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ATTACHMENT 14 AGREED-UPON REDACTED COPY -- MAY BE MADE PUBLIC

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Protection Strategies Incorporated (PSI) Subcontractor: ALPHA Services

A summary of evaluation results for PSI is as follows: Criterion Adjectival Rating EXCELLENT EXCELLENT EXCELLENT EXCELLENT Weighted Points/ Percentage Final Proposed Cost Probable Cost

1: Key Personnel 2: Technical Capability 3: Past Performance Total/Overall

90.50

Criterion 1 - KEY PERSONNEL PSI was rated EXCELLENT in this criterion with a score of 42.75 weighted points, which is 95% of the available 45 points. The following is a table summarizing the SEB's evaluated strengths and/or weaknesses. Neither Significant Strength Significant Strength Weakness Strength nor Weakness Weaknesses Program Manager* Other Key Personnel: VA Manager OPSEC Manager SSSP Manager *Significantly more important than any other key personnel Offerors were instructed to propose "Key Personnel" for the following positions or SOW specialties: Program Manager, VA, OPSEC, and SSSP. The RFP indicated it was the expectation that Key Personnel were to be highly qualified and have the demonstrated ability to effectively manage a program of the nature, size and scope of the work required in the SOW. Offerors were also instructed to provide resumes of Key Personnel and specify the availability and commitment of each Key Personnel to accept employment in the positions proposed (at an agreed upon salary and benefits package) by submitting signed and dated letters of commitment. Failure to submit such resumes and letters of commitment may result in an Offeror's proposal receiving an unsatisfactory rating. Offerors were also required to describe its plan for retaining SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 1 of 20

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proposed Key Personnel. Note: The RFP's evaluation criteria did not include the evaluation of the Offeror's Key Personnel retention plan; therefore, the SEB did not evaluate this plan, EVALUATION CRITERION It is expected that the Offeror's proposed key personnel for this contract are highly qualified, and demonstrate the ability to effectively manage a program of the nature, size and scope of the work required in the SOW. The Offeror's key personnel will be evaluated on their qualifications, currency and relevancy of experience, attainment of advanced degrees in related disciplines, and demonstrated technical expertise, in the specific positions for which they are proposed. Currency and relevancy of experience is significantly more important than education. The Program Manager is considered significantly more important and was given more weight in the evaluation than any other key personnel. The availability and commitment of each of the Offeror's key personnel to accept employment in the positions proposed (at an agreed upon salary and benefits package) must be demonstrated by submitting signed and dated letters of commitment, and resumes demonstrating how the proposed personnel meet the experience and qualifications specified. Failure to submit such resumes and letters of commitment may result in an unsatisfactory rating. The following is the SEB's detailed evaluation, by indicator, of PSI's Key Personnel. Program Manager: Significant Strength Key Person: Bruce H. Rogers Position: Program Manager

Qualifications (special skills, relevant training/courses, professional affiliations, credentials, and publications): Mr. Rogers has over 35 years of DOE and DOD security program support experience. Mr. Roger's resume notes he is a Certified Professional Manager and an Organizational Development Specialist, although the organizational affiliation for these credential are not specified in his resume. Mr. Rogers published two documents: "Modified Risk Evaluation Methodology" in 1998 which he presented at the International Security Conference and Symposium, and "Asset Protection Review Process" in 1993. His special skills include: Project management, security analysis, organization analysis, and audits and inspections. In addition, he is an authorized derivative classifier. Mr. Roger's training includes: Project management certification, basic survey, survey team leader, organization development, vulnerability assessment methodologies, physical security systems, combat skills training, and classification management. He has formal training in Basic Survey, Survey Team Leader, and Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies. Mr. Rogers also has formal training in the practical application of explosive charges. Currency and Relevancy of Experience: Since August 2002 Mr. Rogers has been a Security inspector for Paragon Technical Services, Inc. He is a Key Inspector and Team Lead for the DOE Office of Assessments in the areas SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 2 of 20

