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UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

ISMAEL JOHN, et al., for Themselves and for a Class Consisting of the People of Enewetak,

) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) __________________________________________)

No. 06-289 L Hon. Christine O.C. Miller

P A N IF ' MO A D M I O P ST O L I T F S ME R N U N P O I I N T D F N A TSMO I NT D S S O EE D N ' T O O IMIS

December 18, 2006

DAVOR PEVEC Attorney at Law American Savings Bank Tower 1001 Bishop Street, Suite 1360 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 Fax: 310-402-5983 Phone: 808-599-5655 Email: [email protected] Attorney for Plaintiffs

Of Counsel: JON VAN DYKE 2515 Dole Street Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 Fax: 808-956-5569 Phone: 808-956-8509 Email: [email protected]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ME R N U I O P STO T D F N A TSMO I NT D S S ..........1 MO A D M N P O II N O E E D N ' TO O IMIS . I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY................................. 1 II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................ 10 III. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................... 10 A. The Court Has Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Claims, Which is Not Validly Withdrawn in the Compact Act....................................... 10 1. The Prior Litigation Left the Door Open for Plaintiffs to Return to this Court if the NCT Failed to Award Just Compensation, Notwithstanding Article XII............................................................... 1 0 2. Absent a Valid Settlement and Release or the Payment of Just Compensation, It is Unconstitutional to Eliminate All Jurisdiction Over Takings Claims............ 13 3. No Court Has Decided Whether Jurisdiction-Stripping is Constitutional In the Absence of a Valid Settlement or the Payment of Just Compensation............... 19 4. Because Just Compensation Has Not Been Paid, the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Depends on Whether There Has Been a Valid Settlement and Release of Claims..................................................................... (a) T ee ae i a sh f e l oe m n si c r h r es v le t e r gvr et f ui y l ot e da n ' d a obligations and is invalid under federal common law........................... (b) T e MI epuao pi tc i ss nnocaludr h R ' soslf r a lm iuefr b ne s ve a e e international law.................................................................. 5. The Compact Act Can Be Construed to Avoid Unconstitutionality............... B. T e r r i i ao Pa tf Ca so L c o Jrd t n os o h Pi Ds s l f ln f ' lm fr ak fui ii D e N t o m s i is i s co Bar the Present Claims........................................................................ 1. The Prior Litigation Did Not Decide Whether the Compact Validly Stripped Jurisdiction If the Compact Process Failed to Provide Just Compensation.............................................................................. 2. The Prior Litigation Was Not Dismissed on the Merits, So There is No Claim Preclusion...........................................................................

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3. The Claims Alleged in the Complaint Were Reserved in the Earlier Litigation................................................................................. C. The Adjudication of Takings Claims is a Core Judicial Function, Not a NonJsc b "o taQ et n ............................................................ uti l P li l uso. ia e ic i " D. Pa tf Ca s rN t a e B T e tu O Lm ti s ne2 ln f ' lm A e o B r d y h Sa t f i it n U dr 8 i is i r te ao U.S.C. Sec. 2501.............................................................................. 1. In The Compact And Section 177 Agreement, Congress Intended To Accept Responsibility And Provide Just Compensation For Nuclear Damage Claims Without Regard To Any Limitations Period Or Other Procedural Barriers........................................................................

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2. The Language in Peter on the Statute of Limitations Is Not Binding Under the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel or Issue Preclusion, Because This Issue Was Not Addressed by the Federal Circuit on Appeal ad ec IN t "i lR l g r n t ts N cs r t t E d n H nes oa Fn " u n o O eh I" ees yoh n a i a a e Decision hn d. T e Mae ..................................................................... 39 " 3. Pa tf I p e-In-Fact Contract Claims Are Not Barred By The ln f 'm ld i is i Statute Of Limitations, Because They Were To Be Determined By The Alternative Tribunal And Because The Breaches Are Continuing, As Alleged In The Amended Complaint................................................... 4. The Statute of Limitations Did Not Accrue on Counts III - VI Until Issuance of the 2000 NCT Final Decision, As All Events Necessary to Fx e nat Lait H d o O cr i D f dn s i ly a N t cur e ' bi ed.......................................... 5. If the Statute of Limitations Accrued Prior to 2000, it was Equitably Tolled....................................................................................... E. Pa tf C utI T ruh I o te lm U o Wh h ee ln f ' on I hog V D Sa Ca s pn i R lf i is sI t i c i May Be Granted.............................................................................. 1. Standard of Review........................................................................ 2. Under RCFC 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs Have Alleged the Proper Factual Predicate For Their Fifth Amendment Takings Claims..............................

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3. Under RCFC 12(b)(6), Plaintiffs Have Alleged the Proper Factual Predicate For Their Breach of Implied Contract Claims.............................. 48 IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 50

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page

Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ................................................... 43 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) ................... . 28 Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005) ...................... . . . 35 Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 444 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......... . 44 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947)). ..................................... . 29 Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ........................ passim Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Ct. 406 (1996) ............................ . 48 th Arakaki v. Lingle, 423 F.3d 954 (9 Cir. 2005), judgment vacated on other grounds, 126 S.Ct. 2859 (2006) ............... 35, 36 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) ................................. 40 Arkansas Val. Ry. v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 727 (Ct.Cl. 1946) .......... . 18 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). .......................................... 36 Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936) .......... . 17 Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, (D.C. Cir. 1987) ............................ . 15 Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2 Cr14)....... d i 98 . . 15 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) .............................................. . 33 Bingaman v. Dept. of the Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .......... . 29 Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.,1 US12 17)............... 16, 30 49 .. (94 0 Case No. A/18 Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction Over Claims of Persons with Dual Nationality (U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, April 6, 1984), 23 ILM 489, 501 (1984)) ................................. 28 th Central States Pension Fund v. Hunt Truck, 296 F.3d 624 (7 Cr20) i 02 .... . 34 Chisolm v. House, 183 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1950) ................................. 24 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) .......................................... 30 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) .......................................... 47 Correlated Dev. Corp. v. United States, 56 . 55 C. l 97 ....... 5 F d 1 (t . 7) 2 C 1 . . 48 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) ................................. passim Davis v. George B. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292 (1925) ................... 17 Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 76 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super 1950) ............... 23 D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505 (C. l 97 .... t . 6) . C 1 48 Do-Well Machine Shop, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ................................................... 33 Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................ 33 El-Shifa Pharmaceuticals Indust. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................................. 37 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004) .......... 29 Gelb v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 798 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) ............... 40 Griffin v. United States, 110 Ct.Cl. 330, 77 F.Supp. 197 certiorari granted 335 U.S. 883, reversed on other grounds 336 U.S. 641, rehearing denied 337 U.S. 920................................. 44 Gross v. German Foundation Industrial Initiative,

