendant's discovery requests. 1. Rule 16(a)(1)(A): Defendant's Statements.

The Government has disclosed all known written and statements of the Defendant and the substance of oral statements made by the Defendant in response to questions by government agents in this case. //

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2.

Documents, Arrest Reports, and Tangible Evidence.

In accordance with obligations under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and 16(c), the Government will permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or photograph all books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or portions thereof, which are within or may come within the possession, custody, or control of the Government, and which are material to the preparation of the Defendant's defense or are intended for use by the Government as evidence-in-chief at trial or were obtained from or belong to the Defendant. 3. Rule 16, and Brady: For Exculpatory Evidence.

The Government is well aware of, and will fully perform, its duty under, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Accordingly, the Government

will disclose exculpatory evidence within its possession that is material to the issue of guilt. Defendant is not entitled to all

evidence known or believed to exist which is, or may be, favorable to the accused, or which pertains to the credibility of the Government's case. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in

United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980): [T]he prosecution does not have a constitutional duty to disclose every bit of information that might affect the jury's decision; it need only disclose information favorable to the defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality. Id. at 774-75 (citations omitted). See also United States v.

Sukumolachan, 610 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1980) (the Government is not required to create non-existent exculpatory material); United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1976) (Brady does not create any pretrial discovery privileges not contained in the

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). 4. Rule 16, and Brady: For Sentencing.

The Government is also well aware of, and will fully perform, its duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) regarding evidence pertaining to punishment. Accordingly, and consistent with its position

stated above, the Government will disclose exculpatory evidence within its possession that is material to the issue of punishment. 5. Rule 16(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C): Prior Record

The Government has already provided Defendant with arrest reports, judgment and conviction documents for prior offenses and other evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Rules 16(a)(1)(A), (B) and (C). 6. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Evid. 404(b): Prior Arrests, Convictions Or Bad Acts.

The Government reserves the right to introduce such prior bad acts, and will address such evidence and its intentions in motions in limine to be filed separately according to the Court's scheduling orders. 7. Rule 16(a)(1)(C): Evidence Seized.

In accordance with obligations under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and 16(c), the Government will permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or photograph all books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible

objects, buildings, or places, or portions thereof, which are within or may come within the possession, custody, or control of the Government, and which are material to the preparation of the

Defendant's defense or are intended for use by the Government as evidence-in-chief at trial or were obtained from or belong to the

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Defendant. 8. Henthorn Material

Pursuant to United States v. Henthorn, 831 F.2d 29, 30 (9th Cir. 1991), the Government will comply with its responsibilities to review the personnel files of its agents who may serve as witnesses; and the Government will disclose any impeachment information regarding

criminal investigations.

The Government is presently unaware of any

criminal involvement by any prospective government witness, or that any prospective government witness is under investigation. The

Government objects to Defendant's request that the Assistant United States Attorney personally review all personnel files of prospective witnesses. 9. Expert Witnesses.

The Government will meet obligations pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E) to disclose information regarding expert witnesses. The Government anticipates presenting testimony of a fingerprint examination expert witness who will identify Defendant's fingerprints on documents from his A-file. The Government will produce details

regarding the nature of the expert's testimony, and the qualifications of the expert when a trial date is scheduled and any expert is obtained. 10. Impeachment Evidence.

The Government is unaware of any impeachment evidence of a prospective Defendant. government witness is biased or prejudiced against

The Government is aware of, and will comply with, its

obligations regarding impeachment evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

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11.

Evidence of Criminal Investigations of Witnesses.

The Government is currently unaware of any pending criminal investigations against a prospective government witness is biased or prejudiced against Defendant. The Government will comply with its

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and provide such evidence if and when it becomes known. 12. Evidence of Witnesses. Bias, Motive to Lie of Government

The Government is unaware of any evidence indicating that a prospective Defendant. government witness is biased or prejudiced against

The Government is also unaware of any evidence that

prospective witnesses have a motive to falsify or distort testimony. The Government is aware of, and will comply with, its obligations to provide such evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 13. Evidence of Criminal Investigation of Witnesses

The Government is unaware of any evidence indicating that a prospective government witness is currently under criminal

investigation by the Government. 14. Evidence Affecting Perception, Recollection, Ability to Communicate, or Veracity.