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and has knowledge of vulnerability assessments, program planning and direction, training, surveys, self-assessments, feedback and improvement, and program management. He is a known subject matter expert and inspector for physical security, security systems, classified matter protection and control, and security force effectiveness, many of the elements directly related to the SOW. Mr. Rogers was recently a key member of a DOE-wide Site Assistance effort to consider alternate protection system designs and technologies to meet the increased requirements of the revised DBT. He is currently assisting the DOE in identifying key technologies to support the government's DBT upgrades. During the period 1991 through 1995, Mr. Rogers served as Project Manager for an extensive security transition project at the Hanford Nuclear reservation. Demonstrated Technical Expertise: From February 2006 to present, Mr. Rogers serves as the Vice President of West Coast Operations for PSI. He participated in the completion of the development of the SSSP and VA of the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) for NSO. Mr. Rogers also directed the completion of a baseline VA of the (DAF) and a preliminary VA of another planned critical facility. He continues to support DOE Office of Assessments as a subject matter expert and inspector in the key areas of protection program management, VAs, training, surveys, selfassessments, feedback and improvement. From August 2002 to 2006, Mr. Rogers served as a key inspector for the U.S. DOE Office of Assessments in the areas of protection program management, physical security, security systems, classified matter protection and control, and security force effectiveness. He is currently participating as a key member of a DOE-wide Site Assistance effort to consider alternate protection system designs and technologies to meet the increased requirements of the revised DBT. Mr. Rogers served as a technology subject matter expert in the Site Assistance Visit program directed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy and integrating a team of experts from across the DOE, including facilitating the table-top exercise process. From June 2002 to present, Mr. Rogers has been a business owner, World Security Group, LLC. During April through August 2002, PSI was contracted through the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority to conduct vulnerability analyses of its subways, tunnels and bridges. Mr. Rogers was selected by PSI to manage a team of 10 people and complete infrastructure VA analyses. From November 1990 to April 2002 Mr. Rogers was a Security Specialist for DOE Fluor Daniel Hanford, and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Through this employment Mr. Rogers administered the physical security program for over 1,000 facilities, 10,000 employees, and property over $100M in value. He developed and implemented procedures, policies, and programs that directly impacted the site security program. He led a training reengineering effort for the Hanford Site that identified extensive cost-saving and value-added training initiatives. He gained hands-on security experience through activities such as: developing standards and procedures for the protection of SNM; developing corrective actions and ensuring their adequacy; planning, organizing and directing the facility clearance SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 3 of 20

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program for over 100 facilities; and planning, directing and evaluating major security force terrorist evaluations at Hanford Site in support of the protection of SNM. In addition, he managed the facility survey/inspection program and developed survey/inspection plans, schedules, checklists, assigned resources to the task, and presented the results to senior management. As a Manager/Analyst for Fluor Daniel Hanford, Mr. Rogers facilitated development and implementation of critical performance assurance criteria and measures. He developed a standard reporting process for reporting performance effectiveness to DOE, and he managed, planned and orchestrated completion of security force terrorist threat evaluations and 80 limited scope performance tests of critical government assets. In addition, Mr. Rogers validated terrorist threat evaluations using a Joint Tactical Simulation computer model at SNL, and participated in several VAs of critical government facilities as team leader and member. Although Mr. Rogers' resume does not specifically reference experience in the conduct of VAs at the DOE, his experience with the Joint Tactical Simulation computer model does provide him specific experience in VAS such as those expected in the SOW element # 1. Also during this time period Mr. Rogers participated in the planning, development and execution of several emergency management site exercises. In addition, as a Derivative Classifier, Mr. Rogers has experience and detailed knowledge in the SOW elements regarding classification and CMPC. Education (including attainment of Advanced Degrees in a related field): Mr. Rogers has an MS in Organization Development, and a BA in Social Sciences and Management. He has an Associate of Applied Sciences degree in Industrial Security and an AA degree in Criminology. SEB's Overall Assessment: Mr. Rogers has extensive experience and technical expertise in security and DOE's VA process. In addition, his resume indicates that he has broad knowledge, through U.S. DOE Office of Assessments inspection team membership, of many of the other elements of the SOW. Mr. Rogers has recent managerial experience at NTS/NSO for PSI over many elements of the SOW. Overall, Mr. Rogers' qualifications, experience, technical expertise and education result in his being considered a significant strength. VA Manager: Strength Key Person: Lee Day Position: Vulnerability Assessment Manager