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456 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2006) ............................................. Gulf Power Company v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) ........................................ Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) ............................... Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) .................................. . . Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981) .................. Hornback v. United States, 405 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................. Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. 232 (1866) ............................... I.K. Frazer v. United States,8 F3 14 (e. i 20) ................ 28 . 37 FdCr 02 d . In re Estate of Amuso, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (N.Y. S r C.98 ............ ur t 5) . 1 International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir. 1951) ............................................. Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) ...................... . Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) ............................... . Jpn a n As .. m C t en o. 7 US 21 18).......... aa Whl g s nvA . e ca Sc 48 ..2 (96 i ' a , . Japanese War Notes Claimants Association v. United States, 373 F.2d 356 (Ct. Cl. 1967) .............................................. Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441, (1984) ............................... . Juda v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 667, 689 (1987) ............................... . Jung v. Assn of Am. Medical Colleges, 339 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004) ........................................ . Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) ............................... . Kearns v. Gen. Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............. . Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) ............................... . Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Serv., 865 F.2d 235 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ............. . Kwan v. United States, 272 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................. Lagenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 55 FdCr18)................ 16 (e. i 95 . Lins v. United States, 688 F.2d 784 (Ct. Cl. 1983) ................... . .... st Liston v. Gottsegen, 348 F.3d 294 (1 Cir. 2003) ............................ L.S.S. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 695 F.2 15 (e. i 18)...... d 39 FdCr 92 . Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ............................ Maas v. Lonstorf, 194 F. 577, 587 (6th Cir. 1912) ............................ Martin v. Henley, 452 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1971) ............................... . . Mat vH n r Ls e14 U.S. 304 (1816) ............................... rn . ut ' es , i es e . . Mavromatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Ser. B., No. 3 (192) ............. 4 Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 424 F.3d 1229 (Fed Cir. 2005) ..................................... Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928) ............................... . . Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp., 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996) ...................... . . Ministry of Defense v. Elahi, 126 S.Ct. 1193 (2006) ...................... . . Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) .............................................. Moran Towing & Transportation Co. v. Navigazione Libera Tristina, S.A., 92 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 744 (1937)) .......... Morgan v. DOE, 424 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................ Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau,

35, 36 18 29 29 41 33 33 45 23 41 45 16 36 44 4 passim 19 35 29 16 40 36 35, 36 44 23, 24 44 16 24 41 36 26 29 24 24 37 17, 18 41 29

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924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991) ............................................. 27 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Ry. Case, PCIJ, se. A/B, No. 76 (1939) ............. . 26 People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134, 136 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ........................................ . . passim People of Saipan v. Dept. of the Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973) .......................................... 27 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) .......................................... 23 Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768 (1984) ................................. passim Peter v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 691, 692 (1987) ........................ 8, 42 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) ........................ 19 Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) .......................................... 38 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) ........................ 26 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) ........................ 16, 30 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ..................................... . 28 th Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9 Cir. 2006) ........................ 35 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, (2006) ........................ 36 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894) ........................ 16 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 2912) ............ 9(93 17 Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) ............... 24 Siegemund v. Shapland, 324 F.Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2004) ............... 24 Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............... 33 th Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6 Cir. 1989) ............... 24 The Loewen Group v. United States, 42 I.LM.1 ( SD20)............ . 81 I I 03 C 26 United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) ............................ . 26 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 74 (1947) ................................. 45 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) ................................. 19 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) ........................ 37 United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341(1923) ............. . . 18 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) ........................ 19, 25 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct.Cl. 1979) .............................................. . 25 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 45 20)....... 6 (03 . . 23 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) ................ 28 Vink v. Hendrikus Johannes Schif, Rolkan, N.V., 839 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .............................................. . . 33 Walker v. United States, 105 Ct.Cl. 553, 64 F.Supp. 135 (Ct.Cl. 1946) .............................................. . . 18 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796) ........................................... 36 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ........................................... 29 Wii sn on R g nl l n g o m n . la o C ut ei aPa i C m ' v lm y o nn Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) ................... . . 44 Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) ..................................... . . 28 Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................ 16 STATUTES First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, § 25 (1789) ..................................

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Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 .............................................. . 10, 20 .4, Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986) ........................... passim 61 Stat. 3301 (1947) .......................................................... . 23 RULES RCFC Rule 41(b) .......................................................... .

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OTHER Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandate Islands, 61 Stat. 3301 T.I.A.S. No. 1665 (1947)................... passim Restatement (2d) of Trusts ....................................................... 23, 24 Restatement (2d) of Contracts ................................................... 24 Restatement (3d) of Foreign Relations .......................................... 26, 27 Restatement (2d) of Judments ................................................... 33, 34 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure ...................... 33, 36, 44 Consolidated Brief of Appellee, People of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik and Other Marshall Islands Atolls v. United States (June 24, 1988) .............................................. 12, 31, 46 . Transcript of the oral argument in Dames & Moore, U.S. Supreme Court No. 80-2078 .............................................. 12 Tomaki Juda v. United States, Nos. 172-81L, 543-81L and 561-82L, April 13, 1983 Transcript of Proceedings ................... . 34 Geneva Convention of 1930 on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws ............................ . 28 U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Affairs Manual ............................ . 26

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES Bogart, Trusts and Trustees (2d ed. rev. 1980) ................................. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed. 1998) .......... . M. Duschesne, The Continuous-Nationality of Claims Principle: Its Historical Development and Current Relevance to Investor-State Investment Disputes,6 e. s.n l . e.8 (04 .......... 3 G oWahIt L R v73 20) ' . . S. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,6 m JIt L 22 20) 9 A ..n l .6 (02 ' ..................... D C rt hr h ,AF nt nl nl io Ca at l i ly . hio eO l " ucoaA a s f lm n Ei b i , sp y i ys i g it" in International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983) ........................................... . Jm s r fr, h It nt nl a C m i i 'A tl o a e Ca odT en raoaL w o m s o s rc s n w e i sn ie State Responsibility (2002) ........................................... . 23, 24 26

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UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) __________________________________________)

ISMAEL JOHN, et al., for Themselves and for a Class Consisting of the People of Enewetak,

No. 06-289 L Hon. Christine O.C. Miller

P A N IF ' MO A D M I O P ST O L I T F S ME R N U N P O I I N T D F N A TSMO I NT D S S O EE D N ' T O O IMIS I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Enewetak Atoll is located in the extreme northwestern part of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and was formerly a part of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Iad. m ne C m ln( m C m l)¶7 s nsA edd o p i " . o p "¶1-18. l at A . Enewetak Atoll is private property, owned by the people of Enewetak. For centuries, it w sh olpoe y w e b t polo E e e k h r i ec s e o t a ls a t n rpr o nd yh ep f nw t w o ee xl i l n h t l e y t e e a ld u v y e o' resources for their needs. Id. ¶ 1. The Enewetak people were removed from their ancestral homeland in 1947 so that the United States could conduct nuclear weapons tests on their land. Id. ¶¶ 1, 57. Enewetak Atoll was chosen as a nuclear test site by the United States so that the United States mainland would be spared the devastating effects of high-yield nuclear weapons tests. Id. ¶ 1. The Enewetak people were relocated to Ujelang Atoll, an isolated, small, resource-poor atoll, 124 miles southwest of Enewetak Atoll. Id. ¶¶ 57, 63. The removal and relocation was effected pursuant to the November 25, 1947 Directive from President Truman to the Secretary of

