Free Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

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No. 05-396C (Judge MaryEllen Coster Williams)

tN THE UNITED STATES COURTOF FEDERALCLAEVIS

THOMAS REMPFER L. and RUSSELLE. D1NGLE, Plaintiffs,
V.

THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

DEFENDANT'SMOTIONTO DISMISS

PETER D. KEISLER Assistant Attorney General DAVID M. COHEN Director JAMESM. ICANSELLA Deputy Director OF COUNSEL: LT COL P. CHRISTOPHERCLARK Air Force Legal Services Agency General Litigation Division 1501WilsonBlvd., 7'h Floor Arlington, VA22209-2403 DOUGLASK. MICKLE Trial Attorney Commemial Litigation Branch Civil Division Deparmaent Justice of Atm:Classification Unit 8th Floor, 1100L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Tele: (202) 353-7961 Fax: (202) 353-7988 Attorneys For Defendant

May20, 2005

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE(S) DEFENDANT'S DISMISS MOTION TO .................................................................................... STATEMENT OF ISSUES THE ................................................................................................... STATEMENT ...................................................................................................... OF CASE THE I. NatureThe ....................................................................................................... Of Case II. Statement Facts OfThe ................................................................................................. SUMMARYARGUMENT OF THE ............................................................................................ ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. I. Standard Review AMotion Dismiss Of For To ............................................................ II. TheCourt LacksSubject MatterJurisdiction To Entertain Plaintiffs' Claims............. A. Mr. Rempfer's And Mr. Dingle's Claims, Brought As Former Members Of The ComaecticutAir National Guard, The State Militia, Are Against The State Militia, The Not United .............................................................................. States B. Mr. RempferArad Mr. Dingle Voluntarily Separated FromThe ConnecticutNational .......................................................................... Air Guard C. Mr. Rempfer's ClaimsAre BarredByTheStatute Of Limitations ..................... 11I. Mr. RempferAndMr. Dingle's Claim For Reinstatement AndFull CompensationFails To State A Claim Because They Axe Not Entitled To MilitaryPayAsFomler Members TheNationalGuard Of ........................................ IV. Mr. Rempfer'sAndMr. Dingle's Request For Declaratory Relief Is Not AnIncident Of AndCollaterol To AJudgment Money For Damages ...................... CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 1 9_ 9_ 9_ 3 5 6 6 7

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T~LE CASES

OF AUTHO~TIES PAGE(S)

Adams United States, v. 46Fed. 834 CI. (2000) ..................................................................................................... Adkinsv. United States, 68F.3d (Fed. 1995) 1317 Cir. .......................................................................................... Bevelheimerv. United States, 4 C1. 558, (1984) Ct. 561 ................................................................................................ Bobula Department Justice, v. of 970 854 Cir.1992) F.2d (Fed. .................................................................................... Bonen UnitedStates, v. 229 C1.144, F.2d (1981) Ct. 666 536 .............................................................................. Bowen Massachusetts, v. 487 879 U.S. (1988) ......................................................................................................... Brown UnitedStates, v. 30Fed. 227 CI. (1993) ..................................................................................................... Cannichael UnitedStates, v. 298 1367 Cir.2002) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Christie v. United States, 207 CI.518 584 Ct. F.2d (1975) ...................................................................................... Clark v. UnitedStates, 322 1358 Cir.2003) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Colonv. UnitedStates, 35Fed. 515 C1. (1996) ..................................................................................................... Conlev v. Gibson, 355 41 U.S. (1957) ............................................................................................................. Coonv. United States, 30Fed. 531(1994) C1. ..................................................................................................... -ii-

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CosmicConstr. Co. v United States, 697 t389 Cir.1982) F.2d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Cottrell v. UnitedState~, 42Fed. 144 C1. (1998) ..................................................................................................... Covington v. Dep't of Human Health and Human Servs., 750 937 Cir.1984) F.2d (Fed. .......................................................................................... Crockerv. UnitedStates, 125 1475 Cir.1997) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Dehnev. United States, 970 890 Cir.1992) F.2d (Fed. .............................................................................. Deponte Invs.. Inc. v. UnitedStates, 54Fed. 112 C1. (2002) ....................................................................................................... Don'all v. Dep't of the Army, 301 1375 Cir.2002) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Faulknerv. UnitedStates, 43Fed. 54(1999) el. ....................................................................................................... Fisher v. United States, 402 1167 Cir.2005) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Furash & Company United States, v. 46Fed. 518 C1. (2000) ....................................................................................................... Gallucci v. UnitedStates, 41Fed. C1.631 ..................................................................................................... (1998) Gnaavv. UnitedStates, 225 C1.242, F.2d (1980) Ct. 634 574 ........................................................................ Greenev. UnitedStates, 2005 1023514 C1.Apr. 2005) WL (Fed. 29, .................................................................... Hambsch United States, v. 857 763 Cir.1988) F.2d (Fed. ............................................................................................ Hamletv. United States, 873 1414 Cir.1989) F.2d (Fed. .......................................................................................... -iii-