Qualifications (special skills, relevant training/courses, professional affiliations, credentials, and publications): Mr. Day has taken training/courses in Vulnerability Assessment Fundamentals, Analytical System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS), Explosive

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Breaching, and Chemical/Biological Warfare Protective Equipment. Mr. Day is also an NTC Certified Training Instructor for Vulnerability Assessment Fundamentals. Currency and Relevancy of Experience: From June 2006 to present, Mr. Day is the PSI VA team leader for the NNSA/NSO baseline vulnerability assessment, which includes the 2003 DBT, for the Device Assembly Facility and the critical experiment facility. From December 2002 to June 2006, Mr. Day was responsible for the Savannah River site Safeguards and Security risk management programs and projects. His duties included responsibility for threat, capability, vulnerability, and target criticality analyses. From October 1990 to December 2002, Mr. Day provided guidance and oversight for security programs and project planners for Wackenhut Services Inc. at the Savannah River Site. His duties included responsibility for threat, capability, vulnerability, and target criticality analyses. Demonstrated Technical Expertise: Mr. Day has over 16 years of experience supporting DOE/NNSA vulnerability assessments at nuclear weapons sites. Mr. Day is also experienced in a wide range of vulnerability analytical software including ASSESS, JTS, JCATS, Blast X, Blast FX, ConWeps, and Hot Spot. Education (including attainment of Advanced Degrees in a related field): Mr. Day has a BS in Resource Management. SEB's Overall Assessment: Mr. Day has extensive experience and technical expertise in VAs. Mr. Day's managerial experience is only recent at NTS/NSO as the VA Manager for PSI. Overall, Mr. Day's qualifications, experience, technical expertise and education result in his being considered a strength. OPSEC Security Manager: Strength Key Person: Brian Gladstone Position: OPSEC Security Manager

Qualifications (special skills, relevant training/courses, professional affiliations, credentials, and publications): Mr. Gladstone has over 23 years of experience in Information Security/Technology, Program Management, Risk Communications Analysis, Training and Curriculum Development,

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Investigative Reporting and Technical Writing. He was an adjunct instructor to the DOE Central Training Academy (now the NNSI) in Information Security. Mr. Gladstone was a television news anchor/reporter/producer. He wrote, produced, reported and anchored television newscasts and special programming in various markets in the Southwest U.S. and Hawaii. Mr. Gladstone has training in the following courses from DOE: Automated Information Systems Security, OPSEC, Classified Automated Information System Security Officer Course, CMPC, Advanced Instructor's Training, Security Education Instructor's Training, bomb Incident Planning Training, Lessons Learned from Oklahoma City, and the Controller/Evaluator Course for large scale DOE Protective Force Exercises. He also has training in Emergency Communications Joint Information Center Operations Trainers' Course, and Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluators Course. He has Reid Interviewing and Interrogation Techniques. He was the instructor and course developer for DOE/DOD Public Spokesperson Training and conducted mock media anchor/reporter exercises for government employee training. Currency and Relevancy of Experience: Mr. Gladstone is currently employed by PSI as providing direct support to the DOE-HQ-EM Project Manager for S&S/Emergency Management. Mr. Gladstone provides assistance and advice in developing, implementing and assessing the DOE EM complex OPSEC programs. He reviews OPSEC program plans, conducts and prepares surveys and reports for the EM complex OPSEC programs and provides advice and assistance to the OPSEC site managers in the implementation of strategic planning, program reviews and development of internal procedures for effective program implementation. As a Derivative Classifier, he provides classification guidance for OPSEC and other S&S programs. As the Western Regional Information Technology Manager he plans, conducts and prepares reports on security program surveys, validates SSSPs, MSSAs, and conducts performance tests of the protection system elements. Mr. Gladstone provides advice and assistance to the S&S Team Leader in the implementation of strategic planning, performance reviews of the implementation of S&S policy, and development of internal procedures for the effective management of the S&S Team. Demonstrated Technical Expertise: From 2000 to 2002 Mr. Gladstone was the Information Security Program Manager for Kaiser Hill LLC. During this time he developed, implemented, assessed and managed the integrated Information Security Program for the RFETS. Security program elements included AISS, CMPC, OPSEC, COMSEC, TSCM and CI. From 1999 to 2000 Mr. Gladstone worked for Worldwide Security Services, and was the CMPC/CISS Program Manager. His responsibilities included drafting and implementing site policy for compliance with multiple DOE security programs, including CMPC and Classified Computer security. He assessed program compliance, developed budget and planning SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 6 of 20