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Defense and was to be accomplished in accordance with the memorandum addressed to President Truman by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Id. ¶¶ 52, 53. In these documents, the United States promised that the Enewetak people would be accorded U.S. Constitutional rights, would be treated as wards of the United States, would be taken care of during their displacement, and would not be subjected to greater danger from the tests at Enewetak than U.S. citizens. Id.¶¶ 1, 51-54. The United States promised to care for the physical, economic, educational, cultural and other needs of the Enewetak people until it returned their atoll to them in substantially the condition in which it had taken it or paid compensation for any damages. Id. ¶ 191. In return for the promises of the United States, the people of Enewetak complied with the decisions and orders of the United States, abandoned their homeland and accepted temporary relocation to Ujelang Atoll without any attempt to resist, either physically or by means of petitions to the United States or to international forums. Id. ¶ 192. The United States exclusively used and occupied Enewetak from 1947 to 1980 for a variety of purposes. Between April 1948 and August 1958, Enewetak Atoll was the site of 43 of the 66 high-yield nuclear tests the U.S. conducted in the Marshall Islands. Id. ¶¶ 76-77. The United States Department of Energy described the effects of the 43 tests as follows: The immense ball of flame, cloud of dark dust, evaporated steel tower, melted sand for a thousand feet, 10 million tons of water rising out of the lagoon, waves subsiding from a height of eighty feet to seven feet in three miles were all repeated, in various degrees, 43 times on Enewetak Atoll. Id. ¶ 9 T eetcue t cm le r a i vpr ao o f e f nw t 'iad,n 7. h t s asd h o p to pra aoi t n fi o E e e kss nsad s e e tl zi v a l many other islands were heavily contaminated with radiation. The lagoon was seriously damaged. Vegetation was completely stripped from many islands, and nearly all plants of agricultural and economic value on Enewetak were totally destroyed. Id. ¶¶ 78-85. During this

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period, the U.S. prevented the Enewetak people from returning to their homeland, while maintaining their ultimate right to return. Id. ¶ 88. After their relocation on Ujelang, the health, nutrition and shelter of the people of Enewetak were virtually ignored. Conditions on Ujelang were characterized by famine, near starvation, and death from illness due to the severe limitations of the environment and resources on Ujelang. There were also polio and measles epidemics, and a period of uncontrollable infestation of rats. Id. ¶¶ 66-75, 144. The United States Department of Interior, in 1978, summarized some of the suffering and hardship as follows: During the thirty years that the Enewetak people have been displaced from their home atoll they have suffered grave privations, including periods of near starvation, in their temporary home on Ujelang Atoll. The people have cooperated willingly with the U.S. Government and have made many sacrifices to permit the United States to use their home islands for atomic testing purposes. Id. ¶ 88. In 1972, the U.S. announced that it would resettle the Enewetak people on Enewetak Atoll. However, the U.S. did not begin radiological cleanup of Enewetak until 1977. The radiological cleanup activity that began in 1977, ended in 1980. Id. ¶¶ 90-92. The cleanup activity caused further damage to Enewetak Atoll because radioactive soil, plants and other material were dug up, bulldozed or scraped off the land. Id. ¶ 97. Virtually all food bearing plants were removed during the cleanup. Unfortunately, the cleanup activity only made portions of Enewetak Atoll habitable. The northern half of the atoll, including the major residential island of Enjebi, remains uninhabitable due to radiation contamination. Id. ¶¶ 91-93. Runit Island, the fifth largest island in the atoll, was not cleaned up and is totally unusable because its soil is heavily contaminated with plutonium. Id. ¶ 133. During the cleanup, a crater on the northern tip of Runit Island was filled in with over 110,000 cubic yards of plutonium

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contaminated material and is now a nuclear waste storage site with no long-term stewardship program in place to ensure that its contents do not pose a health risk to the residents of Enewetak Atoll. Id. ¶ 95. In October 1980, after 33 years of exile marked by starvation, epidemics, and near complete isolation from the rest of the world, the Enewetak people were finally permitted to return to their atoll. Id. ¶¶ 66-75, 99, 144. It was not until their return to Enewetak in 1980 that the Enewetak people could, for the first time, determine the duration of the taking and become aware of the nature and extent of the damages to their atoll. Id. ¶¶ 88, 99. After becoming aware of the duration of the taking, the continued taking of the northern islands of Enewetak Atoll, and the damages inflicted on their atoll, the plaintiffs, on September 15, 1982, filed a Complaint in this Court seeking, inter alia, compensation from the U.S for the temporary taking of their Atoll, and compensation for the breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Id. ¶ 101. Two other groups of Marshall Islanders also filed actions in this Court for damages relating to the nuclear testing program: the people of Bikini and the peoples of other Northern Marshall atolls and islands directly downwind from the test sites. Id. ¶ 102. The government moved to dismiss all three cases, which this Court denied. In Juda v. United States, C. t 4,18)" 6 l . 1(94 ( C 4 Juda I" t s orhl t th Bk i s a s t )h C ut e h t i n n hd te i d a e ia ad claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, for takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment and for breach of an implied-in-fact contract that created fiduciary obligations to the people of Bikini. Id. ¶ 104. In the Enewetak case, this Court held that the complaint properly stated a claim under the Tucker Act for breaches of an implied-in-fact contract that imposed fiduciary obligations on the United States, and that this claim was not barred by the statute of limitations or by sovereign immunity, but it also concluded that the claim of the Enewetak people for the

