Free Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

Case 1:88-cv-00508-EGB

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant, ) _________________________________________ ) THE NAVAJO NATION,

No. 508-88L Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink

THE UNITED STATES' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv EXHIBIT LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii MOTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 MEMORANDUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A. The 1882 Reservation and 1934 Reservation Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. 2. B. C. D. II. III. The 1882 Reservation Area and the Healing v. Jones Decision . . 3 The 1934 Reservation Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The 1974 Settlement Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The 1980 and 1988 Amendments to the Settlement Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Conclusion of the District Court Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A. B. Standard for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction . . . 14 Standard for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Standard for Deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C. IV.

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. The Six-Year Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Takings and Breach of Trust Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1. The Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Breach of Trust Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 The Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Takings Claim . . . . . 23 ii

2.

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B.

The Court Should Reject Plaintiff's Breach of Trust Claim . . . . . . . . . . 29 1. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over a Non-Constitutional Breach of Trust Claim Premised on Congressional Actions . . . . 29 Plaintiff Cannot Identify Specific Fiduciary Obligations That Can Fairly Be Interpreted as Mandating Compensation for Damages Sustained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2.

C.

The Court Should Limit Plaintiff's Claims to an Examination of those Written Proposals that Plaintiff Actually Proposed and Was Not Allowed to Undertake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Seek Compensation for Individual Tribal Members' Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 The Court Should Reject Plaintiff's Agins-Based Takings Arguments as a Matter of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 The Court Should Reject Plaintiff's Penn Central-Based Takings Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 1. The Bennett Freeze Did Not Cause Significant Economic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 The Bennett Freeze Did Not Interfere with Plaintiff's Reasonable Investment Backed Expectation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 The Character of the Government Action Favors a Finding of No Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

D.

E.

F.

2.

3.

V.

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Allen v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 677 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Allred v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 349 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1188 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44 Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 133 F.3d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 26 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A., de C.V. v. United States, 291 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 904 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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Chancellor Manor v. United States, 331 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 10 Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Const. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29 Edwards v. District of Columbia, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Erosion Victims of Lake Superior Regulation v. United States, 833 F.2d 297 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Esch v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 582 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . passim First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

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Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 569 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Furash & Co. v. United States, 252 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Golden Pac. Bankcorp. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43, 44 Grosdidier v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 106 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Healing v. Jones, 210 F.Supp. 124 (D. Ariz. 1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Jones v. Healing, 373 U.S. 758 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Latinos Unidos De Cheslea En Accion v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

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Masayesya v. Zah, 792 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff'd, 65 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1168 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Masayesya v. Zah, 793 F.Supp. 1495 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff'd in part, 65 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1168 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 May v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 442 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 441 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 221 Ct. Cl. 506, F.2d 1335 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 19 Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 13, 2008) (No. 07-1410) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34, 35 Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm'n v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 400 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Reed Island-MLC, Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 27 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Rith Energy v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 vii

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Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 968 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Secakuku v. Hale, 108 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Secakuku v. Hale, 517 U.S. 1168 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 873 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 9 Sette v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 37 (1998), aff'd, 217 F.3d 855 (Fed. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 31 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375(Fed. Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Steward v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 540 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

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Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 32, 36 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 37 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34 Voisin v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 164 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001), aff'd, 537 U.S. 465 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 141 (1879) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 FEDERAL STATUTES 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 23 U.S.C. §§ 201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 25 U.S.C. § 640d-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 25 U.S.C. § 640d-7(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f)(3)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1683 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 25 U.S.C. §§ 391-416 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 25 U.S.C. §§ 631 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 28 U.S.C. § 250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 28 U.S.C. § 1491 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 28 U.S.C. § 2501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 42 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2004b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 15 Stat. 667 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 48 Stat. 960 (the "1934 Act") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6 72 Stat. 403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 88 Stat. 1712 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 94 Stat. 92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 10 Pub. L. No. 85-547 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Pub. L. No. 93-531 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Pub. L. No. 96-30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 10 FEDERAL RULES RCFC 12(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 16 RCFC 12(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim RCFC 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 46 RCFC 12(b)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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RCFC 12(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 RCFC 12(h)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 RCFC 56(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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EXHIBIT LIST Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Description Map, titled "Existing Navajo and Hopi Reservations" Executive Order, dated Dec. 16, 1882 Executive Order, dated Jan. 8, 1900 S. Rep. No. 93-1177 (1974) 126 Cong. Rec. H16822 (daily ed. June 25, 1980) Letter from John Boyden to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated May 29, 1963 Notice issued by Clyde Pensoneau, Superintendent of Hopi Agency, to Jack Frank, dated Apr. 4, 1966 Letter from Superintendent Clyde W. Pensoneau to W. Wade Head, Area Director, dated Apr. 8, 1966 Letter from John Boyden, Hopi Tribal Attorney, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated June 11, 1966 Letter from Richmond F. Allan, Associate Solicitor of Indian Affairs, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated July 1, 1966 Letter from Robert Bennett, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Graham E. Holmes, Navajo Area Director, dated July 8, 1966 Letter from Robert Bennett, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Graham E. Holmes, Navajo Area Director et al., dated Oct. 31, 1967 Letter from Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Area Directors, dated Dec. 28, 1970 Letter from Sgd. Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to Peter MacDonald, Chairman of Navajo Nation Tribal Council, dated Aug. 4, 1972 (with attachment) Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Area Directors, dated Aug. 15, 1972 (with attachment) Page Number DOJ1 DOJ2 DOJ3 DOJ4-DOJ12 DOJ13-DOJ15 DOJ16-DOJ17 DOJ18 DOJ19-DOJ20 DOJ21-DOJ23 DOJ24-DOJ25

