Free Brief in Opposition to Motion - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 04-cv-01160-LTB-CBS ISABELLE DerKEVORKIAN, Plaintiff, v. LIONBRIDGE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., d/b/a LIONBRIDGE US, INC., SHARRYN E. ROSS and ROSS, MARTEL & SILVERMAN, LLP Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS SHARRYN E. ROSS AND ROSS MARTEL & SILVERMAN, LLP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________________ Plaintiff, by and through her attorneys, Dietze and Davis, P.C., respectfully submits the following Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendants Sharryn E. Ross and Ross Martel & Silverman, LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). On a motion for summary judgment, all facts of the Complaint well-pleaded stand admitted. Harris v. Railway Exp. Agency, 178 F.2d 8, 9 (10th Cir. 1950). The pleadings of the party opposing

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summary judgment must be taken as true, unless by the admissions, depositions, and other evidence, it appears beyond genuine controversy otherwise. Day v. United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement, 466 F.2d 83, 86 (6th Cir. 1972). STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. Plaintiff is a citizen of France. French is her native language, she is fluent in English,

has a good knowledge of German, and speaks some Russian and Italian. In July 1997, she came to the United States and worked as an intern for International Language Engineering Corporation ("ILE") in Boulder under a J-1 Visa (Amended Complaint, ¶3). 2. Later in 1997, ILE decided to hire Plaintiff as a full-time Translator. To continue

working in the United States, Plaintiff was required to obtain an H-1B Visa. ILE hired an attorney to obtain such a Visa and Plaintiff subsequently was granted an H-1B Visa that was valid until November 9, 2000 (Amended Complaint, ¶4). 3. ILE ultimately became known as INT'L.com. In 2000, Lionbridge Technologies

("Lionbridge") acquired INT'L.com and its Boulder operations. As a consequence of this acquisition, Plaintiff became an employee of Lionbridge (Amended Complaint, ¶5). 4. In early 2000, Plaintiff was promoted to Project Manager. In that capacity, in late

2000, Plaintiff was granted an extension of her H-1B Visa until October 1, 2003. To continue living and working in the United States beyond October 1, 2003, Plaintiff needed to receive permanent resident status, i.e. a "green card"(Amended Complaint, ¶6). 5. In March 2001, Plaintiff was promoted to Translation Manager, effective April 1,

2001. This change of position required an amendment to her H-1B Visa. Lionbridge was aware of the need for this change, but did not file for an amendment (Amended Complaint, ¶7).

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6.

Under Lionbridge's Permanent Resident Program ("Program"), a foreign employee

can request sponsorship of his or her green card application. In September 2001, Plaintiff requested sponsorship under the Program. Under the Program, Lionbridge selects the legal counsel to process the application (Amended Complaint, ¶¶8, 9). 7. On December 17, 2001, Lionbridge informed Plaintiff that it had approved "full

sponsorship" of her application under the Program. On January 3, 2002, Lionbridge informed Plaintiff that it would have an attorney handle the application process and would begin compiling the necessary paperwork (Amended Complaint, ¶10). 8. Plaintiff still held the position of Translation Manager when Lionbridge agreed to However, her H-1B Visa reflected her former job of Project Manager.

provide full sponsorship.

In late January or early February 2002, Lionbridge determined that Plaintiff's Visa would have to be amended to reflect this change before an application for a green card could be filed (Amended Complaint, ¶12). 9. On February 11, 2002, Lionbridge informed Plaintiff that before the application for

a green card could be filed, Plaintiff's Visa had to be amended to reflect her current job of Translation Manager. Upon request, Plaintiff immediately supplied Lionbridge with written job descriptions for her former and current positions (Amended Complaint, ¶13). 10. In early March 2002, Lionbridge hired Defendant Sharryn E. Ross("Ross")and her

law firm to handle the green card process for Plaintiff (Amended Complaint, ¶14). 11. After agreeing to handle the green card process, Ross became aware that Plaintiff's

Visa had not been amended after her April 2001 promotion to Translation Manager. Ross knew that such an amendment was necessary before the green card application could be filed. Ross also knew

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that Lionbridge had been required by law and/or regulation to amend the Visa when Plaintiff was promoted, that Lionbridge was in violation of the same for failing to do so, and that Lionbridge was subject to a claim for back wages if it was determined that it had failed to pay Plaintiff the prevailing wage for the position of Translation Manager (Amended Complaint, ¶17). 12. Ross considered both Lionbridge and Plaintiff to be her clients in the process of

amending the current Visa and attempting to obtain a green card (Deposition of Sharryn E. Ross, pertinent portion attached as Exhibit 1, 8:21-11:23). 13. To obtain an amendment of Plaintiff's Visa, Lionbridge was required to represent to

the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") that it would be paying Plaintiff the prevailing wage for the Translation Manager position. This is required to prevent United States employers from taking jobs away from United States citizens by hiring aliens at salaries below what the employer would have to pay a United States citizen (Amended Complaint, ¶19). 14. On March 14, 2002, Plaintiff faxed to Ross certain documents that Ross had

requested from Lionbridge. On March 15, 2002, Ross's assistant, Shaun Foster, sent an email to Plaintiff, requesting certain additional information. Plaintiff emailed the requested information to Foster the same day (Amended Complaint, ¶20). 15. By March 15, 2002, Ross had prepared certain paperwork to be submitted to the INS

in order to obtain an amendment of Plaintiff's Visa. Although Ross was aware that Plaintiff had held the position of Translation Manager since April 2001, the paperwork incorrectly stated that Plaintiff held the position of Project Manager and that the promotion to Translation Manager was intended, but had not occurred. Upon information and belief, Ross intended to file this paperwork

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once she obtained information that the salary being paid to Plaintiff as Translation Manager met the prevailing wage requirement (Amended Complaint, ¶21). 16. Plaintiff had been informed by Lionbridge that the process for obtaining an

amendment of her Visa would be complete by the end of March 2002. On April 12, 2002, she emailed Foster and asked that she be kept posted regarding status. On April 16, 2002, Foster emailed Plaintiff and told her that the law firm needed to obtain a formal prevailing wage determination from Department of Labor and Employment for the State of Colorado before moving forward. Later that day, he emailed Plaintiff that the law firm had filed the request for a prevailing wage determination (Amended Complaint, ¶23). 17. On April 18, 2002, Ross learned from Renee Rinehart of the State of Colorado

