Free Motion for Attorney Fees - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 1 of 18

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 04-cv-01071-MSK

San Luis Valley Ecosystem Counsel, Nancy Albright, James Martin, Jerre Guthals, Antlers Rio Grande Lodge, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, and Charles C. Powers,
Plaintiffs, V.

United States Forest Service
Defendant and

ALXCHNG, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company, CNXCHNG, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company and RIO OXBOW RANCH, Inc., a Colorado Corporation
Interveners

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

_______________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF ______________________________________________________________ Comes Now the Plaintiffs, Antlers Rio Grande Lodge, Inc., San Luis Valley Ecosystem Counsel, and Charles C. Powers, by and through the undersigned attorney Charles C. Powers, and move this Court for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412, and as grounds therefore state:

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 2 of 18

1. The applicants, Antlers Rio Grande lodge, Inc., San Luis Valley Ecosystem Counsel and Charles C. Powers are prevailing parties; and, a. Antlers Rio Grande Lodge, Inc. was a plaintiff and was at all times a Colorado Corporation with a net worth of less than $7,000,000.00. b. San Luis Valley Eco system Counsel, Inc. was at all times material herein a Section 501 (c) (3) charitable organization. c. Charles C. Powers, had a net worth of less than $2,000,000 and had no agreement for fee or remuneration with the other individual parties Plaintiff, but agreed with Antlers Rio Grande Lodge, Inc. and San Luis Valley Eco System Counsel to represent them on a contingency to accept as a fee whatever was recoverable on behalf of those parties under the EAJA. d. The Plaintiffs prevailed on appeal and were granted the requested relief which was reversal of the Decision notice of the Forest Service to approve a Land Exchange as arbitrary and capricious and not based on substantial evidence; and, e. An appeal to the 10th Circuit was dismissed and the mandate issued on March 3, 2008. 2. Charles C. Powers, Esq., is a pro se Plaintiff as President and as an owner of Antlers Rio Grande Lodge, Inc. and is attorney of record for himself and the remaining Plaintiffs. 3. He has been licensed to practice law in Colorado since 1976 and in Florida since 1977, and he has been actively practicing law in private practice since 1977. He has practiced general practice in Mineral, Rio Grande and

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 3 of 18

Alamosa Counties in Colorado since 1998. His experience and background is detailed in the attached affidavit Exhibit A and his time expended and costs incurred in this matter are detailed in Exhibit B. 6. At the time of filing this action, Charles C. Powers shared office space with Gordon H. Rowe Jr. an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Colorado and who agreed to appear of record as attorney for the Plaintiffs and accept any fee that might be awarded under the EAJA and with the agreement that Charles C. Powers would do most of the research and writing of such matters; Mr. Rowes' son, Gordon H. Rowe, III is an attorney as well licensed in Colorado New Mexico and Oklahoma, and he agreed to assist as co counsel and to appear in matters as necessary. Gordon H. Row III`s affidavit is attached as Exhibit G and his itemized time is attached as Exhibit H. Eventually this matter became too voluminous for them to handle on a contingency basis and Mr. Powers appeared personally and as lead Counsel of record July 21, 2004. 5. He represented the Plaintiffs with an agreement for remuneration that he could recover attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act if Plaintiffs prevailed. He received $4,700.00 toward costs from the San Luis Valley Ecosystem Counsel, and $2,000.00 from private donations to assist with fees of this litigation and otherwise has received no remuneration for his efforts in this appeal. 6. Chris Krupp, Esquire, is an attorney licensed in the State of Washington and actively practicing in State and Federal Courts and is a staff attorney with Western Land Exchange, Inc., a 501(c) (3) tax exempt organization,

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 4 of 18

dedicated to representing the public interest in federal land exchange matters. The Western Land Exchange filed an objection to the exchange that is the subject of this action at the agency level and an appeal to the Regional Agency level. Mr. Krupp provided legal consultation on appeal to this Court to Charles C. Powers, counsel of record as an attorney with expertise in the area of land exchanges, NEPA, FLPMA and appeals of agency actions. His itemized time sheet is attached as Exhibit C and his affidavit regarding his involvement in this case is Exhibit F. 7. Charles C. Powers, Esq., was required to put aside other matters and to devote considerable time and effort to this appeal which he would have otherwise devoted to legal matters undertaken for a fee. 8. The attorney for the Plaintiffs, Charles C. Powers, Esq. at all times herein charged $200 per hour for hourly work on matters of general practice and civil litigation. There are several special factors that warrant a higher hourly fee in this particular matter: a. this matter was undertaken, with no certainty of recovery and without being paid on a regular basis as would be the case in a typical hourly monthly bill fee contract; this matter has been pending for four years and throughout that time the attorney has had to work on this matter with limited compensation; and b. This matter involves a complex area of the law with an inordinate number of applicable statutes, regulations and case law that are