11

DOJ26-DOJ29

12

DOJ30-DOJ32

13 14

DOJ33-DOJ35 DOJ36-DOJ40

15

DOJ41-DOJ44

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16

Letter from Leona Natsoway, Tribal Secretary of Hopi Tribal Council, to Lynn Montgomery, Acting Project Officer of Bureau of Indian Affairs, dated Sept. 9, 1975 Letter from Sgd. Morris Thompson, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Chairman Peter MacDonald, Chairman of Navajo Nation, dated July 16, 1976 Letter from Freddie Howard, Assistant Director Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Commission, to Roy Dan, Executive Director Agency Housing Project, Bureau of Indian Affairs, dated Nov. 22, 1978 Hamilton v. MacDonald, No. 579 (D. Ariz.) (Oct. 14, 1972) (Order of Compliance) Sidney v. MacDonald, No. 58-579 PCT-EHC (D. Ariz.) (Sept. 26, 1988) (order on preliminary injunction) Honyoama v. Shirley, No. 74-842-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz.) (Dec. 4, 2006) (Order and Final Judgment, with attachments) Plaintiff's Summary of Navajo Nation Proposals, transmitted as Exhibit B to the United States' Discovery Requests Plaintiff's Record of Hopi Responses to Navajo Requests, previously submitted by Plaintiff as Plaintiff's Exhibit 32-A to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment United States' List of Navajo Nation Proposals Plaintiff's Response to Interrogatories (dated Apr. 27, 2007) (relevant portion) Declaration of William J. Shapiro, dated June 2, 2008

DOJ45

17

DOJ46-DOJ50

18

DOJ51-DOJ52

19 20

DOJ53-DOJ56 DOJ57-DOJ73

21

DOJ74-DOJ130

22

DOJ131-DOJ140

23

DOJ141-DOJ165

24 25 26

DOJ166-DOJ182 DOJ183-DOJ185 DOJ186-DOJ188

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MOTION Defendant, the United States of America, hereby moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to RCFC 56. Plaintiff, the Navajo Nation, alleges a breach of trust and a temporary regulatory taking claim related to a portion of the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona. As discussed below, Plaintiff and the Hopi Tribe have disagreed on their tribes' respective rights to this property for decades. In 1966, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued an administrative policy that required each tribe to obtain the consent of the other tribe before undertaking any unilateral development in the disputed area, until such time as the tribes resolved their disagreement. Congress codified the consent requirement in 1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f) (1980)). In December 2006, after thirty-two years of litigation, the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation settled their dispute. Plaintiff alleges that the imposition of the consent requirement prevented Plaintiff from developing the area in dispute, except with the consent of the Hopi Tribe. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff's claims should be rejected pursuant to RCFC 12(b) or, in the alternative, RCFC 56 for several reasons. First, the six-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, bars Plaintiff's claims. The consent requirement was imposed in 1966 and codified in 1980. Both dates are more than six years before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Therefore, the Court should dismiss these claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). See Memorandum, § IV(A). Second, Plaintiff's breach of trust claim should be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over a non-constitutional breach of trust claim premised on Congressional actions.