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Hartv. UnitedStates, 910 815 Cir.1990) F.2d (Fed. .......................................................................................... Heaph¥ UnitedStates, v. 23Ct.Ct.697, (1991) 700 ............................................................................................... Hemandez United States, v. 38Fed. 532 C1. (1997) ..................................................................................................... Hoplm~d Bandof PomoIndians v. United States, 855 1573 Cir.1988) F.2d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Hunt UnitedStates, v. 52Fed. 810 CI. (2002) ..................................................................................................... Hurick v. Lehman, 782 984 Cir.1986) F.2d (Fed. .......................................................................................... James v. Caldera, 159 573 Cir.1998) F.3d (Fed. .......................................................................................... Katzv. Cisneros, 16F.3d (Fed. 1994) 1204 Cir. .................................................................................... Khm~ United States, v. 201 1375 Cir.2000) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Kirbyv. UnitedStates, 201 C1. (1973) Ct. 527 ..................................................................................................... Landv. Dollar, 330 731 U.S. (1947) ........................................................................................................... Lelmaanv. Nakshian, 453 156 U.S. (1981) ........................................................................................................... Library of Congressv. Shaw, 478 310 U.S. (1986) ......................................................................................................... Litzenber~er UnitedStates, v. 89F.3d (Fed. 1996) 818 Cir. ............................................................................................ Mars v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24F.3d (Fed. 1994) 1368 Cir. ............................................................................................ -iv-

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Martinez UnitedStates, v. 48Fed. 851 C1. (2001) ..................................................................................................... Maryland UnitedStates, v. 381 41(1965) U.S. ........................................................................................................... Moody UnitedStates, v. 58Fed. 522 CI. (2003) ............................................................................................... Moverv. UnitedStates, 190 1314 Cir.1999) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Murphy UnitedStates, v. 993 871 Cir.1993) F.2d (Fed. .......................................................................................... NEC Corp v. United States, 806 247 Cir.1986) F.2d ~ed. ............................................................................................ National Corn GrowersAss'n v. Baker, 840 1547 Cir.1988) F.2d (Fed. ........................................................................................ New YorkLife Ins. Co. v. United States, 118 1553 Cir.1997) F.3d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Palmer UnitedStates, v. 168 1310 Cir.1999) F.3d (Fed. .................................................................................. Parker v. UnitedStates, 2 C1. 399, (1983) Ct. 402 ................................................................................................. Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 334 U.S. (1990) ......................................................................................................... Pohanic UnitedStates, v. 48Fed. 166 C1. (2000) ............................................................................................... Ponderv. UnitedStates, 117 549 Cir.1997) F.3d (Fed. ............................................................................................ Ravmark Indus.. Inc. v. UnitedStates, 15C1. 334 Ct. (1988) ......................................................................................................... Reevesv. UnitedStates, 49Fed. 560 C1. (2001) .....................................................................................................

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Reynolds v. Armyand Air Force ExchangeSere., 846 746 Cir.1988) F.2d (Fed. ........................................................................................ Rickelshausv. Sierra Club, 463 680 U.S. (1983) ......................................................................................................... Rocovichv. UnitedStates, 933 991 Cir.1991) F.2d (Fed. ............................................................................................ Sammt UnitedStates, v. 780 31(Fed. 1985) F.2d Cir. ............................................................................................ Sandersv. UnitedStates, 219 C1.285, F.2d (Ct. CI.1979) Ct. 594 804 .................................................................. Scarseth v. UnitedStates, 52Fed. 458 CI. (2002) ..................................................................................................... Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 232 U.S. (1974) ....................................................................................................... Singleton v. MeritSystemsProtection Board, 244 1331 ....................................................................................................... F.3d (2001) Sorianov. UnitedStates, 352 270 U.S. (1957) ......................................................................................................... Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 83(1998) U.S. ............................................................................................................. Tippettv. United States, 185 1250 Cir.1999) F.3d (Fed. ............................................................................ TraTco.Inc. v. UnitedStates, 994 832 F.2d (1993) ......................................................................................................... United States v. King, 395 t (1969) U.S. ......................................................................................................... United States v. Kubrick, 444 111 U.S. (1979) ......................................................................................................... UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 463 206 U.S. (1983) ......................................................................................................... -vi-

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United States v. Sherwood, 312U.S. (1941) 584 ................................................................................................. UnitedStates v. Testan, 424 392 U.S. (1976) ............................................................................................. United States v. White MountainApacheTribe, 537 465 U.S. (2003) .........................................................................................................

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STATUTES 5 U.S.C. .......................................................................................................................... § 702 5 U.S.C. ........................................................................................................................ § 5596 10U.S.C. ............................................................................................................................ §1107 28U.S.C. ................................................................................................................ §1331 28U.S.C. ................................................................................................................ §1346 28U.S.C. .................................................................................................................. §1491 28U.S.C. ...................................................................................................................... §2201 28U.S.C. ...................................................................................................................... §2501 37U.S.C. .................................................................................................................. §204 37U.S.C. ........................................................................................................................ §206 4, 16 3, 17 3

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MISCELLANEOUS National Guard Regulation (AR)600-100, 15 April 1994, Commissioned Officers - Federal Reco_maition And Related Perso~mel '~ 2-2........................................................................ Action, Wiener, Militia Clause the Constitution,54 Harv.L. Rev.181(1940)............................. The of

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INDEX TO APPENDIX Document Page

Mr. Rempfer's Application for Ready Reserve Assignment, AF Form 1288 December 22, 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Discharge Order, State of Connecticut, Captain Thomas Rempfer, 23 February 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Discharge Order, State of Connecticut, Major Russell Dingle, 23 March 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Notification of Eligibility for Retired Pay at Age 60, Major Russell E. Dingle 9 April 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Application For Transfer To Retired Reserve, Major Russell Dingle 21 March 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Retirement Order, 29 May 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Declaration of Chief Master Sergeant Kristine C. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Declaration of Brigadier General Daniel R. Scace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Extract, National Guard Regulation (AR) 600-100, 15 April 1994, Commissioned Officers Federal Recognition And Related Personnel Action, ¶ 2-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS THOMASL. REMPFER and RUSSELL E. DINGLE, Plaintiffs,
V,

