Free Status Report - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 1 of 7
Page 1

411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 1 of 2 DOCUMENTS MARIAN K. HANSSON, APPELLANT v. GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, APPELLEE No. 04-5157 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 411 F.3d 231; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 February 24, 2005, Argued June 10, 2005, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (No. 02cv02028). Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 40, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5265 (D.D.C., 2004) LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") in the Department of the Interior for discrimination on the basis of her national origin and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. [**2] (2000). When the Secretary of the Interior awarded only one-fourth of the requested attorney's fees, Hansson filed suit in the district court, alleging that the Secretary's final fee award violated Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations, and the parties' settlement agreement. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3). Upon de novo review, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 U.S. App. D.C. 275, 360 F.3d 188, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Hansson's complaint because it was a contract claim against the United States for more than $ 10,000, over which the Court of Federal Claims has exclusi v e jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000). This court generally treats settlement agreements as contracts subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, see Shaffer v. Veneman, 355 U.S. App. D.C. 470, 325 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the court

COUNSEL: David C. Vladeck argued cause and filed the briefs appellant.

the for

Marina U. Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence entered an appearance. John A. Payton and Paul R. Wolfson were on the brief for amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in support of appellant. JUDGES: Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. OPINIONBY: ROGERS OPINION: [*232] ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Marion Hansson seeks to recover $ 37,077.94 in attorney's fees that she incurred in settling her administrative complaints against the

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 2 of 7

Page 2 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 recently held in [**3] Brown v. Agreement, Gebhardt submitted to the United States, 363 U.S. App. D.C. 464, BIA a statement of its fees and costs 389 F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004), associated with its representation of that a claim for breach of a Title VII Hansson, totaling $ 37,077.94. By settlement agreement is a contract letter of September 12, 2002, the claim within the meaning of the Tucker Director of the Office for Equal Act. Because Hansson's claim for Opportunity ("OEO") for the [*233] attorney's fees neither requires an Department of the Interior awarded interpretation of Title VII with Gebhardt $ 8,959.44, explaining that respect to her discrimination the law firm was not entitled to fees complaint nor seeks equitable relief, for pre-complaint services or for it involves "only straightforward services related to Hansson's age contract issues" that belong in the discrimination [**5] claim. The OEO Court of Federal Claims. Shaffer, 325 letter also stated that this was the F.3d at 373. Accordingly, we vacate agency's final decision regarding the opinion and judgment of the Hansson's claim for attorney's fees district court and remand the case to and costs, and that she could appeal the district court with instructions the decision to the EEOC within 30 to transfer the case to the Court of days or, "in lieu of an appeal to the Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 Commission, [she could] file a civil (2000). action in an appropriate United States District Court" within 90 days, naming I. the Secretary of the Interior as the defendant. Marian Hansson, "an American of Kiowa (American Indian) origin" who is On October 16, 2002, Hansson sued over sixty years of age, is employed the Secretary in the United States by the BIA as a curator of American District Court for the District of Indian art. Compl. P 2, at 2. In Columbia, alleging that the final November 2001, she retained the law decision to award less than one-fourth firm of Gebhardt & Associates, LLP of the requested attorney's fees was ("Gebhardt"), to file several arbitrary, capricious, and in administrative complaints with the BIA violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § alleging employment discrimination on 2000e-5(k), n1 the EEOC regulations, the basis of her national origin and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), and the age. On June 28, 2002, the BIA Resolution Agreement. She sought executed a Resolution Agreement [**4] recovery of the $ 37,077.94 in granting Hansson substantially all of attorney's fees incurred in settling the relief sought in her complaints, her administrative complaints -- the including "reasonable attorney's fees same amount her attorney requested and costs" in accordance with the EEOC pursuant to the Resolution Agreement regulations at 29 C.F.R. § - plus reasonable attorney's fees and 1614.501(e) (2004). Resolution costs incurred in maintaining this Agreement P 8m, at 8. In exchange, action. The Secretary moved to dismiss Hansson agreed to withdraw all pending the complaint for lack of subject and potential discrimination matter jurisdiction under Title VII complaints against the BIA, through and [**6] for failure to exhaust the date of the Resolution Agreement. administrative remedies, and Hansson Id. P 5, at 3. The settlement cross-moved for summary judgment. The agreement provided that "should the district court granted the Secretary's Agency fail to honor its obligations motion to dismiss for lack of subject as set forth in this Resolution matter jurisdiction, and Hansson Agreement for any reason not appeals. attributed to acts or conduct by the Complainant, the provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 shall n1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) govern." Id. P 11, at 9. provides that "in any action or In accordance with the Resolution proceeding under this subchapter

