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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM
Performance Assessment

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 1 of 12

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Possible dose
Analysts have calculated the possible radiation dose rate to people who may be living near the repository thousands of years in the future. Because where and how people will be living in the distant future cannot be predicted , analysts base their calculations on the current situation,

Radiation is a form of energy that is everywhere

In the natural and man-made world. The basic
unit for measuring the damage that a given dOse of radiation can cause to human tissue Is called a rem. Each year in the United States, the av. erage person receives a dose of about 360 mn. lirem (a millirem Is one one-thousandth of a rem)

They assume

that the nearest population lives 20 kilometers (about 12 miles) from the repository

boundary and has a lifestyle similar to the average ' person living today in Amargosa
Valley, about 30 kilometers (about 19 miles)

from natura' and man-made sources. Natural

sources-cosmlc rays, radon gas, soli and rock, and the human body Itself-account for aboUt
300 mllilrem of the total annual average dose. with man-made, mostly medical , sources ae:counting for the remaining 60 mlllirem. 18 Manmade sources of radiation Include diagnostic Xrays and other medical procedures, television sets, and computer monitors. Radiation exposures vary widely depending on geographic location and life choices. For example, a person . IMng at an altitude of 5,000 feet In Denver. ColO-

from Yucca Mountain,
During the first 10 000 years after the repository is closed , current models indicate that the mean peak annual dose rate to an average individual in this futw' e population
would be about O.

millirem. However

given the uncertainties associated with the assumptions and the performance assessment models, the peak dose could be higher
or lower than the estimated average. There

is a 5 percent (1 in 20) chance of exceeding 8 millirem and a greater than 25 percent chance of no exposure at all.

rado, receives nearly two times as much cosmic radiation as a person living near sea level In Washington, D.

During the first 1 million years , the mean
peak annual dose rate to an average individual is estimated to reach 200 mil1irem, with a 5 percent chance of exceeding 1 000

During the first 100, 000 years, the mean
peak annual dose rate to an average indi-

vidual is estimated to be 30 millirem with
a 5 percent chance of exceeding 200 mil-

lirem and a greater than 20 percent chance
of zero dose.

miUirem (or 1 rem) and a 5 percent chance of being lower than 0. 07 millirem,

360 mrem

pruent-day . exposure
000,000
t'1f'

average

yea,.
'1;.1'

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01 rnrem

1 mrem

1000 mrem or 1 rem

10 rem

Mean peak annual dose rate from the repository

0072

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 2 of 12

Performance Assessment

Other safety issues
The analysis of the safety of a repository at
Yucca Mountain must also consider both the

ture generations to drill or otherwise
plore for gold ,

ex-

hydrocarbons , or otherma-

likelihood and the effect of possible disruptive processes and events , such as volcanism , earthquakes , human intrusion , and nuclear criticality. " The DOE has concluded that there is little likelihood that
Yucca Mountain would significantly affect the long- term . performance of a repository.
such processes or events at

terials,
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
concluded that there is no scientific basis for predicting such human activities over the very long periods of time for which the

repository must function. The NAS, thel' fore, recommended that future human in-

. trusion not be considered in the quantita-

Volcanism
The area around Yucca !yIountain was very

active volcanically millions of years ago,
The rock of Yucca Mountain-~alled tuffis compos(!d of volcanic ash from eruptions
that occurred about 13 million years ago,

tive performance assessments, However, to evaluate how the repository would p erform if humans were to intrude, the NAS recommended, 2O and DOE has conducted , a

separate analysis of a theoretical casein which a waste package is penetrated by
someone drilling into tho repository in the future, Performance assessments indicate that peak dose rates would increase if a
waste package were penetrated by exploratory drilling. and if waste were then car-

However , large-scale volcanism in the area ceased about 7. 5 million years ago, and the last, small eruption occurred about 75 000
years ago. Experts have concluded that the

chance of future volcanic activity disrupt..
ing the site is negligible. As a result, volcanism would be unlikely to affect the long-

ried down the drillhole to the water table.
However, as not.ed, natural resource assessments indicate that the Yucca Mountain

term performance of the repository.

site does not exhibit characteristics that
would make it an attrac6ve location for exploratory drilling.