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 5 of 18

peculiar to this area without any general application beyond the area of agency appeals, Forest Service regulations and environmental law; and c. the prevailing rate for handling such matters is $200 to $400 per hour; and d. the record on appeal of this matter was approximately 4,000 pages and the factual issues presented were complex particularly in light of the disjointed nature of the Forest Service record presented on appeal; and e. the issues were not confined to a single error but encompassed the totality of the facts before the agency; and f. because of the above Plaintiff's were unable to retain an attorney willing to work on this matter as legal counsel for the fees provided under the EAJA. 9. The position of the United States Forest Service on appeal was not substantially justified. As the decision of the Court reflects, the Forest Service finding that the proposed exchange was not significant and; therefore, that no EIS was required, was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, the position of the Forest Service on appeal was, by definition, not substantially justified so as to require attorney fees and expenses to the prevailing party, the Plaintiffs on appeal. 10. The United States Forest Service appealed District Court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeal for the 10th District case #07-1292 and the Interveners appealed this Court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th circuit in Case #07-1308. The appeals were dismissed by Mandate

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 6 of 18

issued on March 3, 2008 and therefore this matter is final and a Motion for Attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act is now appropriate and timely. 11. Plaintiffs claim $134,365.90 as and for attorney fees and $4,756.63 as and for costs and expenses of this litigation as reasonable and necessary. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN USPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS I. AUTHORITY FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS The Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §2412, (EAJA) provides for attorney fees and costs to a party that prevails against the United States or any of its agencies in litigation including an appeal of an agency decision. 28 U.S.C.A 2412 (b) provides for attorney fees for the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency... in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statue which specifically provides for such an award. The purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate, for the average person, the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions; Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990). Congress clearly articulated the legislative intent to provide public funds to compensate private litigants for correcting unlawful government conduct: "The bill rests on the premise that a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the government is not only representing his or her own vested interest, but is also refining and formulating public policy...The bill thus recognizes that the expense of correcting error

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 7 of 18

on the part of the Government should not rest wholly on the party whose willingness to litigate or adjudicate has helped to define the limits of Federal authority where parties are serving a public propose, it is unfair to ask them to finance through their tax dollars unreasonable government action and also bear the costs of vindicating their rights." H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. At 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4988-89.

Although Charles C. Powers was a party Plaintiff he also was attorney of record for all plaintiffs. He originally retained an attorney in Washington, D.C. with Latham & Watkins who specialized in Forest Service matters but the fee at that time, 2001, was $320 per hour. Attorneys in Durango, Colorado who specialize in environmental litigation were unwilling or unable because of their schedule to undertake this matter. Gordon H. Rowe, III, an attorney in Albuquerque, New Mexico with knowledge of the lands in question initially agreed to make an entry of appearance, but was unable to continue to commit the time necessary to handle this matter (Affidavit Exhibit G). Western Land Exchange was unable to commit it's resources to this matter as lead Counsel (Exhibit F) and therefore, the Plaintiff, Charles C. Powers, having exhausted his knowledge of available environmental attorneys, was forced to handle this matter himself; and, therefore, the undersigned made an entry of appearance as counsel for all Plaintiffs (Exhibit A). The undersigned attorney devoted a huge amount of time away from his practice in this matter with $2,000.00 in fees and contributions to pay costs and pursued it to conclusion. As the file reflects, Mineral County was interested in this matter along with many residents well beyond just those who participated in the legal proceedings.