Department of Labor Certification that Rinehart had placed the Translation Manager position within the category of "General and Operations Managers" with a Level 2 wage. This decision placed Plaintiff in the same category as managers at large companies who managed many more employees than Plaintiff. The prevailing wage for Level 2 "General and Operations Managers" was $106,288 per year. Under this determination, Plaintiff would have to be paid a salary within 5% of this figure in order to satisfy the prevailing wage requirement. Plaintiff then was making $57,000 per year. Therefore, the salary being paid to Plaintiff did not satisfy the prevailing wage requirement, under the determination by the State of Colorado (Amended Complaint, ¶24). 18. Ross and Lionbridge believed that Plaintiff was being paid a salary in line with the

prevailing wage for her position. Other Lionbridge employees holding similar positions at other offices were being paid salaries equal to or less than Plaintiff. Employees holding similar jobs at

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other companies in the same industry were being paid salaries similar to that being paid to Plaintiff (Amended Complaint, ¶25). 19. Ross believed that the Translation Manager position should have been classified as

Level 1, rather than Level 2 (Amended Complaint, ¶26). 20. On April 18, 2002, Ross communicated with Rinehart via email and questioned why

the position was classified as Level 2. Rinehart stated that Level 1 wages are for entry level jobs or positions requiring little or no experience and that Level 2 wages are for experienced positions. Rinehart stated that the fact that the Translation Manager position required a bachelor's degree and two years experience made it a Level 2 position. Ross told Rinehart that she disagreed with this determination and expected that certain new guidelines to be forthcoming from the United States Department of Labor would clearly state that a job which requires a bachelor's degree and two years experience can be classified as Level 1. Rinehart said that she would not consider changing her position until such new guidelines were issued (Amended Complaint, ¶27). 21. Had Lionbridge been willing to agree to pay Plaintiff, upon issuance of a green card,

a salary of $100,974, which is within 5% of $106,288, Plaintiff's Visa could have been amended and the green card application could have been filed using the prevailing wage as determined by the State of Colorado (Amended Complaint, ¶28). 22. Although Rinehart had elected to place the Translation Manager position within the

category of "General and Operations Managers," Plaintiff was not a general manager or operations manager and Ross did not believe that she was. Ross determined that if the Translation Manager position was placed within the category of "Managers, all other," the prevailing Level 2 wage would be reduced from $106,288 to $87,922 per year. If Plaintiff's position had been so classified, a

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salary of $83,546, which was within 5% of $87,922, would have satisfied the prevailing wage requirement, even if Rinehart had refused to classify the position as Level 1 (Amended Complaint, ¶30). 23. Ross did not attempt to convince Rinehart that the Translation Manager position

should be classified with "Managers, all others" instead of "General and Operations Managers." Ross did not tell Lionbridge that placement of the Translation Manager position within the category of "Managers, all other" would result in a lower prevailing wage determination (Amended Complaint, ¶31). As noted above, this would have allowed Lionbridge to proceed with the

application if it agreed to pay Plaintiff a salary of $83,546 upon issuance of the green card. 24. Although Plaintiff had asked Foster to keep her posted and although Plaintiff was

Ross's client, neither Foster nor Ross informed Plaintiff of the unfavorable prevailing wage determination, of Ross's communications with Rinehart, or of the new guidelines expected to be issued by the United States Department of Labor. However, Ross informed Lionbridge of these developments on April 24, 2002. In that communication, Ross told Lionbridge that a private wage survey could be commissioned, to be used in lieu of the prevailing wage determination. She told Lionbridge that she had decided not to do this and instead would wait for six weeks for the new guidelines to be issued (Amended Complaint, ¶32). 25. Lionbridge told Ross on or about April 24, 2002 that it would not pay Plaintiff a

salary sufficient to satisfy the prevailing wage requirement as determined by the State of Colorado (Amended Complaint, ¶33). 26. Ross could have applied for an amendment to Plaintiff's Visa without a favorable

prevailing wage determination for the State of Colorado. Specifically, if Lionbridge believed that

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it was paying Plaintiff the prevailing wage for the position of Translation Manager, it could have made such a statement in the application. This statement would have been challenged only in the unlikely event of an audit. Nevertheless, Ross did not seek to amend Plaintiff's Visa even though she was aware that such an amendment should have been sought when Plaintiff was promoted to Translation Manager in April 2001. Lionbridge did not want to seek an amendment because the INS might discover that Lionbridge had been in violation of the law and/or regulation that required the Visa to be amended when Plaintiff was promoted (Amended Complaint, ¶34). 27. After communicating with Foster on April 16, 2002, Plaintiff heard nothing for over

a month. She contacted Foster for information. On May 29, 2002, Foster informed her that the law firm had encountered a problem relating to the prevailing wage and that they were awaiting a clarification from the National Office of the Department of Labor. He did not provide any specifics regarding the prevailing wage determination received from the State of Colorado on April 18, 2002. Plaintiff asked Foster to find out from Ross when the clarification would be received. On June 4, 2002, Foster told Plaintiff that Ross said that the information from the Department of Labor had not been received. Foster said that he would notify Plaintiff as soon as there were any new

developments (Amended Complaint, ¶35). 28. Another month and a half passed without any additional information being provided

to Plaintiff. On July 15, 2002, she asked Foster for an update and expressed concern about the lack of progress and the fact that her Visa would be expiring in October 2003. On July 17, 2002, Foster informed Plaintiff that the law firm had been instructed that Plaintiff should contact Lionbridge for information about her case. Ross had been instructed by Lionbridge not to engage in further

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communications with Plaintiff. Despite the fact that Plaintiff was her client, Ross complied with this directive (Amended Complaint, ¶36). 29. Plaintiff contacted Lionbridge for information on July 18, 2002. On July 22, 2002,