Earthquakes
. Yucca Mountain is located in the southern

Nuclear criticality
A nuclear criticality occurs when sufficient . quantities of fissionable materials come together in a precise manner and the required

Great Basin, a large region that has some
earthquakes, Yucca Mountain itself is . a . Hlted blOCk of rock that is bounded by geo-

logic faults. A magnitude 5. 6 earthquake occurred about 12 miles away in 1992,
repositOl-y and surface facilities would be designed to withstand earthquakes , as are

conditions exist to start and sustain a
nuclear chain reaction. The waste packages

would be designed to prevent a criticality
. addition ,

model'll tunnels , buildings , and power
plants in seismically active areas.

from occurring inside a waste package. In it is very unlikeIy that a suffieient

Accidental human intrusion

It is possible that future human activities
might intrude on the repository: One pos-

sible activity would be exploration for valuable natural resources. However , Yucca Mountain exhibits few characteristics that would make it an attractive location for fu-

quantity of fissionable materials could accumulate outside of the waste packages in the precise configuration and with the required conditions to create a criticality. If somehow , an external criticality were to occur , analyses indicate that it would have

only minor effects on repository performance, An explosive external criticality is
not credible.

0073

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Filed 04/16/2004

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Page 3 of 12

Performance Assessment

W~at we are learning
The performance assessment shows that the most significant single fac-

tor affecting the ability of the repository to protect public health and safety would be the amount of water that directly contacts the waste. Yucca Mountain itself would provide the first major barrier to such contact, ensuring that the repository would not be fl~ed by either a rise in the deep water table or by infiltration of water from the surface during periods much wetter than the present. However, some waste packages
wm. experience. dripping water, and the amount is uncertain.

To address this concern. the reference design includes multiple barriers
to limit water contact with the waste. The inner and outer waste pack.

age layers and the metal cladding on the spent fuel are barriers between
water and the waste.

rhe vast majority of the radionuclides in the waste are not mobile
water and thus pose no threat to public health and safety. even when the

waste package and cladding are breached and the waste is exposed to
water. However. a very small fraction of the radionuc1ides (representing less than 0. 2 percent of the initial radioactivity of all the radionuclides)

are able to dissolve and move. While the quantities of the radionuclides that could reach the environment appear to be small. they nevertheless pose a potential health hazard that must be addressed.

Total system performance assessments of the reference design. indicate that , for 10, 000 years after the repository is closed. people living near Yucca Mountain would receive ' little or no increase in radiation exposure. Mter about 300, 000 years, people living about 20 kilometers (12 miles) south of Yucca Mountain might receive additional radiation doses that are comparable to present- day doses from natural background radiation.

Although the performance assessments are encouraging, there are remaining uncertainties that should be addressed before a site recommendation decision is made and a license application is submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Therefore. DOE plans to co.nduct further tests of the site and of candidate waste package materials in support of the license application. The DOE also plans to evaluate alterna-

tive repository designs that could reduce the possible doses
living near Yucca Mountain thousands of years in the future.

to people

0074

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 4 of 12
License Application

Plan to compl~te a license application
. improving the

In the next four years, DOg will focus on repository and waste package design, strengthening the understahding of the key natural processes, preparing

To obtain an NRC license, DO:h: must demonstrate that a repository can be con-

the environmental impact statement , and
developing the l11formation needed to support the site recommendation decision. Be, cause a license application takes years to

structed, operated, monitored, and eventually closed without unreasonable risk to the health and safety of workers and the pub-

lic. The challenge

in licensing a geologic

. prepare ,

DOE has begun to assemble the

repository is demonstrating a reasonable assurance of compliance with long-term safety standards for many thousands of years,

information needed to support one.
Before DOE can submit a Hcense application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

However, the recent issuance of a permit
by the Environmental Protection Agency for the disposal oflong-lived transuranic waste

in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant shows
that cqmpliance with long-term safety standards is achievable. In preparing to submit a license application , DOE is drawing

Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires tho following decisions, anyone which can stop the process:
(NRC) , the

. The Secretary

must decide , based on a formal evaluation of the site and after

on the Waste" Isolation Pilot Plant experifocusing on both operational and long- term safety issues.
ence .and

considering the views of States, affected Indian tribes, and the NRC, whether to recommend the site to the President. site recommendation must be accompa-

nied by an environmental impact statement, which is scheduled for completion in 2000. Current schedules plan for a site
recommendation to be made in 2001.

