Free Response to Motion - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 1 of 15

Performance Assessment

Long waste package lifetime
The waste package in the reference design has two layers: a thick outer layer made of
strength and delays any contact of water with the inner layer , and a thinner inner layer of a high.nickel aHoy that resists cor-

that dripping water could cause the first

carbon steel that provides structural

penetrations-tiny pinholes-to appear in some waste packages after about 4 000
years. More substantial penetrations could begin to occur about 10 000 years later. Pro-

jections of waste package performance also
assume that at least one waste package will
fail in 1

rosion after the outer layer is penetrated.
Based on preJiminary results of corrosion experiments and the opinions of experts,

000 years due to a manufacturing

defect.

computer simulations indicate that most of the waste packages would last more than 000 years , even if water is dripping on
them. The longevity of man-made materi.

To redu~ the uncertainty in waste package performance, further research on the
conditions that waste packages will. be
ex~

als in the repository environment over such
long periods of time is subject to significant

posed to and testing of waste package materials is underway. In addition , DOE is

evaluating alternative waste package decompensate for the uncertainty and enhance longevity.
signs and materials that could

uncertainty, however, and some waste pack-

ages could fail earlier. Scientists estimate

Amargosa Valley

0069

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" ".
Document 789-8 Filed 04/16/2004 Page 2 of 15

Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM
Performance Assessment

Low rate

of

release

of

radionuclides from breached waste packages
During the thousands of years required for water to reach the waste, the radioactivity
of most of the radionuelides would decay to

Once water enters a waste package, it would
have to penetrate the metal cladding of the spent nuclear fuel to reach the waste. For about 99 percent of the commercial spent
nuclear fuel, the cladding is highly corro-

sion-resistant metal that is

designed to

virtually zero. For the remaining radionuelides to get out of the waste package, they must be dissolved in water , but few of the
remaining radionuelides cotild be dissolved in water at a significant rate. Thus , only the long- lived , water-soluble radionuelides such as isotopes of technetium , iodine , neptunium , and uranium , could get out of the

withstand the extreme temperature and radiation environment in the core of an operating nuclear reactor. Current models indicate that it would take thousands of years to corrode dadding sufficiently to allow
water to reach the waste and begin to dis-

solve the radionuc1ides. However mates of cladding performance are uncer, esti-

waste package. Although most of the waste would not migrate from tIle package even

tain , and more work in this area is planned.

" if it were breached , the release of any radionuclides is reason for concern and moti. vation for seeking improvements in the reo pository design. Ongoing tests are providing more information on how radio. nuclides dissolve in water.

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P A- 196058

Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 3 of 15

Performance Assessment
.. . -._-- .0_.

Reduction in the concentration

of

radionuclides as they are transported from
transported by moving groundwater because they do not adsorb well to minerals. Two isotopes-plutonium- 239 and plutonium- 242- tend to adsorb but could be
mobile because they can attach themselves

the waste packages
Long- lived, water-soluble radionuclides that. migrate from the waste packages will
l.ave to move down through about 1
000 feet

of rock to the water table and then travel

about. 20 kilometers (about. 12 miles) to
. reach a point

where they could be taken up in a well and consumed or used to irrigate crops.
As the long- lived , water-soluble radionuclides begin to move down through
the rOCk

to small particles (or colloids) and then be transported along with those particles.
Given the uncertainty about the rate at which groundwater moves and the possible

existence of fast. pathways or channels
through the saturated zone, the DOE is con-

some will stick (or adsorb) to the minerals in the rock and be delayed in reaching the water table. After reaching the water table, radionuclides will disperse to some extent
in the larger

tinuing to investigate groundwater flow
characteristics and is analyzing the possible effects on radionuc1ide transport and dilu-

volume o(groundwater be.

tion.

neath Yucca Mountain , and the concentrations will be diluted. Eventually, groundwater with varying concEmtrations of

different radionuclides will reach locations near Yucca Mountain where the water could
be consumed.

Of the approximately 350 different radioactive isotopes present in spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive waste , six are

present in sufficient quantities and are suf.
ficiently long-

lived, soluble, mobile, and

hazardous to contribute significantly to cal. culated radiation exposures. Four of these isotopes- technetium- 99, iodine- 129, neptunium- 237, and uranium- 234-can be

Amargosa Valley

0071

P A- 196059

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM
Performance Assessment

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 4 of 15

_hm..