As addressed in items 12-14 above, the Government is unaware of any evidence affecting the perception, recollection, ability to communicate, or veracity of any prospective Government witness. The

Government will provide such evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), if and when it comes to light. // //

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15.

The Government Witnesses.

Is

Unaware

of

Favorable

Defense

The Government is unaware of any witness who made a favorable statement concerning the Defendant, or of any statement that may be favorable to Defendant's defense, which have not already been provided in discovery. 16. Jencks Act.

Consistent with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the Defendant is not entitled to disclosure of witness statements prior to the witness testifying on direct examination at trial. The Government

must produce these statements only after the witness testifies on direct examination. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 790 (9th Cir.). Indeed, even material believed to be exculpatory and, therefore, subject to disclosure under the Brady doctrine, if contained in a witness statement subject to the Jencks Act, need not be revealed until such time as the witness statement is disclosed under the Act. See United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 556 (9th Cir. 1979). The Government reserves the right to withhold the statements of particular witnesses until after they testify. However,

notwithstanding any statements the Government deems necessary to withhold, the Government will disclose witness statements prior to trial in as timely a manner as practicable, provided defense counsel has complied with his obligations under Rules 12.1, 12.2, 16 and 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and provided that defense counsel submitted all reciprocal discovery and "reverse Jencks" statements. The Government will comply with its Rule 26.2 obligation to

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produce for the Defendant's examination statements of witnesses in the Government's possession after, or shortly before, such witnesses testify on direct examination. The Government objects to the

Defendant's request that such statements be produced at this time. Similarly, if Rule 12(i) becomes relevant pursuant to suppression proceedings, the Government will comply with obligations to produce statements in accordance with Rule 26.1. 17. The Government Will Comply With Giglio.

The Government has not made any promises, express or implied, to any government witnesses in exchange for their testimony in this case. Therefore, the Government is currently unaware of any discoverable impeachment information pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 18. Agreements Between the Government and Witnesses.

Consistent with its obligations pursuant to Giglio, stated above, the Government will provide any agreements with witnesses. however, none exist. 19. Informants and Cooperating Witnesses. To date,

Consistent with its acknowledged obligation to provide discovery of prospective witnesses' statements, the Government would provide the requested evidence. To date, however, the Government has not employed any informants or cooperating witnesses in the present case. B. GRANT LEAVE TO FILE FURTHER MOTIONS

Although the Government does not oppose in principle Defendant's request to file further motions, the Government would oppose the filing of any further substantive motions that would not be

entertained by the court until the time set aside for motions in limine. If the defendant foresees the need to file further

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substantive motions, the Government respectfully requests that the defendant request, and the Court set, a separate date for an

additional motion hearing, and that any motions in limine and trial not be set until the conclusion of such hearing. C. THE INDICTMENT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 1. Introduction

The indictment returned by the Grand Jury in this case sets forth each of the necessary elements of a 8 U.S.C. § 1326 ("Section 1326") offense. Specifically, the indictment alleges that Defendant

(1) is an alien; (2) was deported from the United States; and (3) was found in the United States without the permission of the Attorney General. See United States v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 2001). The indictment in this case sets forth each of these elements, and is therefore valid. The indictment provides notice of the requisite elements of the offense of being found in the United States after deportation. "An

indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 (1980) (quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that Section 1326 is a general, rather than specific, intent crime. See United States v.

Ortiz-Villegas, 49 F.3d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1994); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 790 (9th Cir. 1968). Again, this conclusion

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means that no specific intent to voluntarily enter the United States need be alleged in the indictment where the defendant is charged with being "found in" the United States. See United States v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2001). In Parga-Rosas, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Section 1326 sets forth three separate offenses for a deported alien: to "enter," to "attempt to enter," and to be "found in." 1213. See id., 238 F.3d at

As the Court noted, "we have never suggested that the crime of

`entry' must be charged in order to charge the crime of being `found in.'" Id. In short, for "found in" prosecutions under Section 1326,

the indictment need not allege the specific act of entry into the United States. As such, Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment

should be denied. 2. The Indictment Need Not Allege Mens Rea

Defendant argues that the indictment must be dismissed because it fails to allege the mens rea element of the charged offense. Defendant's argument is contrary to United States v. Rivera-Sillas, 376 F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant's argument and held that a indictment charging a violation of Section 1326 sufficiently charges general intent where it alleges that a deported alien was subsequently found in the United States without permission. Unlike Id., 376 F.3d at 892-93. entry cases, Section 1326 "found in"

attempted

prosecutions do not require specific intent.

