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In the United States Court of Federal Claims
Nos. 01-517C; 05-371C; 05-963C Filed: April 17, 2007 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * GHS HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION, INC. d/b/a BLUELINCS HMO, Plaintiff, TEXAS HEALTH CHOICE, L.C., Plaintiff, SCOTT & WHITE HEALTH PLAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Daniel B. Abrahams, Constance A. Wilkinson, and Michael D. Maloney, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff GHS Health Maintenance Organization, Inc. d/b/a BlueLincs HMO. Michael S. Nadel, Joel L. Michaels, Maura A. Dalton, and Arthur G. Sapper, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs Texas Health Choice, L.C. and Scott & White Health Plan. Jane W. Vanneman, Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, for defendant. With her were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Susan Whitman and Jill Gerstenfield, United States Office of Personnel Management, Washington D.C., of counsel. OPINION HORN, J. These cases come before the court upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs are three health benefits carriers (collectively, the "carriers") GHS
* * * * * * * * * * Federal Employees Health Benefits Act provision 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i); 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) (Final Year Regulation); Chevron Deference; Waiver; Laches; Reformation; Summ ary Judgment.
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Health Maintenance Organization, Inc., doing business as BlueLincs HMO (BlueLincs), Texas Health Choice, L.C. (Texas Health), and Scott & White Health Plan (Scott & White). These cases involve contracts between the carriers and the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for health care benefits to federal employees. OPM is the federal agency responsible for administering the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (2000). The FEHBA governs all health plans servicing federal employees. These cases focus on each plaintiff's last year of participation in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). As discussed more fully below, each year during a carrier's participation in the program, OPM and the carrier engage in a process to reconcile the current year's premium rates with the premium rates the contractor is charging the lower of two similarly sized subscriber groups (SSSGs). This is because the premium rates charged by carriers at the beginning of a contract year are only estimates of what a carrier's rates are projected to be for that year. The reconciliation results in a finding either that the government paid the carrier too much or too little. If it is determined that the estimated rates were higher than the actual rates the carrier should have been paid, the carrier refunds the government the difference. If it is determined that the estimated rates were lower than the actual rates the carrier should have been paid, the government pays the carrier the difference. Whether this payment or recoupment as a result of the reconciliation process should occur in a carrier's last year of participation in the program is the issue before the court. Included in all FEHBP contracts is a mandatory clause, titled "Accounting and Price Adjustment (Jan 1998)," which contains a paragraph known as the "Final Year Regulation." The Final Year Regulation states that: "In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the subscription rates prior to rate reconciliation and the actual subscription rates." 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) (Oct. 1, 1998). Accordingly, in the last year of participation in the FEHBP, if the government overpays, the clause contemplates no recoupment for its losses from a carrier through the reconciliation process and, similarly, if the government underpays, the clause anticipates no recoupment to the contractor for its losses through the reconciliation process. In their complaints before this court, the plaintiffs argue that 48 C.F.R. § 1652.21670(b)(6), promulgated by OPM, conflicts with the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i) (2000), which requires that: "Rates charged under health benefits plans described by section 8903 or 8903a of this title shall reasonably and equitably reflect the cost of the benefits provided." The plaintiffs argue that the Final Year Regulation, incorporated into the plaintiffs' contracts, violates the statute and, therefore, results in a breach of the plaintiffs' contracts. Each plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the government's alleged breach of contract. The plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment, asking this court to invalidate 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) either in whole, or as applied to each plaintiff's contract with OPM. Specifically, plaintiff BlueLincs seeks $369,127.00 for breach of contract, while plaintiff Texas Health seeks $622,246.00, and plaintiff Scott & White seeks $3,625,782.00. For the 2
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reasons discussed below, this court finds that 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) conflicts with 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i). The court, therefore, grants the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and denies the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. FINDINGS OF FACT Procedural History Only BlueLincs initially filed its case in the United States Court of Federal Claims, which became case no. 01-517C, and the lead case of these consolidated cases. Case no. 01-517C, however, was stayed in this court at the request of the parties, pending resolution of procedural issues in the other two cases, which plaintiffs initially filed in different federal district courts. Texas Health initially filed its case in January, 2003, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In June, 2003, the government moved to dismiss or transfer the case to the United States Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. A Magistrate Judge of the District Court recommended that the District Court deny the government's motion. See Texas Health Choice, L.C. v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. Civ. A. 9:03CV14, 2004 WL 3266033, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2004). The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and denied the government's motion to dismiss or transfer. The government appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Finding that Texas Health's contract was controlled by the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2000), the Federal Circuit reversed the Texas District Court in Texas Health Choice, L.C. v. Office of Personnel Management, 400 F.3d 895 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (2005). The Federal Circuit found: We agree with OPM that under the CDA, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over Texas Health's suit against OPM relating to the validity of the Final Year Regulation incorporated into the FEHBA contract as Clause 3.2(b)(6). That is because Texas Health's claim is related to the FEHBA contract. "The CDA exclusively governs Government contracts and Government contract disputes." Cecile Indus., Inc. v. Cheney, 995 F.2d 1052, 1055 (Fed. Cir.1993). Texas Health Choice, L.C. v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 400 F.3d at 898. The Federal Circuit stated: "That Texas Health's complaint, literally read, sought only to invalidate the Final Year Regulation, as opposed to recover the $622,246 reconciliation amount, is of no consequence to the question of jurisdiction because the complaint relates to a dispute implicating a contract with the Government." Id. at 900.