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strategies, and maintained management control systems. He planned and participated in DOE inspection and enforcement efforts. He conducted oversight of classified matter accountability and inventory, classified matter inspection program, security incident inquiries and infractions, and classified automated information systems security. Education (including attainment of Advanced Degrees in a related field): Mr. Gladstone has a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice and is a Candidate for Juris Doctorate. SEB's Overall Assessment Mr. Gladstone has extensive managerial experience but his OPSEC experience has been in an oversight basis rather than hands on experience. Overall, Mr. Gladstone's qualifications, experience, and technical expertise result in his being considered a strength. SSSP Manager: Strength Key Person: Robert Leonard Position: SSSP Manager

Qualifications (special skills, relevant training/courses, professional affiliations, credentials, and publications): Mr. Leonard has taken training and courses in Project Management, Physical Security, MC&A, and Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies. Mr. Leonard is also a certified Project Manager. Currency and Relevancy of Experience: From March 2006 to present, Mr. Leonard serves as PSI's Senior Site Safeguards and Security Specialist for Nevada Site Office to develop their SSSP. Additionally, Mr. Leonard participated in the completion of a baseline vulnerability assessment for NSO's DAF and another critical facility. From June 2003 to March 2006, Mr. Leonard served as the manager for traffic & Transportation and Waste Operations for Kaiser-Hill LLC. From January 1998 to June 2003 he was project manager with Nuclear Material Management for Kaiser-Hill where he directed activities associated with removal and handling of SNM at Rocky Flats Site. From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Leonard was the manager of Safeguard and Security Systems for EG&G where he managed procurement and construction of all new safeguard and security system installations and coordinated preparation of the sites SSSP and VA.

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Demonstrated Technical Expertise: Mr. Leonard has project management experience and has knowledge of SSSP. Education (including attainment of Advanced Degrees in a related field): Mr. Leonard has a BS in Electrical Engineering and an MBA in Operations and Information Technology. SEB's Overall Assessment: Mr. Leonard has experience and technical expertise in SSSP. Mr. Leonard also has extensive managerial experience. Overall, Mr. Leonard's qualifications, experience, technical expertise and education result in his being considered a strength.

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Criterion 2 - TECHNICAL CAPABILITY PSI was rated EXCELLENT in this criterion with a score of 34.40, which is 86% of the 40 available points. The following is a table summarizing the SEB's evaluated strengths and/or weaknesses. Neither Strength or Weakness

Indicators 1. Technical Approach 2. Nucleus of Skilled Employees 3. Corporate Experience 4. Transition Plan

Significant Strength

Strength

Weakness

Significant Weakness

Offerors were required to describe the extent of their technical capability (to accomplish the SOW in support of NNSA/NSO security programs and missions) by providing the following: (i) Information on its technical approach to successfully accomplish the SOW including identification of any technical risks and their impact associated with performance of this contract as well as the Offeror's approach for minimizing those risks. (ii) A description of the Offeror's ability to provide a highly trained professional nucleus of employees who possess the necessary skills and flexibility to perform the SOW. (iii) A description of the Offeror's corporate experience in performing all aspects of the SOW. Corporate experience in performing all the tasks outlined in the SOW is expected to be clearly demonstrated. The Offeror shall also describe how its corporate capabilities in these areas will be assessed and utilized by its proposed Key Personnel to accomplish the requirements of the SOW. Experience of all proposed teaming partners, including subcontractors, must be described consistent with the proposed teaming arrangement. (iv) The Offeror shall provide a Transition Plan that describes the Offeror's proposed transition activities that will mitigate the risk to the continuity of operations of critical NNSA NSO and Nevada Test Site security missions and tasks. The Transition Plan shall identify key issues, risks, and milestones, and explain how the Offeror will resolve any barriers to a smooth transition. EVALUATION CRITERION The Government will evaluate and assess the Offeror's technical capability to accomplish the SOW in support of NNSA/NSO security programs and missions. In evaluating and assessing the Offeror's technical capability, the Government will consider: SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 9 of 20