No. 05-396C (Judge MaryEllen Coster Williams)

THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant,the UnitedStates, respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the complaint of Thomas Rempferand Russelt E. Dingle pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court L. of Federal Claims("RCFC") becausethe Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain their claims, haitially, Mr. Rempfer'sand Mr. Dingle's complaint must be dismissed because their claims, if any, do not lie against the United States. Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dinglebring their and claims as members the ConnecticutAir National Guard, which is the state of Connecticut's of militia. Furthermore, both Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle requested separation fiom the Connecticut Air National Guardaf~er they refused inoculation with the Antl~rax Vaccine Adsorbed ("anthrax vaccine"). Since it is well settled that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review back pay claims pursumatto the TuckerAct ifa military member voltmtarily leaves the service, plaintiffs claims are barred. Finally, Mr. Rempfer's claim is also jurisdictionally barred by the statute of limitations. In the alternative, the defendantrespectfully request the Court dismiss the claims of Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle pursuant to RCFC and 12(b)(6), as their complaint fails to state any claim

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upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, since Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle are former and members the ConnecticutAir National Guard, they are not entitled to pay for drills whichthey of did not attend or training duty whichthey did not perform. Furthemaore,since Mr. Rempfer and Mr. Dingleare not entitled to a money-judgment this Court, their claims for declaratory relief in are not incident of, and collateral to, any monetary relief. Accordingly,these claims are barred as well. In support of our motion,the defendant relies uponplaintiffs' complaint, the following brief, and the Appendix filed under separate cover.~ STATEMENTOF THE ISSUES 1. Whetherthe Court possesses jurisdiction over claims brought by Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle in their capacity as formermembers the state militia, the ConnecticutAir National of Guard? 2. Whetherthe Court possesses jurisdiction over claims brought by Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle given that they voluntarily separated from the Connecticut Air National Guard? 3. Whetherthe claims of Mr. Rempfer barred by the statute of limitations? are 4. WhetherMr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted given that former members the Air National Guardare only entitled to pay for of duties actually performed? 5. WhetherMr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle's request for declaratory relief is incident of, and and collateral to, a judgmentfor money damages? STATEMENTOF THE CASE I. Nature Of The Case

Plaintiffs are former members the Connecticut Air National Guardwhoallege they of ~ Citations to "Compl." refer to plaintiffs' complaint; "DA" refers to the defendant's appendix. 2

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were forced to resign fromthe state militia becausethey refused to obey an order to be inoculated with anthrax vaccine. Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle seek judgment from the Court ordering: (I) reinstatement to the ConnecticutAir National Guard; (2) back pay and other compensation financial losses they suffered as a result of allegedly being forced out of the for ConnecticutAir National Guard;-' (3) a declaration that anthrax vaccine is an investigational new drug pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1107, Executive Order 13139, and Departmentof Defense Directive 6200.2; (4) a declaration that the anthrax vaccine was an investigational newdrug the time of the inoculation order; (5) a declaration that the anthrax vaccine inoculation order was unlawful;(6) an awardof fees and costs; and, (7) any other relief the Courtfinds appropriate. lI. 3 Statement Of The Facts

MrRempfer a fom~erCaptain and pilot with the Connecticut Air National Guard. is Compl.at I 1. Mr. Dingle is a fomaerMajor and pilot in the Connecticut Air National Guard. Compl. 1 2. at Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle, as members the ComaecticutAir National Guard, were of ordered to be inoculated with anthrax vaccine pursuant to the Department Defense's Anthrax of Vaccination Irmnunization Pmgam. Compl.at 11 6-7. Refusing to complywith orders to be inoculated with the anthrax vaccine could subject military members disciplinary action, to

: Entitlements allegedly due pursuant to 37 U.S.C. § 204 or 5 U.S.C. § 5596. Compl 11 22, at 27, 31. ~ For purposesof this motion, the defendantaccepts as tree the facts alleged in the complaint. However, defendmat the reserves the right to contest the alleged facts in subsequentproceedings. TheCourt mayalso consider evidence set forth in Defendant'sAppendix whendetermining if it lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Rempfer's Mr. Dingle's complaintbecauseit contains and relevant evidence concerning jurisdictional facts. Re,moldsv. Army Air Force Exchanue and Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 3

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including courts-martial or administrative discharges. Compl.at ¶ 7. Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle opposedthe use of the anthrax vaccine and refused to be inoculated. Compl.at ¶ 15. Mr. Rempfersubmitted an Air Force ("AF") Form1288, "Application for ReadyReserve Assi~ent," dated December22, 1998, requesting assig~maent from the Connecticut Air National Guard to the Air Force Reserve. DA1-2, 10. His commander, (then) Lieutenant Colonel (~Lt Col") John S. Swift, recommended approval. Id., DA2. Mr. Rempfer'srequest was approvedand he was honorably discharged from the Com~ecticutAir National Guard, effective March11, 1999, and transferred to the Air Force Reserve, effective March12, 1999. DA3. Mr. Dingle also submitted an AFForm 1288 requesting reassi~ent from the Com~ecticutAir National Guardto the Air Force Reserve. DA8,10. Mr. Dingle's request was approved, and he was honorably discharged from the Connecticut Air National Guard, effective April 3, 1999, and transferred to the Air Force Reserve, effective April 4, 1999. DA 4. In a letter dated April 9, 2002, Mr. Dinglewasnotified that he had completedthe required years of duty to be eligible for retired pay at age 60. DA5. Mr. Dingle submitted an AFFom~ 131, ~'Application for Transfer to the Retired Reserve," dated March21, 2003, requesting transfer to the Retired Reserve. DA6. Mr. Dingle's request was approvedand he was relieved from his current assigmnentand assigned to the Retired Reserveeffective June 28, 2003. DA7. Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle filed their complaint on March23, 2005. Theyassert the Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain their claims under the AdministrativeProcedureAct (~APA"),5 U.S.C. § 702; the Declaratory Judgn~entAct, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and 28 U.S.C.