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Thus, the Federal Circuit referred jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal Claims to hear the plaintiff's claim, and review the validity of the regulation as it applied to the final year of participation in the program by a health benefits carrier. After the Federal Circuit's decision, in March, 2005, the Eastern District of Texas District Court transferred Texas Health's case to this court. Texas Health's case was filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims as case no. 05-371C. Scott & White initially filed its case in August, 2001, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which became Scott & White v. OPM, No.01:CV:1824 (JGP). In January, 2003, while its case was pending in District Court, Scott & White filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, which became case no. 03-61C. Another judge of the Court of Federal Claims, however, dismissed that case because Scott & White also had the same case pending in the District Court. See Scott & White v. United States, No. 03-61C (Fed. Cl. Apr. 22, 2003) (order dismissing without prejudice). On March 31, 2005, relying on the Federal Circuit decision in Texas Health Choice, L.C. v. Office of Personnel Management, 400 F.3d at 898, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered that Scott & White's case be transferred to the United States Court of Federal Claims. Scott & White appealed the District Court's March 31, 2005 order, but subsequently moved to dismiss its appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed Scott & White's appeal on September 1, 2005. The District Court then transferred Scott & White's case to this court on September 2, 2006. After the two cases initiated in the two different District Courts were transferred to this court, the court consolidated the three cases because they raise the same legal issue involving the validity of 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6). Background of the FEHBP In 1959, Congress established a subsidized health insurance program which covered federal workers, family members, annuitants, and retired federal workers. See Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) of 1959, Pub. L. 86-382, H.R. Rep. No. 86-957 (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N 2913, 2914. The current FEHBA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (2000). Under the FEHBA, OPM is authorized to contract with qualified carriers offering health benefits plans for a renewable term of at least one year. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902(a). A contractor under the program provides a health benefits plan to enrolled federal enrollees and their families and is compensated by premium payments comprised of a government contribution and an enrollee contribution. Therefore, once enrolled in a plan, the employee pays only a portion of the fixed premium. The government contributes an amount not to exceed 75% of the actual subscription charge for an enrolled individual. See 5 U.S.C. § 8906(b)(1)-(4). The rest of the premium is withheld from the enrollee's paycheck or annuity. See 5 U.S.C. § 8906(d). BlueLincs, Texas Health, and Scott & White each entered into a contract with OPM to provide health benefits to eligible federal enrollees and their families through the FEHBP. As part of the plaintiffs' contracts, OPM annually negotiated with each contractor the benefits and premiums for the next contract year, which began January 1 of the following 4
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calendar year. Premiums were negotiated on the basis of experience rating or community rating. The process began each May, when contractors proposed to OPM premium rates for the upcoming contract year. The premium rates proposed represent the contractors' estimates of what the contractors will charge similarly sized subscriber groups (SSSGs) during the upcoming calendar year. See 48 C.F.R. § 1602.170-13. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation (FEHBAR) defines an SSSG as follows: (a) Similarly sized subscriber groups (SSSGs) are a comprehensive medical plan carrier's two employer groups that: (1) As of the date specified by OPM in the rate instructions, have a subscriber enrollment closest to the FEHBP subscriber enrollment; and, (2) Use any rating method other than retrospective experience rating; and, (3) Meet the criteria specified in the rate instructions issued by OPM. (b) Any group with which an FEHB carrier enters into an agreement to provide health care services is a potential SSSG (including separate lines of business, government entities, groups that have multi-year contracts, and groups having point-of-service products). 48 C.F.R. § 1602.170-13. In determining the final rates for a plan, the OPM Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation requires that "OPM shall determine the FEHBP rate by selecting the lower of the two rates derived by using rating methods consistent with those used to derive the SSSG rates." 48 C.F.R. § 1602.170-13(d). Furthermore, the acquisition regulation requires that: "The subscription rates agreed to in this contract shall be equivalent to the subscription rates given to the carrier's similarly sized subscriber groups (SSSGs) . . . ." 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(2). Rate negotiations for a given calendar year typically take place in June, July and August so that rates are finalized prior to the open season during which employees select their insurance plans for the following year. During that year, OPM remits the premium payment at the agreed-upon rates. Health maintenance organizations are at risk when they determine their rates. If they charge too much, they are at risk of losing enrollees in the competitive open season process. If they charge too little, they may not earn enough premium income to meet the covered health services of the group. It is the carrier's responsibility to project the appropriate amount to charge for covered services in advance of the year in which the services will be provided. Generally, beginning in April of the contract year, contractors and OPM engage in a process to reconcile the current year's premium rates (which were estimates of what the contractor's SSSG rates would be) with the premium rates the contractor actually is charging an SSSG. OPM does not obtain all detailed records that may be maintained at 5
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the carrier's place of business. Instead, OPM relies on audits to provide an incentive for the carriers to accurately represent the data that drive their rates in the first instance. To the extent an audit of any plan results in findings regarding the calculations or representations relevant to negotiation or reconciliation figures, those figures are subject to correction, adjustment or claim by OPM under 48 C.F.R. § 1652.215-70, titled "Rate Reduction for Defective Pricing or Defective Cost or Pricing Data," and 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70, the "Accounting and Price Adjustment" clause. In years when the contract is renewed, if it is determined that the rates currently in force were higher than the rates actually charged to the SSSG, the contractor pays the government the difference. See 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(4-5). If it is determined that the rates currently in force were lower than the rates actually charged to the SSSG, the government pays the contractor the difference. See id. With respect to the years at issue when the contracts were not renewed for the three named plaintiffs, the government refused to adjust the differences between the rates that were then currently in force and the rates actually charged to the SSSG. OPM takes the position that this result is mandated by 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6), which requires that the following language be included in all program contracts: "In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the subscription rates prior to rate reconciliation and the actual subscription rates." 