_-n

1998
Viability Assessment

. 'I' he President will then decide, possibly
in 2001, whether to recommend the Yucca

--- 2000
Environmental Impact Statement

Mountain site to Congress.
. If the

, 2001
Site Recommendation
to Con-

Governor and legislature of Nevada

submit a notice of disapproval

gress, Congress must then decide

whether to override Nevad~ s objections and approve the Yucca Mountain site,

2010 2002
license
Application
Stop if site

If the p receding decisions are made in a
timely manner and ultimately support development of a repository at the Yucca Mountain site , DOE would submit a license application to NRC in 2002.

Emplacement begins

is unsuitable

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM
Ucense Application

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 5 of 12

-- 0Operational safety
To ensure that a repository can be operated
safely, DOE is using demonstrated technol-

. ers and the public during the preclosure period of repository operations.
Identification

ogy and accepted design criteria , systematically identifying design-basis events , and
classifying aU repository structures, sys-

tems, and components on the basis of their
importance to. safety.

design-basis events and safety classifications
of

Demonstrated technology and
accepted design criteria
facilities and operations is not a unique endeavor. Many codes , starldards , and Nuclear Regulatory
Designing waste- handling

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulationsrequire DOE to identify internal design- basis events (such as dropping a waste
package) and external design-basis events
(such as an earthquake) that cOuld cause

accidents resulting in unacceptable radialion exposures to workers or to the public.
The regulations require that DOE protect
both workers and the public when design-

Commission regulatory guidance documents , along with many years of industry experience in the operation of nuclear fa. cilities

ing any engineered structures, systems, or
components that are important to safety: all such elements must be able to withstand design-basis events. The DOE is now identifying design- basis events , performing safety classifications, and incorporating the

, can be applied to preclosure reposi-

tory design and operations. (preclosure re. refs to th~)

time when waste is being

emplaced and monitored. ) Man)' elements

of the reference design are based on demonstrated technology and accepted design
criteria to ensure protection of both work-

resulting design requirements into its design requirements documentation.

Mst' s concept of operations to move waste underground. Remote-controlled equipment would be used to place waste packages on rail cars
and move the ran cars into shielded transporters. Human-operated electric locomotives would take loaded transporters underground.

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 6 of 12
License Application

Long-term safety
To reduce! current uncertainties

and increase confidence that a repository can con-

being injected into

the rock, and scientists

tain and isolate waste for thousands of
years, DOE is focusing its ongoing efforts

water moves through the rock, In another
experiment, microspheres are being injected
into the rock to simulate possible colloidal

are measuring how much and how quickly

. on three major areas:

transport of radionuclides. These experiments will provide more data on how much

. I ncreasing understanding of the key
natural processes that are important to
long. term performance of a l"epository
. Improving the design of key engineered components of a repository

water might infiltrate the repository and
how water could transport radionuclides to

the water table.
The DO E is also conducting

experiments on

.the effect of heat generated by the waste
. . Increasing confidence in performance assessment models

packages on moisture in the surrounding
rock. Large heaters have been placed

areas of the existing tunnel , and scientists
These three sets of activities will be the focus of DOE work between this viability assessment and the site recommendation decision, which could lead to submission of a

are observing the effect of the heat on the unsaturated rock. These experiments will increase understanding of how water would

license application.
Increasing understanding of

be driven away from the waste packages
during the period of high temperature and how, later, declining temperatures could

the key

affect water movement through the unsat- .
urated zone,

natural processes that are important of a . long- term performance to

repository
The key natural processes are water movement through the unsaturated zone above

Additional information on the movement of
water in the saturated zone below the wa-

ter table will be gained from a series of wells installed by DOE and from wells being in-

and below the repository, the effect of heat

stalled by Nye County, Nevada.

. from the waste packages on moisture in the rock around

the tunnds , and the movement of groundwater beneath

the repository, Increased un. derstanding of these processes will reduce the

uncertainties about the
performance of a repository.