Possible dose
Analysts have calculated the possible radiation dose rate to people who may be living near the repository thousands of years in
Radiation is a form of energy that is everywhere

the future. Because where and how people will be living in the distant future cannot
be predicted , analysts base their calculations on the current situation.

In the natural and man-made world. The basic
unit for measuring the damage that a given dOse of radiation can cause to human tissue Is called a rem. Each year in the United States, the average person receives a dose of about 360 millirem (a millirem is one one-thousandth of a rem)

They assume

that the nearest population

lives 20 kilo-

meters (about 12 miles) from the repository

boundary and has a lifestyle similar to the average ' person living today in Amargosa
Valley, about 30 kilometers (about 19 miles)

from naturm and man-made sources. Natural

sources-cosmlc rays, radon gas. soil and rock. and the human body Itself-account for aboUt
300 mllllrem of the total annual average dose, with man-made, mosUy medical, sources accounting for the remaining 60 millirem. 18 Manmade souroes of radiation include diagnostic Xrays and other medical procedures, television sets, and computer monitors. Radiation exposures vary widely depending on geographic location and life choices. For example, a person living at an altitude of 5.000 feet in Denver, ColO-

from Yucca Mountain.

During the first 10, 000 years after the repository is closed , current models indicate that the mean peak annual dose rate to an average individual in this futw' e population would be about 0. 1 miJlirem. However,
given the uncertainties associated with the

assumptions and the performance assessment models, the peak dose could be higher or lower than the estimated average. There is a 5 percent (1 in 20) chance of exceeding 8 miUirem and a greater than 25 percent chance of no exposure at alL

rado. receives nearly two times as much cosmic radiation as a person living near sea level In Washington, D.

During the first 1 million years , the mean
peak annual dose rate to an average individual is estimated to reach 200 millirem with a 5 percent chance of exceeding 1 000

During the first 100 000 years, the mean
peak annual dose rate to an average indi-

vidual is estimated to be 30 millirem with
a 5 percent chance of exceeding 200 mil-

lirem and a greater than 20 percent chance
of zero dose.

millirem (or 1 rem) and a 5 percent chance of being lower than 0. 07 millirem.

360 mrem

average present-day exposure
000,000 Y'."

01 mrem

1 mrem

0mrem

100 mrem

1000 mrem or 1 rem

10 rem

Mean peak annual dose rate from the repository

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 5 of 15

Performance Assessment

Other safety issues
The analysis of the safety of a repository at
Yucca Mountain must also consider both the

ture generations to drill or otherwise
plore for gold ,

ex-

hydrocarbons , or other ma-

likelihood and the effect of possible disruptive processes and events , such as volcanism, earthquakes , human intrusion , and nuclear criticality. " The DOE has con.

terials.
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS)

cluded that there is little likelihood that
such processes or events at

Yucca Mountain would significantly affect the long- term

performance of a repository.

scientific basis for predicting such human activities over the very long periods of time for which the repository must function. The NAS, therefore , recommended that future human inconcluded that there is no
trusion not be considered in the quantita-

Volcanism
The area around Yucca Mountain was very active volcanically millions of years ago.
The rock of Yucca Mountain-~alled tuff-

tive performance assessments. However to evaluate how the repository would perform if humans were to intrude, the NAS recommended, 2O and DOE has conducted, a separate analysis of a theoretical case in

is composod of volcanic ash from eruptions
that occurred about 13 million years ago.

which a waste package is penetrated by
someone drilling into the repository in the

However , large-scale volcanism in the area ceased about 7. 5 million years ago, and the last , sman eruption occurred about 75 000
years ago. Experts have concluded that the

future. Performance assessments indicate
that peak dose rates

would increase if a

waste package were penetrated by explor-

chance of future volcanic activity disrupting the site is negligible. As a result, volcanism would be unlikely to affect the long-

atory drilling and if waste were then carried down the drillhole to the water table.
However, as noted, natural resource assessments indicate that the Yucca Mountain

term performance of the repository.

site does not exhibit characteristics that
would make it an attractive location for exploratory drilling.