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6). This paragraph in the Accounting and Price Adjustment clause, known as the Final Year Regulation, appears in the contracts of BlueLincs, Texas Health, and Scott & White. The clause was not negotiated, but mandatory. Scott & White's Final Year Reconciliation Claim Scott & White provided health care benefits to federal employees in Texas as part of the FEHBP. Section 3.2 of Scott & White's contract with OPM incorporated the Final Year Regulation, quoted immediately above. Scott & White's final year of participation in the FEHBP was 1999. In a telefax dated September 22, 1999, Scott & White informed OPM that it intended to withdraw from the FEHBP, effective January 1, 2000. In the telefax, Scott & White stated: "As we discussed this afternoon, Scott and White regrets that we have decided to withdraw from participation as an HMO under the FEHBP effective upon the contract anniversary date for 2000 [January 1, 2000]." On September 23, 1999, OPM responded to Scott & White's notice and informed Scott & White that it was the carrier's responsibility to continue health care benefits to all federal enrollees until coverage under their new health benefits plan begins. Thus, 1999 was Scott & White's final year of participation in the FEHBP, which, according to the defendant, invoked the Final Year Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6), as incorporated in a clause in the contract. For Scott & White's 1999 contract year, beginning in July, 1999, OPM actually performed a reconciliation calculation on Scott & White's rates. During the reconciliation, OPM calculated the difference between Scott & White's estimated 1999 contract rates and 6
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the rates that should have been charged based upon Scott & White's actual community rates in effect on January 1, 1999. By a letter dated July 30, 1999, Nancy Kichak, Director of the Office of Actuaries, Retirement and Insurance Service for OPM, informed Scott & White that: "We have calculated the difference between the 1999 contract rates and the rates that should be charged based on your plan's actual community rates in effect on January 1, 1999 and the information you provided about the plan's Similar Sized Subscriber Groups (SSSGs). The parties have stipulated that the 1999 reconciliation resulted in $3,625,782.00 due to Scott & White. OPM, however, did not refund to Scott & White the amount reconciled for its 1999 contract year. This amount, $3,625,782.00, represents the amount requested by Scott & White in its October 10, 2000, certified claim to David Lewis, a contracting officer in the Insurance Contracts Division of OPM. In its claim to the contracting officer, Scott & White stated: The claim seeks to recover $3,625,782 (the "Claim Amount") in unpaid premiums for the 1999 contract year. Specifically, SWHP [Scott & White Health Plan] requests payment for premiums owed by OPM under the Contract for benefits and coverage provided by SWIP to FEHBP members for the 1999 contract which OPM did not pay to SWHP. OPM did not pay the Claims Amount on the ground that SWHP terminated the Contract at the end of the 1999 contract year and therefore was not entitled to a rate reconciliation adjustment. It is SWHP's understanding that OPM relied upon 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) in denying SWHP payment on the Claim Amount. . . . SWHP objects to OPM's refusal to pay the Claim Amount . . . . The $3,625,782.00 amount, plus interest, also is the amount requested by Scott & White in its lawsuit in this court. Texas Health's Final Year Reconciliation Claim Like Scott & White, Texas Health provided health care benefits to federal employees in Texas as part of the FEHBP. Also similar to Scott & White, section 3.2 of Texas Health's contract with OPM incorporated the Final Year Regulation language. Texas Health's last year of participation in the FEHBP was 2001. Specifically, on September 27, 2001, David Marlon, President of Texas Health, wrote to Clifford Moseley, a contracting specialist with OPM, and stated, "please let this serve as formal notification of our decision to non-renew the above-referenced contract with the Office of Personnel Management to participate in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) in Texas, effective December 31, 2001." Before Texas Health had notified OPM of its intention to withdraw from the FEHBP, OPM actually had reconciled Texas Health's rates for 2001. Based upon its reconciliation, 7
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OPM concluded that Texas Health was due $622,246.00, and paid that amount to Texas Health. However, after receiving Texas Health's notification that it did not intend to renew its contract, OPM informed Texas Health that the company would need to refund the $622,246.00 to the government. Specifically, in a letter dated October 15, 2001, OPM's Nancy Kichak wrote to Texas Health stating: "We were informed that you [Texas Health] would be withdrawing from the FEHB program at the end of 2001; therefore, we should not have performed a reconciliation of your 2001 contract rates. We need to settle the outstanding amount owed to OPM due to an over payment. . . . As a result of this overpayment, OPM is due $622,246." On January 8, 2002, Texas Health filed a certified claim with William T. Stuart, a contracting officer with OPM. In its certified claim, Texas Health stated that it filed the claim, "disputing the action taken by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to recoup $622,246.00 paid to TXHC for the 2001 rate reconciliation," and stating that Texas Health believed that "the regulation (48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6)) upon which OPM relied in recouping the $622,246 from TXHC is inconsistent with OPM's statutory obligation to pay a fair and equitable rate and a rate that is equivalent to that charged the similarly sized subscriber groups (SSSGs)." (emphasis in original). OPM did not respond to the claim. The $622,246.00 amount, plus interest, is the amount requested by Texas Health in its lawsuit in this court. BlueLincs' Final Year Reconciliation Claim GHS, doing business as BlueLincs, a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) owned by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma, entered into a contract with OPM to provide health benefits to federal employees, annuitants and their dependents in Oklahoma. Similar to the contracts entered into with Texas Health and Scott & White, BlueLincs' contract with OPM also incorporated the Final Year Regulation language. BlueLincs' final year of participation in the FEHBP was 2000. By letter dated July 14, 2000, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma informed OPM that it would "no longer be offering BlueLincs HMO to federal employees for 2001." Before BlueLincs submitted its notice of non-renewal to the OPM, BlueLincs had provided OPM with documentation and a revised proposal for the rate reconciliation process for BlueLincs' contract year 2000. Assuming that the BlueLincs contract would be renewed, OPM actually conducted a reconciliation with respect to BlueLincs' contract, and determined, at that time, that BlueLincs was owed $364,962.00 for the year 2000. After BlueLincs had submitted its notice to OPM that it did not intend to renew its FEHB contract, OPM issued a contracting officer's final decision on September 7, 2000, claiming entitlement to $312,867.00 for lost investment income under a prior settlement with BlueLincs for contract years 1993, 1994, and 1995, pursuant to section 5.9(e) of BlueLincs' contract with OPM, and 48 C.F.R. § 1652.215-70. Neither party has provided evidence in this case addressing OPM's lost investment income claim that BlueLincs owes 8