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1331 ("Federal Question"), 1346 ("Little Tucker Act"), mad1491 ("Big Tucker Act"). at 4[ 4. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Dingle and Mr. Rempfer'sclaims because they seek relief as members the state's militia. This Court only posseses jurisdiction to of entertain claims against the UnitedStates. 28 U.S.C. § 149I. Furthermore,jurisdiction is lacking because both Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle requested reassi~mnment from the Connecticut Air National Guard. To properly state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491in this Court, a plaintiffmust base his claim on a money mandatingprovision. However, is well settled that it the Court lacks jurisdiction to review back pay claims under the TuckerAct if a military member voluntarily leaves the service. Both Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle requested separation from the ConnecticutAir National Guard, and they were voluntarily discharged pursuant to their requests. In addition, Mr. Dingle voluntarily retired from the Air Force Reservesubsequentto discharge from the Co~mecticutAir National Guard. TheCourt also lacks jurisdiction over the claims of Mr. Rempfer,as his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 2501of Title 28, UnitedStates Code,requires filing a lawsuit in this Court within six years after a cause of action accrues. Mr. Rempfer's cause of action accrued upon his discharge from the Connecticut Air National Guardon March1 I, 1999, and thus, he had until March11, 2005to file his complaint. However, Rempfer not file Mr. did his complaint until March23, 2005. Accordingly,his claim is time barred. Evenassumingthe Court's jurisdiction, Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle's claims must be

rejected becausethey fail to state a claim uponwhichrelief can be ganted. Unlikeservice members serving uponactive duty or in a full-time status, members the Connecticut Air of 5

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National Gnardare entitled to pay only for actual duties perforuaedpursuant to the applicable military pay statute, 37 U.S.C. § 206. However,Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle are asserting a back pay claim for duties they did not performwith the Connecticut Air National Guard. Thus, their complaintfails to state a claim uponwhichrelief can be ganted. Finally, this Courtmay grant equitablerelief only if it is collateral to, or as an incident of, a judgmentfor money damages.However,the only military pay statute applicable to them as former non-full time members the Connecticut Air National Guardis 37 U.S.C. § 206, and of Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle cannot obtain a money judgment for duties not actually performed in the ConnecticutAir National Guard. Thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their requestfor equitablerelief. ARGUMENT I. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss ha ruling on RCFC 12(b) motions, the Court must accept as true the complaint's undisputed factual allegations and construethe facts in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiff. Scheuerv. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hamletv. United State~, 873 F.2d 1414, 1416(Fed. Cir. 1989). Oncejurisdiction is challenged pnrsuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), a plaintiff cannot rely merely on allegations in the complaint, but mustinstead bring forth relevant, competentproof to establish jurisdiction. Landv. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,735 n.4 (1947); Reynoldsv. Army Air & Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d at 747. A plaintiffmust makeonly a prima facie showingof jurisdictional facts through the submittedmaterial in order to defeat a motionto dismiss. Ra,anarkIndus.. Inc. v. UnitedStates, 15 CI. Ct. 334, 338(1988) (citing DataDisc.. Inc. SystemsTech. Assoc.. Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285(gth Cir. 1977). 6

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If the undisputedfacts reveal any possible basis on which the non-moving party might prevail, the Court must deny the motion. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. However, the motion if challenges the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint,the Court may consider relevant evidencein order to resolve the factual dispute. Rocovich U~lted States, 933 F.2d v. 991,994(Fed. Cir. 1991). Anyambiguities regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction should be "resolved against the assumptionof jurisdiction." Marsv. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon

Conlux,24 F.3d 1368, 1373(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). RCFC 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaintbased upon failure to state claim uponwhichrelief can be ganted. TheCourt is not to decide if the plaintiff has alleged a set of facts sufficient to support his claim. Scheuer, 416U.S. at 236. This Court wilt dismiss a complaintpursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears beyonda doubt that the plaintiffcan prove no set of facts entitling himto relief. Conle7v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957); Ponder United States, 117 F.3d 549, 552-53(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110(1998). 1I. The Court LacksSubject Matter Jurisdiction To Entertain Plaintiffs' Claims

"Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter whichmust be addressed before the Court reaches the merits of the plaintiff's claims." Deponte Invs.. Inc. v. UnitedStates, 54 Fed. C1.112, 115 (2002) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for aBetter Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); Hambsch United States, 857 F.2d 763,765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("When court is without v. a jurisdiction to hear a case, it is correspondingly withoutauthority to decide the merits of a case."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1054(1989). "Withoutjurisdiction the court catmotproceedat in any cause. Jurisdiction is powerto declare the law, and when ceases to exist, the only it function remainingto the court is that of announcing fact and dismissing the case." Steel Co. the

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Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex Parte McCardle,74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869). A. Mr. Rempfer's And Mr. Dingle's Claims, Brought As Former Members Of The Connecticut Air National Guard,The State Militia, Are Against The State Militia, Not The UnitedStates