Lionbridge told Plaintiff that there was a problem with the prevailing wage and that it was seeking approval of an alternative wage source. She was informed that the law firm still had not received the clarification (Amended Complaint, ¶37). 30. Although the prevailing wage can be established though a prevailing wage

determination from the State Department of Labor Certification, other methods are available. As Ross stated to Lionbridge on April 24, 2002, a private wage survey can be commissioned, to be used in lieu of a prevailing wage determination. Qualified industry salary surveys also can be used (Amended Complaint, ¶38). 31. Ross did not reasonably investigate the cost of commissioning a private survey. At

most, she merely talked to a lawyer at another firm, who told her that another lawyer in that firm had commissioned a survey at a cost upward of $10,000. Based on this information, which Ross admits is hearsay, Ross informed Lionbridge that a private survey to be used in Plaintiff's case would cost $10,000 or more. Lionbridge later relied on this information in deciding whether to commission a survey (Amended Complaint, ¶39). 32. Any source for a survey is acceptable, as long as the survey has state-specific

information and complies with requirements established by the United States Department of Labor. The survey can be conducted by an independent survey company or by the employer, itself. There were surveys available through industry associations that could have been used in 2002 to demonstrate that Plaintiff was being paid the prevailing wage for the position of Translation

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Manager. Ross failed to reasonably investigate whether such surveys might exist (Amended Complaint, ¶40). 33. On September 5, 2002, Ross emailed Lionbridge, asking whether it used any industry

surveys in its work. According to Ross, Lionbridge told her that the only industry surveys of which it was aware were not state-specific. According to Ross, Lionbridge did not tell her what effort had been made, if any, to find a survey that might be utilized in the process. Lionbridge made no effort to determine whether qualified industry surveys were available or whether there existed industry data that could be utilized to demonstrate that Plaintiff was being paid the prevailing wage for her position (Amended Complaint, ¶41). 34. Lionbridge's decision whether to pay for a private survey was given to the Site

Manager of Lionbridge's Boulder office. Based on the information provided by Ross, she believed that the cost of such a survey was around $10,000. Such expense would have affected her bottom line and she was not willing to bear this expense (Amended Complaint, ¶43). 35. On September 17, 2002, Plaintiff expressed increasing concern to Lionbridge at the

apparent absence of progress. She again stated that she was worried about the possibility that her Visa would expire before her green card process had advanced to the point where she could stay in the United States legally while the green card application was being processed (Amended Complaint, ¶44). 36. Plaintiff could have continued working in the United States beyond October 1, 2003

if her green card application had been filed at least one year prior to that date (Amended Complaint, ¶45).

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37.

Plaintiff's September 17, 2002 communication resulted in a meeting at Lionbridge.

For the first time, Plaintiff was informed that the prevailing wage determination indicated that the prevailing wage for the Translation Manager position was $106,000. She was told that Lionbridge could commission a survey at a cost of several thousand dollars, but that it would not do so because of the expense. She was told that Lionbridge would proceed with the application if she accepted a demotion from Translation Manager to Translator, without a decrease in salary. Translator is a Level 1 position and Plaintiff's salary was within the prevailing wage range for Level 1 positions within the category of "General and Operations Managers" (Amended Complaint, ¶46) 38. Plaintiff did not want to be demoted from Translation Manager to Translator, even

though her salary would remain the same. She believed that a demotion would have an adverse effect on her career and she did not want to limit her duties to translation work. There were many other non-management aspects of the job of Translation Manager that she enjoyed and did not want to give up (Amended Complaint, ¶47). 39. Plaintiff requested that Lionbridge arrange for a conference call with Ross, so that

Plaintiff could ask her questions. Lionbridge scheduled the call for October 8, 2002, which it stated was the earliest date that could be arranged. However, the conference call was not held. Plaintiff requested that the conference call be rescheduled, but Lionbridge refused to do so. Ross was aware that Plaintiff wanted to speak to her and ask questions (Amended Complaint, ¶52). 40. The new guidelines from the United States Department of Labor were issued in

approximately early October 2002. Ross received and reviewed these guidelines. She then spoke to Jim Shimada, a representative of the Department of Labor Certification for the State of Colorado, in an attempt to convince him to reconsider the prevailing wage determination issued in April 2002.

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He declined to do so. Ross had no further contact with the State of Colorado concerning Plaintiff's case (Amended Complaint, ¶53). 41. After the issuance of the new guidelines and her unsuccessful attempt to convince

Shimada to reconsider the prevailing wage determination, Ross continued to believe that the Translation Manager position should be classified as Level 1, rather than Level 2 (Amended Complaint, ¶54). 42. After the State of Colorado declined to reconsider its prevailing wage determination,

Ross could have challenged this determination by filing the green card application and stating that Plaintiff's salary met the prevailing wage requirement. Approximately two years later, a federal analyst would have decided the issue. If that decision was adverse, it could have been appealed (Amended Complaint, ¶55). 43. Had Ross elected to challenge the State of Colorado's prevailing wage determination

and filed the green card application, Plaintiff would have been permitted to live in the United States and work for Lionbridge until a decision was made by the federal analyst. Such a decision would not have been reached until at least a year after her Visa expired on October 1, 2003 (Amended Complaint, ¶56). 44. Ross did not tell Plaintiff that she could challenge the prevailing wage determination

or that she could file an application even without a favorable determination from the State of Colorado. Ross also did not inform Lionbridge of this possibility (Amended Complaint, ¶57). 45. Ross now contends that such a challenge would have been too risky, because it could

have been unsuccessful, thus wasting the time and effort put into the process. Ross did not ask

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Plaintiff or Lionbridge if they wanted to proceed with the green card application despite this risk (Amended Complaint, ¶58). 46. On October 15, 2002, Ross emailed Lionbridge, stating that the new guidelines had

come out, but that the Colorado office would not lower the prevailing wage. She stated that the only option was for Plaintiff to accept a demotion to Translator (Amended Complaint, ¶59). 47. On October 24, 2002, Lionbridge informed Plaintiff that the new guidelines were

not favorable for the position of Translation Manager (Amended Complaint, ¶60). 48. Although Plaintiff's job title was Translation Manager, management duties made up

only about 20% of her duties. She had only four direct reports. Her management duties consisted of writing yearly performance reviews for the four direct reports, approving time sheets and conducting a weekly department meeting. If these management duties had been eliminated, she still would have had sufficient work to easily fill a forty hour work week (Amended Complaint, ¶61). 49. Lionbridge and its predecessor companies, have assisted employees in the past by