Earthquakes
Yucca Mountain is located in the southern

Nuclear criticality
A nuclear criticality occurs when sufficient quantities of fissionable materials come together in a precise manner and the required

Great Basin, a large region that has some
earthquakes. Yucca Mountain itself is a tilted block of rock that is bounded by geo.

logic faults. A magnitude 5. 6 earthquake occurred about 12 miles away in 1992. A repository and surface facilities would be designed to withstand earthquakes , as are model'll tunnels , buildings , and power
plants in seismically active areas.

conditions exist to start and sustain a
nuclear chain reaction. The waste packages would be designed to prevent a criticality
. addition ,

from occurring inside a waste package. In it is very unlikely that a sufficient

Accidental human intrusion

It is possible that future human activities
might intrude on the repository: One pos-

sible activity would be exploration for valuable natural resources. However , Yucca Mountain exhibits few characteristics that would make it an attractive location for fu.

quantity of fissionable materials could accumulate outside of the waste packages in the precise configuration and with the required conditions to create a criticality. If somehow , an external criticality were to occur, analyses indicate that it would have

only minor effects on repository performance. An explosive external criticality is
not credible.

0073

PA- 196061

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=-_.... ...
Page 6 of 15

Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM
Performance Assessment

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

What we are learning
The performance assessment shows that the most significant single fac-

tor affecting the ability of the repository to protect public health and safety would be the amount of water that directly contacts the waste.
Yucca Mountain itself would provide the first major barrier to such contact , ensuring that the repository would not be fl~ded by either a rise in the deep water table or by infiltration of water from the surface during periods much wetter than the present. However, some waste packages
will experience dripping water, and the amount is uncertain.

To address this concern, the reference design includes multiple barriers
to limit water contact with the waste. The inner and outer waste
pack-

age layers and the metal cladding on the spent fuel are barriers between water and the waste.
The vast majority of the radionuclides in the waste are not mobile in water and thus pose no threat to public health and safety, even when the waste package and cladding are breached and the waste is exposed to water. However , a very small fraction of the radionuclides (representing less than 0. 2 percent of the initial radioactivity of all the radionuclides) are able to dissolve and move. While the quantities of the radionuclides

that could reach the environment appear to be small, they nevertheless pose a potential health hazard that must be addressed.
Total system performance assessments of the reference design indicate that , for 10, 000 years after the repository is closed, people living near Yucca Mountain would receive little or no increase in radiation exposure. Mter about 300, 000 years, people living about 20 kilometers (12 mHes) south of Yucca Mountain might receive additional radiation doses that are comparable to present- day doses from natural background radiation.
Although the performance assessments are

encouraging, there are re-

maining uncertainties that should be addressed before a site recommendation decision is made and a license application is submitted to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Therefore, DOE plans to co,nduct further tests of the site and of candidate waste package materials in support of the license application. The DOE also plans to evaluate alterna-

tive repository designs that could reduce the possible doses living near Yucca Mountain thousands of years in the future.

to people

0074

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 7 of 15
License Application

Plan to complete a license application
In the next tour years, DOg will fOCus on improving the repository and waste package design, strengthening the understahding of the key natural processes, preparing
'1'0

obtain an NRC license, DOB must dem-

onstrate that a repository can be con-

the environmental impact statement , and developing the information needed to support the site recommendation decision. Be-

structed. operated, monitored, and eventually closed without unreasonable risk to the health and safety of workers and the pub-

lic. The challenge

in licensing a geologic

cause a license application takes years to prepare, DOE has begun to assemble the information needed to support one.
Before DOE can submit a license application to the Nuclear RegulatO1' y Commission

repository is demonstrating a reasonable assurance of compliance with long- term safety

standards for many thousands of years.
However, the recent issuance of a permit
by the Environmental Protection Agency for the disposal oflong-lived transuranic waste

in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant shows
that compliance with long- term safety standards is achievable. In preparing to sub-

(NRC), the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires the following decisions , anyone of which can stop the process:
. The Secretary

mit a license application, DOE is drawing
on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant experi-

must decide, based on a

formal evaluation of the site and after considering the views of States, affected Indian tribes, and the NRC. whether to recommend the site to the President. site recommendation must be accompa-

ence and focusing on both operational and long- term safety issues.

nied by an environmental impact statement, which is scheduled for completion
in 2000. Current schedules plan for a site
recommendation to be made in 2001.
. The President

__h

1998
Viability Assessment

will then decide, possibly

--- 2000
Environmental Impact Statement

in 2001, whether to recommend the Yucca

Mountain site to Congress.
. If the

. 2001
Site Recommendation

Governor and legislature of Nevada submit a notice of disapproval to Con-

gress ,

Congress

must then decide

whether to override Nevad~ s objections and approve the Yucca Mountain site.