TheUnitedStates, "as sovereign, is immune suit save as it consents to be sued." from United States v. Sherwood,312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); accord Furash & Company United v. States, 46 Fed. CI. 518, 520 (2000), affd 252 F.3d 1336(Fed. Cir. 2001). The '"limitations conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied."' Lel~rnanv. Nakshian,453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)); accord NEC Corpv. United States, 806 F.2d 247, 249 (Fed. Cir. 1986). That is, a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, is a waiver of sovereign immunity.Section 1491(a)(1) provides: TheUnited States Court of Federal Claimsshall have jurisdiction to render judgmentupon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congessor any regulation of an executive department, or uponany express or implied contract with the UnitedStates, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages cases not soundingin tort. in Accordingly, is well settled that the jurisdiction of the Courtof Claims(and its successors): it is confined to the rendition of money judgmentsin suits brought for that relief against the UnitedStates... and if the relief sought is against others than the UnitedStates the suit as to themmustbe ignoredas beyond jurisdiction of the court,.., or if its the maintenance against private parties is prerequisite to prosecution of the suit against the UnitedStates the suit mustbe dismissed." 8

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UnitedStates v. Sherwood, U.S. at 588 (citations omitted). 312 Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dinglebring their suit as "former officers and pilots with the and Connecticut Air National Guard." Compl.p. 1 & Compl.¶¶ 1, 2; DA3,4. In addition to declaratory relief, Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingleask the Court to "reinstate [them] into their and forn~er positions with the [Connecticut Air National Guard]." Compl.Prayer for Relief¶ A. Thus, it is clear fromtheir pleadings, and the relief that they seek, that Mr.Rempfer's Mr. and Dingle's claims are not against the UnitedStates, but against the state of Connecticut. It is uncontroverted that the National Guard a lineal descendant the militia; as such, is of the Constitutionreserves to the states the appointment its officers. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, of cl. 16; see generally, Wiener, TheMilitia Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv.L.Rev. (1940). 181 Furthermore, dual status of a guard officer is set forth clearly in the governing the federal regulations: The appointmentof officers in the Army National Guardis a function of the State concerned,as distinguished from the Federal recognition of such appointment. Uponappointment in the Army National Guardof a State... an individual has a State status under whichhe can function. Suchindividual acquires a federal status whenhe is federally recognized and appointed as a Reserveof the

National Guard Regulation (AR) 600-100, 15 April 1994, Commissioned Officers - Federal Recoanition AndRelated Personnel 4 Action, ¶ 2-2. Similar to every other state, Connecticuthas promulgated statutes to effectuate the Governor'srole in appointing officers in the ConnecticutAir National Guard.Specifically, the Governoris the "commander-in-chief" the Connecticut National Guard. Conn. Gen. Stats. § of 27-14. Pursuant to ColmecticutGeneral Statutes § 27-49, it is the Governorwhoappoints

~ Anextract of this regulation is providedfor the Court's convenienceat DA11-14. 9

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5 officers to the ColmecticutNational Guard. Thus, to be reinstated in the ConnecticutAir National Guard, the Court wouldhave to order the Governorof Connecticut to exercise a function of the state, and appoint Mr. Dingleand Mr. Rempfer officers in a state organization. as This is beyondthe Court's jurisdictional authority. See Singleton v. Merit SystemsProtection Boar~d, 244 F.3d 1331, 1336 (2001) (holding the MSPB not have jurisdiction to order did Governoror the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guardto take action against an Ohio guardsmanwhowas also a National Guard Teclmician). It is well settled that members a state's national guardare not Federal actors. In of Maryland United States, 381 U.S. 41, 45 n. 5 (1965), vacated on other ~rounds, 382 U.S. 159 v. (1965), the Supreme Court approveda line of cases whichheld that military members the of Guard are state employees. A member Connecticut Air National Guard does not becomea of Federal actor, or comeunder the control of the UnitedStates until "they are formally called into the military service of the UnitedStates." Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358, 1366(Fed. Cir. 2003). It is for this reason that "a member a National Guardunit not in active federal service of is not, insofar as his military capacity with the Guardis concerned,a federal employee the for purposes of the BackPay Act." Gna~v United States, 225 Ct. C1. 242, 634 F.2d 574, 579 v. (1980). The reasoning of Gna~v directly applicable here: a member the Connecticut Air is of NationalGuard,not in active federal service, is not a Federal actor for the purposesof the Tucker Act.

Conn.Gen. Stats. § 27-49provides in relevant part: Officers of the national guard and naval militia shall be appointed by the governor, subject to the procedureprescribed in regulations of the departmentof defense relating to the national guard and naval militia. 10

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Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle have never alleged that they were ever "called into the and military service of the United States." Indeed, their discharge orders from the ConnecticutAir National Guardwere si~ed "by the order of the Governor." DA3, 4. Furthermore, the relief they seek makesclear they were wearingtheir "state militia hat" whenthey weresubject to the order to be inoculated with the authrax vaccine. See Perpich v. Dep't of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 347 (1990) (explaining that National Guardmembers keep three hats in their closets--a "civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an arn~yhat"). Significantly, only one hat can be "wornat any one time." Id~ Therefore, because Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle are challenging orders they received and as officers of the ConnecticutAir National Guard,and the relief they seek is reinstatementin the Co~mecticut National Guard,their suit is not against the United States. Accordingly,this Air Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain their claims and their complaintmustbe dismissed. B. Mr. RempferAndMr. Dingle Voluntarily Separated FromThe Connecticut Air National Guard