"tweaking" job descriptions and/or job duties to meet the prevailing wage requirement. In fact, Lionbridge previously has removed direct reports to obtain a favorable prevailing wage determination. Such tweaking is a common practice (Amended Complaint, ¶62). 50. Plaintiff suggested to Lionbridge that her job duties be modified to take away her

direct reports, thus removing her direct management duties. This same action had been taken by Lionbridge and predecessor companies in order to meet prevailing wage requirements for other employees. Ross believes that tweaking of job duties is an appropriate way around a prevailing wage problem, if the employee actually will be performing the job, as modified (Amended Complaint, ¶63).

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51.

After Plaintiff suggested to Lionbridge that her direct reports be eliminated, Ross was told by Lionbridge that the

Lionbridge asked Ross whether this could be done.

elimination of direct reports would take away most of Plaintiff's job duties and "it wouldn't be the job anymore." Based on this representation, Ross told Lionbridge that this was not an option. However, Ross did not ask Plaintiff whether Lionbridge's representation was true (Amended Complaint, ¶64). 52. Although Ross believes that tweaking of job duties is appropriate if the employee

actually will be performing the job, as modified, she believes that modification of the job to lessen its requirements may open the position to qualified United States citizens. In such event, the employer would be unable to demonstrate that there are no United States citizens qualified to perform the job, a showing required for the issuance of H-1B Visas and green cards (Amended Complaint, ¶65). 53. Although the lessening of job requirements makes it more likely that the job could

be opened to qualified United States citizens, Ross believes that the existence of a language requirement can eliminate that concern, since it is difficult to find United States citizens fluent in a foreign language and having knowledge of foreign language computer terminology and software applications (Amended Complaint, ¶66). 54. Ross contends that removal of Plaintiff's direct reports would have opened the job to

qualified United States citizens. She acknowledges, however, that the existence of a language requirement for the position of Translation Manager would have eliminated this concern (Amended Complaint, ¶67).

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55.

The written job description for the position of Translation Manager was provided to

Ross by Lionbridge and is contained in her file. This document indicates that the job requires a Bachelor's Degree in translation, two to four years translation experience, and knowledge of other languages. It requires training and supervision of other translators. Under "Position Summary" on the first page of the job description, it states, "This position is primarily responsible for supervising the in-house and external translators and the accomplishments of the translation portion of projects including the quality of the service" (Amended Complaint, ¶68) 56. Ross claims that she asked and was told by Lionbridge that there was no language

requirement for the Translation Manager position. She contends that, based on this representation, she believed that there was no language requirement, even though the written job description was then in her possession. Ross has admitted that she did not know what Plaintiff did on her job. She never asked Plaintiff about her job duties or whether knowledge of a foreign language was required to perform her job (Amended Complaint, ¶69). 57. Ross never discussed the relevance of the language requirement with Lionbridge or

Plaintiff. Since the inclusion of a language requirement would have eliminated the concern that the removal of the direct reports would make the job available to United States citizens, Plaintiff's job duties could have been changed to eliminate her four direct reports and reduce the job from Level 2 to Level 1. If this effort was successful, the green card application could have been filed with a favorable prevailing wage determination from the State of Colorado (Amended Complaint, ¶70). 58. Plaintiff suggested that she be given the title of Translation Supervisor, which would

eliminate her management duties, but would preserve the desirable non-management aspects of her job that distinguished her position from that of Translator. This job title had been held by employees

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at other Lionbridge offices. Lionbridge communicated this suggestion to Ross, stating "the job would actually entail technical translation with lead responsibilities over other translators." Ross told Lionbridge that this would not change the result (Amended Complaint, ¶71). 59. After Lionbridge received Ross's opinion, it rejected Plaintiff's suggestion that her

job be changed to Translation Supervisor (Amended Complaint, ¶72). Lionbridge relied on Ross's advice in making this decision (Deposition of Jennifer Lynn Tymkovich, pertinent portions attached as Exhibit 2, 143:5-144:11). 60. Although Ross told Lionbridge that changing the job title to Translation Supervisor

would not change the prevailing wage, she did not have sufficient information to make that determination. She now asserts that she needed to see a complete job description for the proposed Translation Supervisor position. However, she did not request that she be provided with one or indicate to Lionbridge that she needed more information before she could render an opinion on this question (Amended Complaint, ¶73). 61. Although Lionbridge said that it would proceed with the green card application only

if Plaintiff accepted a demotion to Translator before the application was filed, an immediate demotion was not required. The employer is required only to represent that it will have the designated job available for the applicant when the green card is issued. Therefore, Plaintiff could have remained in the position of Translation Manager pending the application for a green card for the position of Translator (Amended Complaint, ¶74). 62. Through her own investigation, Plaintiff learned that any demotion accepted for

purposes of a green card application does not have to be made effective until the application is granted. Plaintiff provided this information to Lionbridge and expressed a willingness to accept a

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future demotion to Translator, while continuing to hold her Translation Manager position during the pendency of her application (Amended Complaint, ¶75). 63. Lionbridge told Ross that Plaintiff had offered to accept a future demotion. Ross

knew that the green card application could be filed for the position of Translator, without requiring Plaintiff to accept an immediate demotion (Amended Complaint, ¶76). 64. Lionbridge refused Plaintiff's suggestion that she accept a future demotion. This

decision was based on advice from Ross. It continued to insist, without explanation, that the application could not be filed without an immediate demotion. Ross was aware that Lionbridge had refused Plaintiff's suggestion. Lionbridge's insistence that Plaintiff accept an immediate demotion was motivated in part by its awareness that Plaintiff's retention of the Translation Manager position, without amendment to her Visa, would cause Lionbridge to be in continued violation of the law and/or regulations that required an amendment upon Plaintiff's promotion in April 2001 (Amended Complaint, ¶77; Deposition of Tymkovich, 135:11-138:24). 65. Ross now agrees that the green card application could have been filed for the position

of Translator without requiring Plaintiff to accept an immediate demotion, but asserts that this could have raised a red flag at the INS and caused it to question whether Plaintiff actually would be performing the job of Translator. She did not ask Plaintiff if she wanted to proceed with the application despite this alleged risk (Amended Complaint, ¶78). 66. In November 2002, Plaintiff retained legal counsel to represent her in her discussions

with Lionbridge. On December 5, 2002, counsel sent a letter to Lionbridge, stating that Lionbridge had refused to bear the cost of a survey, to increase Plaintiff's salary to meet the prevailing wage determination, or to modify her job description, and had insisted that an immediate demotion was