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taking of their atoll was barred by the statute of limitations. Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768 (94 ( 18)" Peter I" A . o p ¶ 0. htu n wt r pct t t i c i s a ) m C m l 15 T arl g i e etoh a n lm w s . . i h s e kg a appealed by plaintiffs on the grounds that the taking was temporary and plaintiffs had no way of knowing the extent and duration of the taking until they were permitted to return to Enewetak in 1980. Id. While the Juda and Peter cases were pending, the United States was negotiating the future political status of its wards, the people of the Marshall Islands. The people of the Marshall Islands were wards of the United States since 1947 when the Marshall Islands, together with the rest of Micronesia, were administered by the United States pursuant to the terms of a U id aos rs eh A r m n ( rs eh A r m n ) Id. ¶ 21. The Trusteeship n e N t n Tut si ge et" ut si ge et . t i e p e T e p e " A r m n gat t US " lpw ro am n t t nl iao,n j i ii " vrh ge et r e h ..f lo e fd i sao, g li ad u s co oet e nd e u s ir i e s t n rd t n e Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and the right to fortify the islands and close off parts of them for security purposes. Id. ¶ 22. At the same time, it required the U.S. to promote the economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants; to promote their political advancement toward self-government or independence; to protect their health; and to protect t m "gi th l s fhil d n r or s Id. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, the h aa st o o t ra ad e uc . e n e s e n s e" people of Enewetak and the other inhabitants of the Marshall Islands became citizens of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands with passports reflecting this status. They remained citizens of the Trust Territory until 1990, when the Trusteeship terminated. Id. ¶ 28. During the trusteeship, U.S. executive authority over the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was vested in a U.S. High Commissioner, appointed by the President and who, beginning in 1951, served under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. The first proclamation issued b t Hg C m i i e i 14,none t te xr sd a pw ro gvrm n ad yh i o m s o r n 97anucd h h ee i "l o e f oe etn e h sn , a ce l s n

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jurisdiction . .ad i ld i sav r pni ly oet Tut e i r adt .n f aam n t t ee os it vrh rsT rt y n i n ir i s bi" e ro s inhabitants. Any local laws inconsistent with the Trusteeship Agreement, Interior Department Orders or Executive Orders, or any directive of the High Commissioner, would be null and void. Id. ¶ 27. During the entire trusteeship period, defendant maintained strict control over the Trust Territory. The Trust Territory Government could not communicate directly with foreign governments, and the High Commissioner maintained control over budget, accounting, and other relations with U.S. government agencies. Id.¶ 30. The political status negotiations resulted in a Compact of Free Association between the United States and the Marshall Islands. President Reagan signed the Compact of Free A sc t n c( o pcA t i oa o Jna 1,96 P bL N .9 s ii A t" m at c )n l n aur 418 (u. . o9-239, 99 Stat. o ao C " t w y 1770) and by proclamation dated November 3, 1986, declared the Compact to be in effect. Id. ¶ 38. In Section 177(a) of the Compact, the United States accep d r pni ly o t " sos itfr e e bi compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands . . . for loss or damage to property of the citizens of the Marshall Islands . . . resulting from the nuclear testing program which the Government of the United States conducted in the Northern Marshall Islands between June 30, 14 ad uut 815. Id. ¶ 108. 96 n A gs1,98 " I a ea tar m n( et n 7 A r m n )t U id te,usato n spr e ge et" co 17 ge et , e n e Sa spr n t a e S i e " h t t u Section 177(b) of the Compact Act, agreed to the establishment of a Nuclear Claims Tribunal ( r ua o " C "t t ol " nef adt m nt n pn lc i s at r etn " i nl rN T )h w u r dri l e r i i uo a lm ps pe nad Tb " a d e n e ao la , s future, of the Government, citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based on, arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear Tet g rga ..Id. ¶¶108-109. sn Por . i m "

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The Section 177 Agreement also provided for the establishment of a $150 million trust fund, the income from which was earmarked for nuclear-affected atolls, for the Tribunal, and for other programs related to the legacy of the nuclear testing program. $45.75 million of income from the trust fund was to be made available to the Tribunal over a 15-year period to pay out awards, and after 15 years, at least 75% of the income earned by the trust fund was to be made available t t Ti nlfr i usm n ipy etf oe r a a s ae yh Ca s oh r ua" d br etn am no m nt y w r m d b t lm e b o s e a d e i Ti nln usqet er" ¶ 110. r uai sbeun ya .Id. b s By its own admission, defendant made no effort to calculate the magnitude of the damages and injuries inflicted upon the people of Enewetak and other Marshall Islanders in deciding the amount of the payments authorized under the Section 177 Agreement. Asked by the H uen r r o m teo "ou etw i r l th cl li s t A m n t t n os It i C m ie frdcm n h h e e t a u t n"h d i sao eo t s c f c e c ao e ir i m d " dt m n hwm c sol b pit ec gop f lm n ,t A m n t t n ae t e r i o uh hu e a o ah ru o c i at"h d i sao o e e d d a s e ir i r pne t tn [ c] ou etei. Id. ¶ 111. e oddh "o s h dcm n x t s a u s s" In conjunction with the establishment of the Tribunal, Article X of the Section 177 A r m n etl " sosl s t :T iA r m n constitutes the full settlement of all ge et n td Epua" te " h ge et e , ie , as s e claims, past and future, of the Government, citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based upon, arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear Testing Program and which are against the United te, s gn ,m l escn at s n ci n ad aoa .. Sa si aet e p ye,ot c rad iz s n nt nl .. t t s o r o te i s " Article XII of the Section 177 Agreement, provides: All claims described in Articles X and XI of this Agreement shall be terminated. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to entertain such claims, and any such claims pending in the courts of the United States shall be dismissed. The people of Enewetak were not parties either to the negotiations on the Compact or the Section 177 Agreement. Id. ¶ 112.

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Following enactment of the Compact of Free Association and Section 177 Agreement ( o pcA r m n " i18,e natee e i m t no i i ,n t s orhl " m at ge et )n 96df dnr w dt o o td m s adh C ute C e s e n s i s s i d that the Compact withdrew jurisdiction over certain proceedings including the then pending takings claims and breach of contract claims arising from the nuclear testing program. Id. ¶ 114. T iC utut r e t t ln f 'ost i acaegsoh ae av c i s h orfr ehl h p i iscntu o lhlne t t lr t e lm s h d a a tf itn l e tn i a poeue st pn h Sco 17 gem n w r "r a r because the Agreement rcdr eu it et n 7 A r et e pe t e s e i e e m u" provided an alternative method of compensation ­ h N c a Ca s r ua " ]e t ul r lm Ti nl [ h e e i b :T ste et rcdr a e et t t og t Sco 17 gem n poi s ` aoal el npoeue s f c a dh uh h et n 7 A r et rv e ar snb ' tm , f ue r e i e , d e e ad cr i m aso otn g o pnao. e et ste et rv e ` eut n ` tn en fr b i n cm est nWht rh el n poi sa qa ' ea ' ai i h e tm d d e cm est ncnob dt m nd th t e Juda v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 667, 689 o pnao,ante e r i at si . i e e i m " (97 ( 18)" Juda II" Id. ¶¶ 114-115. The Juda II opinion was adopted in Peter v. United States, ) . 13 Cl. Ct. 691, 692 (1987) (" Peter II" ) . On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed this decision: The [Compact] and the section 177 Agreement, provide, in perpetuity, a means to address past, present and future consequences, including the resolution of individual claims, arising from the United States nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands. . . . [W]e are unpersuaded that judicial intervention is appropriate at this time on the mere speculation that the alternative remedy may prove to be inadequate. People of Enewetak v. United States, 864 F.2d 134, 136 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Am. Compl. ¶ 120. Moreover, in Juda II, t s orsit tC nr s a r on e ad rt t h C uta h " oge hse gi d n po c d i d a s c z ee p i isr h t j to pnao frai s n fr r c o cn at Juda II, 13 Cl.Ct. ln f 'i t ou cm est n o t n ad o be h fot c" a tf g s s i kg a r . at 689. Consequently, the Juda II opinion (which was endorsed by the Federal Circuit in People of Enewetak)a t t oges nue t t ln f 'i thd o d apa dhog ay si h C nr esr h p i isr h a nt i per t uh n d a s d a a tf g s s e r statute of limitations or any other procedural barrier. Am. Compl. ¶ 121. In addition, the ruling of this Court in Peter regarding the dismissal of plaintiffs taking claim on statute of limitations