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 8 of 18

As the above congressional purposes indicate, the fact that an individual citizen has an interest in a dispute with the government does not obviate the justification to compensate them for the cost of the litigation when they are successful. This is such a case. The time and effort of the Plaintiffs herein benefited the public just as the congress envisioned when it passed the EAJA and attorney fees are appropriate. The enormity of undertaking this matter and the financial disincentive to devoting so much time from other gainful pursuits would have meant that this matter would not have been pursued, but for, the EAJA. II. THE MOTION IS TIMELY A application for Attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA must be filed within thirty days after the final judgment in the matter in which the application is made, 28 USC § 2412 (d) (1) (B). A Judgment is not final until all

appeal times have run and a mandate has issued. Bianchi v Perry, 154 F3d 1023 (9th Cir 1998); Kolman v Shalala, 39 F.3d 173 (7th Cir. 1994); Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 672 (11th Cir. 1990). In this case the Forest Service and the Interveners did appeal to the 10th Circuit and the matters were dismissed and the mandate issued on March 3, 2008. III. PLAINTIFFS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES Plaintiffs filed this action in 2004 seeking to set aside a Decision Notice of the Rio Grande National Forest Supervisor to approve a proposed land exchange between the Forest Service and certain private parties on various grounds including that the action was significant and that a full Environmental Impact

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 9 of 18

Study should have been done. An initial Motion for Preliminary injunction was denied as moot because immediately before the hearing on the Motion the Defendant, Forest Service, and the private parties, Interveners, filed a stipulation that the exchange would not be consummated pending the outcome of this matter. Eventually the matter was determined by this Court entering an opinion and Order that a full EIS should have been done prior to the decision notice and, therefore, the Court did not reach the other issues raised and the Decision Notice was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. A prevailing party is "one who has been awarded some relief by the court;" and requires a, "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties." See, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 532 US 598, 603-605 (2001). In this case, the Forest Service decision was reversed and remanded and the Interveners did not receive the federal lands at issue. In fact the land exchange would have occurred but for this action and said exchange would have occurred in violation of Federal law. The Plaintiffs obtained a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and are the prevailing parties. IV. THE FOREST SERVICE POSITION WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED

Under Subsection, 28 U.S.C.A. §2412 (d) (1) (A), Attorney fees and expenses are to be awarded unless the Court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 10 of 18

justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. The Equal Access to Justice Act [28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)] reference to "position" means, in addition to the position taken by the government in the litigation, the position taken in the underlying agency action. Bazaldua v. U.S.I.N.S., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 776 F. 2d 1266. "Position" as used in this section refers to and includes agency action which made it necessary for the party to file suit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., C.A.3 1983, 703 F. 2d 700. The definition of arbitrary and capricious is lacking in any substantial competent evidence to support the decision. The government bears the burden of proving that its position was substantially justified so as to avoid an Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) attorney fee award to the prevailing party, and the test for substantial justification is essentially one of reasonableness in both law and fact. Gutierrez v. Sullivan, C.A.10 (Utah) 1992, 953 F.2d 579, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S. Ct. 3064, 509 U.S. 933, 125 L.Ed.2d 746; Crawford v. Sullivan, C.A.4 (Va.) 1991, 935 F.2d 655; Russell v. Sullivan, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1991, 930 F.2d 1443. Whenever the government contests an application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, it must address the issue of whether the agency's underlying action that gave rise to civil litigation is substantially justified and whether its position in civil litigation is substantially justified, and the government

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 11 of 18

bears the burden of proof on both issues. Jones v. Lujan, (C.A.D.C.1989) 887 F.2d 1096, 281 U.S.App.D.C. 105. Examination of whether the government's position was substantially justified, as would preclude an award of attorney fees under the EAJA, encompasses an evaluation of both the agency's pre-litigation conduct and subsequent litigation positions of the Justice Department. Under this inquiry, it is not sufficient for the government to show that some of its earlier positions or arguments were valid, and unless the government can establish that all of its positions were substantially justified the claimant is entitled to fees. Myers v. Sullivan, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1990, 916 F. 2d 659. The court rendered a 25 page opinion in this case (Court Document # 116). At page 25, the Court summarized the crux of the ruling where it stated, "The decision to approve the exchange without an EIS was the product of an incomplete process, and therefore arbitrary and capricious." Thus, the Court has already ruled that the Forest Service Decision and the opposition to the appeal lacked substantial justification. V. THE NUMBER OF HOURS EXPENDED WAS REASONABLE The determination of how much to award for fees is committed to the court's discretion; Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2553, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). Plaintiffs claim that Charles C. Powers, Esq., expended a total of 606 hours on this matter. Included in that total is 87.8 hours of time spent during the agency action and prior to preparation of a Complaint for filing in this Court;