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See Memorandum, § IV(B)(1). In addition, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's breach of trust claim because Plaintiff cannot show the existence of a money-mandating fiduciary duty. See Memorandum, § IV(B)(2). Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff's claims are limited to those written projects Plaintiff actually proposed and was not allowed to undertake. See Memorandum, § IV(C). In addition, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek compensation or damages on behalf of individual tribal members. See Memorandum, § IV(D). Finally, the Court should reject Plaintiff's takings claims based on the test articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The challenged government action did not cause significant economic impact or interfere with Plaintiff's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action does not support an inverse condemnation claim. See Memorandum, §§ IV(E)-(F). The undisputed facts show that the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of Plaintiff's takings claim, and the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the United States. A memorandum in support of this motion follows. MEMORANDUM I. BACKGROUND A. The 1882 Reservation and 1934 Reservation Areas

A full understanding of the claims involved in the instant case requires a discussion of two distinct geographical areas, the ownership of which the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation have litigated over the past several decades: the 1882 Reservation Area and the 1934 Reservation

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Area. The area impacted by the consent requirement is that portion of the 1934 Reservation Area lying to the west of the 1882 Reservation Area. The two Reservation Areas are depicted in Defendant's Exhibit 1. 1. The 1882 Reservation Area and the Healing v. Jones Decision

The Navajo Reservation was created pursuant to a treaty executed in 1868 between the United States and the Navajo Nation. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, art. II, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667, 668 ("1868 Treaty"); see also Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F.Supp. 1183, 1185 n.1 (D. Ariz. 1978) (showing location of the area included in the 1868 Treaty), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980). The 1868 Treaty set aside the reservation "for the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians, and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit among them." 1868 Treaty, 15 Stat. at 668. Various executive orders and Congressional acts issued subsequent to the reservation's creation withdrew other lands that would eventually expand the reservation's boundaries. See Sekaquaptewa, 448 F. Supp. at 1185 n.1 (collecting orders and acts); see, e.g., Def.'s Ex. 3 (Jan. 8, 1900 Executive Order) (withdrawing a large area, which would eventually be included within the area to which the consent requirement applied, "from sale and settlement until further ordered," without describing a particular purpose for the withdrawn land). By 1880, the Navajo Reservation consisted of approximately eight million acres. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F.Supp. 124, 135 (D. Ariz. 1962). The reservation's vast size was insufficient, however, to prevent numerous land boundary issues from arising:

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Despite the vast size of the Navajo reservation at that time [1880], this semi-arid land was considered incapable of providing support for all of the Navajos. Moreover, except for one or two places, the boundaries of the Navajo reservation were not distinctly marked. It is therefore not surprising that great numbers of the Navajos wandered far beyond the paper boundaries of the Navajo reservation as it existed in 1880. Id. "By 1882, Navajos comprising hundreds of bands and amounting to about half of the Navajo population had camps and farms outside the Navajo reservation, some as far away from it as one hundred and fifty miles." Id. On December 16, 1882, President Chester A. Arthur signed an Executive Order establishing a reservation of nearly two-and-a-half million acres in Arizona for the use and the occupation of the Hopi (then called the "Moqui") and "such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon." Def.'s Ex. 2 (Dec. 16, 1882 Executive Order). Principal among the reasons for establishing the 1882 Reservation was to protect the Hopi Tribe from the pressures of Navajo migration, Mormon settlers, and non-Indian "intermeddlers." Def.'s Ex. 4 at DOJ6 (S. Rep. No. 93-1177) (1974). Nevertheless, because the Navajo population in the area on and around the Hopi Reservation grew substantially, "[c]onflicting claims to exclusive use arose between the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation, producing what became known as `the greatest title problem in the West.'" Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Healing, 210 F.Supp. at 129)). In 1958, Congress authorized the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation to institute or defend a quiet title action against the other with respect to the 1882 Reservation Area. See Act of July 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-547, § 1, 72 Stat. 403. The Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation immediately initiated conflicting quiet title actions in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ("District Court"). See Healing, 210 F.Supp. at 130. In 1962, the District Court 4