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gonsahuh pel , a seicl ntdr sd yh Fdr Cr i " eas we rud,l og apa dw spc i l oade e b t ee l i u : B cue t e f ay s e a ct a i t dc i o t Ca s ort d m sapln 'o p i so l k fuj t fr h eio fh lm C uto i i peat cm ln fra o sb c fm e s n e i s s l s at c e matter jurisdiction, we need not address other issues."People of Enewetak, 864 F.2d at 136 n. 4. (emphasis added) Am. Compl. ¶ 121. In 1990, the people of Enewetak filed claims before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, seeking damages for the loss of Enewetak Atoll, the costs of a radiological cleanup of the Atoll and consequential damages suffered as a result of their relocation and losses. Id. ¶ 122. On August 3, 2000, the Tribunal issued a final decision awarding plaintiffs a total of $385,894,5001 for property and consequential damages, after deducting for compensation and restoration funds already received by plaintiffs under Article IV, Section 2 of the Section 177 Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 151116H w vrdeo ogesoe li dqa fni o t Ti nl s e a 3,4,4. o ee u tC nr ' vr ln eut ud g fh r ua a w l s , s a a e n e b , l other awards it has issued under its Article IV jurisdiction, the Tribunal has been able to pay out a total of only $1,647,483 o p i isTi nlw r--or 0.375% of the actual award. Id. ¶¶ n ln f ' r uaa a a tf b d 148-149. As of August, 2006, the remaining funds available to the Tribunal for its award payments and internal administrative expenses was less than $1.8 million. Id. ¶ 151. In September 2000, the Marshall Islands government filed a petition with the U.S. C nr sr usn ad i afnso oeupi Ti nlw rs u t " hne oge ,e et g dio lud t cvr na r uaa a deo C agd s q i tn d b d Cr m t cs pr ato rc I o t Sco 17 gem n Id. ¶ 163. To date, i u s ne" us n tA tl X fh et n 7 A r et c a u ie e i e . Congress has not acted on the petition, although a January 24, 2005 State Department letter advised Congress that the petition should be denied. Id. ¶ 166. Accordingly, it is clear that the alternative remedy established by Congress has been inadequate to satis p i is f ln f ' y a tf
1

The $ 385,894,500 award was broken down into three categories: $244 million for past and future loss of Enewetak Atoll; $107.81 million for restoration costs for a radiological cleanup of the atoll; and $33,814,500 for hardships suffered by the People of Enewetak as a result of their relocation to Ujelang. Am. Compl. ¶ 146. -9-

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constitutional and contract claims, and that this Court should intervene to ensure that plaintiffs receive fair compensation for their considerable sacrifices. II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to determine whether the award of the Nuclear Ca s r uapoi suto pnao fr ln f 'ai s lm udrh Ff lm Ti nlrv e j cm est n o p i ist n c i s net ih i b d s i a tf k g a e t A ed etn/ aeutcm est n o p i isbec o i p e cn atlm ? m nm nad rdqa o pnao fr ln f ' r h fm ld ot cc i s o e i a tf a i r a 2. Wht r ln f 'lm a br d y political question doctrine? e ep i isc i s r a e b the h a tf a e r 3. Wht r ln f 'lm a br d yh s t e fi it n? e ep i isc i s r a e b t tu o l ti s h a tf a e r e at m ao 4. Wht r ln f 'lm a sb ct d m s l neR l1() )o f l eo e ep i isc i s r uj to i i audr u 2b( frau t h a tf a e e s s e 6 ir allege the elements of a Fifth Amendment taking or for failure to establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract for the payment of adequate compensation? III. ARGUMENT A. The Court Has Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Claims, Which is Not Validly Withdrawn in the Compact Act. The Tucker Act, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), confers jurisdiction on this Court " r drug et pn n c i aa st U id te fudd pn i et t e e j m n uo ay lm gi th n e Sa sone uo ehrh o n d a n e t t t e Constitution, * * * or upon any express or implied contract with the United States E c o t . ah fh " e claims in the amended complaint fall within that statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction. The question before the Court is whether Congress validly repealed that grant of jurisdiction with regard to claims described in Article X of the Section 177 Agreement by enacting the Compact of Free Association Act (Compact Act), Pub. L. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986), and whether the claims alleged in the complaint are covered by Article X. 1. The Prior Litigation Left the Door Open for Plaintiffs to Return to this Court if the NCT Failed to Award Just Compensation, Notwithstanding Article XII.