In order to properly state a claim under 28 U.S.C.§ 1491in this Court, a plaintiff must point to "a substantive right in the Constitution, an act of Congess,or an executive department regulation on whichto base his claim. Dehnev. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The substantive right alleged must be one that mandatesthe paymentof money.I_.d., citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-217(1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976). TheUnited States Court of Appealsfor the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to revie~v back pay claims under the TuckerAct ifa military member voluntarily leaves the service. Carmichaelv. United States, 298 F.3d 1367, 1371(Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Moverv. United States, 190 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); United States, 185 F.3d t250, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Adkinsv. United States, 68 F.3d 1317,

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1321(Fed. Cir. 1995); Sammt United States, 780 F.2d 31, 33 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In this case, v. Mr. Rempfer submitted a request for transfer to the Air Force Reserve, whichresulted in his voluntary discharge from the Co~mecticutAir National Guardon MarchI 1, 1999. DA1-3. Likewise, Mr. Dingle was voluntarily discharged from the Connecticut Air National Guard, effective April 3, 1999, pursuant to his request for transfer to the Air Force Reserve. DA 4. Resignationsand retirements are presumed be voluntary and the plaintiffs bear the to burdenof establishing that the separation wasinvoluntary. Tippett v. UnitedStates, 185 F.3d at 1255; Ckcristie v. United States, 207 Ct. C1. 333,338, 518 F.2d 584, 587 (1975). See also Moody v. United State~, 58 Fed. C1. 522, 524 (2003); Heaphy United States, 23 C1. Ct. 697, 700 v. (1991) (table), aft'd, 972 F.2d 1355(Fed. Cir. 1992). Determinationof whethera separation voluntary requires an examinationof all of the surroundingfacts and circumstances. Covington v. Dep't of Human Health and Human Servs., 750 F.2d 937, 941-42 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle allege that their separations were not voluntary, as they were and **required to resign their commissions CTANG as officers... [and] although they resisted, they

~vere constructively discharged." Compl.at '~113. Allegedly, they were "forced out of the CT ANG simply becauseof their stance against the antl~ax vaccine, and their refusal to be inoculated." Compl. '~] 15. According the plaintiffs, "[r]efusing to comply at to with orders to take the [anthrax vaccine] inoculations subjected [them] to military disciplinary actions, including courts-martial or administrative discharges." Compl.at ¶ 7. However, these circumstances, even if true, do not overcome presumptionthat their separations were the voluntary, as merelyfacing "unattractive options" does not maketheir separations any less voluntary. Dorrall v. Dep't of the Am~v, F.3d 1375, 1361(Fed. Cir. 2002). "This governing 301 principle holds true evenwherea resignation is offered to avoid a court-martial or other serious 12

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discipline." Moody United States, 58 Fed. C1. at 524. See Scarseth v. United States, 52 Fed. v. CI. 458, 468 (2002) (finding no jurisdiction whenplaintiff resigned in face of impending courtmartial); Gallucci v. United States, 41 Fed. C1.631,645 (1998) (finding no jurisdiction when plaintiff resigned in the face of a recommendation administrative discharge); Brown for v. UnitedStates, 30 Fed. C1. 227, 229-230(1993) (finding no jurisdiction when plaintiff resigaaed "for the good of the service" after being recommended court-martial), affd, 26 F.3d 139 for (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table). Basedupon the facts as alleged by Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle, their and separations from the Co~mecticut National Guardwere voluntary and, thus, the Court lacks Air 6 jurisdiction over their claims. C. Mr. Rempfer's Claims Are Barred Bv The Statute of Limitations

"Every claim of whichthe United States Court of Federal Claimshas jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years at~er such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C.§ 2501(1992). It is well settled that this six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional, thus, compliancewith § 2501 is one of the terms and conditions upon whichthe United States has waivedits sovereign immunityand consented to suit. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); United States v. Sherwood, U.S. at 586 ("The terms of its consent to be 312 suedin any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit."); Hart v. UnitedStates, 910 F.2d 815, 817-18(Fed. Cir. 1990). "Compliance ~vith the statute of limitations, in this court, an explicit jurisdictional prerequisite for the commencement suit." Coonv. United States, 30 of

~' Moreover,Mr. Dingle has subsequentlyvoluntarily retired from the Air Force Reserve. In a letter dated April 9, 2002, Mr. Dingle wasnotified that he had completedthe required years of service for eligibility to retired pay uponreaching age 60. DA In response, Mr. Dingle 5. submitted an AFFoma131, "Application for Transfer to the Retired Reserve," dated March21, 2003. DA6. His request was approved and he was relieved from his Air Force Reserve assignmentand assigned to the Retired Reserve, effective June 28, 2003. DA 7. 13

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Fed. C1. 531,534, aff'd, 41 F.3d 1520(Fed. Cir. 1994); Bevelheimer UnitedStates, 4 C1. Ct. v. 558, 561(1984)("The statute of limitations is to be interpreted in light of its function of giving consent for the government be sued."); Parker v. UnitedStates, 2 C1. Ct. 399, 402 (1983). to Accordingly,section 2501is strictly construed and this Court cannot waivecompliancewith its provisions. Rickelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 605 (1983); Soriano v. United State~, 352 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1957). To prove that his claim is not time barred, Mr. Rempfer must showthat his "claim accrued within six years of the filing of the complaint." Martinezv. UnitedStates, 48 Fed. CI. 851,857(2001), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For the purposes of section 2501, cause of action accrues "whenall events whichfix the government's liability have occurred and the plaintiffwas or should have been aware of their existence." HoplandBandof Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1576-77(Fed. Cir. 1988). See also Colonv. United States, 35 Fed. C1. 515, 517-18(1996). "Stated differently, a claim has accrued whenthe last event transpires that gives plaintiffa cause of action." Adanlsv. UnitedStates, 46 Fed. C1. 834, 838, aff'd, 243 F.3d 560(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 961 (2001). Mr. Rempferwas discharged from the Connecticut Air National Guard on March11, 1999. TheFederal Circuit specifically established a bright line rule that "a claim based on ma alleged unlawfuldischarge from the military service accrues on the date of discharge." Hurick v. Lehman,782 F.2d 984, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1986), ~ Wilsonv. United States, 231 Ct. C1. 958 (1982)); Bonenv. United States, 229 Ct. C1. 144, 666 F.2d 536, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1981), Kirby v. UnitedStates, 201 Ct. C1. 527 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974). Thus, Mr. Rempfer'scause of action accrued on March11, 1999, and thus, he had until March1 i,