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the $312,867.00,1 nor has the defendant filed a counterclaim in that amount. The lost investment income issue, therefore, is not before the court. The only issue under review is whether BlueLincs is entitled to a reconciliation for its final contract year, 2000. On July 20, 2001, BlueLincs submitted a certified claim to Abby Block, OPM's Assistant Director for Insurance Programs, requesting that BlueLincs be able to offset $314,587.00 OPM claimed was owed by BlueLincs against BlueLincs' contract year 2000 rate reconciliation. On March 7, 2002, BlueLincs submitted a supplemental certified claim in the amount of $54,540.00. OPM did not respond to either claim. The total of these two claims is $369,127.00. In its complaint in this court, BlueLincs requests that the court invalidate OPM's Final Year Regulation, and award BlueLincs the $369,127.00, plus interest, for breach of contract. History of the Final Year Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) The Final Year Regulation, as incorporated in the plaintiffs' contracts, was promulgated by OPM through the formal rulemaking process in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). On October 20, 1989, OPM published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking addressing multiple regulations pertaining to the FEHBP, including the Final Year Regulation. See FEHB Acquisition Regulation; Revision of Contract Clauses and Community Rating Practices, 54 Fed. Reg. 43089-01 (Oct. 20, 1989). The summary of the proposed rulemaking stated: The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is issuing proposed regulations which would recognize the increasing diversity in community rating practices within the insurance industry and, specifically, within the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The regulations would also expand and clarify OPM's FEHBP price negotiation policy. At the same time, OPM is taking the opportunity to amend some of the required contract clauses found in section 1652 of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation (FEHBAR) to better reflect the specific needs of the FEHBP, to add a new Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause requiring carriers to maintain a drugfree workplace, and to delete unnecessary or inappropriate FAR clauses. 54 Fed. Reg. at 43089. With reference to the Final Year Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6), OPM indicated in its proposed rulemaking that:
The record, which is somewhat confusing, reflects that OPM withheld not $312,867.00, but $314,587.00, on the lost investment income issue. 9
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The Accounting and Price Adjustment clause [1652.216-70] used in the community rated contracts has been substantially changed to reflect OPM's treatment of the new HMO amendments contained in Public Law 100-517. The subscription rate now focuses on the basic PMPM [per member per month] capitation or revenue requirement and is considered to be a market price under the FAR. OPM recognizes that the actual market price for the following contract year may not be available at the time of the carrier's rate submission. Proposed rates must be developed by starting from a current market price and adjusting that price to project to January 1. If the projection is later revised downward for the similarly sized subscriber groups, adjustments must be made to the following year's FEHB proposal to reflect the revision. If the trend adjustment for the similarly sized subscriber groups is increased over the estimate, the carrier may propose an addition to the following year's capitation. This is equivalent to the annual reconciliation currently requested by OPM. 54 Fed. Reg. at 43090 (bracketed material in original). As part of the proposed change to the Final Year Regulation, OPM proposed to include the section at issue in this case that addresses rate reconciliation during the final year of a carrier's participation in the FEHBP. Specifically, OPM proposed language stating: "As prescribed in 1616.270, the following clause [Accounting and Price Adjustment (Jan 1990)] shall be inserted in all FEHBP contracts based on established market price ... (6) In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the estimated and the actual market price, PMPM capitation or revenue requirement." 54 Fed. Reg. at 43094. OPM accepted public comment on the Final Year Regulation between October, 1989 and January, 1990, and received comments on OPM's proposed change to the Final Year Regulation, including a comment from OPM's Office of Inspector General. On December 19, 1989, Karen Eaton of the law firm Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., the law firm representing BlueLincs in this case, also submitted a comment on OPM's proposed changes. In her comment, Ms. Eaton indicated that her firm "represented a number of carriers who participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program as well as the American Managed Care Review Association, an association of managed care plans including carriers which participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program." In response to OPM's proposed rule changes and the Final Year Regulation, Ms. Eaton stated on behalf of her clients that: We object to 1652.216-70(b)(6) in that it penalizes a carrier in its final year of participation in the FEHBP because it did not accurately anticipate seven months earlier (when the rates were filed with the Office of Personnel Management) what its community rate would be on January 1 of the final contract year. The reconciliation process should be applied to every carrier whether or nor they intend to participate the following contract year. 10
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PARTNERS National Health Plans also commented to OPM on January 4, 1990. In its comment, PARTNERS stated: If the contract is not renewed, the proposal states that neither the Government nor the Carrier is entitled to any adjustment (payable or receivable) for the difference between the estimated and actual rates. Why should the fact that the contract is not being renewed impact the rate reconciliation and settlement process? In addition to receiving these comments from representatives of FEHBP carriers, OPM received input from Patrick J. Conklin, the Inspector General of OPM. In his comments on OPM's proposed rulemaking concerning the Final Year Regulation, Mr. Conklin stated: 1652.216-70 Accounting and price adjustments: The clause provides that "In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the estimated and the actual market price, PMPM capitation or revenue requirement." Here too, we do not believe that the Government's interest are adequately protected. The clause does not address the potential for a Plan to intentionally overcharge the Program prior to withdrawing from the program. We believe the clause should only apply when the contract is not renewed "for the convenience of the Government", as defined elsewhere in the FAR. In a July 3, 1990 response to the Inspector General's concerns, Curtis Smith, the Associate Director for Retirement and Insurance stated that: The argument for claims or adjustments in price when a contract is not renewed can be made by either party. For example, one respondent to the proposed rule wants to be able to bill the Government in the event of nonrenewal. Nevertheless, our past experience has been that, on termination, the carriers generally do not have adequate data available for us to make price adjustments. Further, in the event a plan goes out of business, there are no rates to reconcile. In our opinion, the most reasonable solution is for both the Government and the carrier to bear the risk of a carrier's termination. OPM continues to have recourse to debt collection agencies and the courts if the situation warrants. On July 2, 1990, after receiving public comments from the three sources above, namely, Epstein, Becker & Green, PARTNERS National Health Plans and the OPM Inspector General, OPM published its notice of final rulemaking in the Federal Register. See 55 Fed. Reg. 27406-01 (July 2, 1990). With its notice, OPM published its response to the comments received on the Final Year Regulation: 11