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concluded, inter alia, that the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation had "joint, undivided, and equal interests in and to all of the 1882 reservation lying outside the boundaries of land management district 6," which the District Court concluded belonged exclusively to the Hopi Tribe. Id. at 132. The District Court concluded that it lacked authority to partition the jointly-held portion of the 1882 reservation (called the "joint use area" or "JUA"), see id. at 190, establishing a de facto mutual consent requirement for future development on the JUA. See Def.'s Ex. 18 at DOJ51 (letter from Navajo Nation to Bureau of Indian Affairs stating that problems in the former JUA "have greatly deteriorated due to the freeze imposed on September 28, 1962, by the Federal District Court"). In 1972, the District Court formally adopted the mutual consent requirement for proposed development within the JUA. See Def.'s Ex. 19 at DOJ55 (requiring that no new construction would be permitted in the JUA "without a permit issued jointly by the two tribes"). The Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation participated in protracted legal proceedings to determine their respective rights to the JUA. See Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1083 n.2 (listing eighteen opinions the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued addressing the Hopi and Navajo interests in the 1882 Reservation lands); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113, 115 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980) (listing several cases involving disputes about the JUA). 2. The 1934 Reservation Area

On June 14, 1934, Congress enacted legislation to define the boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation. See Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 521, 48 Stat. 960 (the "1934 Act"). The 1934 Act provided that the defined area was "permanently withdrawn from all forms of entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as may already be located thereon."

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Id., 48 Stat. at 961. At the time the 1934 Act was passed, members of the Hopi Tribe lived in the Village of Moenkopi and other areas within the boundaries of the land Congress described, and were, therefore, "`such other Indians' entitled to an equitable interest in the 1934 Reservation." Masayesva v. Zah, 816 F.Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Ariz. 1992), rev'd in part on other grounds, 65 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1168 (1996); see also Def.'s Ex. 1 (map, showing Village of Moenkopi). The Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation have disagreed about the interpretation of the 1934 Act since its passage. See Masayesva v. Zah, 65 F.3d 1445, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995). While the parties' appeal of the district court's decision in Healing was pending before the United States Supreme Court, see Jones v. Healing, 373 U.S. 758 (1963) (aff'g 210 F.Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962)), the Hopi Tribe began to express concern to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs regarding the Hopi Tribe's rights to the 1934 Reservation Area. See Def.'s Ex. 6 (Letter from John Boyden to Commission of Indian Affairs, dated May 29, 1963). Referring to certain development projects the Navajo Nation proposed within the 1934 Reservation Area, the Hopi Tribe explained "that such development would definitely interfere not only with future development of the Hopi interests, but with present usage." Id. at DOJ16. Accordingly, the Hopi Tribe requested "that the Hopi rights in the area be given proper consideration." Id. In a June 11, 1966 letter to the Commissioner, the Hopi Tribe reiterated concerns over its ability to protect its rights in the western portion of the 1934 Reservation. See Def.'s Ex. 9 (Letter from John Boyden to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated June 11, 1966).1/ The

1/

The Hopi Tribe's immediate concern related to the Navajo Nation's legal counsel's insistence that an application of the Arizona Public Service for a right of way over lands within the 1934 Reservation Area "contain a provision in fact denying any Hopi interest in the lands." Def.'s Ex. 6

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Commissioner referred the June 11, 1966 letter to the Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, and asked the Solicitor whether the Hopi Tribe had an interest in the 1934 Reservation Area. See Def.'s Ex. 10 (Letter from Associate Solicitor Richmond F. Allan to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated July 1, 1966). The Associate Solicitor advised the Commissioner that, "[w]hile it is clear that the Hopi have an interest in the area described in the 1934 Act, it is not possible for us to define the nature or extent of that interest." Id. at DOJ25. The ongoing litigation over the 1882 Reservation Area, including the 1962 Healing decision, informed the Department of the Interior's response to the Hopi Tribe. See Def.'s Ex. 11 (Letter from Commissioner Bennett to Graham E. Holmes, Area Director, dated July 8, 1966).2/ Recognizing that the 1934 Act, like the 1882 Executive Order, did not define the Hopi's or Navajo's rights to the disputed land, Robert Bennett, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, expressed the need to preserve both tribes' rights to the 1934 Reservation Area, and implemented an administrative policy that required each tribe to obtain the consent of the other tribe before undertaking any unilateral development in the portion of the 1934 Reservation Area directly west of the 1882 Reservation Area.3/ See id. at DOJ28. This consent requirement became known as the "Bennett Freeze," and the effected area is hereinafter referred to as the