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 12 of 18

470.7 hours devoted to handling the action before this Court through the decision; 20.8 hours of time spent during an appeal by the Forest Service and the Interveners to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and 27.0 hours of time spent preparing this motion for attorney fees and costs. In addition, Chris Krupp, Esq. expended 61.3 hours in consultation with counsel of record Charles C. Powers and research regarding the appeal to this Court (Exhibit C) and Gordon H. Rowe III expended 22.5 hours (Exhibit H). Including all three attorneys' time, the total attorney time expended was 689.80 hours. This appeal involved a proposed land exchange that involved 11 separate Federal parcels of land and 11 separate parcels of non Federal lands. Each parcel had its own peculiarities which had to be separately analyzed in relation to the applicable law and regulations. Because the issue essentially was whether the Forest Service's decision was arbitrary and capricious, the issues were extremely fact intensive as well as complex insofar as the way those facts related to the applicable laws and regulations. The record in this case was 4,000 pages. There were interveners in the case who were represented by able counsel and filed separate motions and briefs. There were issue of standing and there was considerable effort to supplement the record. Although the supplementation was small in terms of pages, all of the supplements were figured prominently in the Plaintiffs' briefs. While the Forest Service may argue that the attorney time expended during the pre suit process at the agency level is not compensable time; in fact the familiarity of counsel for the Plaintiffs with the facts gained at that level was

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 13 of 18

essential to handling the appeal and, if it had not been expended, more attorney time on appeal would have been necessary. In the recent case of Tcemkou v. Mukasey, 022208 Fed. 7, 06-2638 (7th Cir. Feb. 2008), the Court approved a fee for 247.75 hours of attorney time for a relatively simple immigration appeal where the only issue was whether three separate episodes of persecution of the appellant, Tcemkou, was significant enough to warrant political asylum status. The record on appeal in that case was 600 pages, 15% of the record in this case. Yet the time awarded there is approximately 36% of the time claimed here. In the recent case of Conservation Alliance v. Richard Stema and U.S. Forest Service, 04-cv-1816-AP (Colo. D.C., 2006) Judge Kane approved a fee in a less complex matter that did not involve an appeal to the 10th for more than 770 hours of attorney time by attorneys familiar with the applicable area of law at issue. 689.8 hours in this matter was reasonable. In regard to the hours expended on this motion, the Court is allowed to award a prevailing party fees incurred in claiming attorney's fees. See Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1986). The time needed to pursue this motion is appropriately awarded as part of the fee in this case. VI. THE HOURLY RATE IS REASOANBLE Under Subsection (2) (A) The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 14 of 18

of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. Under the EAJA a fee of $125 per hour is specified; however, an increase for cost of living from the date of the statute, 1996, to the date of the service is authorized. In Gomez v. Sullivan, 778 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Colo. 1991) this Court held a cost of living increase is a matter of course. The cost of living increase since 1996 is calculated using the consumer price index for western urban areas for the year the fees were earned. Harris v Railroad Retirement Board, 990 F 2d 519, 521 (19th Cir. 1993). In addition, the rate may be further enhanced if the court determines that a "special factor", such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a special fee, 28 U.S.C.2412 (d) (2) (A). The cost of living enhancement is distinct from any additional enhancement based on "special factors;" Baker v. Bowen, 707 F. Supp. 481,484 (D. Wyo. 1989) This case was filed in May 2004 and the decision was rendered in May 2007, and an appeal was taken to the 10th Circuit which was dismissed as of March 3, 2008. Attached as Exhibit D is the CPI for Western Urban Areas reported by the United States Department of Labor through February 2008. The attached Exhibit B shows the itemization of time spent by Powers on this litigation. The attached Exhibit E shows the number of hours spent in each calendar year then multiplied by the applicable rate as increased by the appropriate CPI for the year the time was incurred. The total time of Charles C. Powers expended in this matter from the presuit agency process through the