2010 2002
License Application
Stop if site

If the preceding decisions are made in a
timely manner and ultimately support development of a repository at the Yucca
Mountain site. DOE would submit a license application to NRC in 2002.

Emplacement begins

is unsuitable

0075

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM
Ucense Application

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 8 of 15

Operational safety
To ensure that a repository can be operated
safely, DOE is using demonstrated technol-

ers and the public during the preclosure period of repository operations.

ogy and accepted design criteria , systematically identifying design-basis events , and classifying all repository structures , systems, and components on the basis of their importance to safety.
Demonstrated technology and accepted design criteria
facilities and operations is not a unique endeavor. Many codes , standards , and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatory guidance documents , along with many years of industry
Designing waste- handling

design-basis events and safety classifications
Identification of

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations require DOE to identify internal design- basis events (such as dropping a waste
package) and external design- basis events
(such as an earthquake) that could cause

accidents resulting in unacceptable radiation exposures to workers or to the public.
The regulations require that DOE protect
both workers and the public when design-

experience in the operation of nuclear facilities , can be applied to preclosure reposi.
tory design and operations. (preclosure re-

ing any engineered structures, systems, or components that are important to safety: all such elements must be able to withstand
design- basis events. The DOE is now identifying design- basis events , performing safety classifications, and incorporating the

fers to th(! time when waste is being
emplaced and monitored. ) Many elements of the reference design are based on dem-

resulting design requirements into its design requirements documentation.

onstrated technology and accepted design criteria to ensure protection of both Work-

Artisfs concept of operations to move waste underground. Remote-controlled equipment would be used to place waste packages on rail cars and move lhe raft cars into shielded transporters. Human-operated electric locomotives would take loaded transporters underground.

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM Document 789-8 Filed 04/16/2004 Page 9 of 15
License Application

Long-term safety
To reduce current uncertainties and increas(! confidence that a repository
can con-

being injected into the rock, and scientists are measuring how much and how quickly

tain and isolate waste for thousands of
years, DOE is focusing its ongoing efforts
on three major areas:
. J

water moves through the rock. In another
experiment, microspheres are being injected into the rock to simulate possible colloidal transport of radionuclides. These experiments will provide more data on how much

ncreasing understanding of the key

natural processes that are important to
long. term performance of a repository
. J

water might infiltrate the repository and
how water could transport radionuclides to

the water table.
mproving the design of key engineered components of a repository
performance assessment models

The DOE is also conducting experiments

on

. Increasing confidence in

the effect of heat generated by the waste packages on moisture in the surrounding
rock. Large heaters have been placed

areas of the existing tunnel, and scientists
These three sets of activities will be the focus of DOE work between this viability assessment and the site recommendation decision, which could lead to submission of a license application.
Increasing understanding of

are observing the effect of the heat on the unsaturated rock. These experiments will increase understanding of how water would

be driven away from the waste packages
during the period of high temperature and how, later, declining temperatures could affect water movement through the unsaturated zone.

the key

natural processes that are important of a to long- term performance

repository
The key natural processes are water movement through the unsaturated zone above

Additional information on the movement of
water in the saturated zone below the wa-

ter table will be gained from a series of wells installed by DOE and from wells being in.

and below the repository, the effect of heat
from the waste packages on

stalled by Nye County, Nevada.

moisture in the rock around
the tunnds, and the move.

ment of groundwater beneath

the repository. Increased un-

derstanding of these pro.
cesses will reduce the

uncertainties about the
performance of a repository.

The DOE is conducting experiments to determine how
water could move through the
unsaturated zone above and

below the repository tunnels. In one experiment, water con-

taining chemical tracers is
Completed single-e1ement heater test

0077

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM
License Application

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 10 of 15

Evaluating ways

to

improve the design

of

key engineered components

of a

repository
As the design process progresses ,

DOE is evaluating several design options and alterhatives that could reduce existing uncer-

tainty and improve the performance of the repository system. Some of these options and alternative concepts were suggested by
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

and by stakeholders such as the Nuclear Waste Repository Project Office of Nye County, Nevada.