9 at DOJ21. The Hopi Tribe's attorney threatened legal action if "anyone proceeds with the proposed right of way or transmission lines over the 1934 reservation without Hopi consent." Id. at DOJ22. 2/ At the time of the Commissioner's letter, the Department of the Interior was involved in serving notices of removal and exclusion to certain Navajo people, who were living in District 6, an area determined in Healing to be an exclusively Hopi area. See Def.'s Exs. 7-8. 3/ Although Commissioner Bennett acknowledged the "unanswered questions about the nature and extent of [the tribes' respective] rights," he declined to extend the administrative policy to the entire 1934 Reservation Area, stating that "[e]ffective administration require[d] a prudent judgment." Def.'s Ex. 11 at DOJ27. 7

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"Bennett Freeze Area." Between 1966 and 1980, the Department of the Interior modified the administrative policy on certain occasions. On October 31, 1967, the Department of the Interior modified the policy to allow the Commissioner to approve "public work type projects" without joint tribal approval. See Def.'s Ex. 12 (Letter from Commissioner Bennett to Graham E. Holmes, Area Director, dated Oct. 31, 1967). Under this policy, "all proposed developments as outlined in [Bennett's] July 8, 1966, letter will be submitted to the Commissioner for determination as to whether they fall within the public works category, and otherwise for his information and consideration." Id. at DOJ30. In addition to announcing the new public works procedure, the October 31, 1967 memorandum approved the Two Grey Hill School and the Tuba City Hospital projects "since these public works type projects are so vitally needed to serve the best interests of the members of both tribes." Id. at DOJ31. On December 28, 1970, the public work type project exception was eliminated. See Def.'s Ex. 13 (Letter from Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Area Directors, dated Dec. 28, 1970). On August 4, 1972, the Department of the Interior allowed Navajo development in an area immediately surrounding Tuba City to proceed without Hopi approval and also allowed Hopi development in the Moencopi vicinity to proceed without Navajo approval. See Def.'s Ex. 14 DOJ36 (Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Interior Harrison Loesch to Chairman Peter MacDonald, dated Aug. 4, 1972); Def.'s Ex. 15 (Letter from Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Area Directors, dated Aug. 15, 1972) (notifying the area directors of the modification). The August 4, 1972 exception included leases, permits, rights of way and other transactions affecting real property. See Def.'s Exs. 14-15.

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Finally, on July 16, 1976, "in order to alleviate [the Freeze's] harsh impact" during the pendency of litigation between the tribes over the 1934 Act lands, the Department of the Interior agreed to review Navajo projects in the affected areas if the Hopi Tribe refused to consent or did not respond to the Navajo construction requests. Def.'s Ex. 17 at DOJ48 (Letter from Morris Thompson to Peter MacDonald, dated July 16, 1976). Specifically, the Commissioner stated that he would "entertain a request for unilateral approval, on an ad hoc basis, for each project for which the Hopi Tribe has specifically refused to grant its consent or that failed to consider granting its consent within 30 days after being requested to do so." Id. B. The 1974 Settlement Act

In 1974, Congress enacted legislation to "provide for final settlement of the conflicting rights and interest of the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation to and in lands lying within the joint use area of the [1882 Executive Order Reservation], and . . . lands lying within the reservation created by the [1934 Act]." Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 (preamble) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d, et seq. (1974) ("1974 Settlement Act"). The 1974 Settlement Act had two significant provisions. First, the 1974 Settlement Act authorized the District Court to partition the JUA. See 25 U.S.C. § 640d-3. Pursuant to this authority, the District Court partitioned the JUA in 1979. See Sekaquaptewa, 626 F.2d at 117-19 (affirming the partition). "The 1974 Settlement Act required members of each tribe to move from lands partitioned to the other tribe by 1986 and created a commission to pay for the major costs of such relocations." Clinton, 180 F.3d at 1084 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 640d-11 to 640d-14). A lengthy and difficult period of relocation of more than 10,000 Navajo and Hopi tribal members from the JUA followed. See id. at 1084-85. The 1974 Settlement Act also afforded each tribe the right to bring suit against the other

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in the District Court to resolve the tribes' dispute about the 1934 Reservation Area. See 25 U.S.C. § 640d-7(a). The tribes sued each other in 1974. See Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1393. On April 5, 1978, the District Court held that, under the 1934 Act, the Hopi and Navajo tribes each held a one-half interest in all land that the Hopis possessed, occupied, or used in 1934 and the Navajos had exclusive trust title to the rest of the reservation. See Sekaquaptewa, 448 F. Supp. at 1196. In 1980, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision in part. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit held that the Hopis had an exclusive interest ­ as opposed to a one-half interest ­ in the lands they possessed, occupied, or used in 1934, see id. at 808, and remanded the case for findings on what lands were encompassed in that description, see id. at 809. The Ninth Circuit recognized the difficulty in that task, and acknowledged the possibility that the tribes may have used some land jointly in 1934. See id. C. The 1980 and 1988 Amendments to the Settlement Act