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 15 of 18

appeal to the 10th plus the time on this Motion for Attorney fees and costs multiplied by the $125 rate adjusted by the CPI for each year is $96,097.12 (see attached Exhibit E). Mr. Krupp's time according to the statue plus cost of living is 9,687.40 (Exhibit C) and Mr. Rowe's time, which was all incurred in 2004 at the applicable adjusted rate of $155 per hour, was $3,487.50 (See Exhibit H). total time adjusted by the cost of living provided by the EAJA of the three attorneys without any special factors is $109, 272.02. In addition, as stated above, Plaintiffs were unable to obtain counsel to represent them after the withdrawal of Gordon H. Rowe III from active participation in this matter. A qualified attorney with special expertise demanded $320.00 per hour as early as 2001 in this matter. Plaintiffs could not afford the hourly rate of qualified attorneys and attorneys with specialized knowledge were unwilling to take this case on a contingency to receive the EAJA fees if successful. With the expert consultation input of Mr. Krupp and with the undersigned, Charles C. Powers, providing the lion's share of the work a successful alliance was formed. The fact that the undersigned was unable to obtain qualified counsel to represent the Plaintiffs and therefore was forced to do it himself is a "special circumstance" specified in the EAJA that justifies a fee at his ordinary rate during the time in question. The undersigned counsel's ordinary rate for the period in question was $200.00 per hour. (See affidavit attached as Exhibit B). At $200.00 per hour, his time of 606 hours is $121,200.00. The

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 16 of 18

In Biodiversity Conservation Alliance v. Richard Stema and U.S. Forest Service, 04-cv-1816-AP (Colo. D.C., 2006), Judge Kane approved a fee for the Plaintiffs of $175,569.24 on a requested fee of $209,011. Biodiversity was a less complicated case than the one before the Court and it was settled after the Motion for preliminary injunctive relief, but before final determination when the Government agreed to permanently drop the project at issue. Based on the analogy to the Biodiversity ruling rendered two years ago, the Plaintiffs request herein is more than reasonable. One of the factors the Court should consider in awarding a fee is the result obtained. Schwarz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 73 F3d 895, 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1995). In Biodiversity the Court awarded an enhanced fee of $225 per hour not because of the special expertise of the Attorney (because the Court refused to rule that environmental law is a specialty), but, rather, on the result obtained. The fee requested was cut only because the total hours were not justified, not the rate applied. In this case the Plaintiffs attorney was against the Federal Government which had two attorneys and interveners who had two attorneys. The case was more complex and was later in time; and, a lower number of hours was expended here than in Biodiversity (more than 770 in that case and 689.8 in this case). The total fee request in this matter including the request of Powers for a special factor for his time is $121,200.00, plus Mr. Krupp at the adjusted rate without a special factor of 9,687.40, plus Mr. Rowe's time at the rate adjusted for

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 17 of 18

inflation without special factors of $3,478.50 brings the total request for fees to $134,365.90. The request is reasonable and should be granted. VII. COSTS AND EXPENSES CLAIMED WERE REASONABLE Costs enumerated under 28 U.S.C. §1920 are recoverable and Courts have interpreted it to include filing fees, postage, telephone calls and delivery charges, see Burda v. M. Eckerd Co., 2 F3d 769, 778 (7th cir. 1993); see also 28 USC § 1920(3) ( including fees for printing among reimbursable costs), and Courts have held that costs of computerized legal research are recoverable as part of an attorney fee award, see Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank Trust of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (7th cir. 2004). The request of $4,756.63 for costs and expenses is reasonable. Wherefore, the Plaintiffs request the Court award an attorney fee of $134,365.90 plus costs of $4,756.63. Dated this 25th day of March, 2008 s/ Charles C. Powers Charles C. Powers 0020 Lodge Drive P.O. Box 1273 South Fork, Colorado 81154 Telephone: 719-873-1740 FAX: 719-873-1742 E-mail: [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiffs

Case 1:04-cv-01071-MSK

Document 132

Filed 03/26/2008

Page 18 of 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on the 26th day of March, 2008, this office served a true and correct copy of this Entry of Appearance and Certificate of Interested Parties via regular mail to the following:

Roxanne J. Perruso U.S. Attorney's Office ­ Denver 1225 17th Street #700 Denver, Colorado 80202

Terry Fox U.S. Attorney's Office ­ Denver 1225 17th Street #700 Denver, Colorado 80202

Charles B. White Petros & White, LLC 1999 Broadway Suite 3200 Denver, Colorado 80202

Jennifer Soice Pelz Petros & White, LLC 1999 Broadway Suite 3200 Denver, Colorado 80202

___________________________ Beverly Darrow