The DOE is conducting experiments to determine how
water could move through the
unsaturated zone above and

below the repository tunnels. In one experiment , water con-

taining chemical tracers is
Completed single-element heater test

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM
License Application

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 7 of 12

Evaluating ways

to

Improve the design

of

key engineered components

of a

repository
. As the design process progresses ,
ternatives that could

DOE is

evaluating several design options and alreduce existing uncertainty and improve the performance of the repository system. Some of these options and alternative concepts were suggested by
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

and by stakeholders such as the Nuclear
Waste Repository Proje~t Office of Nye County, Nevada,
'l'

)'0

he repository design will incorporate de-

sign margin and defense in depth to increase confidence in repository perfor. mance, Design margin provides an extra margin of safety, For example, the waste
package thickness could be increased to pro-

, 30

vide extra design margin. Defense in depth is intended to ensure that failure in anyone barrier would not lead to unacceptable performance of the entire repository system.

erence design. One alternative involves a much cooler , ventilated ri!pository design
so that moisture in the surrounding rock

he HCm will continue evaluating drip
shields, ceramic coatings , and backfill op-

would never reach the boiling point. This
alternative would reduce the complexity of

tions that could increase both design margin and defense in depth.
is also considering alternative repository design concepts , some of which are significantly different from the current refThe DOE

the interaction between the natural and
engineered barriers. Another

alternative

is to use a shielded waste package that
would allow human entry into the emplacement drifts for inspection and, if necessary,

remedial action. .

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 8 of 12
License Application

Increasing the reliability

of

performance assessment models
models , analysts can assess how well their models represent the natural processes and

While forecasts of repository performance

over thousands of years can never be
proven, laboratory and fi~ld studies and experiments provide opportunities to vl;\lidate

the performance assessment models. By
comparing the empirical results of the ex-

engineered features of a repository. Validating the performance assessment models will reduce uncertainties and increase. confidence that a repository will work as expected.

periments with the predicted results of the

Seepage
into drift

t'
. I'NdpltatJon (dlmate) 8nd
InftICntlon

1()

'ercolaUon

zone low)

Schematic cross-sectjon of Yucca Mountain and depiction of processes that are important to repository perlormaoce

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM
Estimated Cost

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Page 9 of 12

, Cost of licensing, building, operating, monitoring, and closing a repositorY
The estimated cost to complete the reposi-

full-scale rate of approximately 3, 000
metric tons per year.
. A total

tory design and other necessary work and to prepare and submit a license application
in 2002 is approximately $1.1 billion, in con:
stant 1998 dollars. This includes the costs

of 70 000 metric tons of waste is

emplaced, including 63, 000 metric tons

of completing an environmental impact
statement in 2000, and providing the information needed by the States, the Secretary, the President, the Congress , and the public,
The estimated cost to complete the licensing process and construct, operate, monitor, ' and

of commercial spent nuclear fuel,

333 metric tons of defense spent
nuclear fuel, and 4 667 equivalent metric tons of high-level radioactive waste.
. The

close a repository is approximately

repository remains open for 100 years after the start of operations. Closing and sealing the repository begin in 2110 and are completed in 2116.

$18. 7 billion , inconstant 1998dollars. This cost estimate is based on the following as. sumptions~
. A

The DOE is evaluating options for constructing and operating the repository that
would reduce construction costs before em. placement begins in 2010. The surface facilities and tunnels could be constructed in phases, or modules, This modular approach could reduce . annual costs but also could increase the total cost of constructing and operating the repositOry. These options win be evaluated in conjunction with the study of alternative designs described in the preceding section-

license application is submitted in

2002 , and the Nuclear Regulatory Com-

mission approves construction of the reposit.ory in 2005.
. Emplacement of

waste in the repository

begins in 2010 and ends in 2033.
. After a five-

year start-up phase , commer-

cial spent nuclear fuel is emplaced at a

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Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM Document 315-8 Filed 04/16/2004 Page 10 of 12
Estimated Cost

Repository costs
The $18. 7 billion estimated repository cost
reflects several factors, The repository subsurface facilities would consist of approxi-

fuel-

000 metric tons per year. Perfor-

mance confirmation and monitoring would continue for 100 years before closing and
sealing the repository,
Because research is ongoing and the repQsitory design has not yet been selected , there

mately 100 miles of steel- or concrete- lined tunnels , and underground operations would
involve remotely operated equipment, The

waste packages would be made of high
grade materials and manufactured under strict quality controls and standards. The

is uncertainty in the cost estimate. To compensate for the uncertainty, contingencies have: been incorporated into the cost esti-

surface facilities would be designed to
handle a high volume of commercial spent

mates,

Performance Confirmation

Regulatory. Infrastructure and Management Support

$2.
Waste

$2.
Subsurface
Facilities

Packages $4.

$5.