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 3 of 7

Page 3 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 the court, in its discretion, may Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. allow the prevailing party . . . West Virginia Department of Health & a reasonable attorney's fee . . . Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 149 L. as part of the costs." Ed. 2d 855, [*234] 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001), to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. II. § 1400 et seq. (2000); and second, whether the district court had In dismissing Hansson's complaint, jurisdiction over Hansson's claim for the district court ruled that 42 attorney's fees in light of the U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which grants court's recent decision in Brown, 363 jurisdiction over "actions brought F.3d 1296. The court expresses under" Title VII, does not extend to appreciation to the parties for this actions brought solely to recover assistance. We now conclude that attorney's fees incurred during Title Hansson's claim for attorney's fees is VII administrative proceedings. It a contract claim that belongs in the relied on North Carolina Department of Court of Federal Claims, and we do not Transportation v. Crest Street reach the question whether Title VII Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, authorizes an award of attorney's fees 93 L. Ed. 2d 188, 107 S. Ct. 336 in an action brought solely to recover (1986), which held that 42 U.S.C. § attorney's fees or the question 1988 does not authorize courts to whether Hansson is a "prevailing award attorney's [**7] fees in party." actions brought solely to recover attorney's fees incurred during Title Although Hansson maintains on VI administrative proceedings. Id. at appeal that her complaint raises a 15. On appeal, Hansson contends that Title VII claim for attorney's fees her case is governed by New York and not a contract claim to enforce Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, the Resolution Agreement, the record 64 L. Ed. 2d 723, 100 S. Ct. 2024 indicates otherwise. Hansson's (1980), which stated that Title VII's complaint seeks "relief for harm "authorization of a civil suit in caused to her by [the Agency's] federal court encompasses a suit unlawful refusal to comply with the solely to obtain an award of Resolution Agreement . . . in that the attorney's fees for legal work done in Agency [ * *9] has without state and local proceedings." Id. at just i f i c a t i o n r e f u s ed to pay 66. She maintains that the district reasonable attorney's fees." Compl. P court erred in relying on Crest Street 1, at 1. Specifically, the complaint because the language and structure of alleges three "causes of action": Title VI are different from that of first, that the Secretary's final fee Title VII: first, § 1988 authorizes award "is arbitrary, capricious, and an award of attorney's fees in unsupported by law, in violation of 42 "actions or proceedings to enforce" U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) and 29 C.F.R. § Title VI, while § 2000e-5(k) 1614.501(e)"; second, that it authorizes an award of attorney's fees "violates the Resolution Agreement for any "action or proceeding under" signed by [Hansson] and the BIA"; and Title VII, and second, administrative third, that it "constitutes an proceedings are voluntary under Title improper deferral of decision-making VI, while they are mandatory under authority from the BIA to the Office Title VII. of the Secretary." Id. PP 14-16, at 4. Hansson's complaint does not allege In supplemental briefs on appeal that the denial of her requested the parties addressed two issues: attorney's fees violated Title VII first, whether Hansson was a because it was discriminatory; nor "prevailing party" within the meaning does she seek redetermination of her of § 2000e-5(k) in light of the original discrimination claims. Cf. court's recent decision in Alegria v. Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 2005 District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262 U.S. App. LEXIS 10173, No. 04-5267 (D.C. Cir. 2004), [**8] which applied