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2005 to file his complaint. However,Mr. Rempferfiled his claim on March23, 2005, and therefore, his claim is time-barred. III. Mr. RempferAnd Mr. Dingle's Claim For Reinstatement And Full Compensation Fails To State A Claim Because They Are Not Entitled To Military Pay As Former MembersOf The National Guard Thejurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claimsto entertain claims and grant relief is dependentupon, and strictly limited to, the extent to whichthe UnitedStates has waivedits sovereig~ immunity.United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 399. A waiver of sovereign immunity and, hence, consent for the United States to be sued in the Court of Federal Claims, "camaotbe implied and must be unequivocallyexpressed." United States v. Kin~, 395 U.S. at 1 (citing United States v. Sherwood, U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); see also Testan, 424 U.S. at 399. 312 Accordingly,any grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claimsmust be construedstrictly, and all conditions placed uponsuch a grant must be satisfied before the Court mayaccept jurisdiction. Library of Conaress v. Shaw,478 U.S. 310 (1986); CosmicConstr. Co. v United States, 697 F.2d 1389, 1390(Fed. Cir. 1982). For this Court to have jurisdiction, Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle must establish an and explicit constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision granting themthe right to the payment of money the UnitedStates, in addition to the TuckerAct, in order to invoke the Court's by jurisdiction. Khanv. United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377(Fed. Cir. 2000); Tippett v. United States, 185 F.3d at 1254-55. Merelyrequesting money damages,however, does not satisfy the money-mandating criterion, as there mustbe a statute, regulation, or contract that specifically allows the monetary relief plaintiff requests. See New YorkLife has. Co. v. UnitedStates, 118 F.3d 1553, 1556(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094(1998).

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In this case, Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle base the Court's jurisdiction "under the and Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 8 702, the Declaratory JudgmentAct, 28 U.S.C. 8 2201, and under 28 U.S.C. 88 1331, 1346, 1491." Compl.at ¶ 4. However,none of these are money mmadating statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act does not mandatemoneydamages. Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. CI. 144, 152 (I998). As noted by the Federal Circuit, "clear precedent exists that the APA not a jurisdictional statute and does not confer jurisdiction on a court not already is possessing it." National Corn GrowersAss'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting AmericanAir Parcel Forwardin~ Co.. Ltd. V. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984)). See also Murphy ted States, 993 Uni F.2d871, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The [Court of Federal Claims] has no authority to invoke the APA."). Neither is the Declaratory Judgment a money Act mandatingstatute. While this Court clearly has the authority to awardmonetaryrelief based on legal claims, it does not havethe authority to grant primarily equitable relief. Bowen Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988). A limited v. exceptionmay apply to the bar on equitable relief, as equitable relief is available pursuantto the TuckerAct if it is "an incident of and collateral to" a claim for money danaages.28 U.S.C. 8 1491(a)(2); Bobulav. Department Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Where of plaintiff seeks "relief other than money damages,"however,its action ordinarily does not belong in this Court. Bowen, U.S. at 904-08; Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 487 1994). In short, the Court has no authority to enter a declaratory judgment unless it is tied to and subordinated to a preexisting monetaryclaim. It is clear that 28 U.S.C.8 1331only confers jurisdiction in district courts, not in the Court of Federal Claims. Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476(Fed. Cir. 1997); 16

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Faulkner v. United State~, 43 Fed. C1. 54, 55 (1999). Moreover,§ 1331"do[es] not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages."Hernandez v. United State~, 38 Fed. C1. 532, 537-38 (1997). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1346and 28 U.S.C. 1491do not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. United States v. White MountainApacheTribe, 537 U.S. 465,472 (2003); Litzenberger v. UnitedStates, 89 F.3d 818, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Travco. Inc. v. UnitedStates, 994 F.2d 832, 837 (1993) (citing UnitedStates Tes tan, 424 at 398). U.S. In their complaint, Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle request that the Court provide them "full and compensation"for being discharged from the Connecticut Air National Guard. Compl.at page 7. Such compensationis allegedly based upon 37 U.S.C. § 204 or 5 U.S.C. § 5596. Compl.at '~['~[ 22, 27, 31. However, U.S.C. § 5596is not a proper money 5 mandating statute, as members of the Air National Guardare not federal employeesas required by this statute. Detmev.United States, 970 F.2d at 892; Gna~o~ UnitedStates, 634 F.2d at 579. v. "Themilitary pay statutes, the military's administrationof those statutes, and [Federal Circuit] precedentsrecognizethat there are two basic categories of pay entitlements for military service." Palmerv. United States. 168 F.3d 1310, 1313(Fed. Cir. 1999). Onecategory is for members the armedservices serving on active duty, as well as National Guardmembers of serving full-time. Thesemembers, wrongfullyseparated from service, are entitled to pay and if allo~vances under 37 U.S.C. § 204, which serves as the money mandatingstatute for Tucker Act jurisdiction. Palmerv. UnitedStates, 168 F.3d at 1313-14(citing Holle¥v. UnitedStates, 124 F.3d I462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. C1. 285,594F.2d 804, 810-i 1 (Ct. C1. 1979) (en banc). Thesecond category applies to members the National Guard of and Reservewhoare not in full-time active duty service. These "part-time" military members 17