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T e oe m n s ot t nhth pi li t n n h C utn t Fdr Cr i h gvr et cn n o t t r rig i i t s oradh ee l i u n ' e i a e o t ao i e a ct closed the door to the claims presen dn h A edd o p i i oe t Fdr Cr is t i t m ne C m ln g r h ee l i u ' e e at n s e a ct hl n t tuh lm w r"r a r" o i h sc c i s e pe t e People of Enewetak, 864 F.2d at 136 (citing Juda II, dg a a e m u, 13 Cl.Ct. at 689), until the adequacy of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal remedy could be determined. The ee l i u sit tt a "ne uddhtuiai e et n s Fdr Cr i a h iw s upr ae t j c ln r n o i a ct d a s a d i tv i appropriate at this time on the mere speculation that the alternative remedy may prove to be inadequate. 84 . a16 e paiadd.T e " 6 F d t 3 ( hs de) h People of Enewetak opinion adopted the 2 m s language in JudaII, h h xlndht rc X Ie i t "rcei s bt int w i ep i t A tl It m n e poed g" u d o c a e a ie r ad n d extinguish the basic claims involved. Juda II,3 l t t8. h C ut s t etht 1 C. . 66 T e ors te nt C a ' am a "w ht rh ste et rv e " dqa "cm est n ant be determined at this []e e t el n poi s aeut o pna o cno h e tm d e i t e i, i , d indicates that this Court has remained ready ­ the appropriate time (i.e., once the m " . at procedure had run its course, as it now has) -- to determine whether the settlement has been adequate. See also Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dismissing c i s net F C ,u r on i a e eynh C utnet T ceA to "n lm udrh T A bte gin r d i t s orudrh ukr cfr a a e c zg m i e ucm est o i dqa lcm est t i " no pna d rn euty o pna d a n ) e a e e kg. The prior decisions were guided (as this Court must be) by t S pe e ors eio h ur C ut dc i e m ' sn in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), which also involved the termination of certain claims (albeit against Iran, rather than the United States) in favor of proceedings before a tribunal established by an international agreement. Just as the government conceded and the Court concluded in Dames & Moore that the agreement with Iran necessarily preserved jurisdiction over takings claims, the United States was careful in the prior litigation not to argue that Congress could constitutionally eliminate takings jurisdiction if ­ has proven to be the as case ­ alternative remedy proved to be inadequate. See Consolidated Brief of Appellee, the

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People of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, Utrik and Other Marshall Islands Atolls v. United States ( n 2,98 ( e. i Bi " a4. s hw i sco I.. infra, any other J e 418)" dCr r f t5 A so n n et n IA2 u F . e) i I , conclusion would render Article XII unconstitutional and unenforceable. In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court took up on certiorari before judgment the constitutionality of an agreement between the United States and Iran that resulted in the release of the hostages held at the United States Embassy, and provided a non-judicial forum ­ U.S.the Iran Claims Tribunal ­ hear claims by United States citizens against Iran. The agreement to terminated any United States judicial proceedings against Iran and its assets. Even though Iran made an open-ended commitment to pay judgments, the adequacy of the Tribunal was in dispute, and Dames & Moore argued that the extinguishment of its rights of action against Iran in favor of proceedings before the Tribunal constituted a taking by the United States. Even though claimants were arguably better off with the Tribunal remedy than they were with uncollectible rights of action against Iran, neither the government nor the Court thought those rights of action could be eliminated without a right of judicial redress against the United States. At oral argument, the Supreme Court obtained a concession from the U.S. Solicitor General that claimants who were dissatisfied with the Tribunal award could sue in this Court, which would retain its jurisdiction to hear takings claims against the United States based on the extinguishment of the rights of action against Iran.2 Although the Court concluded that it was then premature to decide whether there was a valid takings claim ­ adequacy of the Tribunal the

Tasr tf r A gm n ( U S I N " t r stl t i ,o t n t r s r c po O a ru etQ E TO :I h e slaa n yu h k h e a n i l f e' i kg i e' r ey o i MR L E " hts or t n t te eysh T ce A t)id. ( shr a e d frt m ? . E :T aicr c ad h r d it ukr c" e, a m e .; " t e I e remedy [if just compensation is not paid]? And the answer to that, it seems to me, as I read the t a ecp o o t T ceA ththri"Q E TO :T a sh U id te r t xet n fh ukr ct t es U S I N " ht t n e Sa s ey i e a e . ' e t t psi ,oj t . e' Iaet MR L E " hts or t) This Court is respectfully oio ntu MrL e , t i" tn s s k ? . E :T aicr c" e .. requested to take judicial notice of the transcript of the oral argument in Dames & Moore, U.S. Supreme Court No. 80-2078, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201(b).
2

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process being untested ­ was not premature to determine the availability of a United States it judicial forum to hear a takings c i . 5 US a69 " e os itt th Pei n s lm 43 ..t 8 ( h ps b i h t r d t a t i ly a e s e ' at n m y aeh e etfai Pti e s rpr , aei fr d d ao t cos a hv t f co t n et nr poe ym k r eo aj i t n h i e f k g io ' t p u ci e qet n ht r et nr i hv ae ey ta udrh T ce A t) T e orhl uso w e epti ewl ae r d al net ukr c" h C ut e i h io l m w e . d that the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction, id., thus avoiding the grave constitutional question that would have been posed by a scheme that created a non-judicial remedy and extinguished judicial power to determine just compensation. See also id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that those whose claims are not paid in full have the right to bring takings actions in the Court of Claims). To argue, as the government does in its motion to dismiss, that the prior litigation determined that there is no place for the plaintiffs in this court, even after they have exhausted the remedy provided in the Section 177 Agreement and established that they could not obtain just compensation is inconsistent with Dames & Moore, wi t gvrm n s oio i t t t h oe et psi n h h e n ' tn a cs adn h pi li t n Iiuspot b t l gae fh C ut pi dc i i ae n it r rig i . ts nupr d yh a ug o t ors r r eio n e o t ao e e n e ' o sn Juda II ad h Fdr Cr is eio i People of Enewetak. n t ee l i u 'dc i n e a ct sn 2. Absent a Valid Settlement and Release or the Payment of Just Compensation, It is Unconstitutional to Eliminate All Jurisdiction Over Takings Claims. There is no reason to think that Congress intended to defy the Fifth Amendment or Dames & Moore when it approved the Compact. Article XII of the Section 177 Agreement provides, inter alia, a" ] cutfh U id te sa hv j i ii t et tn uh t t[ o oro t n e Sa s hl aeu s co o n r i sc h n e t t l rd t n ea claims [described in Articles X and XI of the Section 177 Agreement], and any such claims pending in the courts ofh U id te sa b d m s d T eeae et f rc X I f t n e Sa s hl e i i e. h l lf co A tl Io e t t l s s " g f ie the Section 177 Agreement depends on Section 103(g)(2) of the Compact of Free Association