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The clause in 1652.216-70 provides that if the FEHBP contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the carrier is entitled to any adjustment for the difference between the estimated and actual market price. Two commenters did not understand why nonrenewal of the contract impacts the rate reconciliation and settlement process. OPM's experience has been that it is difficult to get adequate data from plans when they have terminated. Further, in the event a plan goes out of business, there are no rates to reconcile. In the opinion of OPM, the most reasonable solution is for both the Government and the carrier to bear the risk of a carrier's termination. 55 Fed. Reg. at 27410. In its final rulemaking in 1990, OPM adopted the language of the Final Year Regulation as follows: "In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the estimated and actual market price, PMPM capitation or revenue requirement." 55 FR at 27416 (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6) (Oct. 1, 1990)). The final rulemaking indicated that the language became effective January 1, 1990, and was to be applied beginning with "the 1990 FEHB Program contracts . . . ." The Final Year Regulation was modified in 1997 to read as follows: "(6) In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the subscription rates prior to rate reconciliation and the actual subscription rates." DISCUSSION The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. RCFC 56 is patterned on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) and is similar both in language and effect. Both rules provide that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1996), reh'g denied (1997); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 630-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A fact is material if it will make a difference in the result of a case under the governing law. Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48; see also Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1257; Curtis v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 194, 199, 168 F. Supp. 213, 216 (1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 843 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 941 (1960). 12
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When reaching a summary judgment determination, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the case presented, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249; see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 157 F.3d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (the nature of a summary judgment proceeding is such that the trial judge does not make findings of fact); Johnson v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 648, 651 (2001), aff'd, 52 Fed. Appx. 507 (2002), published at 317 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 595, 599 (2000). The judge must determine whether the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require submission to fact finding, or whether the issues presented are so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-52; Jay v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 998 F.2d 979, 982 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en banc suggestion declined (1993). When the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and the motion must be granted. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1553 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In such a case, there is no need for the parties to undertake the time and expense of a trial, and the moving party should prevail without further proceedings. Summary judgment: saves the expense and time of a full trial when it is unnecessary. When the material facts are adequately developed in the motion papers, a full trial is useless. "Useless" in this context means that more evidence than is already available in connection with the motion for summary judgment could not reasonably be expected to change the result. Dehne v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 606, 614-15 (1991) (citing Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex, Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), vacated on other grounds, 970 F.2d 890 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Vasco Metals Corp., 394 F.2d 1009, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1968). Summary judgment, however, will not be granted if "the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1109 (2002); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In other words, if the nonmoving party produces sufficient evidence to raise a question as to the outcome of the case, then the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Any doubt over factual issues must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, to whom the benefit of all presumptions and inferences runs. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587-88; Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1257; Wanlass v. Fedders Corp., 145 F.3d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied and en banc suggestion declined (1998). The initial burden on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact may be discharged if the moving 13
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party can demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Trilogy Commc'ns, Inc. v. Times Fiber Commc'ns, Inc., 109 F.3d 739, 741 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994)), reh'g denied and en banc suggestion declined (1997); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). If the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a genuine dispute regarding a material fact exists by presenting evidence which establishes the existence of an element essential to its case upon which it bears the burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 204 F.3d 1103, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Schoell v. Regal Marine Indus., Inc., 247 F.3d 1202, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Even if both parties argue in favor of summary judgment and allege an absence of genuine issues of material fact, however, the court is not relieved of its responsibility to determine the appropriateness of summary disposition in a particular case. Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905, 911 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1037 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 942 (2001). "[S]imply because both parties moved for summary judgment, it does not follow that summary judgment should be granted one or the other." LewRon Television, Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Leasing Co., 401 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1083 (1969); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. United States Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2001); Massey v. Del Labs., Inc., 118 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each party that it alone is entitled to summary judgment. The making of such inherently contradictory claims, however, does not establish that if one is rejected the other necessarily is justified. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. United States Filter Corp., 245 F.3d at 593; Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Occidental Int'l, Inc., 140 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998); Reading & Bates Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 737, 748 (1998). The court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114 (2002). Plaintiffs Seek to Invalidate the Final Year Regulation In these cases, the lead motion for summary judgment was filed, jointly, by Scott & White and Texas Health. In its separate motion for summary judgment, BlueLincs adopted its co-plaintiff's motions and incorporated by reference the arguments presented by Scott & White and Texas Health. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, any argument identified as made by one plaintiff is one adopted by all three plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that the government's reliance on the Final Year Regulation, as incorporated in clause 3.2(6) of the contracts, to refuse to reconcile and reimburse the carriers during the last year of a carrier's participation in the FEHBP, if the reconciliation 14