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 4 of 7

Page 4 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2005). On appeal, 1614.501(e), not that Hansson retains Hansson relies primarily on the first the right to bring a Title VII action cause of action, which appears to for attorney's fees in district court invoke this court's authority under pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407. the Administrative Procedure Act to review final agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). Such review is n2 Title VII provides that any precluded, however, if there is federal employee "aggrieved by another "adequate remedy in a court, the [agency's] final disposition [**10] " id., or if "any other of his [or her] [discrimination] statute," such as the Tucker Act, complaint . . . may file a civil "expressly or impliedly forbids the action as provided in section relief which is sought," id. § 702, 2000e-5 of this title." 42 U.S.C. in what is "essentially a contract § 2000e-16(c). The EEOC action," Albrecht v. Comm. on Emple. regulations at 29 C.F.R. § Bens. of the Fed. Reserve Emple. Bens. 1614.407 explain that a Sys., 360 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 357 F.3d complainant "is authorized under 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Title VII . . . to file a civil action in an appropriate United Moreover, while Hansson claims she States District Court . . . has the right to bring an independent within 90 days of receipt of the Title VII action for attorney's fees, final action on an individual or any such action would be waived by her class complaint if no appeal has execution of the Resolution Agreement been filed [with the EEOC]." and could not be pursued until it was reinstated pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § [**12] 1614.504(a), or until there was a determination that the Secretary had The Resolution Agreement also breached the Agreement. See, e.g., states that "should the Agency fail to Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297; Saksenasingh honor its obligations as set forth in v. Sec'y of Educ., 326 U.S. App. D.C. this Resolution Agreement . . . the 370, 126 F.3d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 19 9 7 ) . Contrary to Hansson's 1614.504 shall govern." Resolution suggestion, nothing in the Resolution Agreement P 11, at 9. Those provisions Agreement preserves Hansson's right to provide: bring a Title VII action for attorney's fees in district court pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 if If the complainant believes the parties disagree on the amount of that the agency has failed fees. n2 The Resolution Agreement to comply with the terms of states that Hansson "will receive no a settlement agreement or relief or other consideration beyond decision, the complainant that [**11] recited in this [*235] shall notify the EEO Resolution Agreement." Resolution Director, in writing, of the Agreement P 6, at 4. While Hansson alleged noncompliance within points to the EEOC regulations 30 days of when the incorporated by the Resolution complainant knew or should Agreement, those regulations provide have known of the alleged only administrative procedures for noncompliance. The contesting the final fee award. The complainant may request that Resolution Agreement states that "the the terms of the settlement Agency shall pay reasonable attorney's agreement be specifically fees and costs . . . in accordance i m p l e m e n t e d o r , with the EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. alternatively, that the § 1614.501(e)." Id. P 8m, at 8. Those complaint be reinstated for regulations provide that the final fee further processing from the award "shall include a notice of right point processing ceased. to appeal to EEOC," 29 C.F.R. §

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 5 of 7

Page 5 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 1484-86 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, the 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a). Resolution Agreement incorporates 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), which describes As the Secretary points out, Hansson the familiar lodestar method for failed to notify the EEO Director of calculating attorney's fees: any alleged breach of the Resolution Agreement. Furthermore, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 does not authorize Hansson to The starting point shall be file a Title VII action in district the number of hours court, for it provides only that her reasonably expended complaint may be "reinstated for multiplied by a reasonable further [**13] processing at the hourly rate. There is a point processing ceased," which, for [*236] strong presumption Hansson, was in the administrative that this amount represents process. the reasonable fee. In Nor, contrary to Hansson's limited circumstances, this contention, did the OEO letter of amount may be reduced or September 12, 2002 contemplate the increased in consideration preservation of a Title VII action for of the degree of success, attorney's fees: while advising quality of representation, Hansson that she could file a civil and long delay caused by the action in district court in lieu of agency. appealing the Secretary's final fee award to the EEOC, it did not indicate that Hansson could bring a Title VII 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); action for attorney's fees that was see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. otherwise waived by her execution of 424, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 103 S. Ct. 1933 the Resolution Agreement. Rather, the (1983). Hansson acknowledges that the portion of the OEO letter on which [**15] "reasonable hourly rate" is Hansson relies appears to be guided by the Laffey matrix prepared boilerplate language paraphrasing 29 by the U.S. Attorney's Office. See C.F.R. § 1614.407, which was not Covington v. District of Columbia, 313 incorporated by the Resolution U.S. App. D.C. 16, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105Agreement. Thus, nothing in the 11 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Laffey v. Resolution Agreement or the OEO letter Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. preserves Hansson's right to file a 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other Title VII action for attorney's fees grounds 241 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 746 in district court. Accordingly, F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Enforcement Hansson's claim "turns entirely on the of the Resolution Agreement's terms of a contract," and appears to provision for reasonable attorney's belong in the Court of Federal Claims. fees, then, does not require Albrecht, 357 F.3d at 69. interpretation of the substantive provisions of Title VII with respect While the court generally treats to Hansson's discrimination settlement agreements as contracts complaints, but only the application within the meaning of the Tucker Act, of well-known standards for [**14] see Shaffer, 325 F.3d at 372, determining reasonable attorney's it also recognizes that when a fees. To the extent that Hansson also settlement agreement incorporates seeks attorney's fees for services substantive provisions of federal law related to her age discrimination such that enforcement of the agreement claim under the ADEA, that requires the interpretation and determination does not involve an application of federal law, that interpretation of Title VII, which she enforcement action arises under acknowledges is the only basis for her federal law and belongs in the claim for attorney's fees, as she has district court. See id. at 372-73; Bd. not asserted a claim for fees under of Trustees v. Madison Hotel, Inc., the ADEA itself. Hansson's vague 321 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 97 F.3d 1479,