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necessary before the green card application could be filed. The letter stated that a Denver immigration attorney consulted by Plaintiff had indicated that an immediate demotion was not required. The letter requested that Lionbridge authorize Plaintiff to retain her own immigration counsel, at Lionbridge expense, to proceed forward (Amended Complaint, ¶79). 67. Lionbridge provided the December 5, 2002 letter to its General Counsel, Peggy

Shukur, who sent it to Ross for review and comment. Shukur also provided Ross with a draft of a proposed response (Amended Complaint, ¶80). 68. Ross knew that a dispute existed between Plaintiff and Lionbridge and that the

interests of her two clients were in conflict and had been in conflict for over six months (Amended Complaint, ¶81). 69. Despite this conflict of interest, Ross provided certain information and advice to

Shukur, who modified the proposed response based on Ross's comments and suggestions (Amended Complaint, ¶82). 70. In a letter dated December 20, 2002, Shukur acknowledged that the green card

application could have been filed for the position of Translator without requiring an immediate demotion. However, she stated that this would raise a red flag at the INS and reiterated Lionbridge's position that it would proceed with the green card application only if Plaintiff accepted an immediate demotion. This letter also stated that Lionbridge sponsored many employees and would not take any action that could jeopardize its credibility before the governmental agencies that examine the applications. The letter refused Plaintiff's request that she be allowed to hire separate immigration counsel, stating that employees were required to use counsel designated by Lionbridge for the entire process (Amended Complaint, ¶83).

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71.

With regard to the possibility of modifying Plaintiff's job description, the December

20, 2002 letter stated that taking away Plaintiff's management responsibilities was not feasible, because management was her main responsibility. Through counsel, Plaintiff told Shukur in late December 2002 that management responsibilities made up only 20% of her duties and that other duties, formerly performed by Plaintiff, could be added to Plaintiff's responsibilities if the management duties were eliminated. Plaintiff also asked Shukur to consider applying for the green card using the position of Translation Supervisor (Amended Complaint, ¶84). 72. Shukur forwarded Plaintiff's counsel's email to Ross, stating that Shukur was

prepared to reject the suggestions unless Ross convinced her otherwise. Shukur expressed the opinion that the Translation Supervisor job would start the process over, unless it was a Level 1 job. Shukur requested comment from Ross on this question (Amended Complaint, ¶85). 73. Despite her conflict of interest, Ross provided further advice and comment to

Shukur. Upon information and belief, Ross still did not have sufficient information to determine whether the position of Translation Supervisor was a Level 1 job and did not request such information from Shukur (Amended Complaint, ¶86). 74. On January 7, 2003, Shukur rejected the suggestion that Plaintiff be made a

Translation Supervisor. She stated that Plaintiff's sole option was an immediate demotion to Translator. Since Plaintiff was unwilling to accept an immediate demotion, the discussions ceased (Amended Complaint, ¶87). 75. At the time that she was acting as legal counsel for Plaintiff with respect to the effort

to obtain a green card, Ross also represented another party with conflicting interests, namely Lionbridge (Amended Complaint, ¶113).

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76.

At no time did Ross provide adequate and meaningful disclosures to Plaintiff or seek

or receive her informed consent (Amended Complaint, ¶114). 77. While purporting to represent Plaintiff, Ross in fact worked to protect and advance

the interests of Lionbridge to the disadvantage and detriment of Plaintiff (Amended Complaint, ¶115). 78. As counsel for Plaintiff, Ross owed her duties of undivided loyalty, faithfulness,

diligence and due care. She was obligated to employ the degree of knowledge, skill and independent judgment possessed by members of the legal profession in her community and in the State of Colorado. Ross's duty of undivided loyalty, faithfulness and diligence required her to avoid conflicts of interest and to act at all times in the best interest of Plaintiff (Amended Complaint, ¶116). 79. Ross was negligent and careless in that she breached her duties of care and loyalty

in several respects, including: a. Representing parties with conflicting interests without full disclosure and informed consent; b. Advancing and protecting the interest of Lionbridge to the disadvantage and detriment of Plaintiff; c d. Failing to deal openly, candidly, and honestly with Plaintiff; Failing to inform Plaintiff about matters relevant to the effort to obtain a green card, including:

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(1)

the specifics of the prevailing wage determination, including the tremendous gap between the figure received from the State of Colorado and the salary being paid to Plaintiff;

(2)

the possibility of reducing the prevailing wage, as determined by the State of Colorado, by placing her position in the "Managers, all other" category.

(3)

the ability to challenge the State of Colorado's prevailing wage determination and file the green card application despite that determination.

(4)

the ability to file the green card application for the position of Translator without the necessity of an immediate demotion.

e.

Failing to adequately investigate the cost of conducting a private survey and, instead, informing Lionbridge that the cost would be $10,000 or more, knowing that Lionbridge would rely on this information in deciding whether to pay for such a survey.

f.

Failing to adequately investigate the availability of industry surveys that could be used to demonstrate that Plaintiff was being paid the prevailing wage for her position.

g.

Declining to allow Plaintiff to communicate further with her office after being so instructed by Lionbridge.

h.

Failing to contact Plaintiff in early October, after learning that Plaintiff wished to ask Ross questions about her case.

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i.

Telling Lionbridge that the job of Translation Supervisor would not be a Level 1 position, while knowing she did not have sufficient information to make that determination.

j.