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so indicates, conflicts with the requirement in the statute, the FEHBA. The statute states that a carrier's rates "shall reasonably and equitably reflect the cost of the benefits provided." 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i). The current version of the Final Year Regulation and the contract language state: "In the event this contract is not renewed, neither the Government nor the Carrier shall be entitled to any adjustment or claim for the difference between the subscription rates prior to rate reconciliation and the actual subscription rates." 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70(b)(6). Plaintiffs argue that Congress charged OPM with promulgating regulations "to ensure that the Act's standard of reasonable and equitable compensation is met." Plaintiffs acknowledge that generally, OPM has done so, but that with respect to the Final Year Regulation, "OPM has deviated from Congress's charge." According to the plaintiffs, the Final Year Regulation is in direct violation of statutory guidance in the FEHBA. The plaintiffs' state: The Final Year Regulation turns a health plan's last year in the Program into a compulsory game of Russian Roulette for both the government and the health plan, with a guarantee that one party will find the chamber loaded. Either the health plan overcharges the government in the final year, in which case the taxpayers are cheated, or the government underpays, in which case the health plan is denied the compensation to which it is entitled. In either case, the Final Year Regulation violates Congress's directive that rates paid equitably and reasonably reflect the cost of the benefits provided. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the Final Year Regulation guarantees that "whether by underpayment or overpayment, the government will pay an amount different in some cases, vastly different from the amount commanded by the Act," which should "reasonably and equitably reflect the cost of the benefits provided," 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i), and "creates an incentive for a health plan to propose overly high estimated rates if it knows it is entering the final year of its participation in the program." According to the plaintiffs, the government's reasons for promulgating the Final Year Regulation "fail as a matter of law." Plaintiffs also reject the justification for the Final Year Regulation provided by the OPM in the Federal Register in July, 1990, when OPM issued its final rulemaking decision adopting the Final Year Regulation. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 27410. That rationale, which is quoted in full above, stated that the reasoning behind the Final Year Regulation was that it was the government's experience that it has been "difficult to get adequate data from plans when they have terminated," and that, "in the event a plan goes out of business, there are no rates to reconcile." The plaintiffs argue that this rationale is merely a claim of "administrative convenience," is inconsistent with the statute, and must fail as a matter of law. The plaintiffs rely on Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court stated: "Regardless of how serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its authority `in 15
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a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.'" Id. at 91(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000)). Even if the record in the present case were to support the defendant`s notion that the Final Year Regulation serves the interest of administrative convenience, plaintiffs argue that the regulation still would be invalid because it relieves the government of the requirement of ensuring that the plan was paid in a way that "reasonably and equitably" reflects the costs of the benefits provided, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i). In Ragsdale, the Supreme Court reviewed a federal agency regulation which stated: "If an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA [Family Medical Leave Act] leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement [of 12 weeks]." Id. at 88 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001)) (bracketed material added). The plaintiff's employer, Wolverine, had provided plaintiff Ragsdale 30 weeks of leave, but had failed to designate the leave as under the FMLA. Plaintiff sought her FMLA entitlement of 12 more weeks, on top of the 30 weeks already provided, based upon the agency's regulatory language. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court sided with Wolverine, holding that the agency's regulation was contrary to the statute (the FMLA), in that the regulation effectively provided certain employees the right to more than 12 weeks of FMLA leave in a 1-year period. Id. at 84, 94, 96. "A regulation cannot stand if it is `arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'" Id. at 86 (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))). The FEHBP plaintiffs in this case rely upon the Supreme Court's findings in Ragsdale that the agency's position, reflected in its regulation, was "extreme," id. at 90, "contradicts and undermines the FMLA's pre-existing remedial scheme," id. at 92, and upsets the careful balance set by Congress, id. at 94. The plaintiffs in the present case analogize the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ragsdale to the Final Year Regulation, and argue that the Final Year Regulation "does not say that payment will not follow reconciliation in the final year of the contract if administrative difficulty prevents the reconciliation's completion, but rather says that payment will never follow reconciliation in the final year of the contract." (emphasis in original). Thus, the plaintiffs argue that OPM's Final Year Regulation "contradicts and undermines" the Act's regulatory scheme, as the Supreme Court found the agency regulation did in Ragsdale. Id. at 92. Plaintiffs also maintain that OPM's rationale of administrative convenience is entirely unsupported by the record and contradicted by OPM's own regulations. Plaintiffs state that the defendant "merely assumed that it would be administratively difficult to pay all or a majority of health plans" the amount determined by the reconciliation. Specifically, plaintiffs suggest that OPM provides no explanation as to why OPM could not obtain data from plans that have terminated because OPM's own regulations require carriers to maintain all records for five years, including records for the last year of participation in the FEHBP. Plaintiffs cite to the clause at 48 C.F.R. § 1652.204-70, titled "Contractor Records Retention 16
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(Jan 1998)" (the Retention Regulation), which also was incorporated into each of the carriers' contracts at section 3.4. The clause, as written in Scott & White's contract, stated: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5.7 (FAR 52.215-2(d)) Audit and Records - Negotiation, . . . the Carrier of a contract of $500,000[2] or more will retain and make available all records applicable to a contract term that support the annual statement of operations and the rate submission for that contract term for a period of 5 years after the end of the contract term to which the records relate, except that individual enrollee and/or patient claim records shall be maintained for 3 years after the end of the contract term to which the claim records relate. Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs, OPM guidelines make it clear that the Retention Regulation requires plans to retain the very same documents OPM uses in the reconciliation process. Specifically, in an OPM guideline titled "OPM Reconciliation Guidelines - 1999," OPM stated: All rate agreements between OPM and the carrier are subject to audits by the OPM Office of the Inspector General. The results of such audits may require modifications to previous agreements and subsequent rate adjustment. Pursuant to contract clause 3.4, Contractor Records Retention (FEHBA 1652.204.70 [the Retention Regulation]), OPM requires all carriers to maintain documentation to support all calculations and statements pertaining to this reconciliation. This includes documentation to support the SSSG rates.[3] (emphasis in original). Based upon the above quoted contract requirements, plaintiffs argue that the defendant's rationale that "it is difficult to get adequate data from plans when they have terminated" is negated by OPM's own regulations and guidelines. Plaintiffs argue, therefore, that it is a fair assumption that this difficulty will not occur "in any but the most exceptional of cases," quoting language from Ragsdale v. Woverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. at 93.