The repository design will incorporate de-

sign margin and defense in depth to increase confidence in repository performance. Design margin provides an extra

margin of safety. For example , the waste
package thiekness could be increased to pro-

vide extra design margin. Defense in depth is intended to ensure that failure in anyone barrier would not lead to unacceptable performance of the entire repository system.

erence design. One alternative involves a
much cooler , ventilated rt!pository design
so that moisture in the surrounding rock

The DOE will continue evaluating drip
shields , ceramic coatings , and backfill options that could increase both design margin and defonse in depth.
The DOE is also considering alternative repository design concepts , some of which are significantly different from the current ref.

would never reach the boiling point. This
alternative would reduce the complexity of

the interaction between the natural and

engineered barriers. Another alternative is to use a shielded waste package that
would allow human entry into the emplacement drifts for inspection and, if necessary,
remedial action.

0078

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Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

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Page 11 of 15
License Application

Increasing the reliability

of

petformance assessment models
models , analysts can assess how well their models represent the natural processes and engineered features of a repository. Validating the performance assessment models will reduce uncertainties and increase con-

While forecasts of repository performance

over thousands of years can never be
proven, laboratory and field studies and experiments provide opportunities to validate

the performance assessment models. By
comparing the empirical results of the ex-

fidence that a repository will work as expected.

periments with the predicted results of the

and eKcavation (;\8
on waste package tJ

Effects of heat

G)

ff\~ \&I

Pr8cIp/t8tIon
(cIImaCt) llId

InftItr8tlon

Pen:oldon
(UNtunrted
zone ftow)

Redistribution .
of moIIture by heat

Schematic cross-section of Yucca Mountain and depiction of processes that are important to repository perlormance

0079

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Document 789-8

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Page 12 of 15

Estimated Cost

Cost of licensing, building, operating, monitoring, and closing a

repository
The estimated cost to complete the reposi-

full-scale rate of approximately 3, 000
metric tons per year.
. A
total of 70, 000

tory design and other necessary work and to prepare and submit a license application
in 2002 is approximately $1.1 billion, in con

metric tons of waste is

stant J 998 dollars. This includes the costs of completing an environmental impact
statement in 2000, and providing the information needed by the States, the Secretary, the President, the Congress , and the public.

emplaced, including 63 000 metric tons

of commercial spent nuclear fuel,
333 metric tons of defense spent

nuclear fuel, and 4 667 equivalent metric tons of high- level radioactive waste.
. The

repository remains open for 100

The estimated cost to complete the licensing process and construct, operate, monitor, . and close a repository is approximately

years after the start of operations. Closing and sealing the repository begin in 2110 and are completed in 2116.

$18. 7 billion , in constant J 998 dollars. This cost estimate is based on the following as-

The DOE is evaluating options for constructing and operating the repository that

sumptions:
. A

license application is submitted in

2002 , and the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission approves construction of the repository in 2005.

would reduce construction costs before emplacement begins in 2010. The surface facilities and tunnels could be constructed in phases, or modules. This modular approach could reduce annual costs but also could

increase the total cost of constructing and
. Emplacement of

waste in the repository begins in 2010 and ends in 2033.

operating the repository. rrhese

options will

. After a five-

year start-up phase, commer-

be evaluated in conjunction with the study of alternative designs described in the preceding section.

cial spent nuclear fuel is emplaced at a

0080

P A- 196068

.-.--Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM Document 789-8 Filed 04/16/2004 Page 13 of 15
Estimated Cost

Repository costs

The $18. 7 billion estimated repository cost
reflects several factors. The repository sub.

fuel-

000 metric tons per year. Perfor-

surface facilities would consist of approxi. mately 100 miles of steel- or concrete- lined
tunnels, and underground operations would involve remotely operated equipment. The

mance confirmation and monitoring would continue for 100 years before closing and
sealing the repository.

waste packages would be made of high
grade materials and manufactured under strict quality controls and standards. The

Because research is ongoing and the repository design has not yet been selected , there is uncertainty in the cost estimate. To compensate for the uncertainty, contingencies

surface facilities would be designed to
handle a high volume of commercial spent

have been incorporated into the cost esti. mates.

Performance Confirmation

Regulatory, Infrastructure and Management Support

$2.
Waste

$2.
Subsurface
Facilities

Packages $4.

$5.