Failing to discuss with Plaintiff any perceived risks associated with challenging the prevailing wage determination or filing the green card application for Translator without an immediate demotion and failing to allow Plaintiff to make the decision whether to move forward in the face of any such risks.

k.

Accepting Lionbridge's representation that the removal of Plaintiff's management duties would effectively eliminate her job and then providing Lionbridge with an opinion based on such representation, without making any attempt to confirm whether such representation was true.

l.

Failing to read the job description for the position of Translation Manager, resulting in a misunderstanding of Plaintiff's duties and of the need for knowledge of a foreign language or languages.

m.

Failing to explain the relevance of a language requirement to Plaintiff or Lionbridge, which explanation likely would have resulted in Ross learning of the existence of that requirement, thus permitting the removal of direct reports without the concern of opening up the position to qualified United States citizens.

n.

Failing to advise Plaintiff of the obvious conflict between Plaintiff's interests and those of Lionbridge.

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o.

Providing assistance to Lionbridge in responding to Plaintiff's counsel's correspondence, knowing that a dispute existed between the two parties.

p.

Allowing the decision whether to file the green card application to be determined by Lionbridge's alleged concerns about its credibility before government agencies.

(Amended Complaint, ¶117). ARGUMENT A. Existence of Duty.

Ross contends that she never understood herself to be acting as Plaintiff's attorney. However, she testified at her deposition that she considered both Lionbridge and Plaintiff to be her clients. In her affidavit submitted with her motion, she now contends that she understood the question and her answer to mean that had "the process" gone forward, she would be representing both Lionbridge and Plaintiff. Neither the question nor the answer were limited in this fashion. Ross certainly is entitled to explain her answer at trial, but her testimony is evidence that she believed that Plaintiff was her client during the process to amend the current Visa and to obtain a green card. Ross has acknowledged that she prepared the "Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative," attached to her affidavit. This document, which was never signed or filed because of the problems with the prevailing wage, stated that Ross was entering her appearance as attorney for both Lionbridge and Plaintiff. Ross's affidavit indicates that she would have filed the document had the process proceeded forward. The entry of appearance, although not filed, is

further evidence that Ross considered herself to be Plaintiff's attorney at the time it was prepared.

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Ross claims that she expected to represent both Lionbridge and Plaintiff, but since the filing process did not begin, her only client was Lionbridge (Affidavit of Sharryn E. Ross, ¶10). However, she was not retained simply to file the green card application. By her own admission, she was asked by Lionbridge "to move forward with filing for permanent residence (the so-called `green card') for Ms. Isabelle DerKervorkian" (Affidavit of Sharryn E. Ross, ¶4). Early in the process, she recognized that an application could be filed only after Plaintiff's Visa had been amended to reflect her current position (Affidavit of Sharryn E. Ross, attached as Exhibit A-1 to Ross's Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶¶4,5). Ross did not tell Lionbridge that this was beyond the scope of her retention. Rather, she proceeded to take certain pre-filing actions towards obtaining the amendment - all part of the process of moving forward with filing for permanent residence (Affidavit of Ross, ¶¶4,5,6,7,9). Ross states, "If that (filing of the green card application) had occurred, Ross would then have represented both Lionbridge and DerKervorkian in the matter" (Motion for Summary Judgment at 6). This in itself is an acknowledgment that Ross knew that her retention to move forward toward the filing for permanent residence, which included the necessary amendment of the Visa, was on behalf of both parties. If a husband and wife ask an attorney to file a joint petition for divorce and the attorney accepts the assignment and proceeds to gather information towards that end, a subsequent decision not to file jointly does not mean that no attorney-client relationship was formed or that the attorney can later provide the husband with advice against the wife. There is no question that there is evidence that Ross believed that she had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, that the scope of her legal services included matters preparatory to the filing of the green card application, and that her conduct in such pre-filing matters brought the

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process to a halt. The fact that Plaintiff did not know that Ross was acting as her attorney does not defeat the existence of the attorney-client relationship or the duty of care arising from these circumstances. The attorney-client relationship can be created by the client's agent. 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice §8.3 (2005 Ed.) at 934, citing Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 196 (2000) ("The relationship may arise without any direct dealings between the client and the attorney"). In Simon v. Wilson, 684 N.E. 2d 495 (Ill. App. 1997), the wife was suffering from diminished physical and mental abilities and was dependent upon the husband for attention to her personal and financial needs. She could not leave her home unassisted and her eyesight was so poor that she couldn't read the newspaper or other printed materials. While she was in this condition, the husband hired an attorney to assist in the planning of his and his wife's estate. He told the attorney that his wife was ill and could not join their meetings. Shortly thereafter, the wife was hospitalized and, at the request of her husband, signed a power of attorney to enable him to handle financial matters and accomplish their estate planning. Thereafter, the husband formally engaged the attorney, who then prepared a will for the wife. The attorney never met or spoke with the wife. After the wife died and the wife's legatees did not receive what they believed had been intended by the wife, they sued the husband on various claims and sued the attorney for legal malpractice, claiming that he failed to ascertain and protect the wife's interests, resulting in the frustration of her testamentary intentions. Id. at 794-5. Plaintiff legatees submitted an unrebutted expert opinion that the wife was a client of the attorney, thereby creating a duty that was subsequently breached. Nevertheless, the trial court

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entered judgment for the attorney based on its finding that the wife was not the attorney's client. The Appellate Court reversed. It found that the wife's delivery of a power of attorney for the purpose of estate planning constituted an authorization that the attorney act on her behalf and that the attorney accepted the power to act by preparing her will. Thus, the attorney was representing the wife, an attorney-client relationship was created, and the attorney owed the wife a duty of care as a matter of law. Id. at 800-1. Simon v. Wilson clearly demonstrates that an attorney-client relationship can be created even if the attorney has never met or spoken to the client and the client is completely unaware of the attorney's existence.1 Lionbridge's Permanent Resident Program states that it will select the legal counsel to handle the application. As such, it acted as Plaintiff's agent in hiring counsel. Ross accepted that assignment, as evidenced by her attempt to obtain an amendment of the Visa, her completion of the unsigned entry of appearance, and her deposition testimony that she considered both Lionbridge and Plaintiff to be her clients. Therefore, as in Simon v. Wilson, an attorney-client relationship was created despite the client's lack of awareness of this fact. This only makes sense, since there are many instances in which an attorney may owe a duty to a client who may not be aware that he or she is being represented. The fact that a comatose or otherwise-incapacitated person may not know that an attorney has been appointed by a court or hired by a relative does not mean that the attorney owes no duty of care to that person. After all, the entire purpose of retaining the attorney in such instances is to protect that person's interests.