The clauses as written in BlueLincs' and Texas Health's contract contained similar records retention requirements, however, they did not contain the $500,000.00 standard. See also the clause at FAR 52.215-2, "Audit and RecordsNegotiation (Jun 1999)," included in the contracts, which provides the contracting officer or authorized representative the right to examine and audit records. 17
3
2
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The plaintiffs also cite Bolden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association, 669 F. Supp. 1096 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in support of their position. In Bolden, the court reviewed an OPM decision directing that the Program's surplus reserve money be refunded to certain Blue Cross/Blue Shield enrollees. Id. at 1102. Although the court found that OPM's reasoning for its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the District Court rejected OPM's rationale of administrative convenience. Specifically, the Bolden court stated: OPM's reference to administrative concerns raises a factual question. However, OPM merely assumes that a refund to past enrollees would be administratively difficult. There is no concrete evidence that including plaintiffs in the refund would significantly burden OPM. Mere speculation is not enough. . . . To the extent, therefore, that OPM's decision rests on administrative concerns, it is not supported by the record. Bolden v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 669 F. Supp. at 1105. Based upon the holding in Bolden, plaintiffs similarly argue that there is no "concrete evidence" of any difficulty in the administrative record. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the administrative record contains only two instances, out of hundreds of health benefits carriers that contract with OPM, in which OPM believed the documentation of a non-renewing plan to be insufficient. Those two instances are presented in the administrative record and involved the carriers Coordinated Health Care and Maxicare. In both instances, documentation was deemed insufficient to support rate reconciliation. Plaintiffs suggest that it would have been more consistent with the statutory guidance at 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i) for the final regulation to provide for an exception to reconciliation only when insufficient data is available, rather than to establish a "per se" prohibition that no carrier is entitled to reconciliation in the final year of participation. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Final Year Regulation is invalid as applied to the plaintiffs in this case. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that they obtained and retained sufficient data to complete a reconciliation in the last year of each plaintiff's participation in the FEHBP. Plaintiffs argue that their contracts should, at a minimum, be reformed to permit reconciliation of each carrier's final year of participation in the FEHBP. Moreover, in spite of defendant's concern that there is insufficient documentation to support reconciliation in the final year, reconciliation activity actually took place for each of the three plaintiffs. In July, 1999, OPM completed a reconciliation process on Scott & White's rates with respect to its 1999 contract. During the reconciliation, OPM calculated the difference between Scott & Whites' estimated 1999 contract rates and the rates that should have been charged based upon Scott & White's actual community rates in effect on January 1, 1999. The parties have stipulated that the 1999 reconciliation resulted in $3,625,782.00 due to Scott & White. OPM also performed an initial reconciliation of Texas Health's rates for 2001. Based on its reconciliation, OPM concluded that Texas Health was due $622,246.00, and paid that 18
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amount to Texas Health. However, after receiving Texas Health's notification that it did not intend to renew its contract, OPM informed Texas Health that it would need to refund the $622,246.00. BlueLincs, similarly, provided OPM with documentation and a revised proposal for the rate reconciliation process for BlueLincs' contract year 2000. Assuming that the BlueLincs contract would be renewed, OPM also conducted a reconciliation with respect to BlueLincs' contract, although the resulting adjustment appears to be minimally in dispute. BlueLincs seeks a total of $369,127.00 for a year 2000 reconciliation. Citing LaBarge Products, Inc. v. West, the plaintiffs argue that "[w]here, as here, the government's misconduct results in a violation of law in the writing of the contract, courts will reform the contract to correct the illegal term." See LaBarge Prods., Inc. v. West, 46 F.3d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding reformation appropriate despite the contractor's initial adherence to a contract provision that was later shown to be illegal); see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("When a contract or a provision thereof is in violation of law but has been fully performed, the courts have variously sustained the contract, reformed it to correct the illegal term, or allowed recovery under an implied contract theory . . . ."). Citing Barrett Refining Corp. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1055, 1059 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (2001), the plaintiffs further argue that when the offending clause is struck, "the express contract simply incorporates an implied-in-fact promise by the government to pay at least fair market value . . . under the contract." In Barrett, the court found that because a price escalation clause was unauthorized and unenforceable, "there was no longer any express clause covering price escalation, and thus, nothing to preclude an implied-in-fact agreement on that term." Id. at 1060. Fundamental to the court's decision in Barrett was its factual finding of a promise by the government to pay at least fair market value. Similarly, according to the plaintiffs, the FEBHA requires the government to compensate participating health plans at rates that "reasonably and equitably" reflect the cost of the benefits provided, and for which OPM bargained, before accepting the plans' services. Defendant's Support for its Final Year Regulation The defendant argues that OPM is entitled to substantial deference in interpreting the FEHBA, which Congress charged it to administer, including promulgation of the Final Year Regulation in implementation of the statute. The defendant argues, therefore, that the regulation is a "valid and proper exercise of OPM's very broad authority to administer the FEHBP in accordance with OPM's statutory mission." Defendant believes that the Final Year Regulation "is a permissible construction of the FEHBA, [and] promotes efficiency and management of the program." The defendant also states that the Final Year Regulation properly allocates the risk of incorrectly estimated or negotiated rates in a year in which a carrier chooses to leave the program. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that the Final Year Regulation is not arbitrary or capricious; rather, that it is valid and effective as a matter of law. The defendant analyzes the Final Year Regulation under the Chevron deference standard. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, reh'g 19