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(i) The Offeror's technical approach to successfully accomplish the SOW including whether the Offeror's technical approach demonstrates a thorough understanding of any technical risks and their impact associated with performance of the contract, as well as the Offeror's approach for minimizing those risks. (ii) The Offeror's ability to provide a highly trained professional nucleus of employees who possess the necessary skills and flexibility to perform the SOW. (iii) The extent and strength of the Offeror's corporate experience in performing all aspects of the SOW. The Offeror's corporate knowledge and experience to successfully accomplish the requirements of the SOW will be evaluated. The extent and type of the Offeror's corporate support to its key personnel to accomplish the requirements of the SOW will also be evaluated. (iv) The Offeror's Transition Plan to mitigate risk to continuity of operations and identification of key issues, risks, milestones and planned resolution of these to provide for a smooth transition." Process Used to Evaluate Technical Capability For purposes of evaluating technical capability, the SEB did the following. For Indicator 1, Technical Approach, the SEB evaluated the Offeror's technical approach to accomplishing each of the eight Statement of Work (SOW) elements. For Indicator 2, Ability to Provide a Highly Trained Nucleus of Employees, the SEB evaluated the overall ability of the Offeror to provide highly trained employees in order accomplish the SOW. For Indicator 3, Corporate Experience and Corporate Support to Key Personnel, the SEB evaluated: (1) the Offeror's Corporate Experience, based on its experience in performing each of the eight SOW elements, its performance of work of similar size, scope and complexity and how well they performed the work and the extent of Corporate Support to Key Personnel; and (2) the Offeror's overall approach to provide Corporate Support to Key Personnel to enhance its ability to accomplish the SOW. Indicator 4, Transition Plan, was then evaluated. The following is the SEB's detailed evaluation, by indicator, of PSI's technical capability. 1. Technical Approach, Thorough Understanding of Technical Risks and Impact Associated with Performance and Minimization of Risk: Strength Statement of Work Element 1 (VA):

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Statement of Work Element 2 (OPSEC):

. Statement of Work Element 3 (SSSP):

.

Statement of Work Element 4 (Classification Administrative Support):

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.

Statement of Work Element 5: (Physical Fitness Training Unit)

Statement of Work Element 6: (Classified Matter Staffing and Administrative Support)

. Statement of Work Element 7: (Pass and Badging)

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Statement of Work Element 8: (Other Security Support)

. SEB's Overall Assessment of Technical Approach: PSI proposes a comprehensive approach to VAs, OPSEC, SSSPs, Physical Fitness Training Unit, and Classified Matter Staffing and Administrative Support. PSI's proposed approach to the other elements of the SOW generally explained that PSI would meet these requirements. PSI also proposed a comprehensive approach to the identification of potential risks for most SOW elements and a minimization/mitigation strategy for each of the identified risks. Overall, PSI's proposed approach should increase the potential of successful contract performance and therefore is considered to be a strength. 2. Ability to Provide a Highly Trained Professional Nucleus of Employees: Neither Strength nor Weakness PSI's proposed approach is to have the Key Personnel augment or replace those already providing the services listed in the SOW. While PSI also proposed to give all incumbent staff first right of refusal, PSI proposes to demonstrate its ability to reach into its corporate staff to "force multiply" (PSI's reach back capability to the PSI team for non-fulltime resources) the fulltime staff for recurring but non-continuous requirements. The SEB could not ascertain any additional benefit to NSO. Overall, PSI's proposed approach represents neither a strength nor weakness. 3. Corporate Experience and Support for Key Personnel: Significant Strength PSI has extensive corporate experience and knowledge in all elements of the SOW.

PSI also proposed corporate SSSP and OPSEC Directors whose qualifications and expertise should provide direct support to the proposed Managers for each of these SOW areas.