See United States v.

Ortiz-Villegas, 49 F.3d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that intent to be in the United States at the moment he or she is located is not necessary); see also United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1994); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 790 (9th

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Cir. 1968). In Pena-Cabanillas, the Court noted: The statute in question is not based on any common law crime, but is a regulatory statute enacted to assist in the control of unlawful immigration by aliens. This offense is a typical mala prohibita offense, [footnote omitted] and since it denounces the doing of an act as criminal, if a defendant voluntarily does the forbidden act, the law implies intent. [Cite omitted.] . . . It would be absurd for this court to think that Congress left `intent' out of Section 1326. Since Congress used no words bearing on specific intent, such an element is not part of the statute or of the government's burden of proof. 394 at 788-90 (emphasis added). be denied. Defendant also argues that the indictment must be dismissed because it fails to allege inspection and admission, or actual and intentional evasion of inspection. Again, Defendant's argument is In Rivera-Sillas, the Court Defendant's motion should therefore

contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent.

rejected Defendant's identical argument, holding unequivocally that the Government need not plead and prove entry in order to convict a defendant as a Deported Alien Found in the United States. F.3d at 892. Defendant also claims that the indictment fails to state an offense under Section 1326 because it fails to allege a voluntary entry into the by United States. Again, which Defendant's argument that is an Id., 376

foreclosed

Rivera-Sillas,

definitively

held

indictment alleging that the defendant is a Deported Alien Found in the United States, need not allege voluntary entry. 3. Salazar-Lopez Does Not Require a Different Result Because the Indictment Alleges Removal After Relevant Conviction Date

Defendant points to the Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in United States v. Salazar-Lopez, __ F.3d __, No. 06-50438, 2007 WL 3085906

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(9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007) as support for his argument that the indictment should be dismissed. In Salazar-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit

held that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), bars a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1326 from having his statutory maximum sentence increased for prior convictions, unless the

indictment alleges "the date of the removal, or at least the fact that Salazar-Lopez had been removed after his conviction." Salazar-Lopez, 2007 WL 3085906, at *2. The indictment in the present case

specifically alleges that Defendant was removed subsequent to October 15, 2001, the date of his prior aggravated felony conviction. Defendant argues, nonetheless, that there is no assurance that the grand jury found probable cause regarding the allegation of his prior removal date. Defendant provides no basis or authority for his

assertion, which is undermined by the plain-reading of the indictment returned by the grand jury in the present case. support, Defendant's argument should be rejected. 4. Prior Conviction Need Not Be Alleged Without further

As Defendant concedes, the Ninth Circuit has already rejected his argument that his prior conviction must be alleged in the indictment. United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2006). Because this court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendant's argument should be rejected. D. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND IDENTITY NEED NOT BE SUPPRESSED, AND NO HEARING IS NECESSARY 1. Defendant's Statements are Admissible

Defendant contends that his statements obtained by Border Patrol agents should be suppressed due to Miranda violations. As indicated

above, Defendant admitted he is a citizen of Mexico without proper

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documents to enter or remain in the United States.

Defendant was

neither in custody, nor subjected to interrogation by Border Patrol agents at their first encounter. A custodial interrogation is a prerequisite to the attachment of Miranda rights. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)

("It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation."). To

determine if a suspect is in custody, a court must assess the objective circumstances of the situation from the prospective of a reasonable person in the suspect's position. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2001) is instructive here. In Galindo-Gallegos, Border Patrol agents

stopped several aliens running near, but north of, the border between the United States and Mexico, and questioned them regarding their citizenship. In determining whether custodial interrogation took

place, the Court first noted the following: The material factual circumstances here are that (1) the questioning took place out of doors; (2) the location was isolated, away from view by the general public, but there were 15 or 20 aliens and only two law enforcement officials; (3) no one was handcuffed, but everyone was required to sit on the ground; (4) the questions were a necessary predicate to letting anyone go free, but were also reasonably likely to elicit incriminating admissions by those for whom the facts were incriminating; and (5) the group of aliens had been caught running in an area very near the border, and Galindo-Gallegos had persisted in running away from the border patrol but was caught and returned to the group that had been seated on the ground. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 734. Based on these facts, the court

upheld the admission of the statements, without Miranda warnings, because those facts showed a sufficiently public apprehension. Here, the apprehension of the defendant took place in a public