In July 1980, two months after the Ninth Circuit remanded Sekaquaptewa, Congress amended the 1974 Settlement Act to codify the Bennett Freeze. See Pub. L. No. 96-305, 94 Stat. 929 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f) (1980)) ("Any development of [certain] lands in litigation pursuant to [the Settlement Act] . . . shall be carried out only upon the written consent of each tribe. . . ."). Consistent with the purpose of the original administrative policy, the purpose of the 1980 Amendment was to "preserve the parties' rights subject to a final adjudication." Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1397. In September 1988, following Navajo Tribal Chairman Peter MacDonald's efforts to implement an aggressive building campaign in the Bennett Freeze area, the District Court issued

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a preliminary injunction in Sidney v. MacDonald, No. 58-579 PCT-EHC (D. Ariz.). See Def.'s Ex. 20. Finding that Chairman MacDonald's efforts would result in substantial damage to the Hopi Tribe, the District Court issued an injunction that, among other things, required the Navajo Nation to make "written application to the Hopi Tribe, with a copy to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, for any construction or development activities on the Bennett Freeze." Id. ¶ 3, at DOJ71. The District Court's order required any proposed development application to include specific information, "including location, estimated cost, and justification for the proposal." Id. ¶ 3(b)(iii), at DOJ72. In November 1988, shortly after the District Court's preliminary injunction order, Congress amended the Settlement Act again. Congress modified the terms of the Freeze to create some exceptions for improvements such as those for public health and safety and to create a limited appellate mechanism whereby a development proposal that had been declined might be appealed to the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f)(2)-(3). In the 1988 Amendment, Congress provided that the consent requirement would not apply if the proposal "does not involve new housing construction" and if "the Secretary of the Interior determines that [the proposed project] is necessary for the health or safety of the Navajo Tribe, the Hopi Tribe, or any individual who is a member of either tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f)(3)(A). D. Conclusion of the District Court Litigation

The District Court issued three decisions in 1992, designating certain discrete lands as belonging exclusively to either the Navajo Nation or Hopi Tribe, and partitioning the land that

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the two tribes had jointly used.4/ In its September 25, 1992 decision partitioning the disputed lands, the District Court attempted to terminate the Bennett Freeze. See Masayesva, 816 F.Supp. at 1424 (ordering "[t]hat the `Bennett Freeze' restriction on construction and development within the 1934 Reservation, and codified by 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9, is lifted"). In December 1995, the Ninth Circuit considered the three District Court decisions jointly, affirming the decisions in part and reversing them in part. See Masayesva v. Zah, 65 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1995). Among other findings, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's lifting of the Bennett Freeze, and held that the "freeze remains in effect for the lands `in litigation.'" Id. at 1460. The Ninth Circuit did not specifically identify the "lands in litigation," but stated that "[t]hose lands include, at the least, areas where the Hopis claim religious shrines and other religious occupancy." Masayesva, 65 F.3d at 1460. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1996, and the matter was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. See Secakuku v. Hale, 517 U.S. 1168 (1996). On March 31, 1997, the District Court entered an order approving a stipulation between the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe that provided that certain specified areas were no longer in litigation. At that time, the Navajo Nation alleged that, after the approval of the stipulation, approximately "700,000 to 800,000 acres remain[ed] subject to the [Bennett Freeze]." Joint Status Report, dated Sept. 30, 1997 (Doc. No. 40). The District Court litigation continued for the next decade. Finally, in November 2006,

See Masayesya v. Zah, 792 F.Supp. 1155 (D. Ariz. 1992) (regarding certain discrete lands purchased exclusively by or on behalf of the Navajo Nation); Masayesya v. Zah, 793 F.Supp. 1495 (D. Ariz. 1992) (regarding the Hopi Tribe's interest in certain lands); Masayesva v. Zah, 816 F.Supp. 1387 (D. Ariz. 1992) (partitioning the jointly-used land). 12