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denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). The defendant argues that OPM's interpretation of the statutory provision requiring reasonable and equitable rates for community rated plans is reasonable under Chevron and Mead. Citing Chevron, the defendant states that: "Where, as here, OPM interprets a statute that it is entrusted with administering, its interpretation is entitled to `considerable weight.'" See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 844. The defendant argues that OPM's discretion to administer the FEHBP is "very broad." The defendant cites to court opinions which have reviewed the FEHBP, and concludes that OPM enjoys broad discretion in managing the program. For example, the defendant cites to Tackitt v. Prudential lnsurance Company, 758 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985), which stated that the "grant of authority given OPM to approve benefit plans is very broad." The defendant also cites to National Federation of Federal Employees v. Devine, 679 F.2d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "In considering the issues on appeal, we note first that OPM has been granted by statute broad discretionary authority to negotiate and contract for the benefits to be offered by health carriers," but see National Treasury Employees Union v. Campbell, 589 F.2d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[T]he [Civil Service] Commission's [OPM's predecessor] discretion under the Health Benefits Act, though broad, is bounded by [5 U.S.C.] Section 8902(i); and it is to the courts that the task of policing the boundary falls.") (bracketed material added). Defendant further argues that "OPM's construction of the FEHBA statute, as it implemented section 8902(i) requiring reasonable rates, is not arbitrary or capricious. Nor is OPM's regulation clearly wrong, or an impermissible construction of the statute." Defendant asserts that the court should defer to OPM's expertise because "OPM is in the best position to determine how best to administer the program, to balance statutory requirements against the limited resources OPM possesses, in order to minimize costs to the Government and to FEHBA enrollees." Additionally, the defendant argues that the Final Year Regulation not only is reasonable and consistent with FEHBA, but also is consistent with the cost and pricing analysis and contractor accountability principles of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and alleviates the administrative burden and inefficiencies the agency had experienced in attempting to deal with community rated carriers which had terminated contracts with OPM, and for which no rates could be adjusted for the next following insurance year. Citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978), the defendant argues that OPM is in a better position to determine the requirements of the agency because: "Administrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved." Moreover, the defendant suggests that even if a different or better way than the Final Year Regulation to regulate community rates could be achieved under 5 U.S.C. § 8902(i), when a carrier exits the program, that does not mean that the Final Year Regulation as written is arbitrary or capricious.
20
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Addressing the costs to the government in managing the FEHBP, the defendant argues that it is OPM's duty to consider the cost to the government in making determinations relating to the FEHBA. To support its position, the defendant cites to National Federation of Federal Employees v. Devine, 679 F.2d at 912, in which the court stated: "The entire legislative scheme is based upon OPM considering cost to the government in contracting for health benefit plans." Thus, considering the cost to both the government and the carriers, the defendant argues that OPM developed "an indisputably equitable solution," whereby OPM and the carriers would "share" the risk of any upward or downward adjustment in a carrier's final year of participation in the FEHBP. Defendant argues that the plaintiffs are attempting to advance the notion that there is a precise rate for carriers, and that this is "a distorted characterization of the rating and reconciliation process." Defendant states that community rates are driven by actuarial science applied to data that is maintained and presented by the carrier to OPM. According to the defendant, there is no requirement that the rates "equal, precisely, the cost of benefits, nor is it required that the SSSG price must equal, in dollar terms, the FEHBP price." There is language in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition Regulation (FEHBAR) which states: "OPM shall determine the FEHBP rate by selecting the lower of the two rates derived by using rating methods consistent with those used to derive the SSSG rates." 48 C.F.R. § 1602.170-13(d). Citing 48 C.F.R. § 1602.170-13(d), the defendant states that all that is required is that the rates for FEHBP enrollees be developed using rating methods consistent with those used to derive the carrier's SSSG rates. Moreover, the rates are subject to adjustment and reconciliation, as provided by 48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-70. Defendant argues that section 8902(i) only requires a reasonable and equitable reflection of the cost of benefits provided when comparing the federal group to the appropriate SSSG, a standard which is met by initial, unreconciled rates. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the regulation should not apply to the plaintiffs individually because they had records available to reconcile in their last year of performance in the FEHBP, the defendant asserts that a regulation applies to all community rated carriers, including plaintiffs, without regard to whether the underlying rationale of the regulation pertains to their individual cases. The defendant argues that in promulgating general rules, the agency is not required to determine, and take into account, the actual effect of the rule upon each person subject to the rules. The defendant cites to The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583 (1927), in which the United States Supreme Court stated: "[I]n establishing a rule of general application, it is not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of its appropriateness in respect to every railroad to which it will be applicable. In this connection, the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from