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place, which is sufficient to "reduce the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse." U.S. at 438). Id. (quoting McCarty, 468

Under both Galindo-Gallegos and Berkemer, therefore,

no custodial interrogation occurred. Defendant further ignores that statements made in response to routine investigative questions and on-the-scene questions at the border are admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 122 F.3d

837, 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (Miranda warnings not required where Customs inspector at border questioned defendant upon entry into the United States); Vickers v. Stewart,144 F.3d 613, 615 (9th Cir. 1994) (no interrogation when prison guard pulled defendant from scene of the fire and asked what happened). status. Defendant was asked his citizenship

This type of questioning is border-related and routine, and

does not amount to interrogation as conceptualized in Miranda and its progeny. The statement, therefore, is admissible. 2. Defendant's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing Should be Denied requests an evidentiary Ninth Circuit hearing and regarding his

Defendant suppression

motion.

Under

Southern

District

precedent, as well as a Southern District Local Rule, however, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress only when the defendant adduces specific facts sufficient to require the granting of defendant's motion. See United States v.

Batiste, 868 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (where "defendant, in his motion to suppress, failed to dispute any material fact in the government's proffer, . . . . the district court was not required to

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hold 783

an F.

evidentiary Supp. 1266,

hearing"); 1274 (S.D.

United Cal.

States 1991)

v.

Moran-Garcia, motion

(boilerplate

containing indefinite and unsworn allegations was insufficient to require evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress

statements); Crim. L.R. 47.1. Defendant here.

There has been no such proffer by

Requiring a declaration from a defendant in no way compromises defendant's constitutional rights, as declarations in support of a motion to suppress cannot be used by the government at trial over a defendant's objection. require declaration in See Batiste, 868 F.2d at 1092 (proper to support of Fourth Amendment motion to

suppress); Moran-Garcia, 783 F. Supp. at 1271-74 (extending Batiste to Fifth Amendment motion to suppress). believe that a defendant will have Nor is it reasonable to information than the

less

Government, and so should not be required to provide proof to support a motion. See Batiste, 868 F.2d at 1092. At least in the context of

motions to suppress statements, which require police misconduct incurred by Defendant while in custody, Defendant certainly should be able to provide the facts supporting the claim of misconduct. Without such a proffer, no need for an evidentiary hearing has been made. Moreover, any argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 requires an

evidentiary hearing in every case is of no merit. requires only that the Court make a pretrial

Section 3501 of

determination

voluntariness "out of the presence of the jury."

Nothing in section

3501 betrays any Congressional intent to alter the longstanding rule vesting the form of proof on matters for the court in the discretion of the court. See Batiste, 868 F.2d at 1092 ("Whether an evidentiary

hearing is appropriate rests in the reasoned discretion of the

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district court.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is warranted in this case. The Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that a government proffer based on the statement of facts attached to the complaint is alone adequate to defeat a motion to suppress where the defense fails to adduce specific and material facts. See Batiste, 868 F.2d at 1092.

As Defendant has failed to provide a declaration alleging specific and material facts, the Court would be within its discretion to deny Defendant's motion based solely on the statement of facts attached to the complaint in this case, without any further showing by the Government. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny Defendant's motion for further discovery, grant Defendant's motion for leave to file further motions, deny Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, and deny his motion to suppress statements. DATED: February 4, 2008 Respectfully submitted, KAREN P. HEWITT United States Attorney CHRISTOPHER P. TENORIO Assistant U.S. Attorney

s/ Christopher P. Tenorio

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that: I, CHRISTOPHER P. TENORIO, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. My business address is 880 Front v. PEDRO CRUZ-TERCERO, Defendant. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Criminal Case No. 07CR3021-WQH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Street, Room 6293, San Diego, California 92101-8893. I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused

service of GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them: Daniel Casillas, Esq. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 4, 2008 Respectfully submitted, KAREN P. HEWITT United States Attorney CHRISTOPHER P. TENORIO Assistant U.S. Attorney

s/Christopher P. Tenorio

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