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the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation reached a settlement agreement, which resolved the District Court litigation. On December 4, 2006, the District Court entered the agreement as an Order and Final Judgment of the Court. See Def.'s Ex. 21. In entering its Final Judgment, the District Court lifted the Bennett Freeze in its entirety. See id. ¶7, at DOJ77 ("The Court hereby finds that no lands are any longer `in litigation' for purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 640d-9(f), and that the restrictions on development contained in that statute, commonly known as the `Bennett Freeze,' are of no further force or effect."). II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 25, 1988, Plaintiff filed its original complaint in this case. On April 7, 1989, the United States filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 3), and the matter was fully briefed (Doc. Nos. 4-5). The Court conducted oral argument on the motion on March 27, 1990, and issued an order one day later. The Court's March 28, 1990 Order permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and denied the United States' Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, submitted on June 29, 1990, identified three claims for relief: (1) a violation of the Fifth Amendment; (2) a breach of trust; and (3) a denial of equal protection. See Pl.'s First Am. Compl., filed June 29, 1990 (Doc. No. 99-5) (added to electronic Docket on Jan. 14, 2008). At the core of each claim is Plaintiff's allegation that the Bennett Freeze "prohibited Plaintiff and its members from development and construction on a substantial portion of their land except with the consent of another Indian Tribe, the Hopi Tribe." Id. at 1. From October 1990 to October 1993, the parties in this case submitted periodic status reports regarding the District Court litigation, and conducted discovery in this case. On June 28, 1994, the United States filed a motion for summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.,

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filed June 28, 1994 (Doc. No. 7). On March 8, 1996, the Court denied the United States' motion with respect to Plaintiff's takings and breach of trust claims, and granted the United States' motion with respect to Plaintiff's equal protection claim. (Doc. No. 29). Subsequent to the Court's resolution of the United States' summary judgment motion, the parties engaged in extensive additional discovery. In January 2008, the parties submitted separate proposed case management plans to the Court.5/ On February 14, 2008, after reviewing these competing plans, the Court authorized the United States to file this motion for summary judgment. See Order, filed Feb. 14, 2008 (Doc. No. 103). III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS A. Standard for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), the court must "presume all undisputed factual allegations to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Steward v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 540, 542 (2008) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Nevertheless, the "[p]laintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942)). If the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See RCFC 12(h)(3).

5/

See Pl.'s Status Report, dated Jan. 14, 2008 (Doc. No. 98); Def.'s Mot. for Adoption of Proposed Case Management Plan, dated Jan. 14, 2008 (Doc. No. 99); Pl.'s Resp. to United States' Mot., dated Jan. 31, 2008 (Doc. No. 101); Def.'s Reply, dated Feb. 13, 2008 (Doc. No. 102). 14

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B.

Standard for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.6/ See Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Where it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief, a court may dismiss the cause of action. See Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. See Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236). Nevertheless, while a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulatic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Esch v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 582, 587 (2007); see also Steward, 80 Fed. Cl. at 543 (explaining that the "court must inquire whether the complaint meets the `plausibility standard'"); May v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 442, 448 (2008) (emphasizing that plaintiff must establish her right to relief above the speculative level). C. Standard for Deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment

In the alternative, this Motion seeks relief pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the Court

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"The legal standard applied to evaluate a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a motion to dismiss" under RCFC 12(b)(6). Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm'n v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 400, 404 (2007). 15

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of Federal Claims. Some of the arguments presented below refer to documents outside the pleadings. To the extent reference to such documents is necessary, the Court should grant the United States' Motion pursuant to Rule 56. See RCFC 12(b) ("If . . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in RCFC 56."); RCFC 12(c) (same). Summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Although, when evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court examines the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, see Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2006), "its opponent `must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Summary judgment is a "salutary method of disposition `designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327). Accordingly, the court should construe Rule 56 "with due regard both to those persons entitled to trial and to those persons demonstrating that the claims have no factual basis." Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327).

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IV.