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are entitled to pay and allowancespursuant to 37 U.S.C. § 206 for duty or training actually performed. Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d at 1314. See also Greenev. United States, 2005 WL 1023514,at *5-6 (Fed. C1. Apr. 29, 2005). Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle, as former members the Connecticut Air National Guard of whowere not in full-time status, cannot invoke 37 U.S.C. § 204 as their money mandating statute. Therefore, at best, 37 U.S.C.§ 206 is the only military pay statute applicable to them. However, order for their back pay entitlement claim to survive a motionto dismiss, "the claim in must be based on duty actually performed." Greenev. United States, 2005 WL 1023514,at *6. See Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d at 1313-14(a member serving on part-time duty has no lawful claim for unattendeddrills or unperformed training duty); Delme United States, 970 v. F.2d at 894("[plaintiff] can point to no statute or regulation that mandates for service never pay actually perfo~Tned a member the Air National Guardof the UnitedStates."); Pohanicv. by of United States, 48 Fed. C1. 166, 167-68 (2000). "Thus section 206(a) mandatespay for regular periods of instruction, periods of appropriate duty, and for performance other equivalent of duties. Thestatute mandatescompensation constractive performanceonly for instruction for missed dne to somephysical disabilities." Reevesv. United States, 49 Fed. C1. 560, 566 (2001)

(quoting Dehnev. United States, 970 F.2d at 893). Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle are not asserting a claim for actual duty performedwith the and Connecticut Air National Guard. Thus, their complaint must be dismissed for failing to state a claim on whichrelief can be granted. Fisher v. UnitedStates~ 402 F.3d 1167, 1175-76(Fed. Cir. 2005).

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IV.

Mr. Rempfer'sAndMr. Dingle's Request For Declaratory Relief Is Not An Incident Of And Collaterol To A Judgment For MoneyDamages As part of their requested relief, Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dinglerequest: (1) reinstatement and

into their formerpositions with the ConnecticutAir National Guard;(2) a declaration that anthrax vaccine as used by the defendant, is an investigational newdrug; (3) a declaration that anthrax vaccine was an investigational newdrug status whenthey were ordered to receive AVA inoculations; and, (4) a declaration that the order for themto receive antt~rax vaccineinoculation wasunlawfitl. Compl. pages 7-8. Clearly, this is not monetaryrelief they are seeking, but at equitable relief, pure and unadorned. Subject matter jurisdiction properly exists in this Court only if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a substantive right exists elsewhere, such as a contract or "tunney-mandating" provision of law." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 398. As previously discussed, this Court maygrant equitable relief purst~antto the TuckerAct only if it is "an incident of and collateral to" a claim for money damages.28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); Bobulav. Departmentof Justice, 970 F.2d at "Stated another way, the Court of Federal Claimshas no power'to grant affirn~ative nonmonetaryrelief nnless it is tied and subordinate to a money judgment.'" Jamesv. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573,580(Fed. Cir. 1998)(quotingAustin v. United States, 206 Ct. C1. 719, 723 (1975); Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1208(Fed. Cir. 1994). Mr. P~empfer'sand Mr. Dingle seek back pay for being forced out of the Connecticut Air National Guard. However,as non-full time Air National Guardmembers,they are not entitled to a money judgment for duties not actually performed. Thus, because Mr. Rempferand Mr. Dingle can cite to no money mandating statute entitling themto a pay remedy,the Court also cannot grant their requested equitable remedies. Pohanicv. United States, 48 Fed. C1. at 168

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(citing Palmerv. UnitedStates, 168 F.3d at 1314); Huntv. UnitedStatea, 52 Fed. C1. 810, 813 (2002) (legal entitlement to pay pursuant to 37 U.S.C. § 206 is extinguished even for a ~vrongful discharge), affd, 62 Fed. Appx.933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, werespectfully request the Court dismiss the claims of Mr. Rempfer Mr. Dingle for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC and 12(b)(1). the alternative, werequest the Court dismiss their complaintfor failure to state a claim upon whichrelief can be granted pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). Respectfully submitted, PETER D. KEISLER Assistant Attorney General DAVID M. COHEN Director

s/James M. Kinsella b7 Bryant G. Snee JAMES M. KINSELLA Deputy Director

Of Counsel: LT COL P. CHRISTOPHERCLARK Air Force Legal Services Agency General Litigation Division 1501 WilsonBlvd., 7th Floor Arlington, VA22209-2403

s/Douglas K. Mickle DOUGLASK. MICI~E Trial Attorney CommercialLitigation Branch Civil Division U.S. Departmentof Justice Classification Unit, 8th Floor 1100 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Tele: (202) 307-0383 Facsimile: (202) 353-7988 Attorneys for Defendant 20

May20, 2005

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I herebycertify under penalty of peljury that on May 2005, a copy of the foregoing 20, "DEFENDANT'S MOTION DISMISS"with its accompanying appendix was filed TO electronically. I understand that notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by operationof the Court's electronic filing system. Parties mayaccess this filing throughthe Court's system.

s/Douglas K. Mickle Douglas K. Mickle