Although the wife signed the power of attorney at the request of her husband, there is no mention of any evidence that she knew that he had hired or would be hiring an attorney. In any event, the evidence indicates that she suffered from diminished mental abilities.
1

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DePape v. Trinity Health Systems, Inc., 242 F.Supp.2d 585 (N.D. Iowa 2003), demonstrates that an attorney-client relationship can be created under circumstances similar to those involved in the instant action. An Iowa medical practice entered into an employment agreement with a Canadian doctor. The doctor needed a Visa to enter and practice medicine in this country and the ultimate goal was to obtain a green card. The medical practice agreed to pay for all costs associated with the doctor's immigration and later advised the doctor that it "had engaged the services of a law firm." The law firm held an initial conference with employees of the medical practice to discuss the doctor's immigration options. The law firm did not advise the doctor to participate, nor did it even inform him of the conference. Id. at 591-2. After the initial conference, the law firm sent an engagement letter to the medical practice, confirming the agreement to represent both the medical practice and the doctor. The law firm did not send a copy of the letter to the doctor, nor did it advise the medical practice to do so. The doctor did not see the engagement letter until trial. The only time that the doctor spoke directly with the firm was eleven months after the mailing of the engagement letter. The conversation lasted onetenth of one hour. Id. at 592, 599, 611. In the 28 pages of the opinion in DePape, there is no mention that the doctor was aware that the law firm had been hired to act as his attorney or that there was an attorney-client relationship between the doctor and the law firm. Rather, the doctor was advised only that the medical practice had engaged the services of the law firm. All legal fees were paid by the medical practice and, aside from a brief conversation eleven months after the firm was retained, the doctor had no direct communications with the firm.

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In discussing the elements of a legal malpractice claim, the U.S. District Court noted the requirement of an attorney-client relationship. It stated that there was no dispute that the law firm had been hired to represent both the medical practice and the doctor or that an attorney-client relationship existed between the doctor and the law firm. Id. at 608. Although the existence of an attorney-client relationship was not contested in DePape, the case clearly demonstrates that, under very similar facts, such a relationship can arise even though the client may be unaware of its existence. In DePape and here, the employer informed the immigrant that it had engaged the services of a law firm to handle the process. All legal expenses were paid by employer. The immigrant never received an engagement letter or other document indicating that there was an attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the immigrant. The immigrant had virtually no direct contact with the firm, which provided its advice and counsel to the employer. The law firm considered itself to represent both the employer and the immigrant. The parties and the court in DePape agreed that an attorney-client relationship existed between the law firm and the doctor. At the very least, whether such a relationship existed between Plaintiff and the Ross firm is an issue for trial. Whether a legal duty is owed a plaintiff as well as the scope of such duty are questions of law which the court must decide. Although the court may consider a variety of relevant factors in reaching its decision, the question becomes one of fairness under a contemporary standard: would a reasonable person recognize and agree that a duty of care exists? Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24 (Colo. App. 1994); Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987). Attorney Ross was retained by Lionbridge to "move forward with filing for permanent residence for Ms. DerKervorkian." She accepted the assignment, with full knowledge that

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Plaintiff's ability to live and work in this country beyond October 1, 2003 was dependent upon Ross's efforts and that Plaintiff could not protect herself, since the process was controlled entirely by Lionbridge. A reasonable person would recognize and agree that Ross owed a duty of care to Plaintiff under these circumstances. Conversely, a reasonable person would not believe that Ross could negligently cause Plaintiff to lose her right to live and work in the United States without being held accountable for the damages caused by her conduct. B. Negligence Claim.

Plaintiff's negligence claim is not time-barred. The first issue is when Plaintiff filed her claim against the Ross Defendants. That date is January 7, 2005. On January 7, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend and her Amended Complaint adding the claim against Ross. The motion was denied on January 12, 2005 because it was not doublespaced. Plaintiff refiled the motion in the proper form on January 18, 2005. However, Plaintiff had simultaneously filed the identical claim against the Ross Defendants as a new action in Boulder District Court on January 7, 2005. See Exhibit 3 attached. Ross was provided with a copy of the Amended Complaint filed herein on that same date. See Exhibit 4, attached. Under F.R.C.P.15(c)(2), an amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. Even assuming the rejected motion and amended complaint cannot be considered for purposes of establishing the date of filing, Plaintiff's state court complaint is the "original pleading" containing the claims against the Ross Defendants. Mueller v. Long Island Railroad Company, 1997 WL 189123 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Miranda v. Costco

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Wholesale Corporation, 1996 WL 571185 (D. Or.1996); Hutchinson v. The United States of America, 2004 WL 350576 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). As such, for statute of limitations purposes, the claims against the Ross Defendants were filed January 7, 2005. The next question is when these claims arose. Under C.R.S. §13-80-108, a cause of action shall be considered to accrue on the date both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. On January 7, 2003, Lionbridge's house counsel rejected Plaintiff's final suggestion that she be given the job of Translation Supervisor as an alternative to an immediate demotion from Translation Manager to Translator. Had Lionbridge accepted this suggestion, the green card

process could have proceeded forward. Although Plaintiff knew on January 7, 2003 that Lionbridge was refusing to take further action on the green card, the actual impact of that decision did not occur until October 1, 2003, when her Visa expired and she had to resign her employment. However, even if a person's knowledge that they will be injured in the future is sufficient under C.R.S. §13-80-108, Plaintiff did not have such knowledge until January 7, 2003. As such, her January 7, 2005 claim was filed within two years of the date her injury was known. Just as importantly, Plaintiff's cause of action against Ross was unknown until she learned in late 2004 that Ross had been her attorney.2 Under the discovery rule, her claim against Ross did not accrue until that time.