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Act, codified at 4 USC § 93g() T apoio " ti sad prv[ "h Section 8 ... 10() . ht rv i r ie ]n apoe ] t 2 s n af [ s e 177 Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands on the following terms: It is the explicit understanding and intent of Congress that the jurisdictional limitations set forth in Article XII of such Agreement are enacted solely and exclusively to accomplish the objective of Article X of such Agreement and only as a clarification of the effect of Article X, and are not to be construed or implemented separately from Article X. The plain text of § 103(g)(2) thus makes the withdrawal of jurisdiction in Article XII of the Sco 17 gem n oe t e nyo f c a w aC nr s ne t do e " lad et n 7 A r et pr i ol te et t ht oge udro tb a f ln i e av f ue s so u f aste eto a c i s gi th U id te, 13g()ad a i eddo e i lel n fl lm aa st n e Sa s§ 0() ,n w sn ne tb n tm " l a n e t t 1 t implemented only in conjunction with such a settlement. The words of section 103(g)(2) were carefully chosen by Congress to leave the doors of this courthouse open to claims within the scope of the Tucker Act in the absence of a valid ste etgem n " h nwl el nar et T e e a tm e : nguage is intended to make clear that court-stripping provisions of article XII of the section 177 agreement have no independent force or effect and their sole function is to implement the provisions of article X. Thus, if article X is valid, espousal stands, and if article X is invalid, claims covered by the espousal provisions will remain j ti liUS cut r a l s frc X I 11 ogR cH 1 2 (ay dD c1, u ia en ..or,e r e o a ie I" 3 C n. e. 1, 9 di e. e.1 sc b s gds tl . 8 l 1985) (remarks of Rep. Seiberling explaining resolution of House-Senate conference) quoted in Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 685. By conditioning the withdrawal of jurisdiction in this way, Congress suh tao eat g n nost i ar oao o j iapw ro ret " s ogto vi ncn a ucntu o le ct n fu c l o et odrh j t d i itn v i di e u cm est n ga n e w eeet U o pnao" ur t d hnvrh nited States takes private property for its own use i ae e udrh Ff A ed etC nr s a w lhv "s m d sosl a vl ad net ih m nm n oge m y e ae as e epuaw s ad n e t . s l u i e et e id., but that has nothing to do with whether Congress intended to withdraw f cv, f i "

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jurisdiction over nuclear-testing claims described in Article X if that assumption proved to be incorrect. Congress did not condition the effectiveness of Article XII on a prior judicial review o t "soslpoio iA tlX( t H ue e i o sco 13g() rub fh epua rv i n rc e " sn ie a h os vro fet n 0() a al s e sn i 2 g y required), but it did insist that the two stand or fall together when such review occurred. If section 103(g)(2) were construed, contrary to its plain terms, to deny any court of the United States ­ whether state or federal and including the Supreme Court -- all jurisdiction to a a " scm est n fr r a poe yae b t U id te, w u b w r j to pnao"o pi t rpr t n yh n e Sa si ol e d u i ve t k e t t t d unconstitutional. If Congress could prohibit any court from enforcing the Fifth Amendment, it could do precisely what the Fifth Amendment expressly forbids. Congress could abrogate contracts or deprive landowners of the use of their property by regulation without having to pay a dime in compensation, provided that it withdrew all jurisdiction to award just compensation at the same time that it authorized the taking. Dames & Moore proves that it makes no difference in the analysis that the dispute in this case arises in an arguably international context. A blanket prohibition of all jurisdiction by any United States court (such as Article XII of the Section 177 Agreement purports to impose) does not implicate the long debated authority of Congress to make regulations and exceptions to legislatively conferred jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, § 2. Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 703-04 (D.C. Ci 18) "te uso"ht r 97 (lt qet n t . il i a eliminating jurisdiction of state and federal courts to review constitutionality is unconstitutional); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 19 . 2427 2 Cr14)" ]e xr s o 6 F d 5,5 (d i 98 ( Th ee i f 2 . [ ce Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to take

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pi tpoe y i otuto pnao..Wh e oges ol em ntthis C ut r a rpr wt u j cm est n ) ve t h s i " i C nr cu l i e l s d i a ors ' jurisdiction over takings claims, it must provide some judicial forum for such claims.3 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (district court necessarily had jurisdiction over condemnation action prior to conferral of jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in the Tucker Act). Article XII of the Section 177 Agreement, however, does not provide any judicial forum empowered to award just compensation. Article X establishes an alternative remedial process, but at the end of the day if such an alternative process fails to provide just compensation, a judicial remedy must remain available. The federal government cannot set a cap on just compensation for taking private property and deprive the courts of jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of the payment in an international agreement any more than Congress can do so by legislation or the President by executive fiat. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rebuffed legislative efforts to dictate what constitutes just compensation. For example, in Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), the Court held that the failure of Congress to authorize payment of interest on property taken as a
3

The United States cannot avoid takings liability by invoking sovereign immunity to claims for just compensation for taking private property. The Fifth Amendment establishes the federal gvrm n s oe r lb i ,o hrcn e o oe i i m n yo uto pnao oe et m nt yi it s t e a b n svr g m ui t j cm est n n ' a a ly e en t s i awards. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution). Although there is dicta in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934), suggesting that the United States could withdraw consent to be sued for a taking, the Supreme Court has never so held, and it has repeatedly adopted constructions of federal statutes to avoid that question, including in Lynch. Examples include Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-87 (1981); and Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 126 (1974). The only authority cited in support of the Lynch dicta is Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1894), in which the patent infringement claims are properly classified as governmental torts, not takings. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1350-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Antolok involved statutory tort claims, not constitutional takings claims, and consequently did not consider the extinguishment of all jurisdiction over claims for just compensation. See 873 F.2d at 374; id. at 393 (Wald, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Juda II, 13 Cl. Ct. at 688 (United States is not obligated to poi auiar ey hntc a si ti i i da aa sie .. h Juda court rv e j c le d w e i"r t r h nn v ul gi tt l" T e d di m e e g s d i s n s f) erred in extending that reasoning to takings. See 13 Cl. Ct. 689-90.

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result of dam construction by the TVA did not prevent a court from awarding interest as just compensation, because the obligation to pay arose from the Constitution, not from a statute. The Court has repeatedly recognized that it is for a court, not the political branches, to determine what just compensation is due.4 In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893), Congress enacted a statute severely limiting the amount of compensation it would provide for the condemnation of a lock and dam of the Monongahela Navigation Company. The statute m na d ht ln fsr ci t clct lfr asg a n t r e nte os e d n adt t p i i'f nh eo o eto so ps e l gh i r ob cni r i e a a tf a s l l a o ev de determining the sum to be paid by the United States. The Supreme Court soundly rejected the gvrm n s oio t t ogest og l iao,ol hv t f asyn e r i n oe et psi h C nr , ruh e s t ncu aeh i la i dt m n g n ' tn a s h g li d en e i the amount of compensation due under a Fifth Amendment taking. By this legislation congress seems to have assumed the right to determine what shall be the measure of compensation. But this is a judicial, and not a legislative, question. The legislature may determine what private property is needed for public purposes; that is a question of a political and legislative character. But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the property, through congress or the legislature, its representative, to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the rule of compensation. The constitution has declared that just compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry. The Court concluded: The right of the legislature to det m n w ait ` scm est n iogto e i htsh j to pnao't uht r e eu i py ro x nu h n pro sc ` m est n b popcv cn c r a...o t et gi ay a fuh c pnao' y rset e oj t a i s t o i i eu l
4