ARGUMENT A. The Six-Year Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Takings and Breach of Trust Claims

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, defines the subject matter jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Furash & Co. v. United States, 252 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Court of Federal Claims' jurisdictional grant includes: [J]urisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). In addition to this limited subject matter, the Court's jurisdiction is restricted to claims filed within six years after the date on which the claims accrue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 ("Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues."). "The six-year statute of limitations set forth in section [28 U.S.C. § 2501] is a jurisdictional requirement for a suit in the Court of Federal Claims." John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that "[t]his limitation period constitutes an express limitation upon the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Tucker Act," and must be construed strictly. Allen v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2000). See also Sette v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 37, 39 (1998) ("Limitations periods traditionally have been strictly construed in suits against the United States."). In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled expressly that, because 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is jurisdictional, this Court may not "consider whether certain equitable considerations

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warrant extending [the] limitations period." John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008). Accord Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (holding that a court may not invoke equitable exceptions to a jurisdictional limitations bar, because the "Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has described it as "hornbook law" that a claim accrues when "all events necessary to fix the liability of the defendant have occurred." Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 904 (1993). "The question whether the pertinent events have occurred is determined under an objective standard; a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue." Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 721 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). "Knowledge of a cause of action sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations may, therefore, be as much a matter of constructive notice as of actual notice." Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63, 68 (1986).7/ 1. The Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff's Breach of Trust Claim

Plaintiff filed its original complaint in this case on August 25, 1988. Consequently, for any breach of trust claim to be valid, the claim must have accrued on or after August 25, 1982. A breach of trust claim accrues when "all events necessary to fix the liability of the defendant have occurred." Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1570. Assuming for the purposes of this

As the Court is aware, the United States argued that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the sixyear statute of limitations in connection with its earlier dispositive motions. The Court denied the United States' motions without prejudice. The parties have conducted extensive discovery since the Court's order, much of which specifically related to the statute of limitations issue. As discussed below, there are no material facts in dispute that preclude the granting of this motion. 18

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argument that the United States owed Plaintiff trust obligations with respect to development of the lands on the 1934 Act Reservation, any infringement of those rights began, at the latest, in June 1980, when Congress codified the Freeze that Commissioner Bennett had implemented on the 1934 Reservation Lands some 14 years earlier.8/ Plaintiff does not allege that it was unaware of the imposition of the Bennett Freeze or that, by 1980, Plaintiff was unfamiliar with the ramifications of a consent requirement on its lands or uncertain as to what legal remedies it might invoke. Nor does the "law . . . insist that one be certain of the existence of a course of action before the statute of limitations may commence running." Mitchell, 10 Cl. Ct. at 67. To the contrary, "whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry, is [also] notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led." Id. at 67-68 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 141 (1879)). Further, "[t]he existence of a trust relationship does not call for the application of a different rule." Mitchell, 10 Cl. Ct. at 68. In pursuing a breach of trust claim, an "Indian beneficiary of a trust, no less than any other, is charged with notice of whatever facts an inquiry appropriate to the circumstances would have uncovered." Id. There is no evidence in the record that suggests the United States attempted to impose the Bennett Freeze without Plaintiff's knowledge of its conditions or effects. Indeed, Plaintiff's knowledge of the terms of the Bennett Freeze was essential for the policy's effective

In fact, Plaintiff's breach of trust and taking claims arose no later than July 8, 1966, when Commissioner Bennett instituted the administrative policy. See Def.'s Ex. 11. On that date, Plaintiff was legally prohibited from development on the 1934 Act lands without the Hopi Tribe's consent. As discussed above, however, it is clear that Plaintiff's claims accrued no later than 1980, since the 1980 amendment to the 1974 Settlement Act, "as a federal statute, . . . established [Plaintiff's] present and future rights." Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 569, 571 (1993). 19

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administration. Moreover, because of the long history of land disputes between Plaintiff and the Hopi Tribe, the de facto freeze imposed on the 1882 Reservation lands after the District Court's 1962 decision in Healing v. Jones, and the administrative policy in place on the 1934 lands since 1966, Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that it was unaware of the imposition of the Freeze. The certain conclusion is that Plaintiff had reason to know of any breach of trust cause of action more than six years before Plaintiff brought suit. In Catawba Indian Tribe, the Federal Circuit addressed the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2501 to an analogous situation involving an Indian tribes' assertion of both breach of trust and takings claims. In that case, the United States terminated the trust relationship on July 1, 1962. See 982 F.2d at 1567. The tribe asserted that, during the course of negotiations with the federal government that led to the passage of the Termination Act, the government had repeatedly assured the tribe that the termination of the trust relationship would not affect the tribe's rights to pursue a claim against the State of South Carolina and numerous private landholders involving title to certain ancestral lands. See id. In 1980, the tribe brought suit against various private landowners, claiming ownership to the ancestral lands. See id. The landholders responded that, subsequent to the passage of the 1962 Termination Act (and consistent with the Act's express terms), the tribe was subject to all state laws, including the law of adverse possession, and therefore any landowner who could prove the requisite continu