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 6 of 7

Page 6 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 policy objection that the Court of reserved to another body," Massie, 166 Federal Claims is not a "national F.3d at 1189; cf. Bobula v. U.S. Dep't court" like the district court is of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 858 (Fed. unavailing in light of our precedent. Cir. 1992) (Civil Service Reform Act). [**16] In holding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over a claim Hansson points out that the Court for an annuity under the comprehensive of Federal Claims "has consistently remedial scheme of the Military Claims held that it lacks jurisdiction to Act ("MCA"), the Federal Circuit hear claims alleging the breach of a distinguished between "review [**18] Title VII settlement agreement due to of the substantive issues of the MCA the comprehensive statutory scheme [*237] claim -- the existence and established under Title VII of the extent of the government's liability" Civil Rights Act." Griswold v. United -- and the enforcement of "an express States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458, 465 (2004); contract embodying" the claimant's see Lee v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. entitlement to the annuity under the 374, 378-79 (1995); Fausto v. United MCA. Massie, 166 F.3d at 1189. This States, 16 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1989). jurisdictional line is analogous to These cases can all be distinguished, that drawn by this court in Brown, 389 however, on the ground that they F.3d at 1296, Shaffer, 325 F.3d at involved claims for equitable relief 373, and Madison Hotel, 97 F.3d at that the Court of Claims lacked 1485. Finally, the Court of Federal jurisdiction to grant. See Griswold, Claims has acknowledged our decision 61 Fed. Cl. at 460; Lee, 33 Fed. Cl. in Brown, see Boston Edison Co. v. at 376-77; Fausto, 16 Cl. Ct. at 751. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 167, 178 We are unaware of any case in which (2005), and the Secretary the Court of Federal Claims has denied affirmatively stated in briefing that jurisdiction over an action to enforce Hansson's claim is one in contract a Title VII settlement agreement in within the exclusive jurisdiction of which only money relief is sought. The the Court of Federal Claims and cases cited by Hansson in her through counsel represented to the supplemental brief that involve annual court during oral argument that, and sick leave and back pay are not to contrary to the government's position the contrary. See Taylor v. United in other cases, see, e.g., Massie, 166 States, 54 Fed. Cl. 423, 423 (2002); F.3d at 1188; Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl. at Mitchell v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 461, the government would not argue in 437, 438 (1999). [**17] the Court of Federal Claims that that court lacks jurisdiction over The Federal Circuit appears to Hansson's claim for attorney's fees. agree with the Court of Federal Therefore, this court has no reason to Claims' precedent that "the Court of conclude [**19] that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction Federal Claims will not accept 'over actions for breach of settlement jurisdiction over Hansson's claim. Cf. agreements when the agreements arise Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating from disputes which would have been Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19, 100 L. litigated in other fora.'" Massie v. Ed. 2d 811, 108 S. Ct. 2166 (1988). United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration in Because Hansson's claim for original); cf. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr. attorney's fees neither requires an v. United States, 32 F.3d 548, 550 interpretation of Title VII with (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Medicare Act); Chin respect to her discrimination v. United States, 890 F.2d 1143, 1146 complaint nor seeks equitable relief (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Postal Reform Act). under Title VII, but rather seeks It also appears to agree with this reasonable attorney's fees defined by court's precedent that the Court of well-established standards, it is a Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction contract claim against the United under the Tucker Act only if States for more than $ 10,000. Under "disposition of the contract claim Shaffer and Brown, Hansson's claim for would require review of subject matter

Case 1:05-cv-00906-RHH

Document 7-2

Filed 10/13/2005

Page 7 of 7

Page 7 411 F.3d 231, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10799, **; 95 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1860 attorney's fees is within the opinion and judgment of the district exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of court and remand the case to the Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. district court with instructions to Accordingly, we hold that the district transfer the case to the Court of court lacked jurisdiction over Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Hansson's complaint, and we vacate the