Other examples include: Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (93 ( p i n t t[uto pnao ipoi d for by the Constitution and the right to 12)e ln gh " ]scm est n s rv e x ai a j i d icnob t e a a b s t e I acr i ets j iafnt n ) Davis v. George B. tantea n w y y tu . t se a m n iau c luco.. k at s tn di i " Newton Coal Co., 27 ..9,0 (95 ( t acr i et fo pnao iauia 6 US 2231 12)" h se a m n o cm est ns j c l `e tn i di fnt n" Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States,9 US 3938 13)" h j t uco' ; i ) 28 ..4,6 (96 ( eu T s compensation clause may not be evaded or impaired by any form of legislation....[W]hen [an owner] appropriately invokes the just compensation clause, he is entitled to a judicial determination of the amount. The due process clause assures a full hearing before the court or o etbnlm o e do e om t j iafnt nno e.. t rr uae pw r tpr r h u c luco i l d ) h i e f e di i vv " - 17 -

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advantage, or in any manner to interfere with the just powers and province of courts and juries in administrating right and justice, cannot for a moment be admitted or tolerated under our constitution. If anything can be clear and undeniable, upon principles of natural justice or constitutional law, it seems that this must be so. 148 U.S. at 327-328. Similarly, in United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 3434 (93, e orsuk o nh gvrm n s e r i t n hto pnao frol 4 12)t C utt c dw t oe et dt m n i t cm est n o ca h r e n ' e ao a i taken during war time under the Lever Act should be paid based on the lower prices of domestic coal, rather than the os e b h hr r e o epr d ol p i t t[h cni r l i epi s f xot ca oi n h " ]e day g c e , ng a t ascertainment of compensation is a judicial function, and no power exists in any other department of the government to declare what the compensation shall be or to prescribe any binding rulenhtea . it r r " a gd A t Eeet Cr ir et ep i d" iu i a lt r pni ly fh sh l n i u e n y xln ,i s lm tyh e os ito t e v h ct c l ae t t e e s bi e judicial branch to ensure that the compensation awarded for a taking satisfies the constitutional s na o j to pnao" n t tiC nr (or the executive branch) attempts to t dr fu cm est n ad h " oge a d s i a f ss impose a limitation on the measure of compensation for a taking, a court must evaluate that standard to see if it is consistent with the constitutionally mandated level of just compensation, and a court is not bound to follow that standard in making judicial determinations of the cm est n u it s na f lt scrj to pnao.. o pnao defh t dr aso eueu cm est n )Gulf Power Company v. i ea d i s i " United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Monongahela Navigation, Co., supra). 5 Wholly apart from whether limitations on jurisdiction violate the Fifth Amendment just compensation guarantee, Congress also cannot legislate the outcome of pending litigation by
5

Accord Walker v. United States, 105 Ct.Cl. 553, 64 F.Supp. 135, 139 (Ct.Cl. 1946) (stating df ivlt t[h dt m nt n futo pnao udrh Ff A ed ets e n i yh " ]e e r i i o j cm est n net ih m nm n i ite a t e ao s i e t ec s e auiafnt n T iinwud pt ad eu e n cao o at ry ) xl i l j c luco. h s o ni u d n r i s o it n fu oi . ; uv y di i s s e qr ti h t" Arkansas Val. Ry. v. United States, 68 F.Supp. 727 (Ct.Cl. 1946) (sti t tt dt m nt n an h " e e r i i t g a h e ao o j to pnao udrh Ff A ed ets xl i lauiafnt n) fu cm est n net ih m nm niec s e j c luco" s i e t uv y di i . - 18 -

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requiring dismissal for separation of powers reasons. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (Congress cannot preclude jurisdiction to determine the effect of a pardon on a pending appeal of property claim against the United States); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-228 (1995) (Congress cannot reopen final judgments). Klein, like this case, involved an attempt by Congress to dictate by legislation the outcome of claims litigation against the government. The s t e a a ucntu oai r gm n o t pw ro t j ia bcue i tu w s n nost i ln i e et n h o e fh u c r eas " at i t n fn e s e d iy t prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner that r u e t cuttdc e cn oe yn h G vrm n sao. United States v. Sioux e i dh or o ei a ot vr i t oe et f r qr e s d r s e n ' v " Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 404-05 (1980) (describing holding of Klein). Congress can eliminate substantive legal rights it has created, it must do so directly, not by dictating the outcome of litigation, as Article XII attempts to do. See Jung v. Assn of Am. Medical Colleges, 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that Congress had altered substantive antitrust law, not interfered with judicial decision making). But ­ as explained above ­ Congress has no legislative control whatsoever over takings claims, which derive from the Constitution, not from legislation. Congress cannot extinguish constitutionallybased takings claims by directing courts to dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction. 3. No Court Has Decided Whether Jurisdiction-Stripping is Constitutional In the Absence of a Valid Settlement or the Payment of Just Compensation. No court has yet adjudicated the constitutionality of extinguishing all judicial review of takings claims against the United States absent a valid settlement and release of the claims or adequate compensation by the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. In the earlier litigation, both the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit concluded that it was premature to decide that question, until the alternative compensation scheme established in the Compact of Free Association had run its

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course. People of Enewtak, 864 F.2d at 136-3 ( e rupr ae t tuiai e et n s 7 " a ne udd h j c ln r n o i w e s a d i tv i appropriate at this time on the mere speculation that the alternative remedy may prove to be i dqa . ; n eut" Antolok, 873 F.2d at 378 (Challenge to the constitutionality of the remedial a e) shm c a dnh C m ats opoe y e rt cut eas,[fhria ce e r t it o pcint rpr bf eh orbcue" ]t es n ee e l o e i e ucm est o i dqa lcm est t i , e ln f 'e eysnh Ca s no pna d rn euty o pna d a n t p i isr d ii t lm e a e e k g h a tf m e i Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U,.S.C. § 1491(a), not in the District Court under the Federal T rCa s c" Juda II,3 l t t8 ( r a r t dc e ht rh C m at ot lm A t) i .; 1 C. . 69 " e t e o ei w e et o pc C a pm u" d h e framework provides adequate compensation). The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims filed prior to approval of the Compact on the understanding that Congress had established an alternative means to provide just compensation and that it was unnecessary to decide whether that alternative remedy was cntu oay dqa " avne fh ehut n fh ae av poi d Polo ost i l aeut i dac o t xaso o t lr t e rv e. ep f itn l e n e i e tn i d " e E e e k84 . a17 T e oro A pa ep i d ht[n et n 7 o t nw t ,6 F2 t3. h C utf pel xln t " ] sco 17 fh a d s ae a i i e Compact the United States Government accepted responsibility for just compensation owing for loss or damage resulting from its nuclear testi por . Id at 135. The court referred to the n rga " g m py etfa i tlu o $5, 0 0, i ad