As stated in Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, Lionbridge, citing attorney-client privilege, initially refused inquiry into its communications with Ross. It changed its mind and provided a copy of Ross's file on November 29, 2004 and allowed Ross to be deposed on December 17, 2004.
2

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The purpose of the statute of limitations is to "protect defendants and courts from stale claims where plaintiffs have slept on their rights." (Citing cases) One does not sleep on his or her rights with respect to an unknown cause of action. Thus, Arizona law recognizes that "one of the fundamental reasons underlying the philosophy of these statutes--the presumed invalidity of a claim allowed to become stale--is not present in the case where the injured plaintiff has no knowledge that such a claim exists." (Citing case) Under the discovery rule, therefore, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or with reasonable diligence should know the facts underlying the cause. (Citing case) The rationale offered for the discovery rule "is that it is unjust to deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action before the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for believing that a claim exists."(Citing case) Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (Ariz. 1998). Colorado also has adopted the discovery rule. Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 136 (Colo. 2005). To prevail on a cause of action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove that the attorney owed a duty of care and breached that duty. Rantz v. Kaufman, supra, at 134. If Plaintiff was not aware that Ross was her attorney, she could not have known that Ross owed her a duty of care. Therefore, the cause was unknown until late 2004. Ross suggests that the claim arose in late 2002, when Plaintiff believed that Ross had erred with respect to the prevailing wage problem and how it could be overcome. However, although Plaintiff may have perceived Ross to be part of the problem, she had no reason to believe that Ross's conduct gave rise to a claim against her. After all, as Ross has detailed in her motion, Ross had no direct contact with Plaintiff, Plaintiff never had received any communication suggesting that Ross was acting as her attorney, she had been told not to contact Ross and to instead get her information from Lionbridge, and it was clear that Ross was advising Lionbridge about the prevailing wage problem and Plaintiff's various suggestions of ways around the dilemma. Ross's conduct in not communicating with Plaintiff and in promoting the interests of Lionbridge to the detriment of

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Plaintiff would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that she had been hired to represent Plaintiff. C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim.

Ross has recognized that a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim is viable upon a showing of something beyond mere negligence. As stated in Moguls of Aspen, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, 956 P.2d 618 (Colo. App. 1997), this can be "a conflict of interest, or any other consideration beyond carelessness and lack of attention." Id. at 620-21. The Court of Appeals went on to suggest that the duty of "undivided loyalty" may be an absolute duty, the breach of which would be beyond mere lack of due diligence and negligence sufficient to give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 621. As set forth above, Ross violated her duty of undivided loyalty to Plaintiff by representing Lionbridge after a conflict arose as a result of the prevailing wage problem, by acting with Lionbridge's best interests in mind, and by providing advice and counsel to Lionbridge on how to deal with Plaintiff's suggestions for ways around the impasse. Contrary to Ross's suggestion, Aller v. Law Office of Carole C. Schreifer, P.C., 2005 Ap. LEXIS 1210 (Colo. App. July 28, 2005), does not indicate that Plaintiff may not claim a breach of fiduciary duty here. The Court of Appeals found that "there is no reason to distinguish a legal malpractice suit based on negligence from one based on breach of fiduciary duty if all that is alleged is an attorney's breach of the standard of care. Id. at 12. This merely repeats the holding in Moguls of Aspen, supra. Here, Plaintiff has alleged more than a lack of care. Ross's conduct - conflict of interest, pursuit of the best interests of Lionbridge, and abandonment of Plaintiff - went far beyond "a decision based on professional judgment pertaining to the presentation of a client." Aller at 12.

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Ross argues that no facts exist to suggest that Plaintiff suffered damages directly as a result of any alleged breach of fiduciary duty or that suggest that Lionbridge's course of action would have been different had it been advised by a lawyer without any alleged conflict of interest. This is incorrect. As set forth above, Ross could have applied for an amendment to Plaintiff's Visa without a favorable prevailing wage determination, but Lionbridge did not want to do so because the INS might discover that Lionbridge had been in violation of the law and/or regulation that required the Visa to be amended when Plaintiff was promoted. Lionbridge relied on Ross's statement about the cost of a survey in deciding not to pay for one. It relied on Ross's advice in insisting that Plaintiff had to accept an immediate demotion, rather than a demotion at the time the green card was issued, and in rejecting Plaintiff's suggestion that she be given the job of Translation Supervisor. Ross failed to obtain information from Plaintiff with regard to her job duties and the requirements of her position. The resulting misunderstandings led Ross to reject suggestions that could have solved the prevailing wage problem. Lionbridge utilized Ross's advice and counsel in rejecting Plaintiff's suggestions about ways around the prevailing wage problem. Clearly, Ross's conduct in continuing to represent Lionbridge despite the conflict of interest was instrumental in causing Lionbridge to refuse to proceed with the process. Further, Ross failed to advise Plaintiff of the conflict and failed to recommend that she retain separate counsel. As

such, Plaintiff was not given the opportunity to explore other options before it was too late. See Report of Expert Witness, attached as Exhibit 5.3 CONCLUSION

3

This Report is attached to Plaintiff's Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) Expert Disclosures. 33

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For the above-stated reasons, Defendants Sharryn E. Ross and Ross Martel & Silverman, LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. Dated this 10th day of October, 2005. Respectfully submitted, DIETZE and DAVIS, P.C. By: "s/ Joel C. Maguire" Joel C. Maguire Dietze and Davis, P.C. 2060 Broadway, Suite 400 Boulder, CO 80302 Telephone: (303) 447-1375 Fax: (303) 440-9036 Email: [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiff Isabelle DerKervorkian CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 10, 2005, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following email addresses: John Edwin Bolmer, II [email protected] [email protected] Dan S. Cross [email protected] [email protected] David Everett Leavenworth, Jr. [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] By: "s/ Susan J. Armour" Susan J. Armour, Legal Assistant Dietze and Davis, P.C. 2060 Broadway, Suite 400 Boulder, CO 80302 34

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Telephone: (303) 447-1375 Fax: (303) 440-9036 Email: [email protected]

35