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. Overall, PSI's extensive corporate experience and knowledge and its support for Key Personnel should significantly increase the potential of successful contract performance and therefore is considered a significant strength. 4. Transition Plan: Strength PSI proposed a Transition Plan that uses a work breakdown structure and task breakdown structure. PSI would manage this approach using personnel experienced in project management principles and software applications. PSI's Transition Plan using a project management approach should ensure that the timeline for transition is met.

. Finally, PSI proposes to schedule activities, with associated milestones, and all proposed work elements in the schedule to meet the transition period. Overall, PSI's Transition Plan should increase the potential for a smooth transition to enable successful security system services at NSO and is considered a strength.

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Criterion 3 - PAST PERFORMANCE: PSI was rated EXCELLENT in this criterion with a score of of the 15 available points. A summary of PSI's past performance is indicated in the table below.
Contracts Past Performance Significant Strength Strength Neither Strength nor Weakness Weakness Significant Weakness

4

Offerors were instructed to submit information on past performance from contracts completed or in process within the last five years and where the work was in place for at least three months and the work was relevant to the Offeror's cited experience and the Offeror's organization was the responsible performing entity. Note: The RFP Section L.16 (b)(3)(i)(A) contained a typographical error. It erroneously made reference to the Offerors' experience cited in "Criterion 1 above" (Criterion 1 was Key Personnel) versus the correct reference to Criterion 2 Technical Capability. It is also noted that each Offeror provided contracts relating to the Offeror's team member organizations, not its key personnel. Offerors were also instructed to provide copies of associated award fee determinations, Contractor past performance reports, or other documentation that reflects the formal performance assessments of the Offeror; provide a self-assessment of the Offeror's past performance record associated with these contracts (Offerors were permitted to provide information on problems encountered and corrective action taken to resolve the problems); and, to provide completed Past Performance Questionnaire (one per contract) that included the identification of the associated references (technical and contracting points of contact of the customer who rated/evaluated the Offeror's past performance). The RFP specified the SEB would evaluate and assess the Offeror's past performance as noted below. EVALUATION CRITERION The Government will evaluate and assess the Offeror's past performance during the last fiveyears to determine the degree to which the past performance demonstrates the Offeror's ability to successfully perform the Statement of Work. In the case of an Offeror without a record of relevant past performance or for whom information on relevant past performance is not available, the Offeror will be evaluated neither favorably nor unfavorably on past performance. In such a case, the Offeror will receive a neutral rating.

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Process Used in Evaluating and Rating Past Performance The past performance information evaluated included assessments of performance prepared by Federal officials; Award Fee Determinations; Self Assessments; Past Performance Questionnaires; and individual reference checks. Follow up information was requested from Offerors' references that had not submitted a questionnaire. The SEB also considered relevant performance information accessed through the PPIRS and CPS/National Institute of Health's database systems. In evaluating past performance, the goal of the SEB was to determine the prospects for successfully performing the SOW. First, the SEB considered the relevancy of the past performance information to determine whether to evaluate the particular contract. A "not applicable" (N/A) was given to contracts that were not relevant as well as contracts for which past performance was not available. These contracts identified as "not applicable" were not considered for evaluation. Second, the SEB then evaluated and assessed the quality of the past performance of the relevant contracts from the information provided by customer ratings. A significant strength was assigned to contracts rated by customers as Outstanding or Excellent. A strength was assigned to contracts rated by customers as Good. A neither strength nor weakness was assigned to contracts rated by customers as Fair or if no performance rating was provided. Finally, after reviewing these assessments, the SEB reached an overall adjectival rating of EXCELLENT for Criterion 3 as PSI received Significant Strengths for its contracts, though one contract was found to be neither a strength or a weakness. No contracts for PSI were assigned a weakness or significant weakness. The following is a table that summarizes the SEB's analysis of the individual contracts provided by the PSI team.

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Contract Number

Period of Performance

Relevance to Statement of Work

Description of Contract Work

Customer Rating
Q (Quality) T (Timeliness) C (Cost Control) B (Business Practices)

Reference

Strength, Weakness, Neither, or N/A

PSI DE-AT5206NA26366

03/15/200612/31/2006

Yes

Develop and finalize SSSP, complete baseline VA for Device Assembly Facility

10/16/2000 current

Yes
.

GS-10-F11/2/2004 0369M/SAQMPD 11/01/2005 04FB057 for State Dept 11/1/2003 10/31/2008

Yes

VA support and conduct a complete facility vulnerability assessment.