$5.
Surface Facilities
Allocation of costs to construct, operate, monitor, and close a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain

0081

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~ # ~ # # ~ ~ # ~ ~ ~ ~
Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

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Page 14 of 15

Document 789-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Estimated Cost

Total system life cycle costs
A monitor(!d geologic repository is only one

then build , operate, monitor , close, and
seal the repository are $18. 7 billion.

component of a total waste management system , which would also include overall system management, transportation , and benefits to the State of Nevada. The total life cycle costs for a complete waste management system include the following ele-

. The estimated costs

of expanding the re-

pository to

accommodate additional

waste beyond the current 70, 000 metric-

ments:
. Total

ton statutory limit, if authorized , would be approximately $4. 5 billion.
. The estimated

program costs from 1983 through

costs of transporting

1998 were approximately $5. 9 billion in year-or-expenditure dollars. Site characterization activities at all nine of the initial candidate sites and the five-mile ex-

wastes to Yucca Mountain are approxi-

mately $6.

7 bilJion.

. Estimated payments

ecluivalent to taxes

ploratory tunnel at Yucca Mountain
account for the largest portion of the costs to date.
. 1' he

and other benefits to the State of Nevada

and affected units oflocal government are approximately $3. 2 bilJion.
. The estimated costs

e~timated costs to complete a license application and supporting documents is $1.1 billion , in constant 1998 dollars.

of managing the en5 billion. tire system are $2.

. The estimated costs to complete the reo

pository design and licensing process , and

The total of estimated future costs is $36. billion , in constant 1998 dollars. (The additive total of the elements above differs due to rounding.

$1. 200

$1, 000
. Total Hstorical Costs (Year-of. EJcpenditure

$800

Dolars)
III Total Estimated Future Costs (Constant 1998 Dollars)

$600

II)

Ucense Application Costs (1998 Dollars)
. Repository Costs (1998

$400 $200

Dollars)

Fiscal Year
Profile of lotal system life cycle costs. These cost estimales renect DOE's besl projections, given the scope of the work identified and planned
the program have

schedule of required activities. Future events and information could result in changes to both cosls and schedules. Future budget requests for yet 10 be eslablished and will be delermined through the annual executive and congressional budget process.

0082

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:-

Case 1:98-cv-00126-JFM

Document 789-8

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Page 15 of 15

Estimate!f Cost

Who pays?
The Nucl(!ar Waste Policy Act of 1982 requires entities that generate spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive waste to pay for the costs of disposal. The utilities with nuclear power plants pay a fee to fund the disposal of wastes from their plants, while the Federal Government uses tax revenues to pay for the disposal of radioactive waste from the nation s defense programs.
he Act directs the Secretary of Energy to
enter into fee- far-service

funding-free from normal budgetary pressures-required for such a long- term effort.

The Nuclear Waste Fund is intended to cover the entire cost of disposing of com-

mercial spent nuclear fuel. The Secretary
of Energy regularly reviews the Fund and projected costs of the program to tletermine whether the fees will be enough to recover the full costs. If the fees are too high or too

low, the Secretary is authorized to propose
any required changes. .

contracts with

utilities for disposing of the waste. In re-

turn for this service, utilities pay annual
fees that are deposited into a Nuclear Waste Fund where the money earns interest until

The DOE has determined that the amount

generated by the current fees, including the

spent. In setting up the Fund, Congress recognized that the disposal program is
succeed only through a

unspent balance and accumulating interest, is sufficient to cover the total system
life cycle costs of disposing of commercial

extremely complex , first-of-a- kind scientific

spent nuclear fuel. This assumes that the
unspent balance and interest income from

and engineering project and one that can
sustained effort over many decades. Thus , the Fund is designed to provide the adequate, assured , and stable

the Nuclear Waste Fund will remain available for their originally intended purpose.

000

500
1/1

- Year- of- E)IjJeI1diture Dollars (Hstorical)
Ci\1~an Contributions

~ 2, 000
:: 1, 500
ft!

.!II

Total System Ule Cycle Costs
~::L:~~:~L~~

r""~r~.lc~" ~'!jr1i11" t,':'

~1" iII"l" .~'

~"V"'Pi:!,

8 1, 000
1/1

~~~~~i-..

500

(500)

U ii

iiiiiiiii~i~~~~~~~

-.. 'P,.

Fiscal Year
These cost estimates reflect DOE' s best projections,

Historical and projected program income and costs through the waste emplacement phase.

given the scope of the work identified and planned schedule of required activities. Future events and information could result in changes to both co~s and schedules. Future budget requests for the program have yet to be established and will be determined through the annual executive and congressional budget process.

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