$5.
Surface Facilities
AUocation of costs to construct, operate . monitor, and close a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain

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Page 11 of 12

Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Document 315-8

Filed 04/16/2004

Estimated Cost

Total system life cycle costs
A monitored geologic repository is only one

then build , operate, monitor , close, and
seal the repository are $18.

component of it total waste management system , which would also include overall system management , transportation, and
b~nefits to the State of Nevada. The total

. billion.

. The estimated costs of expanding the rEipository to accommodate additional

life cycle costs for a complete waste management system include the following ele-

waste beyond the curre-nt 70, 000 metricton statutory limit, if authorized, would

ments:
. Total

be approximately $4, 5 billion,
program costs from 1983 through
. The estimated

costs of transporting

1998 were approximately $5, 9 billion in year-or-expenditure dollars. Site characterization activities at all nine of the initial candidate sites and the five-mile ex-

wastes to Yucca Mountain are approxi-

mately $6.

7 billion.

. Estimated payments

e((uivalent to taxes

account for the larg~st portion ofthe costs
. 1' hc

to date.
$1,200

ploratory tunnel at Yucca Mountain

~nd other benefits to the State of Nevada

and affected units oflocal government are approximately $3. 2 billion.
. The estimated

c$timated costs to complete a license application and supporting documents is $1.1 billion , in constant 1998 dollars.
to complete the repository design and licensing process , and

costs of managing the en-

tire system are $2. 5 billion.
The total of estimated future costs is $36, billion , in constant 1998 dollars. (The additive total of the elements above differs due
to rounding.

. The estimated costs

000
. Total Hstorical Costs (Year-ot- B,penditure

$800

Dolars)

't "
$400
:!E

It Total Estimated Future Costs (Constant 1998 Dollars)

Ucense Application Costs (1998 Dollars)
. Repository Costs (1998 Ool~3rs)

$200

Fiscal Year
Profile of total system life cycle costs. These cost estimates rellect DOE' s best projections. given the scopeofthe work identified and planned
schedule of required activities. Future events and information could result in changes to both costs and schedules. Future budget requests for

the ~rogram have yet to be established and will be determined through the annual executive and congressional budget process,

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Document 315-8 Filed 04/16/2004 Page 12 of 12
Estimated Cost

'..

Case 1:98-cv-00154-JFM

Who pays?
The Nuc1(!ar Waste Policy Act of 1982 requires entities that generate spent nuclear fuel and high- level radioactive waste to pay for the costs of disposal. The utilities with , nuclear power plants pay a fee to fund the disposal of wastes from their plants, while the Federal Government uses tax revenues , to pay for the disposal of radioactive waste from the nation s defense programs.

funding-free from normal budgetary pres-

sures-required for such a long-term effort.

The Nuclear Waste Fund is intended to cover the entire cost of disposing of com-

mercial spent nuclear fuel. The Secretary
of Energy regularly reviews the Fund and projected costs of the program to 6etermine whether the fees will be enough to recover

enter into fee. for-service contracts with
utilities for disposing of the waste, In re-

he Act directs the Secretary of Energy to

the full costs. If the fees are too high or too low, the Secretary is authorized to propose

any required changes. .
The DOE has determined that the amount

turn for this service, utilities pay annual
fees that are deposited into a Nuclear Waste
Fund where the money earns interest until

generated by the current fees, including the

spent. In setting up the Fund , Congress

unspent balance and accumulating interest, is sufficient to cover the total system
life cycle costs of disposing of commercial

recognized that the disposal program is an extremely complex , first-of-a-kind scientific and engineering project and one that can succeed only through a sustained effort over
to provide the adequate, assured , and stable

spent nuclear fuel. This ~ssumes that the
unspent balance and interest income from

many decades. Thus, the Fund is designed

the Nuclear Waste Fund wilhemain available for their originally intended purpose,

000
Year-of-Bq:Jeoditure Dollars (listorica~

500
III

Ci-.ifian Contributions

8 2, 000
: 1, 500

8 1, 000
III

500

(500) .

Fiscal Year

These cost estimates reflect DOE' s best projections. Historical and projected program income and costs through the waste emplacement phasegiven the scope of the work identified and planned schedule of required activities. Future events and information could resu~ in changes to

and will be determined through the annual

both rosts and schedules, Future budget requests for the program have yet to be established executive and congressional budget process,

0083

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