No

Q - Outstanding T - Outstanding C - Good B - Outstanding Unknown Q - NA T - NA C - NA B - NA Q - Outstanding T - Outstanding C - Outstanding B - Outstanding Q - Outstanding T - Outstanding C - Good B - Outstanding

Vol. 2

Significant Strength

Vol. 2, Tab #4

N/A

Vol. 2, Tab #2, questionnaire

Significant Strength

DE-AT0100EW60643A for DOE/EM

10/16/2000 8/8/2005

Yes

Plan, conduct, and report on field reviews, validate SSSPs, Master S&S Agreements, performance tests of

Q - Outstanding T - Outstanding C - Outstanding

Vol. 2, Tab #1, questionnaire, pg. 8 of Response to Discussion Questions Questionnaire, reference contact

N/A

Significant Strength

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protection system elements, and validation through the use of Limited Scope Performance Tests

B - Outstanding

ALPHA Services (HR Staff Management) DE-AC2812/1/2000 01RW12121 for current DOE/Office of Repository Devel. 8/2/2002 current

Yes

Perform visitor badge/proximity card issuance.

No-proposal did not clearly relate the work to the SOW elements

Q - Outstanding T - Outstanding C - Outstanding B - Outstanding Unknown Q - NA T - NA C - NA B - NA

Vol. 2, Tab #3, questionnaire

Significant Strength

Vol. 2, Tab #5

N/A

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Criterion 4 - COST: In its Final Proposal Revision (FPR), PSI offered a price of . This represents 33 FTEs between PSI and its subcontractor, Alpha Services (Alpha), a net reduction of FTE compared to the initial proposal. The FPR Probable Cost (PC) is based on the application of the DCAA-recommended indirect rate for PSI's Labor Overhead. The PC of the FPR price. Based on the Technical Team's evaluation, the cost proposal tracked to the technical proposal, both for traceability to cost estimates and consistency with the scope, nature, and duration of the proposed work effort. Therefore, no quantitative adjustments to the PC were necessary. A summary of the FPR price and PC follows: Cost Element Direct Labor Hours* Direct Labor Dollars* Indirect Costs Subcontractors* ODCs GFP Fee Total Price
Note: For comparison purposes, subcontractor direct labor hours and dollars are included under Direct Labor (but discussed separately below).

Initial Proposed Price

Final Proposed Price

Probable Cost

Direct Labor: FPR prime direct labor is FTEs. The SEB found that PSI corrected escalation in the basic period, and , as a result of discussions. The offeror also reduced . As a result, the net

per hour. PSI explained that DCAA's exceptions to the rates in its initial proposal were based on labor rates for the Washington D.C. area. The PC for prime labor is the same as the proposed. The DCAA auditor analyzed the basis of all direct labor rates and found that three categories could be verified to the current payroll records, and the remaining categories are based on site-specific salary surveys. DCAA disclosed no exceptions to proposed rates or escalation. The SEB found that PSI proposed sufficient personnel to adequately staff the requirement. Therefore, no changes were made to direct labor as a result of the SEB's cost realism analysis of the FPR.

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Indirect Costs: During discussions, the SEB requested that PSI verify calculations of indirect rates since DCAA had recommended . PSI's FPR disclosed no changes

The PC for indirect cost is based on the DCAA auditor's finding that the Fringe and G&A rates are realistic, but the proposed . Note that there is a small dollar difference in the table above due to computer rounding. Subcontracts: One subcontractor,

of total cost. The DCAA reported that the proposed direct and indirect rates are realistic and reasonable. The SEB found that Alpha proposed sufficient personnel to adequately staff the requirement. Therefore, no changes were made to subcontract costs as a result of the SEB's cost realism analysis. Other Direct Costs: PSI proposed ODCs of $

Fee: PSI proposed for the performance period excluding Transition. Fee was calculated on a base of total cost less the baseline GFP. There was disclosed in the FPR. The SEB's overall assessment is that PSI's FPR costs are reasonable, realistic, and do not present undue cost risk to the Government.

SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION -- See FAR 2.101 and 3.104 Page 20 of 20